Goldschmidt's-FBI-file

Since 16 May 2023 I have attached Kees Neisingh's contribution on Helmut Siegfried Goldschmidt;

Though, this would have implied a severe reduction in page numbers, and consequently creating a, more or less, worthless document.

We therefore can enjoy a nice and rather well researched document; which Kees has extended with bits and pieces found in the Dutch National Archives.

Considering the materials left behind, Kees unravelled some unknown aspects of our Helmut Siegfried Goldschmidt.

We may consider this message was about the nucleus of Goldschmidt's notional (virtual) being in the U.S.; whereas he actually lived in London.

Helmuth Siegfried Goldschmidt. Reference your letters one one eight naught and one two naught naught. Bureau acceptable to utilizing subject (Goldschmidt) as double agent in Latin America preferably in Argentina. Make necessary arrangements and promptly advise Bureau (FBI) full particulars.

(AOB: Mr. A.M. Thurston was an employee at the US Embassy Grosvenor Square 1 London.)

As maintained usually, we will follow the course of the genuine FBI file series.

As will be noted, hereinbefore, I did elicit on a short interview with Goldschmidt, facts which had had not previously been covered. y own impression of the man is that he is sincere and will attempt to give full service controlled closely because of an inherent nervousness and a dash of over-zealousness, as can be observed by the letters inclosed.

Page 39aa/a The white sectors being made invisible on direction of British S.I.S.

page 39: London reception Centre, also known as: Royal Victoria Patriotic School,

AOB: it all sounds innocent - whereas it actually constitutes purely anti-Semitic under-belly feelings:

AOB: the foregoing chapter contains, after a new discovery an aspect, which should be considered containing an "anti-Semitic" tendency! Mr. Goldschmidt had been qualified as possessing below average intelligence. What to think of the next shown Maasbode Newspaper announcement of May 1922:

Leiden, 29 Mei (May) Geslaagd (graduated) voor het doctoraal examen (Masters degree) in de rechten (Law) de heer (Mr.) H.S. Goldschmidt Den Haag;

Mister Goldschmidt passed his Master degree examination at Leiden University.

What ever one may think of Universities, obtaining a Master Degree in Law, cannot be simply downgraded "as being of less than average intelligence".

We have now to consider that "lower motives" have become implicated.

The sad consequences were: that this report had been sent to the FBI as well, and became more or less integrated in their files, now accessible on the web, too.

I interviewed Goldschmidt this morning at the London apartment he has recently been removed to as a result of some of the aforementioned escapades. He impressed me as being a complete worthless and irresponsible individual whose mentality is certainly well below average. He seems to feel that he is in a position to capitalize on his present unique situation, and it was my definite impression that his sole reason for desiring to go to the United States and work for the American authorities was that he feels that Americans will pay the highest wages. He suggested that upon his arrival in the United States that he would not be able to work at a position in the Dutch Consular Service as previously suggested and indicated that he was anxious to obtain employment with the International Shell Oil Company. You will recall that the subject had previously been employed by Shell in Oklahoma a number of years ago and he is of the opinion that this employment might be quite profitable. It appears that it is his intention to argument these earnings by whatever funds he would be able to worm out of his German principals.

Quoting from page 50: … Goldschmidt has a very distinctive style on the radio transmitter key xxx recordings of some of Goldschmidt’s practice transmissions in order that his style could be faked by a Bureau operator.

Quoting from page 57: ... It is pointed out that during the training of subject Goldschmidt he was told that messages would be broadcast from Germany from the first to the tenth of October, 1943 and every succeeding month, at 1530 to 1600 hours, Central European Time, and that these would be broadcast on 14170 kHz.

It is therefore desired that the Laboratory monitor this wave length at these times to determine if Goldschmidt’s principals are attempting to contact him by radio.

Quoting from page 64: You will recall that Goldschmidt is a Dutch Jew who was recruited in Holland and trained in German espionage techniques in both Holland and Hamburg, Germany, and was destined to work for the German Intelligence either in Argentina or the United States. ... He arrived in England on September 16, 1943.

..... nspector Thurston has advised that Goldschmidt is a low grade agent and would be be too much of an administrative problem to be successfully run as a double agent in this country. Thurston has recommended, however, that he might attempt to run Goldschmidt as a "notional (virtual) agent", having him remain in England but arranging suitable cover so that his German principals will believe he is in the United States by having our Laboratory simulate his secret writing and having a wireless operator pose as Goldschmidt.

It would be appreciated if you would place the following name on your Special Watch List so that any communications addressed to this individual my be furnished to us unopened.

The following letter has now been simulated by the Laboratory following the instructions given Goldschmidt in secret ink, the clear portion of the letter being of an innocuous nature:

“Upon arrival found that position which Van Kleffens (Dutch Foreign Minister) promised was no longer open here. Have no job and no money. Can your New York man still contact me? Password same. Have found equipment for my transmitter is available in New York. Am looking for suitable bungalow but can’t do much without funds. Please hurry. My mailing address is John Gold P.O. Box 720, New York City.

I, Helmuth Siegfried Goldschmidt, do hereby make the following voluntary statement.

I am a Dutch citizen and was born at Groningen on January 3, 1895. In August of 1942 I was recruited and trained by the German Secret Service to act for them as an espionage agent to Lisbon, Portugal in order that I could make the necessary arrangements for the travel to my place of assignment. Since it was never my desire to work for the Germans against the United Nations I approached the Dutch Consul general in Lisbon immediately upon arrival and informed him of my relations with the Germans and indicated my desire to use the training I had received, if possible, for the benefit of the Allied war effort. For this reason, arrangements were made for me to proceed to England where I furnished complete details concerning my recruitment and training to the to the appropriate authorities.

I have now been advised by an official of the American Embassy in London that the American authorities as willing to arrange for my notional travel to the United States. In the United States the appropriate American agency could utilize the experience and training I received from the German Secret Service in such a manner that the Germans might possibly be led to believe that I was actually in North America and proceeding with my original assignment. I understand this would entail the use of my name as well as the radio frequencies and code furnished me by the Germans. Inasmuch as this deception, if .. stop no finish

Refence is made to the evidence listed below which was forwarded to the Bureau by the National Censorship and received in the Laboratory on February 8, 1944.

Q4 1 typewritten envelope addressed to Mr. Jack Gold, 60 John Street, New York, N.Y. from Eskenazi, c/o American Embassy, Caracas, Venezuela, postmarked Caracas. Stamped on front of envelope is “Free Diplomatio Mail Correspondencia Diplomatica Libre De Porte”.

Q5 Accompanying typewritten letter on letterhead “Office of Economic Warfare, Caracas”, dated January 14, 1944, beginning “I have wanted to write …” signature not legible.

The questioned typewriting on the specimens Q4 and Q5 was compared with the National Security file without effecting an identification. Photographic copies of this typewriting will be added to the file for reference purposes. The signature on Q 5 was compared with the known handwriting specimens K1 and K4, but no definite conclusion could not be reached because this signature is not comparable with the known writing. However, no significant similarities were noted as a result of this comparison. The signature on Q5 was also searched through the appropriate sections of the National security file.

The above specimens were examined for the presence of the ink by methods which would not cause their appearance to be altered, with negative results. Certain secret inks may not be detected by the methods employed.

The examination of Q4 and Q5 for code, cipher on secondary meaning failed to reveal anything suspicious.

Quoting from page 140: (about the Hotel where Helmuth Goldschmidt notionally (virtually) was living)

Reference is made to my teletype of April 17, 1944 wherein I advised that on April 15^th a cable, as cleared by the Bureau, was sent through R.C.A. to the Strecht's address in Oporto, Portugal, and that this cable was cleared in its original form by censorship.

Prior to the transmission of this cable, Special Agent W. Willis Fischer contacted Mr. Charles Peters, Office Manager, Hotel Governor Clinton, 31^st St. and Seventh Avenue, New York City, on April 4, 1944 to secure his aid in connection with instant case. Mr. Peters readily agreed and prepared a dummy registration card under the subject’s name John Gold. On these cards he placed a notation to the effect that any mail, phone calls, or inquiries, regarding Goldschmidt be referred to him, and arrangements were made whereby he would immediately furnish any information to this office.

In view of the fact that no contact has been made at the Governor Clinton Hotel for Goldschmidt, it is possible that the cable referred to above did not reach the proper authorities. It is, therefore, requested to the Bureau inform whether it has received any information with respect to instant case, and, if not, consideration be given to forwarding additional cable to Goldschmidt’s superiors in Lisbon.

Helmuth Siegfried Goldschmidt, Espionage-G. Subject’s instructions require code book quote Lecturas Espanolas Unquote, Third Edition, Published by Espasa Calpe, S.A. Rios Rosa Twenty Six, Madrid. Send book immediately if available. Advise immediately by cable whether book available and if subject possessed copy.

Supervisor R.G. Fletcher of the Espionage section has called and requested that we start training one of our radio operators to imitate the sending of the above subject since the Espionage section desires to begin operation on a double agent circuit in connection with this case. Although no final plans have been formulated as yet it is believed that on this circuit. Mr. Fletcher has indicated that he sees no investigative objection to such a procedure since Goldschmidt’s principles in Germany (Ast / K.d.M. Hamburg) are to be advised that he is in Washington.

Radio Monitoring Office Ralph A Sanders of the Clinton station is spending two hours a day studying the sending characteristics of Goldschmidt from the recordings furnished by Thurston last fall.

Reference is made to Washington D.C. teletype to San Francisco dated July 26, 1944, captioned as above. Request was made in this teletype to verify employment of subject by the Western Division of Shell Oil Company with headquarters at 100 Bush Street, San Francisco, searched the various indices of his office and failed to find any record of a Goldschmidt having been employed out of the Pacific Coast Territory office in 1927 or at any other time. Kissinger stated, moreover, that to his knowledge no employee of the Pacific Coast Territory office has ever worked east of the Rocky Mountains. He stated that all Shell Oil employees working in Oklahoma are under the jurisdiction of the East Coast Office located at Shell Oil Company Incorporated, 50 West 50^th Street, New York City, New York.

Inasmuch as no record of subject’s employment by Shell Oil Company, Pacific Territory, can be located in San Francisco, this case being considered referred upon completion to office of origin.

It is believed that the following situation should be given consideration by the Bureau in connection with the above entitled matter.

Based upon our review of the file preparatory to establishing a radio circuit, it was ascertained that the code book was not available. Based upon this information, it is understood the Bureau of July 14, 1944, sent a message to the Bureau’s representative in London requesting him to secure a copy of the code book. A reply to this request was received under date of July 17, 1944. On July 19, 1944, the monitoring operator intercepted a message being sent to Goldschmidt by his German principal, and this appears to be the first message sent over this circuit since the circuit became active in February, 1944. In this connection, it is noted that we have been monitoring for this circuit since December, 1943.

It is further noted that the call letters which the German station has been using are those corresponding to the emergency code (not utilizing the code book) and that Goldschmidt’s original instructions were to establish contact by the emergency code, after which message would be changed to the code-book system. In spite of these instructions, it has been found that the message just received from the German end of the circuit is encoded in the code book system.

According. It occurs to me that there may be more than coincidence involved in the transmittal of this first message in a manner contrary to the original instructions and with such short time interval after our request of London for the code book. It would appear that there may be a leak of information in connection with our request. (AOB: in Spain?)

You will recall that in this case we are attempting to operate a double agent operation on a notional (virtual) basis by having Goldschmidt actually remain in England while we ostensibly operate him in this country as an agent in the eyes of his German principals.

In line with this deception a letter dated 11/11/43 prepared by Goldschmidt in England to his principals in secret ink, advising as follows: “Because attitude of Argentine Government not very liberal, Dutch Minister van Kleffens (Foreign Affairs) thinks more desirable not to send me there. Unhappily my name not Dutch and not Aryan. Possibly two to three weeks North America. Please regards everybody especially Janssen.”

A secret writing message was then simulated by the FBI Laboratory and a letter dated December 8, 1943, sent to the Germans, being released from Bermuda on January 23, 1944, advising as follows: Upon arrival found that position which van Kleffens promised was no longer open here. Have no job and no money. Can your New York man still contact me? Pass word same. Have found equipment for my transmitter is available in New York. Am Looking for suitable bungalow but can’t do much without funds. Please hurry. My mailing address is John Gold, P.O. Box 720, New York city.

When no reply had been received from the Germans. The following cable was sent on April 15, 1944 to Goldschmidt’s principals: “Merchandise ordered December 8, last, has not arrived. Cable Hotel Governor Clinton, New York City Urgent. Greeting.

Since February, 1944, the FBI Laboratory has advised that Goldschmidt’s principals have been attempting to contact him, using his call letters and frequencies/ On July 19, 1944, the following message was sent by wireless for Goldschmidt” Confirmation, Stamps received. Consignment of goods on a safer basis is being attempted. I Y.

You will recall that recently arrangements have been made for the FBI Laboratory to establish a transmitter at Clinton and for an operator to mimic the sending style of Goldschmidt in order that we might make contact by radio with Goldschmidt’s principals (in Hamburg) will be advised that he is presently working for the Shell Oil Company, in Washington D.C.

Reference is made to a radio message received July 19, 1944, in connection with the above-entitled case. The message was sent by a station (K.d.M. Hamburg) using the call letters “SAH” and picked up by the Bureau Monitoring Stations at Clinton, Maryland, and Natick Massachusetts. It was repeated on July 21, 1944, by a station (K.d.M. Hamburg) using the calls “FOI”.

Decipherment was effected in the Cryptanalysis section upon receipt of the key book named in the instructions as furnished to the Bureau by Goldschmidt. It is noted that the message was enciphered by use of the key book “Lecturas Espanoles” although the emergency call letters were used apparently indicating that the message had been enciphered in the emergency key. It is also noted that the information contained in the in the indicator group was not in the same order as shown in the above-mentioned instructions. According to the instructions the first two letters were to show the date of encipherment and the least two letters were to indicate the line of the page which had been used. In the message received these were reversed.

The original intercept is being retained in the code and cipher file of the Cryptanalysis Section.

Mitteilt umgehend Telegrafisch an Deckadressen ob Sie uns Hören durch Bestaetigung X Samples Received X Waren ueber Sendung auf Sicherer Basis wird versucht X Nr. X eins X Y

Communicate immediately by wire to cover address (in Lisbon) whether you hear us by means of confirmation. Samples Received. Consignment of goods on a safer Basis being attempted. No one Y*

Goldschmidt was instructed by his principles to obtain the book “Lecturas Espanoles”, third edition, published by Espasa Calpe, S.A. Rios Rosa 26 Madrid. The laboratory in making preparations to operate a station at Clinton Maryland to communicate with the Germans in connection with this case was unable to obtain a copy of this book. Accordingly, a cablegram was directed to Mr. Lynch (Embassy) on July 13, 1944. Requesting that he obtain a copy if possible.

Mr. Lynch obtained a copy of the book and brought it with him, delivering it to the Espionage section this morning. He advised that it would be necessary to return the book to the British. Accordingly, the book was been transmitted to the Laboratory with the instruction that it will be necessary to make a photostatic copies (early XEROX type; this millennium patent was granted in 1939) of the same of the same so that it can be returned. This is being done.

Incidentally, this book enabled the Laboratory to decode the message directed to Goldschmidt by his principles on July 19, 1944.

As of July 31, 1944, the current status of the above matter, particularly as it affects the Laboratory, is as follows.

It having been determined to operate Goldschmidt as a "notional (virtual) agent", ostensibly operating an illicit transmitter in the general vicinity of Washington, D.C., in accordance with the recommendations contained in the memorandum of Mr. R.G. Fletcher of the Espionage Section to Mr. Ladd, dated 28 June, 1944, the Laboratory took immediate steps to install, maintain, and operate such station.

Phonographic copies of Goldschmidt’s hand-sending were obtained, and Radio monitor Ralph A Sanders, currently assigned to Clinton, has been trained to simulate Goldschmidt’s characteristics. He has also familiarized himself with Goldschmidt’s backgrounds and has studied limitations and capabilities.

An (Hallicrafters) HT4B transmitter has been set up at Waldorf station for use on this case. The transmitters has been so altered that its note will not be recognised as that of one from an HT4B. Also power has been reduced to more nearly conform to the power intended to be used by this subject, A Meissner "Signal Shifter" frequency control unit was been attached to the HT4B to eliminate the need for crystals, and to permit small changes in the frequency of the transmitter. A special keying line has been installed directly from the transmitter to upstairs office at Clinton. This keying line is not accessible to either the Waldorf or Clinton personnel except at the keying position in the Clinton office. One (Hammerlund) Super Pro and one HRO receiver have been connected to the RCA antennaplex system for use in this case.

The Laboratory is in a position to quickly decipher any message required in the case.

The German control station, “ONB” (= Hamburg Domäne), sent a message “blind” to Goldschmidt on July 19, 1944. This message was deciphered by the Cryptanalysis Section and stated:

Communicate by wire to cover address whether you hear us by way of confirmation samples received consignment of goods on safer basis is being attempted.

This same message was repeated by the German station on July 21 July 25, and July 31, 1944.

My old friend Brian, formerly F5VQ and NI6Q albeit that he lives now in Arizona, did send me a nice picture example

The, speech amplifier unit on top, might have not been used; as only CW communications had been maintained.

Scheduled for August Sixteen Next ?Sotel? immediately when Reply will be made to Bulet? August Two Last

The German control station ONB (Hamburg) has been repeating the original message every other day, without making any apparent attempt to “raise” Goldschmidt, inasmuch as he sends “SK” (= terminating a CW communication) at the completion of the transmission of the message.

Mr. W.M. Felt, who is supervising this case, has requested that the Radio section attempt to contact the German station of August 16^th, provided, that ONB (the main call-sign in the Goldschmidt Case) of does not send a new message in the interim.

Felt also suggests that after we have once established radio contact with ONB (Hamburg Domäne), and during the transmission of our first traffic to him, that radio transmission difficulty of a nature to be determined by the Engineering Section, be encountered on Goldschmidt’s transmitter. Felt states that he believes this nature of difficulty would lend to deception.

Arrangements are being accordingly made to produce the desired “difficulty” on Goldschmidt’s first traffic transmission.

Reference is made to my memorandum dated August 19, 1944, advising you of the status of this case and suggesting a proposed message for transmission as our message #1 in this case.

On Tuesday, August 22, 1944, an attempt was made to contact the German Control Station ONB (Hamburg Domäne) for the purpose of transmitting our message#1. Reception of ONB was excellent; however, there was no clear indication that our signals were heard, and for this reason no attempt to transmit message #1 was made.

There are strong indications that ONB (Hamburg Domäne temporarily) has heard our signals. Until our first transmission on August 16, 1944, ONB regularly sent its message #1 at two intervals. Since that date ONB has only used "Q" numbers. On August 18, 1944, when our transmission call letters and "Q" numbers were closed, ONB immediately came back on the air and at a faster speed than has been used before. ONB indicated by "Q" numbers that they had nothing for us.

In view of the above and because it is desired to put this circuit into operation as soon as possible, it is recommended that we transmit our message #1 on Thursday, August 24, 1944, if ONB comes on the air. If contact is not established, it is recommended that a similar procedure be followed on August 26 and August 28, 1944.

DOT. HELMUTH SIEGFRIED GOLDSCHMIDT, ESPIONAGE G. REFERENCE NY TELETYPE TO BUREAU AUGUST FIFTEEN, FORT FOUR, RELATIVE TO NOTIONAL CONTACT FOR GOLDSCHMIDT WITH SHELL OIL CO., ORGANISATION. GEORGE J. HORNER, ASST. TO PRES., SHELL OIL CO., NYC, ADVISES CO. POLICY WOULD PROBABLY PREVENT REHIRING OF PERSON DISCHARGED AS GOLDSCHMIDT WAS. IF HE WERE REHIRED, HOWEVER, GOLDSCHMIDT COULD PROBABLY BE WORKING AT SHELL OIL CO. TERMINAL AT SEAWAREN, N.J. WHERE TANKERS AND PIPE LINE BRING IN PETROLEUM PRODUCTS WHERE THEY ARE STORED. SUCH PRODUCTS THEN SHIPPED OVERSEAS VIA TANKER FROM THAT TERMINAL. EMPLOYEES AT THAT TERMINAL WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO GET INFORMATION RE OIL MOVEMENTS THOUGH TERMINAL EMPLOYEES DO NOT KNOW OVERSEAS DESTINATIONS OF TANKERS. HORNER STATES SHELL OIL RECEIVES RESTRICTED INFORMATION FROM ARMY AND NAVY RE SPECIFICATIONS FOR SPECIALISED LUBRICANTS AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS NOT KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC, ALSO RESTRICTED INFORMATION RE ENGINES AND MACHINERY USED IN WAR EQUIPMENT. A PERSON EMPLOYED AS A CLERK IN THE HOME OFFICE, SHELL OIL CO., MIGHT CONCEIVABLY OBTAIN POSSESSION OF SUCH RESTRICTED INFORMATION ACCORDING TO HORNER. CERTAIN EMPLOYEES OF SHELL OIL CO. PARTICIPATE IN MANY COMMITTEES REPRESENTING OIL INDUSTRY AS A WHOLE RE WAR REPORT AND SO ARE POSSESSED OF VALUABLE WAR INFORMATION. A PERSON SUCH AS GOLDSCHMIDT IF EMPLOYED MIGHT CONCEIVABLY CONTACT CERTAIN OF THESE INDIVIDUALS AND BE SUCCESSFUL IN OBTAINING VALUABLE INFORMATION. LETTER IN CONFIRMATION FOLLOWS.

The writer has been orally advised by Radio Section of the FBI Laboratory that on August 18, 1944, the Bureau station was successful in making contact with the German control station (Hamburg Domäne) in this case. No messages were exchanged; however, both stations sent call letters and acknowledged the same by “Q” numbers.

This would seem to indicate that the Germans heard our attempts to contact them on Wednesday, August 16, 1944, inasmuch as they did not repeat their message No. 1, which they had done previously at two-day intervals since July 19, 1944.

Now that contact has been established, it is anticipated that traffic will be exchanged concerning various administrative matters. The Washington Field Office orally furnished the following message for possible transmission on Tuesday, August 22, 1944: (AOB: the translated version, as they communicated mainly in German language)

SENT CABLES SAMPLES RECEIVED TO PORTO (Portugal) AND MADRID ADDRESSES. DID YOU RECEIVE THEM?. OBTAINED EMPLOYMENT SHELL OIL COMPANY, NEW YORK. WAS TRANSFERRED TO WASHINGTON SOME TIME AGO. NEED MONEY AS SALARY VERY UNSATISFACTORY. WILL LISTEN SATURDAY.

It is very likely that further traffic will pertain to the subject’s difficulties and his need for financial assistance.

Sunday, August 20, 1944, is the next date when it is probable the German control station (Hamburg Domäne) on August 20, 1944:

If you approve, the FBI Laboratory will be instructed as follows with regard to possible transmission on August 20, 1944:

If the German send a new message, the same will not be acknowledged and no indication will be subsequently given to the Germans that it was received. If the German do not call, no attempt will be made to contact them. If the Germans call, the Bureau (FBI) station at Waldorf will acknowledge, and by use of “Q” numbers, attempt to maintain contact for a brief period. The Laboratory has advised that it would be possible to make this contact without transmitting a message by the use of “Q” numbers, indicating the Germans are sending too fast, that their signal strength is too weak, etc. or by reducing the signal strength of the Bureau’s transmitter so that the German will be ?? that continued contact at the time is prevented by atmospheric conditions.

In accordance with previous instructions received from the Security Division, attempt was made on August 16, 1944, to contact radio station ONB (at station Hamburg Domäne) on his regular schedule at 1430 GMT (10:30 AM, EWT.) Agents Sanders and Roack were present at Waldorf, with Sanders operating the transmitter, while Agent Bardin and Operator Hunsley remained at the receiver at Clinton.

The attempt to establish radio contact was unsuccessful, due to undoubtedly, to the fact that ONB was apparently not listening for Goldschmidt’s transmission.

From the technical point, the operation of the equipment functioned satisfactorily. A clear spot near the designated frequency of 14170 kHz was selected on the receiver at Clinton (AOB: the Germans considered regularly +/- 10 kHz off-centre frequency as permissible) on the receiver at Clinton and the transmitter at Waldorf was tuned thereto. The signals from the receiver at Clinton were hears with good clarity and volume at Waldorf. Two receivers are employed at Clinton one for monitoring the Waldorf transmitter and the other for receiving ONB (Hamburg Domäne). A switching device throws either of these receivers into operation; the operator at Waldorf is able to monitor everything heard by the operator at Clinton. Telephonic communication is maintained between the two points during the contact.

The transmitter at Waldorf very closely resembles the typical low power clandestine transmitter. Sanders operated the transmitter in a very efficient manner with a commission of sufficient errors to properly simulate Goldschmidt’s recorded sending.

The German station was heard with good volume (AOB: Hamburg and most main stations, possessed directional ‘beam’ antennae for various directions; such as for instance Shanghai) and, except for the fact that he was direct under a strong United States facsimile transmitter, would have made perfect copy. As it was, sufficient of this traffic was copied to definitely establish that he had again repeated the original message.

Attempt will be made on ONB’s next regular schedule, to wit, August 18^th. To establish contact.

A resume of the operational log is as follows, the call letters DON being those used by “Goldschmidt”, while the German control station (Hamburg Domäne) used the call letters MOD – both of which were taken from the emergency call letter code. (AOB: once facilitated on microfilm onto Mr. Goldschmidt)

Reference is made to the radio activity being performed by the Laboratory of the Bureau in the above case.

In accordance with the previous instructions received from the security Division of the Bureau, an attempt was made on 26^th to contact radio station ONB (Hamburg Domäne) on his regular schedule. Agent Sanders was present at Waldorf operating the transmitter, while Operator Winter remained at the receiver at Clinton.

The attempt to establish radio contact was successful. Contact was established at 1450 GMT when the control station (Hamburg Domäne) attempted to break “Goldschmidt’s” transmission and then transmitted a signal strength reading QSA5 (sound reception). There was no schedule made for a future contact, however, an attempt will again be made to contact the control station (Hamburg Domäne) on August 28, 1944.

The resume of the operational log is as follows: The call-(sign) letters RNI, taken from the emergency call letter code, were used by “Goldschmidt”, while the German control station first used the call letters NLA from the regular call letter code and then changed to complete the contact with the call letters ISR from the emergency call letter code.

On Off

1442 NLA (rpt) (pause) 1445

1445 ISR (rpt) QRU AR K 1446

1447 RNI (rpt) QTC QTC RNI (rpt) QSA? QSA? K K 1450

1449 E E E E E (rpt) (pause) E E E E E (rpt) 1450

1450 ISR (rpt) BT QSA 5 QRU AR K 1450,8

1451 RNI (rpt) BT QRV K K 1451

1451 ISR (rpt) BT QSA 5 QRU Ar K K K 1452

1452.5 RNI (rpt) BT BT QTC 1 QTC 1 BT BT QRV IMI QRV IMI K K 1453

143.5 QRV QRV K 1453.8

1454 RNI (rpt) OK OK BT BT QTC 1 QTC 1 NW NW BT BT NR? 17 Nr 17

GR 41 GR 41 BT BT

WKQKP YTZFG RQZRB HPMYK PBPXV KDBBB DQDQS SSBZW CNPNA VZKZJ

FVVRZ TTQQX DMLXX QANQY ASXAI QAXAI MQYRC GHSSL VMVKK ?HZKH

QGSSM XURXG KOITU XGWGG DEAII EGINO VARHB EMLER CNAZR APMIA

LPIPS WLAHS UKXXU TKORD PFWZF CHTBB TNNIK ZSZOI BJZMB BOPIO

JOICO

Ok IMI OK IMI OK IMI K K 1503.2

AOB: the foregoing have been reproduced only to provide an example ‘as to how ciphered messages being constituted - mostly in groups of 5 characters.

Reference is made to the attached cable from the Bureau’s representative in London dated August 26, 1944, advising that two unknown agents are sailing for the United States on the Cabo Buena Esperanza, leaving Portugal on August 31, 1944, and that these agents presumably will attempt to contact Goldschmidt. We have received no indication from Goldschmidt’s principals concerning this matter to date.

Attached are cablegrams to the Bureau’s representative in London advising that we have no information concerning that matter and requesting full details and a cablegram to the Bureau’s representative at London requesting that he furnish crew and passenger lists of the SS Cabo Buena Esperanza, as well as the itinerary of the vessel as soon as possible. This information will undoubtedly be made available by the State Department; however, there is no definite assurance of this.

Attached hereto is the translation and decipherment of a radio message received from Germany on September 1, 1944, in connection with the above-entitled case.

This is the second message received from Germany in this case and was deciphered in the Cryptanalysis Section.

The original intercept is being retained in the code and cipher? Of the Laboratory.

The document suggests that this is the decipherment, though it only constitutes the genuine German text after encipherment.

Reference is made to the radio activity being performed by the Laboratory of the Bureau above.

Radio contact was established between the Bureau station and the German station (at Hamburg).

ONB transmitted its message#2 which was received without garble, and immediately relayed by teletype to the Bureau and the Washington Field Office.

During the course of the contact it was observed that ONB (Hamburg Domäne) is still using very high power, indicating his desire to maintain contact. Likewise, he continually attempts to “break” “Goldschmidt” during procedural stages*. This is interpreted as reflecting his belief that Goldschmidt is able to work “break-in”, and his desire to have “Goldschmidt” restricted his transmission to a minimum, probably in order to reduce his chances of detection by U.S. monitors.

“Goldschmidt” has not acknowledged the attempt to “break”, and has continued his transmissions as though he was not able to work duplex. The ability to work this type of contact is indicative of good operating ability, which “Goldschmidt” may later develop, but which at the present time, is not commensurate with his present state of advancement, as reflected by his actual recordings.

* The German Abwehr W/T operators were widely maintaining B-K. Shortening / streamlining communications. Necessary are two different antennae and two different frequencies sufficiently spaced (spread). When the counter-station did, for example, not copied some letters, he could sent on his behalf a few dotes or even a single one and the counter station went back some cipher groups. Also communications were being speed-up, as call-signs and related matters being simply left-out. Very sufficient. A widely maintained practice hardly encountered on the Allied side. Particularly concerning the Abwehr related W/T communications were often handled by HAMs or DE trained operators, often far ahead of their military (duty) W/T operator colleagues (not blaming the professional/regular personnel).

This will confirm the following message prepared in the espionage section on September 4, 1944, and forwarded by teletype in coded form to Clinton, Maryland, for transmission to our associate station ONB (Hamburg) on the morning of September 5, 1944

THANKS FOR YOUR (message) NUMBER TWO. AM DISAPPOINTED IN BAD WAR NEWS HERE. HAVE GOOD CONTACTS. WHAT INFORMATION IS URGENT. IMMEDIATE PAYMENT EXPECTED IN TO CONTINUE RISK. ADVISE. NUMBER THREE G.

In the future suggested message will be forwarded to the Bureau by cover letter for approval and subsequent coding and transmission. Effort will be made to build up a surplus of messages having “news” or information value. It is realised, of course, that matters purely administrative character may from time to time require expeditious handling outside the usual channel, particularly where a reply is required in answer to some question or statement made by the enemy.

It is respectfully requested that further effort be made to induce the joined Security Control to furnish some traffic which is consistent with the position held by our notional agent in the Shell Oil Company and to which he might reasonably have access through his employment, friends, or other normal contacts.

It is suggested that efforts be made to “locate” the German transmitting station ONB (Hamburg) for several reasons. As a matter of information, the exact or appropriate location of this station should be known as it will be an important piece of evidence in the event of court action. It is further thought that in the event the location can be placed, the station itself may be located at the time of occupation. (was within the British Zone)

In connection with the information received from Mr. J.A. Cimperman (U.S. Embassy London) concerning Goldschmidt, it is suggested that Goldschmidt should be located and efforts made to have his mail withheld if this is possible*. Inquiry should be also be made in connection with Goldschmidt’s life in England was as to whether he has contacted any of the persons mentioned in the British documents who would be likely to communicate with anyone on the continent, and in such communication mention Goldschmidt and in this manner risk compromising Goldschmidt. It would appear that if the British are sufficient interested they could assist materially in preventing from foolishly risking compromise by letter writing or other careless action.

* The British Services behaved partly anti-Semitic against Goldschmidt; and behaved so stupidly bad, that they knew there is no chance whatsoever of establishing a fruitful contact anymore!

In the operation of this case the Germans have been furnished with two addresses for the subject in New York City which have been placed on the Bureau white list.

According to (S.I.S. in Lisbon) (RSS Intercepts) there is indication that the Germans are sending an air mail letter to Subject Goldschmidt in the near future. It is presumed, of course, that it will be addressed to one of the New York addresses. It is possible, however, that the letter will be addressed to Goldschmidt in care of the Shell Oil Company is employed by that office. For this reason it is believed advisable that the Shell address be placed on the special watch list so that a letter addressed in this manner will be intercepted.

The New York Office has been instructed to check the New York addresses daily to determine if such letter is received, and the Washington Field Office is being instructed to make appropriate arrangements with the Shell Oil Company for the receipt of any mail or telephone calls for Goldschmidt at that address.

Deciphered (German text): NACHFOLGEN AUFTRAEGE: PRODUKTIONSANGABEN CON CURTIS, DOUGLAS UND REPUBLIK; BEWAFFNUNG VON BOEING B-29. WELCHE FLUGMOTOREN UEBER 3000 PS IN ENTWICKLUNG ODER EINBAU? NR. VIER FORTS.

(THERE) FOLLOW ORDERS: PRODUCTION ESTIMATES CONCERNING CURTIS, DOUGLAS AND REPUBLIC; ARMAMENT OF BOEING B-29, WHAT AIRPLANE MOTORS OVER 3000 HORSE-POWER (ARE) IN PROGRESS OF) DEVELOPMENT OR CONSTRUCTION; NO. 4 CONTINUED

DECIPHERED (German text) fts Nr. FUENF. BAUT CHRYSLER TEILE FUER BOING B-29 UND IN WELCHEN WERKEN? WIE WIRD UEBERFUEHRUNG VON FLUGZEUGEN UEBER ATLANTIK NAVIGIERT? AMERIK HEER SOLL NEUE RAKETEN KANONEN MIT VERBESSERTEN VISIER HABEN. EINZELHEITEN UEBER GESCHUETZ UND MONITION WUENSCHT.

CONT. NO 5. IS CHRYSLER BUILDING PARTS FOR BOEING B-29 AND IN WHICH FACTORIES? HOW IS TRANSPORTATION OF AIRPLANES ACROSS ATLANTIC NAVIGATED? AMERICAN ARMY IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE NEW ROCKET CANONS WITH IMPROVED SIGHT. DETAILS CONCERNING GUN AND AMMUNITION DESIRED.

Reference is made to the radio activity being conducted by the Laboratory Division of the Bureau in the above case.

Enclosed herewith is the operational log for the ONB (dedicated call-sign utilised for Goldschmidt, by the Hamburg Domäne station) circuit for September 30, 1944.

Radio contact was established by the Bureau station and German messages #9 and #10 and Bureau messages #14 and #15 were exchanged.

It is of interest to note that the Germans started using the wrong keying line into the ONB transmitter (network). Thus, the calls LUI, sent at relatively high speed, and by a different operator, proceeded the regular operator sending the correct call (ARC) at slow hand keying. (AOB: hardly known, I already noticed before, that the German Abwehr communications were handled often by HAMs or ‘DE’ operators. Rather experienced men, some experienced W/T operators brought-in (when their shift started) their own mechanical ‘bug key’ often of US brand; they sat down and disconnected the regular “Junker key” and plugged-in their private one. The consequences were that now speed went frequently up to 30 to 40 words per minute (Tempo 150 .. 200!) Of course, this could only be maintained as long as they knew whom operated on the counter-side. Tough, it boosted their mutual fun)

Goldschmidt (notionally) allowed himself to be broken (interrupt by the Hamburg operator) during the calling period, but refused to ‘break-in mode’ during the transmission of traffic. The theory behind this procedure is Goldschmidt (virtually) could well be concentrating on listening in anticipation of a “break signal” while calling LNA, and the repetition act of sending these three letters does not require concentration, which therefore allowed Goldschmidt to concentrate on the anticipated “break sign” (often a few dots only). On the other hand, once Goldschmidt had started in sending his own traffic, all his attention was concentrated upon that act, and even though the German attempted to break-in him during the course of transmission, Goldschmidt (the current FBI operator) refused to acknowledge the break.

In time Goldschmidt will become a little more proficient in his operation, which will result in more traffic being handled in less time. This is in keeping with the general plan to have Goldschmidt so gradually improve his sending and operational ability as to be hardly recognisable by the German operator (at Hamburg Domäne station). In fact, it is the purpose to make the improvement so imperceptible as to cause the German to believe that the improvement is his (Goldschmidt’s) own ability to handle Goldschmidt, rather than any definite improvement on the part of Goldschmidt.

ONB (station Hamburg Domäne) still continues to call daily, even though he has no traffic.

Reference is hereby made to the radio actively being conducted by the Laboratory of the Bureau (FBI) in the above case.

Contact was made by the Bureau station (Waldorf station), and Bureau message #13 was sent.

As is indicated by the operational log, ONB is still trying to “break” (interrupting) Goldschmidt. This means that he desired to interrupt Goldschmidt during the progress of the latter’s transmission. From a technical standpoint, this is relatively simple, especially where the frequencies of the two stations (Hamburg Domäne and the FBI Waldorf station) are as far removed as they are in this case, i.e. some 400 kHz. All that is required is for Goldschmidt to use a separate antenna for his receiver. An inconspicuous single wire affair will suffice.

The use of break-in is indicative of good operation, and would undoubtedly be attempted by Goldschmidt as proof to his superiors that he is attempting to better (improving) his operating ability. Even if Goldschmidt had not actually used the system before, it is so commonplace that he could not have avoided learning it, especially in view of the fact that the Hamburg system use it extensively (as did most major Abwehr related stations). The original hesitancy of the Bureau to allow Goldschmidt to use this system was to indicate to the Germans the care that Goldschmidt was exercising in the establishment of his station, in erecting only a single antenna.

In view of the fact that the Germans are exceedingly anxious for Goldschmidt to use break-in, and that the use of break-in will greatly expedite the transmission and reception of traffic, resulting in more traffic in less time that therefore, and in view of the fact that Goldschmidt is capable of safely operating break-in, possibly on an indoor antenna, or at least on an inconspicuous outdoor antenna, the use of break-in is contemplated on the next transmission.

Care will be exercised, however, that Goldschmidt’s first attempt will not be 100% perfect.

Suggested traffic for the week beginning October 22, 1944, is set forth hereafter, subject of course to receipt of more important traffic from JCS and the Bureau or to messages received from ONB (dedicated call-sign of station Hamburg Domäne) requiring prompt reply.

B-178 BATES REPORTS DETAILS B DASH THIRTY TWO (B-32) CLOSELY GUARDED. HOWEVER HE STATES COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING PROGRAM IS BEING SET UP AT FIELD IN SOUTH, PRODUCTION AT FORT WORTH AND SAN DIEGO GOING FORWARD SLOWLY BUT PARTS AND SUPPLY CHANNELS ARE BEING SET UP IN PREPARATION FOR THE HEAVIER PRODUCTION SOON TO COME.

B-175 JOKINGLY DERIDED NAVY’S ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH PACIFIC TO WAVE FRIEND AND SHE ADVISED THAT THE LEAST U.S. CARRIERS EXCEED 45,000 TONS AND WILL SOON BE IN SERVICE. THEY ARE EXPECTED TO CARRY LARGE NUMBER TWIN ENGINE BOMBERS AND WILL BE USED IN PACIFIC AREA EXCLUSIVELY.

B-173 ROBERTS, WPB CONTACT PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, ADVISED IN CONVERSATION AT DINNER LAST NIGHT THAT AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION FOR SEPTEMBER TOTALLED 7598 PLANES, INCLUDING RECORD NUMBER B-29 AND B-32 BOMBERS. B-32 ARE CALLED DOMINATORS.

It is noted that while the above messages contain material concerning aviation which may be of interest to the Nazis, it should also be of greater concern to the Japs. This is in line with the Bureau suggestion that in preparing traffic for the immediate future, serious consideration be given to the possibility of turning Peasant (= Goldschmidt notionally / virtually) into an agent for the Japs and of accomplishing this as nearly as possible through the power of suggestion contained in the message transmitted.

This office is not informed of the overall picture of Nazi-Japanese relations or the cooperation between them in matters of military intelligence. Any information or suggestions which the Bureau may have on this subject and which might assist in preparing the desired type of traffic would be greatly appreciated. (There indeed existed some sort of cooperation, one Japanese key-factor was Japan’s Military Attaché in Stockholm: Onodera KV 2/243 PF 603036)

It is probable that the British are intercepting and decoding traffic in this case since have full information concerning it, and for this reason there is no objection to furnishing the enclosures to the British if you deem it advisable.

(AOB: typically, a layman consideration - but the so-called ‘hubs’ are on short-waves of about 14 MHz (and considering the maintained German early afternoon times, such as 1430 GMT = 1530 MET) quite likely 'passing over' the British Isles. EM-waves, considering long distances and the 20 metres spectrum (not only), being bounced between the “Kennely-Heavisite-layers” and the skin of the earth, favourably, sea-water; and therefore likely “jumping” over the U.K.)

Reference is made to the telephone conversation between Mr. Tyler of the Bureau and Special Agent C.H. Stanley of this office on September 30, 1944, wherein Mr. Tyler indicated that a letter had been sent on August 20, 1944 by Goldschmidt’s principals (Referat I T/Wi at K.d.M. Hamburg) to his first mail box in New York City.

This is to inform that a daily check has been made of Post Office Box 720 at the General Post Office, 33^rd Street and Eight Avenue, New York City, which it will be recalled is rented under the name of John Gold, and in addition daily contact has been had with the officials of Hotel Governor Clinton, New York City, at which point there has been placed a dummy registration for Goldschmidt. The results of this investigation to date have been negative.

Office Memorandum United States Government

Mat:JAG

65-4539

To : Director

From : SAC, Washington

Subject Peasant Case (= Goldschmidt Case)

Skipping some paragraphs

To be sent on Tuesday 10-31-44 (31 October 1944)

RE YOUR TWELVE. NATURALLY I HAVE GREATEST CONCERN FOR MY SAFETY. ON OTHER HAND IMPERATIVE THAT I HAVE MONEY TO CARRY FOR YOU. OFFER OF BETTER JOB IN WEST PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED HAS BEEN RENEWED. HOWEVER, AM WILLING TO AGAIN REFECT THIS EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY. ADVISE IMMEDIATELY DATE WHEN MONEY WILL ARRIVE. Goldschmidt.

To be sent Thursday, 11-2-44 (2 November 1944)

ROBERTS, WPB CONTACT PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, ADVISED IN CONVERSATION AT DINNER LAST NIGHT THAT AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION FOR SEPTEMBER TOTALLED 7598 PLANES, INCLUDING RECORD NUMBER B-29 AND B-32 ARE CALLED DOMINATORS.

To be sent Saturday, 11-4-44 (4 November 1944)

IN CONVERSATION YESTERDAY ROBERTS ADVISED LARGE NUMBER P-47 FIGHTERS ARMED WITH EIGHT FIFTY CALIBER MACHINE GUNS BEING FURNISHED TO RUSSIANS.

With further reference to the earlier Bureau suggestion that traffic “suggest” to the enemy the idea of establishing a double agent directly in touch with the Japanese, it is believed this plan could be furthered if the Navy could be persuaded to furnish us with some authentic or completely believable material concerning the current operations in and around the Philippine Islands. Such material, which might be on the schedule for publication by the Navy Department anyway, could serve the double purpose of reducing German morale, as well as giving a clear-cut indication that Peasant (Goldschmidt) has accurate sources of information on the Pacific area.

Reference is made to the radio activity being conducted by the Laboratory of the Bureau in the above case.

Enclosed herewith is the operational log to the ONB (K.d.M. Hamburg’s station Domäne) circuit for November 3, 1944.

Radio contact was established, and German message #19 was received. The Bureau station had no traffic for transmission to Germany.

Radio conditions were good, and an excellent operator was at the German key. The entire contact was completed in ten minutes.

Reference is made to your letter dated November 11, 1944, in which you advise as to the British reaction to developments in this case.

As a matter of information, you are advised that considerable thought was given to the attitude which would have been taken by Peasant (Goldschmidt) under the circumstances. It was felt that inasmuch as he commenced radio operation subsequent to the Normandy invasion and at a time when German prospects appeared to be rapidly on the decline, his only motive could have been to obtain more money. Accordingly, he has been most insistent in his demands for funds and it is felt that this is the only attitude which would not appear to be suspicious to the Germans under the circumstances.

With respect to Mr. Marriott’s (M.I.5.!) suggestion regarding the language used in the traffic, Peasant (Goldschmidt) was instructed that his messages should be in German, Spanish, and English. As a general practice if has been the policy to use more German and Spanish than English and the phraces which are not susceptible of free translation are generally left in English. The suggestion made by Mr. Marriott is, however, a very important one and care will be taken in the future to see that portions of the messages in English are not too correct.

(AOB: Mr. Marriott worked at British M.I.5.; why were they still engaged in the play but had handled most ‘villainously’?)

page 243 UNGLAUBWUERDIG

DIE EUCH GEMACHTEN ANGABEN IN EUREN SPRUECHEN VIER NULL UND VIER EINS SIND UNGLAUBWUERDIG. BESTEHT DIE MOEGLICHKEIT ZUR BEANTWORTUNG UNSERER SPRUECHE EINS DREI UND EINS VIER? NR. ZWO VIER.

TRANSLATION:

THE STATEMENTS MADE TO YOU (CONTAINED) IN YOUR MESSAGE 40 AND 41 ARE INCREDIBLE. IS THERE A POSSIBILITY OF ANSWERING OUR MESSAGE 13 AND 14? NO. 24

It is desired that the following message be prepared and transmitted to ONB on Saturday, December 16, 1944: replying

B-239 WPB FRIEND WAS GREATELY INSENSED WHEN I QUESTIONED THE ACCURACY OF HIS REPORT. AT GREAT RISK TO HIMSELF HE REMOVED RECORDS FROM WPB FILES TO SHOW ME AND I WAS ABLE TO VERIFY THE PRODUCTION TOTALS WHICH I SENT YOU. WPB FRIEND IS ANXIOUS TO PROVE HIS GOOD FAITH HOWEVER I SEE NO REASON TO APPROACH HIM CONCERNING YOUR NUMBER TWENTY FOUR IF HIS INFORMATION IS NOT ACCURATE.

It is suggested that in planning future traffic for this case consideration be given to advising the Germans that Peasant (Goldschmidt) is moving his transmitter to a new and safer location in the Washington D.C. area. It is felt that to so advice the Germans will have the effect of increasing the Germans’ confidence in Goldschmidt.

The suggested move could take place over the Christmas holidays, as it is felt traffic during this period would be normally less.

There is set forth hereafter a suggested message to be transmitted to ONB by Peasant in addition to traffic previously suggested for this week.

It is felt the arrest of the two Nazi agents who were landed by submarine would be a natural source of great worry to Peasant (Goldschmidt), and that in the ordinary case he would immediately notify his principles or discontinue radio communication or both. In the event the New York Office has also deemed it expedient to communicate the arrests of the Germans, it is still felt it would not be inconsistent for Peasant (Goldschmidt) to do so also as this would not indicate control of the radio agents but rather the contrary provided there is no similarity in the language used.

NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO HERE ARE DEVOTING GREAT DEAL OF SPACE TO ARREST OF WILLIAM CURTIS COLEPAUGH END ERICH GIMPEL ARRESTED WITH SIXTY THOUSAND DOLLARS BY FBI AS German AGENTS. WHO WERE LANDED FROM U-BOAT. I HAVE RECEIVED NO MONEY. DID THEY HAVE MONEY FOR ME OR DID THEY KNOW ABOUT ME? AM GREATLY CONCERNED.

For the information of the bureau, it is noted that due to unfavourable (Funk) weather conditions it was impossible to establish contact with ONB (Hamburg Domäne) on Sunday, December 31, 1944, although efforts was made to do so.

Commander Nelson of the Joint Security Control, while discussing other matters, inquired as to whether Peasant (Goldschmidt) had received his money from the Germans and what further action the Bureau contemplated in regard to obtaining the money.

He was advised that Peasant (Goldschmidt) had not received the funds which were promised to him the latter part of December and, therefore, it was deemed necessary to force this issue with the Germans. As a consequence, we are planning to send the Germans a message on Saturday, January 27, informing them that the money had not been received and that as a result it was necessary for Peasant (Goldschmidt) to obtain temporary employment in the mornings and would only listen for the German radio on Saturday mornings.

Commander Nelson stated that he believed this was necessary in order to carry out Goldschmidt’s cover. However, he wished to advise that from information received by them they believed that the Germans had placed faith in Peasant (Goldschmidt) and the information reported by him. He stated that this opinion was based upon information their office had received from other sources which indicated the Germans had believed the information reported by Peasant (Goldschmidt) to be correct and had relayed this information on to the Japanese (Onodera, KV 2/243), who also believed it to be correct.

This information is being reported because the Bureau has been somewhat in the dark as to whether the Germans actually placed faith in Peasant. It further demonstrates the value to the Bureau of receiving Japanese intercept radio messages (from Onodera in Stockholm, which communicated with Japan), which is undoubtedly the source of Commander Nelson’s information was made available to the Bureau, we would then be in a position to better judge the standing of our double agents and also the type of information which is considered to be of value to the Japanese, as well as the Germans.

It would appear from the text of the communication from S.K. Dempuy to Peasant (Goldschmidt) that expected letter from Peasant (Goldschmidt) had not been received raising the possibility that such letters although written by Peasant (Goldschmidt), had been condemned by British authorities.

Further reference is made to Bureau cable dated September 5, 1944, and the Bureau letter dated December 9, 1944, concerning precautions which should be taken to prevent Peasant (Goldschmidt) from compromising this case. The Bureau files do not reflect a specific reply from you to any of the requests set out; however, as indicated above, there is some reason for believing that Peasant’s (Goldschmidt’s) mail is being condemned.

This case appears to be operating smoothly and there is every reason to believe that the deception is successful. It is imperative that every possible precaution be taken to prevent this case from being compromised by Peasant (Goldschmidt).

After you carefully review all Bureau instructions in this case, you should discuss it with appropriate British officials to obtain a specific statement as to just how Peasant (Goldschmidt) can and will be handled in the future. (AOB: the Americans clearly have not the slightest idea as to how poorly M.I.5 has handled and disposed off him; all their efforts were to get appallingly rid of Goldschmidt, without taking any responsibility!)

If you find British unwilling or reluctant to cooperate fully, it may be necessary to have Peasant (Goldschmidt) come to the United States, if you feel that the Bureau’s interest in this case cannot be ?? protected in England, you are instructed to explore the possibilities of heaving Peasant (Goldschmidt) brought to the United States under some suitable pretext. In such event it would be necessary, of course, that Peasant (Goldschmidt) be not aware of the Bureau’s interest. It would also be necessary to arrange some actual and legitimate employment for Peasant (Goldschmidt) as the Bureau will not assume any responsibility to assist Peasant (Goldschmidt) in the United States.

You should advise the Bureau as soon as to the various matters discussed herein.

WPB FRIEND WAS GREATLY INCENSED WHEN I QUESTIONED THE ACCURACY OF HIS REPORT. AT GREAT RISK TO HIMSELF HE REMOVED RECORDS WPB FILES TO SHOW ME AND I WAS ABLE TO VERIFY THE PRODUCTION TOTALS WHICH I SENT YOU. NO. 62 WPB FRIEND IS ANXIOUS TO PROVE HIS GOOD FAITH HOWEVER I SEE NO REASON TO APPROACH HIM CONCERNING YOUR NUMBER 24 IF HIS INFORMATION IS NOT ACCURATE. NO.63.

Under date December 21, 1944, contact was established with ONB at which to me incoming message 28 was received and outgoing 64, 65 66 were transmitted. General radio conditions were noted to be improving by this date.

HEARTHY CHRISTMAS GREETINGS AND MUCH LUCK IN THE NEW YEAR. NO. 28 WE HOPE THAT TRANSMITTAL ARRIVES ON TIME.

TESTIMONY GIVEN BEFORE HOUSE APPROPTIATIONS COMMITTEE PUBLISHED DECEMBER SIX REVEALS NEW BOMBER B-36 WILL DWARF B-29 ANS IS LARGEST AIRPLANE ATTEMPTED IN THIS COUNTRY. DIRECTOR FOR AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS MENTIONED NEW B-35 AND B-42 ALSO UNDERGOING TESTS. IN ORDER TO MEET LIVING EXPESES HERE IT WILL BECOME NECESSARY BEFORE LONG TO SECURE ADDITIONAL WORK IN MORNINGS. HAVE RECEIVED ONLY PROMISES AND POSTPONEMENT OF PAYMENT. WHAT IS CAUSE FOR CONTINUED DELAY?

Om December 23, 1944, radio contact was made with ONB (Hamburg Domäne) at which time outgoing message 67 and 68 were sent. ONB indicated he had no traffic.

WAR DEPARTMENT HAS REVERSED POLICY AND PUBLISHED IDENTITY OF ALLIED ARMY GROUPS AND NUMBERS OF DIVISIONS IN THE LINE ON WESTERN FRONT. ARE YOU INTERESTED? I SEND YOU MOST CORDIAL CHRISTMAS GREETINGS AND BEST WISHED FOR THE NEW YEAR. WILL NOT LISTEN ON DECEMBER 26. WILL RESUME DECEMBER 28.

page 480: AOB: this concerned true letters written by Helmuth Siegfried Goldschmidt to, I suppose, personal friend in the US; these letters were sent from London where Goldschmidt actually lived.

According to information received from the Bureau’s representative in London, Peasant has been corresponding with individuals in Washington D.C. and New York (and elsewhere).

One of the communications was a Christmas card addressed to (Goldschmidt) from S.K. De Puy (AOB: thus a foregoing correspondence must have existed), USNR, Room 301, Wave Quarters, Dodge Hotel, Washington, D.C. On the card was a note to (Goldschmidt) in which it was stated that the writer had not received replies to previous letters to (Goldschmidt). The writer also stated that she might be returning to Tulsa, Oklahoma Goldschmidt had lived there for a while in the near future.

It has been ascertained from London that (Goldschmidt) wrote a letter to Hugo Lorant, 969 Park Avenue, New York. No details concerning this letter are presently available.

Concerning Hugo Lorant, New York file 100-55187, captioned “Gerda Ida Margarethe Friedheim, was, Alien Enemy Control – G” contains a brief summary of information.

The New York Office is instructed to initiate preliminary inquiries to identify Lorant and to discretely determine, if possible, his connection with Goldschmidt.

The Washington Field Office is instructed to initiate similar inquiries with respect to S.K. De Puy.

SAC, Washington Field February 7, 1945

John Edgar Hoover, Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation 65-51317

Peasant (Goldschmidt)

The Bureau desires to be advised concerning the exact dates on which Post Office Box 1052, which is being maintained as a drop box for Peasant, has been since January 1, 1945, and as to the manner in which this check is made. This Post Office Box should be checked daily and if this has not been done in the past, such a procedure should be instituted immediately. A record should be maintained showing the date, time, and the name of the agent making the check.

In connection with future radio contacts with ONB (Hamburg Domäne) in this case, radio technicians of the FBI Laboratory are of the opinion that transmission period should not exceed one half hour. Because of Peasant’s (Goldschmidt’s) gradual improvement and because of the present use of “break-in” it is felt that a half hour period will be sufficient. To be on the air consistently for longer periods may invite suspicion on the part of the Germans as to how Peasant (Goldschmidt) can operate without being detected by United States monitoring agencies.

Reference is made to my cable to Bureau dated January 23, Number 458, which indicated that Peasant (Goldschmidt) had written a letter to one Hugo Lorant of 969 Park Avenue, New York City. Reference cable also notified concerning the facts developed.

At the time received this information the letter which was addressed to Lorant was not available. However, subsequent thereto I had occasion to pursue this letter at which time it was noted that the return address on this letter was H. Goldschmidt and gave a London address. This appeared to me to be somewhat peculiar inasmuch as I

I called this to the attention of name made invisible as well as the Censorship authorities and they too concurred in my findings that the handwritings were not similar and accordingly at my request, conducted an investigation of H. Goldschmidt who had given a London address and determined he was not identical with Helmuth Goldschmidt, but in fact is one Hubert Goldschmidt who is a Canadian presently residing in London.

Concerning Hubert Goldschmidt, it was definitely determined he is pro-Allied and as a matter of fact, had served in the → British Army and had been released due to health reasons …..

Later investigation at Oporto, Portugal determined that the cover address should have been Augusto Strecht Ribero, Rua Boavista 285, Oporto, Portugal.

The other tie-in with Peasant (Goldschmidt) case arises with the fact that Hamann (Friedrich Wilhelm Hamann), who handled ~~Peasant~~ Goldschmidt after his arrival in San Sebastian, Spain and later in Lisbon, Portugal, is now identified as the one who recruited Pinheiro who in turn recruited, presumably for Hamann, Strecht Ribero (the latter whom later travelled to Brazil) (T894 T894return). This shows a close tie in between this case and the arrest of Pinheiro brought about through British pressure upon Portuguese police. The point now arise as whether the arrest of Pinheiro and the compromising of Hamann will in effect compromise the operation of instant case by the Bureau (US FBI?) at the at the present time. This is a matter which I feel deserves consideration in view of Pinheiro’s mention “my work for Hamann was very insignificant even before June (1943) and practically speaking limited itself to the taking out of a passport for Brazil in the name of Strecht. Again we see a definite involvement of Hamann in recruiting an additional agent, namely Acacio Augusto Strecht Ribeiro, a resident of Oporto, Portugal, who is presently in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The statement by Pinheiro is definite confirmation of facts already available indicating that the Strecht Ribeiro in Rio de Janeiro is a German agent. The fact that Hamann was behind both Strecht Ribeiro of Rio de Janeiro and Peasant (Goldschmidt), is obviously what is meant by the term “used” appearing in the first paragraph of Bureau letter dated September 28, 1944.

The situation at present time is this. The British authorities have placed in motion against a known German agent which has a possibility of jeopardizing two cases presently handled by the Bureau (FBI), namely, instant case and that of Acacio Augusto Strecht Ribeiro. With reference o the latter individual, the Bureau (FBI) has issued definite instructions to this office (FBI) that the fact that Acacio Augusto Ribeiro has been identified as a German agent should not be discussed with any outside agencies. These instructions do not appear logical at the present moment, particularly when the British authorities are in the possession of the signed statement of Pinheiro to the effect that he secured a passport for Brazil in the name of Strecht. It is an easy matter to take the next step and make the same identification made by the Bureau (FBI). In view of these circumstances I am tempering the import of Bureau (FBI) instructions and requesting rest of the sentence being deleted.

??? At this stage the request will not be proceed beyond that point. However, it is my belief that if this matter is going to be handled without a compromising of cases presently being handled by the Bureau (FBI), I must be given a carte blanche to deal openly with contacts which in the past have played square with the office. I would appreciate advice on this point at an early date.

There is no information in the files of this office (FBI) concerning Luis Carvalhal. However, Hamann is mentioned in Bureau (FBI) letter dated April 11, 1944 to the office of the Legal Attaché, London England (situated at the US Embassy Grosvenor Square 1), enclosing a document entitled “Enemy Intelligence Activities in Portugal”. He is described as an agent if Eins T/LW (I TL/Wi) Section of K.O. Portugal.

There is one other point which arose early in the history of instant case which I desire to clarify. While in London, England I learned from the office of the Legal Attaché (at the US Embassy) there that the confusion concerning the cover address in Oporto (AOB: Helmuth Goldschimdt got his instructions already in Hamburg), Portugal given to Peasant (Goldschmidt) was laid at my door by the British authorities in London. The authorities there indicated that the address Augusto Strecht, Rua Ribeiro Boavista 285, Oporto Portugal, was received from me following an interview with Peasant (AOB: of course, Goldschmidt got his instructions in Hamburg). This statement is not true. Peasant (Goldschmidt) was never interviewed in detail by me as can be seen from my communication #11 dated October 1, 1943. In this communication (AOB: what do they have to keep hidden for us? Quite many lines have been deleted!) … I thought it desirable to clarify this allegation which was completely unfounded.

(AOB: Maybe this all fits well in the British (sometimes) dirty games they commenced throughout the entire Goldschmidt endeavour!)

The last sentence tells us enough about the “insular attitudes” of their fellow Allied.

Reference is made to Bureau (FBI) letter dated February 2, 1945, in the case entitled Unknown Subjects; Pat J. Espionage – G, requesting information in connection with the coverage of mail boxes and other mail addresses used in espionage cases in this district (Washington D.C. and New York).

In this case information has been received by the Bureau that a letter has been transmitted to the informant, Goldschmidt, in care of the Governor Clinton Hotel in New York City. Arrangements have been perfected through Mr. Charles Peters (U896 U896return), the Assistant.

Manager of this hotel, whereby special box is maintained for Mr. Goldschmidt, and he has been requested to advise this office telephonically in the event any communication for Goldschmidt is received. In further pursuance of this coverage Mr. Peters is contacted daily in connection with the possible receipt of this letter has been received.

The first portion of your letter deals with Peasant’s (Goldschmidt’s) “dilemma” resulting in part from the “action of JCS in repudiating traffic which had previously approved.” (AOB: one of the drives was the fact, that virtually Goldschmidt had not yet received any payments on behalf of the Germans) It is unfortunate, of course, that Peasant (Goldschmidt) was committed to traffic which cannot now be sent for security reasons. It is not believed, however, that this material to the successful operation of this case, particularly in light of incoming message number thirty-four.

In the second portion of your letter you summarize the developments leading up to the present time and point out that “regardless of the desirability of switching Peasant (Goldschmidt) to the Japs … he must extract himself from the present dilemma and resume his work on a sound basis.” To permit Peasant (Goldschmidt) to accomplish this, you recommend that he stay off the air and only go on if ONB (Hamburg station Domäne dedicated call-sign) has traffic to send.

The most important objective under existing circumstances is to maintain a reasonably safe channel of communication for purpose of deception and to study the modus operandi of the German Intelligence System. This can best be accomplished by preparing traffic for each Saturday until a definite break in this case is reached. To adopt Peasant (Goldschmidt) an attitude such as you suggest in an attempt to “convince the enemy … that he is genuine” “even at the risk of dropping out of the espionage picture completely” is to favour one consideration to the complete exclusion of all others. The factors which must be considered are many and each must be modified somewhat so that it will fit into a pattern composed of all the factors involved, each occupying positions of relative importance.

For the above reasons, Bureau (FBI) letter dated February 8, 1945, was sent to you authorizing the transmission of an administrative message on Saturday, February 10, 1945.

Because of the present state of traffic in this case brought about by the action of JCS in repudiating traffic (B-238) which it had previously approved, and also, and perhaps more important, in view of the current status of radio relations with control station ONB (dedicated call-sign to Goldschmidt on behalf of Hamburg Station Domäne), it is believed advisable to summarize recent activities and exchange ideas with the Bureau (FBI) with a view to resuming transmissions and keeping Peasant (Goldschmidt) on the air right up to cessation of hostilities with Germany and possibly thereafter, or better still continuing the circuit with the Japanese as principals of Peasant (Goldschmidt).

This seems particularly desirable when it appears that Germany may be near collapse, and the possibility exists that radio exchange may well become impossible in the near future. It is highly important that Peasant (Goldschmidt) make the correct move at this time when every effort should be made to switch Peasant (Goldschmidt) to the Japanese or at least have him available for such purpose in the event the Germans should themselves decide to suggest such a move. However, regardless of the desirability of switching Peasant (Goldschmidt) to the Japs, I feel he must extract himself from the present dilemma and resume his work on a sound basis, and that this must be done even at the risk of dropping out of the espionage picture completely. I do not mean that Peasant (Goldschmidt) should remain adamant and assume a character who is steadfast to an announced plan or who will refuse to budge (shift) from a stand he has taken. In his living role as a German or Dutch Jew he would be expected to be unscrupulous, vacillating, and subject to person. However, I feel in this instance he must convince the enemy, German or Jap, that he is genuine, and to do this, we must assume the risk it entails.

I understand that Lieutenant Commander Nelson of JCS has verbally indicated there is good reason to believe the enemy has faith in Peasant (Goldschmidt) and has passed information furnished by Peasant (Goldschmidt) to the Japanese. Although this is highly gratifying, I am afraid it comes a bit late in this instance and does not alter the fact that Peasant (Goldschmidt) is confronted with a difficult problem and must extricate himself from this situation with the full confidence of

(AOB: one gets the idea that Mr. Goldschmidt was a human individual – but he wasn’t. Goldschmidt constituted only as a name; his entire existence was notional (virtual). The British did not want him, likely based, to some extent, on an apparent “anti-Semitic” attitude. They, might have had a point, that they handed him virtually over to the Americans. But we learned, they played still a part of the “game” but dropping-down the individual Helmut Siegfried Goldschmidt. After all, rather scandalous, but typically - they didn’t dare!)

His principles. The real danger is that the enemy may believe or suspect that Peasant (Goldschmidt) is controlled. If he is able to surmount the present test, we may be in the position of feeling he has established himself, and we may be convinced that the Germans are and have been fooled completely. I believe this is the most important thing to consider in this case, and the fact that Lieutenant Commander Nelson now tells us Peasant (Goldschmidt) had the confidence of the Germans is not sufficient to allow Peasant (Goldschmidt) to resume his transmission without making serious effort to obtain the money which he has demanded of the enemy. If Peasant (Goldschmidt) allows himself to be bluffed in this instance, we may never feel certain that the enemy was not the one who was running this case, at least from this date on. As indicated hereafter, it appears more than likely that Peasant (Goldschmidt) is being subject to a period of testing, and I think likely that Peasant (Goldschmidt) is being subjected to a period of testing, and I think it highly probable that the enemy maybe somewhat suspicious at this time.

In order that the complete picture of recent developments may be available, I am setting forth what has occurred in considerable detail.

On November 30, 1944, a letter was addressed to the Bureau submitting five messages based upon a news article in the Washington Post of November 29, 1944, outlining in considerable detail the disposition of the Allied armies on the Western Front, identifying the Army groups and setting forth the identities of the various divisions comprising such groups. In this regard, it was suggested that if the messages were approved the first of such message might be transmitted on December 5, 1944 in order to see if the enemy was interested in the material.

Although this traffic was suggested for December 5, 1944, the Joined Chiefs of Staff did not approve the message for some two weeks, such approval being reflected in Bureau (FBI) letter of December 15, 1944, which was only some two days before Marshal Rundstedt began his winter offensive in the Ardennes. Because of this offensive and the nature of the information contained in B-238, the message was not transmitted immediately despite the fact that JCS had given approval, and it was not until December 23, 1944, that the first portion of the message was sent as a feeler in the following form.

WAR DEPARTMENT HAS REVERSED POLICY AND PUBLISHED IDENTITY OF ALLIED ARMY GROUPS AND NUMBERS OF DIVISIONS IN THE LINE ON WESTERN FRONT. ARE YOU INTERESTED? I SEND YOU MOST CORDIAL CHRISTMAS GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR. WILL NOT LISTEN ON DECEMBER 26. WILL RESUME DECEMBER 28.

ONB (dedicated call-sign for Goldschmidt at W/T station Hamburg Domäne) responded to this message immediately although contact was delayed due to the fact that Peasant (Goldschmidt) did not plan activity because of the Christmas holidays and also because of bad (poor) atmospheric conditions. Nevertheless, in their next message, ONB stated the following:

RE YOUR INTERESTING MESSAGE 67 HOW ARE THE ACCOUNTS ASCERTAINED AND WERE PUBLISHED? REPORTS CONCERNING TROOPS EMPLOYED, TROOPS MOVEMENTS, AND NEW TROOPS AVAILABLE FOR TRANSPORT VERY IMPORTANT. STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND CAREFUL VERIFICATION EXTREMELY NECESSARY #29.

It was apparent that the Germans were interested in the substance of the news clipping, and it was believed probable they would make further requests. This matter was discussed with the JCS (Joined Chiefs of Staff) representative, and effort was apparently made to discourage further traffic on the subject in the form of a message suggested by JCS, and furnished the Washington Field Office by Bureau letters dated January 6 and 11, 1945, which is quoted hereafter and was transmitted on January 13, 1945.

CONCERNING YOUR 29 AND MY 67 THE INFORMATION I HAVE CAME FROM THE DEPT. RELEASE PUBLISHED IN WASHINGTON POST ON NOVEMBER 28. NO FURTHER RELEASE WERE PUBLISHED. IT IS RUMOURED HERE THAT PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER WHO RELEASED THE INFORMATION WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE TROOPS ON DECEMBER 1. I PREPARED SUMMARY SHOWING INDICATED TOTAL STRENGTH OF VARIOUS ARMIES BUT DETAILED ACCOUNT TOO LONG TO SEND BY RADIO. ADVISE. WILL TRY FOR CONTACTS FOR THE TYPE OF INFORMATION OUTLINED IN YOUR #29.

At the time this message was sent, I still believed the enemy would not be satisfied, and I also felt national security required that JCS consider the entire clipping. During the week of January 25, 1945, it was learned verbally that JCS had reversed itself and instructed that the messages approved should not be sent under any circumstances. This reversal of opinion was made in spite of the fact that ONB (Hamburg Domäne) had been told that we have the publication listing the Army groups and the numbers of the divisions.

Despite the above message, B-259, the enemy was not discouraged and did not lose interest in the matter, and on January 23, 1945, the last message received from ONB arrived as follows:

COURIER WHO IS UNDERTAKING TRANSMITTAL DEPARTED FROM EUROPE THE MIDDLE OF DECEMBER SO THAT ARRIVAL AT P.O. BOX SHOULD TAKE PLACE ANT DAY NOW. GIVE MOST IMPORTANT DETAILS CONSIDERING THE COMPOSITION OF THE ARMIES MENTIONED IN YOUR #87. WHAT DOES “ESTAPAS” YOUR #93 MEAN? #33.

For sometime it had been felt that Peasant (Goldschmidt) should have money from his principles to justify his continuing to work for them and also to convince ourselves that he held the complete confidence of the Germans. As early as December 18, 1944, I proposed in a letter that Peasant (Goldschmidt) might risk a breakdown in the circuit by going off the air for a time until he received money. The unfortunate incident relating to the troops’ identity on the Western front described above made it appear even more desirable to attempt this logical move, and on January 17, 1945, a letter was addressed to the Bureau (FBI) suggesting that Peasant (Goldschmidt) inform ONB that failure to supply him with funds made it economically necessary for him to seek other work. Subsequently on Saturday, January 27, 1945, our last message was transmitted as follows:

HAVE STILL RECEIVED NO TRANSMITTALS. REGRET I HAVE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO ACCEPT TEMPORARY JOB IN MORNINGS UNTIL MONEY ARRIVES. WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE EXCEPT ON SATURDAYS.

Whether by accident, coincidence or otherwise the date the above message was sent began a series of radio maneuvers (manoeuvres) which have resulted in the writing of a letter. Copies (2) of the radio log for January 27, 1945, with complete explanations of the letter signals are being enclosed herewith for the Bureau (FBI). From this log it appears that ONB came on the air as usual at 10:29 a.m. advising “QTC”, that he had traffic and Peasant (Goldschmidt) answered at 10:34 a.m. The control station heard Peasant (Goldschmidt) and “broke” him, and advising that ONB had traffic and telling Peasant (Goldschmidt) to go ahead, Peasant (Goldschmidt) acknowledged this and told ONB (Hamburg Domäne) to go ahead and send each group complete. This was in accordance with previous routine of allowing ONB to send his →

traffic first. In this instance, however, it is apparently caused ONB (dedicated call-sign in the Goldschmidt case of Hamburg Domäne) to reflect as he said "AS AS", wait, and then to inquire "QRU"," do you have anything for me? Peasant (Goldschmidt) then informed "AS AS" in order to think and then 10.37 a.m., transmitted outgoing message 101 in accordance with instructions.

When Peasant (Goldschmidt) had completed sending 101, ONB instructed him to go ahead with any more traffic he might have. Peasant (Goldschmidt) advised he had nothing and told ONB who broke in (B-K mode) and advised Peasant (Goldschmidt) to wait five minutes. However, immediately thereafter ONB advised Peasant (Goldschmidt) he had nothing for Peasant (Goldschmidt), and had completed his transmission. Peasant pretended not to understand, endeavouring to force ONB (Hamburg Domäne) to send the traffic previously indicated whereupon ONB said "SRI SRI QRU SK SK," meaning sorry I have made an error. I (Hamburg Domäne) have nothing for you. Transmission concluded."

Several logical explanations occur as to this first day, and if viewed alone, the occurrence would cause no particular concern. I understand from numerous clews in operation the Laboratory has concluded that the enemy operates ONB (station Hamburg Domäne) as one of the large number of circuits from a huge control station similar to our own set-up with the transmitters and receivers situated some miles apart (In case of station Hamburg Domäne, their transmitter-site was cover-named "Vorwerk"). A sound theory might be that the operator may have believed he had traffic when he started the exchange with Peasant (Goldschmidt) and later discovered there was none in fact (belatedly perhaps), and at the end indicated he was in error and had no traffic for Peasant (Goldschmidt).

Another logical view suggested is that perhaps a message from Peasant (Goldschmidt) was being encoded at ONB (Hamburg Domäne in Wohldorf in the vicinity of Hamburg) and because Peasant (Goldschmidt) sent such a brief message, much shorter than usual, there was insufficient time to complete coding it before Peasant (Goldschmidt) went off the air. The nature of this traffic may have been such that at subsequent date ONB decided not to send the message.

Neither of the above theories in any way explains the subsequent actions of ONB (Hamburg Domäne) after they had an opportunity to decode and study outgoing message 101, and it is felt that the maneuvers of ONB (station Hamburg Domäne) may well be considered independent of the exchange of signals described as occurring on January 27, 1945.

Although ONB stated on Saturday, January 27, 1945, that he had no traffic (QRU) for Peasant (Goldschmidt) , he came on the air promptly the following day which was Sunday, and on the ensuing six days, January 28 to 31, 1945. On January 29, 1945, he also stated "QTC tomorrow." From this it was anticipated that on the following Saturday, February 3, 1945, when ONB (station Hamburg Domäne) would expect Peasant (Goldschmidt) to be listening, he would have a message for Peasant (Goldschmidt). However, on February 3, 1945, he did not have such a message.

At 10:27 a.m. on February 3, 1945 ONB (Station Hamburg Domäne) came on as usual with the call letters for that day (DLA), and contrary to this usual practice did not indicate whether he did or did not have traffic. (AOB: in early 1945 K.d.M. Hamburg was in a changing process. Some leading officers, such as, for example, Leiter K.d.M. Hamburg Wichmann and Major Pieper had been made redundant due to their age; however, some were recalled in office. Please bear in mind: the SS controlled Amt VI was commencing desperate changes in the old structures) After sending call letters for a time, ONB (Hamburg Domäne) waited only one minute, also unusual, and then repeated the letters. At 10:38 a.m. assumed or had the impression that Peasant (Goldschmidt) was listening and "QSY UP" (tune frequency up higher). At 10:43 a.m., ONB again sent the call letters for the day and gave a single "QRU", (I have no traffic for you). Thereafter at 10:50 a.m., ONB stated "QSY old," instructing Peasant (Goldschmidt) to go back to his old frequency. Peasant refused to answer and at 10:59 a.m. went off the air.

From the above it appears at the early stages of his exchange ONB (station Hamburg Domäne) gave Peasant every opportunity to blunder. It may be argued that ONB did not choose to risk admitting this was his motive, and this may explain the single signal "QRU" indicating belatedly that ONB had no traffic for Peasant (Goldschmidt).

Apparently ONB (Hamburg Domäne) did not desire to give a false QTC to Peasant (Goldschmidt) as this had occurred, whether intentionally or not, on the previous Saturday, and a repetition would serve to pace ONB (Hamburg station Domäne) in an embarrassing position and would be bound to antagonize (annoy) Peasant (Goldschmidt) if he were legitimate, and to inform the Bureau (FBI) or other government agency in the event Peasant (Goldschmidt) were controlled.

It is, of course, not clear just why ONB (Hamburg station Domäne) sent the single QRU signal unless as an afterthought to protest themselves. A QRU signal should not have been expected to bring a response from Peasant (Goldschmidt), and except when Peasant (Goldschmidt) has had traffic, he has never come on the air after receiving a QRU signal. It is not reasonable to suppose that ONB expected he would violate this unwritten safety rule merely for the sake of letting them know he was listening if they considered him entirely legitimate.

To further reflect the activity in this matter, ONB (Hamburg station Domäne) again came on the air Sunday, February 4, 1945, resuming his regular routine and again transmitted the signal QTC indicating he had traffic, and on Monday, February 5, 1945, he repeated this procedure again sending QTC signals.

On Tuesday, February 6, 1945, ONB tuned up at 10:28 a.m. QTC signals for eight minutes which is longer than usual. At 10:41 a.m. he repeated the same thing for four minutes. At 10:48 a.m. he assumed Peasant (Goldschmidt) was answering and indicated there was interference and instructed Peasant (Goldschmidt) to raise the frequency a little. At 10:52 a.m. he said "PSE Call" meaning "please call" which is very unusual , and followed this by stating "HR QTC QTC" meaning "here I have traffic". At 10:58 a.m., he closed "QTC TMW" meaning "I have traffic for you tomorrow".

This unusual series of signals might well be constructed as indicating ONB (Hamburg station Domäne) was very seriously trying to resume contact and induce Peasant (Goldschmidt) to answer.

Inasmuch as Peasant (Goldschmidt) had no traffic for ONB on Saturday, February 3, 1945, or any succeeding day, I believe he acted wisely in refusing to be drawn on to the air by the actions of ONB (Hamburg station Domäne). It seems to me that the action of ONB since he received outgoing 101 cannot be attributed to change or to the idiosyncrasies (peculiarities) of new or unskilled operators. It appears to Peasant (Goldschmidt) that the same operator (or operators) is handling the key, and the various moves outlined in this letter seem to be studied and planned. The only safe conclusion I can reach is that for some reason or other Peasant (Goldschmidt) is being subjected to a period of testing although the enemy still has considerable "to lose", and hesitates to risk dropping Peasant (Goldschmidt).

As the case now stands, Peasant (Goldschmidt) must either maintain his bluff to the bitter end or until some break in the case appears or else "crawl back". to the enemy with a corresponding loss of prestige. If the Germans have really had faith in him and have passed his information along to the Japs at face value, I believe we will be able to ascertain this fact by having Peasant (Goldschmidt) stick it out. I also doubt very much in such case that ONB (Hamburg station Domäne) will go off the air, and in this event we would actually be in communication with the enemy should hostilities cease abruptly.

On the other hand, if Peasant (Goldschmidt) exhibits an urgent desire to resume service for the enemy without achieving a payment at hand, this fact alone would appear highly suspicious to any reasonable person. Peasant (Goldschmidt) is not the type of individual expected to assume the role of a patriot, and the only reasonable conclusion the enemy could draw would be that he is either controlled or a very foolish man.

1. On Saturday, February 10, 1945, unless ONB (Hamburg station Domäne) indicates he has traffic "QTC", I believe Peasant should again refuse to acknowledge the signal of the control station.

2. Even though ONB (Hamburg station Domäne) should indicate that he has traffic for Peasant (Goldschmidt), I recommend that Peasant (Goldschmidt) compel ONB to transmit his message and to inform ONB that Peasant (Goldschmidt) has no traffic on this date. (Peasant (Goldschmidt) might indicate at the conclusion of the exchange that he will listen on Saturday next.)

3. In the event ONB (Hamburg station Domäne) has traffic for Peasant (Goldschmidt) and the Bureau should feel that Peasant (Goldschmidt) must send something in order to keep the exchange of messages active for the record, then I suggest that a message be sent by Peasant (Goldschmidt) which is purely administrative in character and deals mainly with the matter of money, as money is the whole crux of Peasant's (Goldschmidt's) controversy with his principals. In this case the following is suggested as a suitable message but is not being submitted at this time as a message for February 10, 1945.

NEW POSITION UNDERTAKEN HAS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PREPARE MESSAGES FOR YOU. i AM WILLING TO RESUME BUT MUST RECEIVE MONEY BEFORE LEAVING NEW JOB. WILL ADVISE YOU IMMEDIATELY MONEY IS RECEIVED.

The Bureau (FBI) is respectfully requested to advise immediately concerning its wishes in the present case and particularly regarding its desires in connection with traffic for February 10, 1945.

You will recall that this is a double agent operation involving radio communication with Germany through Peasant (Goldschmidt), a notional (virtual) informant. Radio contact was first established in August of 1944, and since that time we have unsuccessfully attempted to receive a remittance from Germany. The failure has been due to the Germans' inability to get money into this country in order to pay Peasant (Goldschmidt). (AOB: though, aiming to trap the one whom was conveying the currency)

On March 3, 1945, a message was received from Germany advising Peasant (Goldschmidt) in effect that have continuously attempted to get money to him without success and requested to know whether he had any channel whereby he could get money out of Brazil. Peasant (Goldschmidt) for the lack of reimbursement had already informed the Germans that he would only be able to transmit on Saturday mornings since he had compelled to secure a job in the morning during the week. The Germans already are aware of the fact that he works for the Shell Oil Company in the evenings.

The Joint Security Control is now anxious to have Peasant (Goldschmidt) operate his radio at least three or four times during the week and since the Germans have informed us that a payment can be made from Brazil, we are taking the following steps:

A cable is being transmitted to Rio de Janeiro, suggesting that they have a reliable contact receive the money for Peasant's (Goldschmidt's) boss at the Shell Oil Company and thereafter transmit it to the United States by member of his firm. If arrangements can be made in Brazil, a radio message will be transmitted to Germany on Saturday, March 17, 1945, instructing the Germans to deliver the money to the individual selected by our representative in Rio de Janeiro.

For your approval, there is attached a cable to the Legal Attaché at Rio de Janeiro, acquainting him with the facts in the case and requesting him to advise by return cable whether an arrangement can be worked out whereby the money can be received at Brazil and thereafter transmitted to this country.

In connection with the present negotiations being conducted by Peasant (Goldschmidt) in an effort to secure through someone in Rio de Janeiro, the following message is suggested as traffic for ONB (Goldschidt's dedicated call-sign of Hamburg station Domäne) on Saturday, March 17, 1945.

BUSINESS ACQUAINTANCE WHO FLEW TO RIO WAS REQUESTED BY MY BOSS TO ASK AN OLD FRIEND TO RECEIVE PACKAGE FROM HIM AS PERSONAL FAVOUR. THIS FRIEND IS MANAGER OF OIL COMPANY IN RIO. HE HAS FACILITATED TRANSMITTALS OF GIFTS AND PERSONAL ARTICLES IN PAST AND BOSS HAS COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN HIM. IF THIS MAN IS AGREEABLE WILL ADVISE IMMEDIATELY INFORMATION IS RECEIVED.

Subsequent to transmittal of this message and in absence of a message from the enemy which might change Peasant's (Goldschmidt's) course, it is planned some day next week to send a third message advising ONB (Hamburg station Domäne) that the friend of Peasant (Goldschmidt's) boss has sent word he is agreeable to accept the package and inquire if ONB can send or deliver the package (money) for "H". in personal care of Wingate Anderson at this office, President Wilson Avenue 118, room 63, at the company and place mentioned in previous message quoted above.

The Bureau is requested to contact the legal attaché in Rio and give appropriate instructions in furtherance of Peasant's (Goldschmidt's) effort to set up a permanent channel to receive money. It is respectfully suggested Rio be furnished with copies of outgoing message #10 sent March 10, 1945 and the above message if approved.

The following administrative message is submitted as a portion of the traffic to be transmitted to ONB (the to Goldschmidt dedicated call-sign of the Hamburg station Domäne) on Saturday, March 10, 1945:

MY BOSS HAS AGREED TO APPROACH A FRIEND OF HIS IN RIO TO ACCEPT MONEY FOR ME. WILL HAVE MODE DETAILS NEXT WEEK.

The above message is submitted in furtherance of the plan to attempt to open up a channel in Brazil through, which (virtual) Peasant (Goldschmidt) may receive a sum of money immediately in order to resume his work on a schedule of several messages weekly, and also through which he may receive funds in the future.

I understand that the message, if approved by the Bureau (FBI) , will be transmitted together with an additional message to be furnished by JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) . In the event the message furnished by JCS is very brief or is not sent for any reason, it is suggested that the following approved message be sent along with the above administrative message:

WAVE FRIEND ADVISES 30 NEW FLEET CARRIERS REQUIRING 3000 COMBAT PLANES PLANNED FOR 1945.

RE PEASANT CASE (GOLDSCHMIDT CASE). ESPIONAGE - G. REFERENCE YOUR RADIOGRAM MARCH 10, 1945. WINGATE ANDERSON, AMERICAN MANAGER OF STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF RIO DE JANEIRO, AGREED TO GIVE FULL COOPERATION. CONSIDERED VERY RELIABLE. FACTS OF CASE NOT DISCUSSED WITH HIM. HIS OFFICE, AVENIDA PRESIDENTE WILSON 118 ROOM 63 WILL BE MOST PRACTICAL FOR PACKAGE DELIVERING. HE WILL BE IN RIO DE JANEIRO UNTIL MAY 10. SUGGESTED THAT CONTACT TIME BE BEST FOR 11:00 AM, MARCH 26. SURVEILLANCE WILL BE PLACED ON COURIER UNLESS YOU ADVISE TO THE CONTRARY.

There is submitted hereafter an administrative message in reply to Incoming No. 38 received from ONB (dedicated call-sign for Goldschmidt in communications with Hamburg Domäne) on Saturday, March 24, 1945.

It is felt that Wingate Anderson as a prominent businessman in Rio would not be receptive to a suggestion that he participate in a bank transaction such as suggested by the germans. It is also believed unlikely that Peasant (Goldschmidt) would approach his boss and Anderson and make such a bold request to continue their original plan and by interference to make contact and payment to Anderson in Brazil.

In view of the present war situation, it is suggested that this message be transmitted on March 29th, as was done last week, in order that the Germans may have the opportunity to make reply on Saturday of this week. It is realized this is the second successive week Pleasant (Goldschmidt) has transmitted on Thursday, and thus gone outside his announced schedule of sending on Saturday only. However, his anxiety to secure funds may be considered sufficient incentive to justify his unusual activity in the eyes of his (German) principals. Unless the Bureau (FBI) instructs to the contrary. the following message will be sent:

HIGH? AND ANDERSON BELIEVE MY MONEY ALREADY IN BRAZIL. I HESITATE TO NOW INFORM THEM MONEY IS IN PORTUGAL/ ALSO FEAR A WOULD NOT ACCEPT RISK INVOLVED IN RECORD TRANSFER. IN ANY EVENT NOT ACCEPT RISK INVOLVED IN RECORD TRANSFER. IN ANY EVENT I NOW HAVE NO SAFE MEANS AND SPEEDY COMMUNICATION WITH A CONSEQUENTLY NO TIME COULD BE SAVED. REQUEST YOU IMMEDIATELY INSTRUCT BRAZIL AGENT AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED. ADVISE.

For Saturday, March 31, 1945, it is suggested that the remaining portion of Message B-401 be transmitted and numbered in sequence following the above message to be sent of Thursday, March 29, 1945. It is noted that the first portion of B-401 bore outgoing number 117, 118, and that the proposed message for Thursday will interrupt the numerical sequence. However, it is believed that Peasant (Goldschmidt) would not hesitate to interrupt his numerical sequence to send a prompt answering message to the enemy proposal on the subject of money.

The following message will be transmitted to ONB (station Hamburg Domäne) on Saturday in the absence of Bureau (FBI) instructions to the contrary:

CONT. P-80 HAS AIR INTAKE DUCTS LOCATED EACH SIDE FUSELAGE JUST FORWARD LEADING EDGE OF WING. JET ENGINE IS MANUFACTURED BY GENERAL ELECTRIC AND BY ALLISON. PLANE IS MANUFACTURED BY LOCKHEED AND BY NORTH AMERICAN. LOCKHEED CLAIMS SIMPLE DESIGN FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR. USE OF JET ENGINES IN BOMBERS AND TRANSPORTS CONTEMPLATED.

When Peasant (Goldschmidt) was trained by the German Intelligence System at Hamburg, he was instructed that in the preparation of his radio traffic each message should be in three languages; English, German and Spanish. The probable purpose for such an instruction would be to make each individual message more difficult to break.

With respect to traffic prepared for transmission to ONB (designated to Goldschmidt by Hamburg station Domäne) on Thursday, March 29, 1945, it is noted that message #119 is in English and Spanish and that message #120 is entirely in German. It is desired that the Bureau (FBI) be advised fully in this connection.

KANN AN ANGEGEBENE ADRESSE AUCH BANKUEBERWEISUNG AUS PORTUGAL GEFAHRLOS ERFOLGEN UM DADURCH ZEITRAUBENDE BRIEFLICHE INFORMATION AN UNSEREN BRASILVERTRETER ZU VERMEIDEN. NR. DREI ACHT. GENUEGT IN DIESEM FALL ANGEGEBENE ADRESSE OHNE DEINEN NAMEN?

CAN BANK TRANSFER ALSO BE MADE SAFELY FROM PORTUGAL TO ADDRESS FURNISHED IN ORDER TO AVOID LOSS OF TIME IN ADVISING OUR BRAZIL AGENT BY LETTER. NO. 38. IN THE CASE IS ADDRESS FURNISHED SUFFICIENT WITHOUT YOUR NAME?

There is submitted hereafter a suggested message to be transmitted to control station ONB (dedicated call-sign to Goldschmidt on behalf of the Hamburg station Domäne) on Saturday, April 7, 1945, which if approved by Bureau (FBI) and JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) will be transmitted in the usual manner.

WAR NEWS HERE DISASTROUS. RESIGNATION JAMES BYRNES, WAR MOBILIZER, CONSIDERED SIGN EUROPEAN WAR NEAR END AM CONCERNED ABOUT MY SECURITY IF WAR ENDED SUDDENLY. SHOULD I CONTINUE WORK OR WILL YOU ADVISE ME. PLEASE RUSH TRANSMITTAL. WILL ARRANGE TO LISTEN TUESDAY.

The purpose of the above message is to illicit some statement from the Germans as to their future plans for peasant (Goldschmidt). It is hoped this message may draw some comment or statement from the enemy which will reveal his present attitude toward Pleasant (Goldschmidt).

For period of approximately two weeks beginning January 27, 1945, the Germans appeared suspicious of Peasant (Goldschmidt) and subjected him to period of testing. This was possibly the result of failure of Peasant (Goldschmidt) (AOB, baloney, as Goldschmidt actually did not existed as he was only a notional /virtual entity) to furnish certain information regarding allied troops on western front which Peasant (Goldschmidt) indicated previously he possessed, but which was not supplied by Peasant (Goldschmidt). However, exchange of traffic has continued between ONB (this call-sign was dedicated especially to Goldschmidt on behalf of the Hamburg station Domäne) and Peasant (Goldschmidt), and to date, April 10, 1945, 39 incoming and 124 outgoing messages have been exchanged. Latest message received April 10, 1945, suggested Peasant (Goldschmidt) continue in usual manner "as long as there is a connection". Peasant (Goldschmidt) continued requests for money and on March 3, 1945, ONB (Hamburg station Domäne) inquired regarding possibility of payment through Brazil. Arrangements made with manager of oil company in Rio to receive payment and ONB (K.d.M. Hamburg) has promised to make provision in this manner. Information received from Bureau indicates Augusto Strecht Ribeiro, presently in Rio, is definitely an agent of the Germans. Possibly appears good that Strecht Ribeiro may arrange payment for Peasant (Goldschmidt) in Rio.

AOB: it has to be said, that the quality of information is steadying-on degreasing!

found to contain two languages rather than three (AOB: please digest some of the foregoing messages), and on one or two occasions the last portion of message appeared in German only/ This is explained by the fact that whatever Peasant (Goldschmidt, virtually) utilized his (notional/virtual) native German more than Spanish or English, and this was thought a natural thing for him (virtually) to do.

It is pointed out ONB (dedicated to Goldschmidt in particular) has used German almost exclusively in his messages and also that he has never challenged the style of translation in Peasant's (Goldschmidt's) messages although (Goldschmidt) has been called to task on several other matters to which ONB (Hamburg station Domäne) took exception. The particular manner of translation was used by Peasant (Goldschmidt) as early as messages 4 - 6, and it is felt that ONB would have called it to Peasant's (Goldschmidt's) attention if it had been considered serious at that time.

It is respectfully suggested that no chance should be considered at this time. To now begin the use of three languages in each section, some of which may be very small, would possibly arouse the suspicions of the Germans, and it is not believed Peasant (Goldschmidt) would be likely to voluntary undertake more difficult and restricting method.

ANGESICHTS LAGE MUSST DU MIT VORUEBERGEHENDER EINSTELLUNG DER UEBERWACHUNG RECHNEN. NR VIER NULL. BITTE STEHE TROTZDEM WITER AUF EMPFANG. FALLS DU UNS NICHT HOERST SENDE VORLIEGENDE SPRUECHE BLIND JEDE GRUPPE DOPPELT AN UNS AB. WIR WERDEN BESTAETIGUNG VERSUCHEN.

IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION YOU MUST FIGURE ON TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF SUPERVISION NO. 40. NEVERTHELESS PLEASE STAND BY FURTHERT TO RECEIVE. IN CASE YOU CANNOT HEAR US TRANSMIT MESSAGES AND HAND TO US BLIND EACH GROUP DOUBLE. WE WILL TRY.

WIE WIRKT SICH ROOSEVELDTS TOD AUS? WELCHER EINDRUCK IN DEINEM BEKANNTENKREIS UND IN DER OEFFENTLICHKEIT? NR. VIER EINS.

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF ROOSEVELT'S DEATH? WHAT ARE THE IMPRESSIONS IN YOUR CIRCLE OF ACQUAINTANCES AND THE PUBLIC? NO. 41.

As you know, Peasant (Goldschmidt) previously advised the Germans that because payment had not been forthcoming he was forced to accept morning employment which would prevent him from being on the air and day except Saturday. he has regularly gone on the air Saturday and has stayed away from work on some week??y to transmit to ONB (specially designated call-sign in communication with Station Hamburg Domäne). On Saturday, April 21, 1945, Peasant sent his message 127 in which he advised that he would be on the air to send Thursday. The German station called Peasant (Goldschmidt) on Tuesday requesting that he stand by on Wednesday. Because Peasant (Goldschmidt) was at work he did not, of course, hear these transmissions. He did, however. go on the air Thursday as had said he would, but although ONB (Hamburg Domäne) could hear him, atmospheric conditions were not such that ONB could receive Peasant's message. ONB indicated however "QRX TMW" indicating that he wanted Peasant (Goldschmidt) to come on the air Friday.

It is believed desirable that we should comply with the Germans request for several reasons. In the first place Peasant's (Goldschmidt's) message planned for Thursday could be sent Friday which would permit traffic regularly planned for Saturday to be sent without delay. In the second place, it is believed desirable for us to maintain as frequent contact as possible so that we will "keep our fingers on the pulse" of the German Intelligence System at this time. It is also felt desirable to keep the circuit as active as possible so that it might be considered for retention by the German leaders who may be planning a Nazi underground.

Some slight risk of suspicion will be run by going on the air two additional days this week; however, Peasant (Goldschmidt) has not previously shown a reluctance to stay from work and in this instance he was specifically requested to be available on Friday.

Peasant's (Goldschmidt's) message 126 and 127 was sent blind on Saturday, April 21, as Peasant (Goldschmidt) was instructed. It was believed desirable that Peasant (Goldschmidt) inquire at his next contact whether these messages were received. This can be done through the use of symbols which were furnished to Peasant by his principals (The German Abwehr/Amt VI) - "17 and 18 OK" This means: Did you receive message 17 and 18 o.k.? It will be interesting to determine if these messages were received inasmuch as they were blind pursuant to Peasant's (Goldschmidt's) instructions. Actually, they were our message numbers 126 and 127; however, the above are the fictitious plain text-numbers which would be known to the German operator.

It is also believed desirable that Peasant conclude his next contact by spending "83". In the language of radio operators (including HAMs) this means in effect: "Good luck (also best greetings) I hope you will get along all right". The Radio Section advises that Peasant's (Goldschmidt's) microfilm listing Q numbers did not contain "73" expression; however, they say that it is extremely common usage.

If you approve, the Radio section will be instructed to make contacts in this case on Friday, April 27, and to use the above indicated "Q number" in addition to the regularly scheduled traffic.

The following messages are approved for transmission to ONB on Saturday, April 28, 1945:

A-148 WAVE FRIEND TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT SHE HAD OVERHEARD HER OFFICER SAY THAT THE EXTRA TIME BEING USED TO HOP UP PHILIPPIENES WOULD PROBABLY DELAY THE NEXT JOINT OPERATION.

B-474 CONTINENTAL MOTORS ANNOUNCED ITS SUBSIDIARY CONTINENTAL AVIATION AND ENGINEERING CORPORATION NOW IN LIMITED PRODUCTION OF NEW LIQUID COOLED ENGINE KNOWN AS I-1430. MOTOR IS TWELVE CYLINDER, SIXTY DEGREE INVERTED V TYPE AND DEVELOPS 2100 HORSEPOWER AT 3400 R.P.M. WEIGHT OF ONLY .69 POUNDS PER HORSEPOWER CLAIMED FOR ENGINE. WHEN CAN I EXPECT TRANSMITTAL TO ARRIVE IN SOUTH?

JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) requested that A-148 be sent at the earliest possible date and for reason it should be given priority.

The following message is approved for transmission during the first few days of may, 1945:

U.S. NAVAL AVIATION FOR NEXT FISCAL YEAR TO COST APPROXIMATELY THREE BILLION DOLLARS. NEW JET PROPELLED PLANES FOR NAVAL AIR FORCE WILL INCLUDE TORPEDO PLANES AND SEAPLANES IN ADDITION TO JET FIGHTERS, ALL OF WHICH WILL BE PRODUCED ON LARGE SCALE.

Attached hereto are the translation and decipherment of a message received from Germany on April 28, 1945, in connection with the above entitled case.

The original intercept and translation are being retained in the Code and Cipher File of the Laboratory.

MR. VIER ZWO. AUGENBLICKLICH VORDRINGLICHES INTERESSE AUCH AN POLITISCHEN MELDUNGEN UND MILITAERISCHEN DISPOSITIONEN.

NR.42 AT PRESENT ALSO URGENT INTEREST IN POLITICAL REPORTS AND MILITARY DISPOSITIONS.

ONB (dedicated call-sign for Goldschmidt by Hamburg station Domäne) was heard calling "QRU QRX TMW" (I have nothing for you. Standby tomorrow) on this regular scheduled time and frequency on April 24, 1945. You will recall that ONB was last heard on April 20, 1945.

In connection with the disappearance of some Hamburg circuits and the continuance of others, it is the unofficial opinion of the FCC that there are two separate sites in the Hamburg environs; and that ONB is probably located northeast of the city. (True indeed, Wohldorf's Abwehr station carried the cover-name Domäne, the transmitters, remote controlled, were situated some kilometres off site, code-name "Vorwerk". While direction findings alone have not been able to demonstrate this fact, the FCC have closely studied the signals emanating from Hamburg and have concluded that two different power sources are used, which may indicate two different locations. (AOB: this likely will not imply that the knew the AC current source of Domäne, but I would not wonder that, for practical reasons, Vorwerk was provided with two different AC power sources. Whether one was driven from a power generator, or that two different power-lines had been involved I don't know) (all transmitters were remote-controlled operated from Domäne) (please notice: https://www.cdvandt.org/Staritz-Abwehrfunk-Funkabwehr-neu2.pdf and notice pdf pages 18 and 19)

The Clinton monitors assert that the transmitter heard today appeared to be the regular ONB transmitter. If this is true, it should appear that ONB is located northwest of Hamburg (located at the Vorwerk site), and may be on the air for a little while longer.

United States Censorship has submitted intercepted communications as a result of placing Almeida Azevedo on the Special Watch List, which to be of interest and significance to this case. One of these intercept submissions pertains to a letter dated September 4, 1944, from Manuel Ribeiro da Silva, Agenda, Portugal, to Gloria Ribeiro, Ave. Nossa Senhora de Copacabana 1227, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The examiner's comments state that the cover which bears the rubber stamped address of Panificio Biljou, Agueda, Portugal, contains a letter from the sender to his ex-wife, advising her that by special favour Almeida Azevedo, has already sailed for Rio, is the bearer of three hampers containing:

"He would have liked to send her Salpicon, Cheese and Olive Oil, but export is prohibited.

"Sender further states that Sr. Almeida Azevedo is also the bearer of Escudos 1150 to cover customs charges, any sum left over, he will turn over to Addressee. Sender states that he has had no news from Addressee relative to another remittance which he sent her by a carrier (ES: unidentified) who travelled by air. Sender expects to avail himself of Sr. Americo Brea, a partner of Seabra y Cia, who is sailing to Rio de Clipper in October to send Addressee a small parcel. Abrantes (EX: unidentified) is employed by the above firm.

The files reflect that when Azevedo was interviewed at Trinidad in September 1944, stated that while on his visit to Portugal he had stayed for about two months with Manuel Ribeiro da Silva, owner of a bakery in Agueda, Portugal. Azevedo did not state his relationship with Ribeiro da Silva. The files contain no reference to Gloria Ribeiro.

(AOB: all ships crossing the mid Atlantic had to be checked at the British Island Trinidad. Passengers were checked thoroughly, as were all mails bags and other loadings. They, most likely, have questioned passengers were appropriate and also might copied mails related to entities appearing on their watch-lists. I strongly doubt - that they could simply confiscate properties belonging to Portuguese and/or Brazilians)

A Censorship submission sheet was also furnished concerning a letter dated March 22, 1944, also from Rebeiro da Silva to Gloria to Gloria Ribeiro, in which he states, "By this time you must be in possession of the gold medals, undershirt, and snapshots I sent with a friend of mine who left for Brazil by airplane. Soon I will send you more and better things and the bearer will be Mr. Almeida Azevevde, the same gentleman who carried the bottle of wine for you. He came again to Portugal and will return to Rio one of these days".

Another submission sheet pertains to a letter dated March 8, 1944, from Jorge Correira Monteiro, R, Da Constitucao 379, Porto, Portugal, to Georgina Jorge Correia, c/o Guilherme Morais D'Almeida, R. Do Ouvidor 169 1° s/120, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The letter was composed of small notes signed Regininha, Jorge, Ruy and Fernando. In the note signed Regininha, acknowledgement is made of receipt of clothing send the first aquarelle portrait made by him. In the note signed Ruy, the writer states that with Azevedo he will be sending her some presents and a few photos of the family. In a note signed Fernando, the addressee is informed that documents needed for the inventory made by "Mr. Morais" will be sent with a courier.

The Bureau file contain no other references to Jorge Correia Monteiro or Georgina Jorge Correia. It is suggested that Gloria Ribeiro and Georgina Jorge Correia be identified and their connections with Azevedo be determined.

Lisbon should secure any information available concerning Manuel Ribeiro da Silva and Jorge Monteiro.

Attention is called to the fact that the full name of Strecht, known German agent, is Accacio Augusto Strecht Ribeiro, and may be related to Manuel Ribeiro da Silva or Gloria Ribeiro.

(AOB: it is for us quite shocking to notice to what an extent the Allies grasped bits and pieces from international mail-bags)

There are indications, that maybe mail conveyed between Brazil and Portugal by means of regular Airlines

This might imply that the mail-bags had been searched for wanted mail; but it could have been likely that a US airline carrier conveyed the mail.

Reference is made to the radio activity being conducted by the Laboratory of the Bureau in the above case.

On 28 April 28, 1945, radio contact was established with ONB (Hamburg Wohldorf station Domäne) with fair signal strength on both sides. Bureau messages #128 and #129, #130 and #131 were transmitted, and German message #42 was received.

No mention was made by Peasant (Goldschmidt) or ONB of the blind transmission on 21 April of Bureau messages #126 and #127.

While ONB (Hamburg) stated "QRX NXT" (I will stand by for you tomorrow), he failed to make appearance on April 29, or April 30, 1945.

(AOB: all rather curious: About 30 April and 1 May, 1945, my best friend Rudolf Staritz visited, on duty (Dienstlich), Domäne at Wolhdorf, and there they were packing and burning documents to a great extent. A special bus was being equipped with a mobile transmitter, as to operate from the field (Wiese). That still a, maybe tiny, section was operative, is, in my perception curious. It is known that the photo-album had been soldered in copper a box by Uffz. Thobaben (which the latter dug in his own garden. Rudi Staritz asked friends in Hamburg; in the 1980s whether this photo-albums does still exist? Luckily, he still remembered Thobaben's name. This man was still alive, and remembered that it must be somewhere in his garden, but he had forgotten where. They retraced it and I possess a copy of this, quite unique, album)

We have not heard the Hamburg Control station handle any of its German clandestine espionage circuits since yesterday. Specifically, they failed to meet their scheduled contact this morning in the Peasant Case (Goldschmidt Case) at 10:30 a.m. EWT (Eastern War Time) In other words they appear to be "off the air".

We are still hearing DAN the German Naval transmitter at Norddeich (Ost-Friesland) on the North Sea and this station does handle some clandestine traffic.

We ate still hearing today HBG a German clandestine control station. British and U.S. Coast Guard authorities have previously told us that station is located in the Hamburg area (The bus fit with a W/T station as Rudi told me?) However, we have previously had our doubts of this location principally because of the fact that some of the operators talk French in their chatter. (AOB, this might point at Stuttgart and surroundings) Therefore, we do not know the exact location of this station.

There are submitted hereafter two proposed messages for transmittal to station ONB. It is requested that they be presented for clearance to the Joint Chiefs of Staffs. In the event both are approved the first message will be transmitted on Saturday May 12, 1945 and the second will be sent during the following week on a date to be designated later.

OPINION OF VARIOUS OBSERVERS AND ANALYSIS APPEARS TO BE THAT DESPITE OBSTACLES INCLUDING DIFFICULTIES IMPOSED BY RUSSIAN DEMANDS THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT SAN FRANCISCO WILL OBTAIN SUBSTANTIAL SUCCESS IN CREATING WORLD SECURITY ORGANISATION HAVING JUSTICE AS CORNERSTONE. ALL NATIONS SEEM DETERMINED NOT TO ALLOW THE CONFERENCE TO FAIL. YET IT WILL TAKE MUCH PATIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING TO MAINTAIN HARMONY AMONG BIG THREE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES.

THERE IS MUCH SPECULATION HERE ON POSTWAR CONTROL OF GERMANY. TENTATIVE DIVISION WOULD ASSIGN US FORCES TO POLICE SOUTHWEST GERMANY INCLUDING BAVARIA AND PART OF AUSTRIA. RUSSIA TO POLICE AREA EAST OF ELBE AND BRITAIN REMAINDER.

INDICATIONS ARE US ARMY WILL MAINTAIN LARGE AIR FORCE DRAWN FROM EIGHT AND NINTH AIR FORCES TO INSURE MAINTENANCE OF ORDER.

Reference is made to radio activity being conducted by the Laboratory of the Bureau in the above case.

ONB failed to make his scheduled appearance on May 5, 1945, at which time the Bureau station transmitted #133, blind, double.

There is submitted hereafter a proposed message for transmission to JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff). If approved, this message will be transmitted (no longer transmitted in code) to associate station ONB on Saturday, May 19, 1945.

U.S. ARMY WHICH EXCEEDS EIGHT MILLION MEN WILL BE REDUCED AS IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DEPLOY THIS GREAT FORCE AGAINST JAPAN. MORE THAN ONE AND ONE-QUARTER MILLION TROOPS HAVING EXTENSIVE SERVICE OVERSEAS WILL BE DISCHARGED ON POINT SYSTEM. OVER HALF OF TROOPS IN EUROPE WILL BE SENT TO PACIFIC THEATER VIA U.S. RECEIVING FURLOUGHS AT HOME. REMAINDER WILL DO TO PACIFIC DIRECTLY AFTER RECEIVING PACIFIC BATTLE TRAINING IN EUROPE.

NONE WHO FOUGHT IN AFRICA AND EUROPE WILL BE REQUIRED TO SERVE IN PACIFIC THEATER. (Source: Washington Star 5-14-45) REPORTED THAT NEW FIFTEENTH ARMY UNDER GENERAL GEROW WILL POLICE GERMANY FOR U.S. (Source: Time Magazine 5-14-45, Page 34, 3

It is noted that all of the above messages was taken from Time Magazine dated 14, 1945, with the exception of one sentence, "none who fought in Africa and Europe will be required to serve in Pacific Theater".

On May 22, 1945, a station sounding like ONB started sending V's on ONB schedule. He continued for nearly 5 hours, He was best heard on the South Rhombic. (AOB: now we get for the first time an idea about the type of antennae they were operating with)

The nature, nationality, and location of this station is unknown, but our monitors are continuing to watch in an endeavour to obtain more information on him.

AOB: there remained some German military stations on the air; often giving a location as, for example: Salzburg auf der Wiese (lawn). Though, they did not communicate any longer in cipher, thus clear text being employed.

Reference is made to my memorandum of May 22, 1945, in which I reported that a station sounding like ONB started sending V's on ONB's schedule and frequency, which he continued for 5 hours.

Mr. G.E. Sterling, RID, FCC, today advised D.G, Bardin that the subject station was heard by FCC on the reported transmission, and subsequent thereto. Sterling advises that this station was transmitting simultaneously on 13703 and 16350 kHz. Later in the evening he appeared calling IRO RI NI and signalling TO TI RI NU (Kana Code).

You will recall that once before the Bureau received Japanese signals on the South Rhombic, which caused some temporary confusion until the matter was later clarified by information received from FCC. Such phenomena are relatively rare, as it means that the Japanese signals transversed the globe "the other way around", during the period which our monitors heard it from the south.

The possibility that the Japanese are attempting to contact Peasant is extremely remote in view of the simultaneous transmission on two frequencies, one of which unknown to Peasant (Goldschmidt) is extremely remote in view of the simultaneous transmission on two frequencies, one of which unknown to Peasant (Goldschmidt), plus the fact that the Japanese made no attempt to contact anyone during the 5 hours period he was heard sending V's.

The matter has been discussed with the Security Division, and it has been determined to watch this station closely on ONB's (formerly station Hamburg with a to Goldschmidt dedicated frequency spectrum) schedules. If he gives indication of trying to contact Peasant (Goldschmidt), or reappears often on ONB's schedules, consideration will be given by the Security Division to have Peasant (Goldschmidt) establish contact.

Recommendation: It is recommended that a copy of this memorandum be forwarded to the Security Division.

Within the near future, it is probable that Peasant's (Goldschmidt's) various German principals, including Janssen, Helwig, Greiner, and Hamann, will be taken into custody. Appropriate British officials should be apprised of the desire of the Bureau (FBI) that these individuals not be questioned specifically as to Peasant (Goldschmidt). It should be pointed out, however, that the Bureau (FBI) will be very happy to receive any information concerning Peasant (Goldschmidt) which these individuals may volunteer.

!!!!!! The last contact with Germany in this case was on April 28, 1945, and the Germans instructed Peasant (Goldschmidt) that he must "expect temporary suspension of supervision and send his messages 'blind' to Germany. They advised that they would try to confirm the receipt of the message by letter. It is contemplated that for a time the German instructions will be followed: however, it will be necessary that arrangements be made with British authorities to be advised of any attempt by Peasant (Goldschmidt) to return to the Continent.↓↓↓↓↓

AOB: this might have been quite difficult, as Goldschmidt was a "free human entity"

↑↑↑↑↑ When this occurs, appropriate action can be considered in the light of developments. Should it be decided to permit Peasant (Goldschmidt) to return to the continent, it will be necessary that he be interviewed, preferably by British authorities (thus, just those who so scandalously treated him!), to impress him with the undesirability of discussing with anyone his activities during the past three years. This could probably be accomplished by advising him that he could not ne guaranteed protection against possible reprisals by German fanatics. Peasant (Goldschmidt) should be cooperative along these lines

(AOB: why after just had been so severely mall treated by the British Services?) should be cooperative along these lines, because from the German standpoint he has been a traitor.

Synopsis of facts: AOB: quite curious is, that we find references which do not appear about their appropriate date of sequence.

Messages exchanged with ONB in usual manner until entry of British into Hamburg, Germany, May 2, 1945, Thereafter, Peasant (Goldschmidt) continued to transmit blind in accordance with instructions until June 2, 1945, and discontinued transmissions in view of the lack of indication messages being received and complete German collapse. Total of 42 incoming and 142 outgoing messages exchanged. Most recently information reflects Peasant (Goldschmidt) still living in England and has not written any letters to European continent recently. No further indication of a connection between Strecht Ribeiro and Peasant (Goldschmidt) developed to date.

Despite the immense of complete military defeat and the steady advance of Allied armies toward Hamburg, Germany, exchange of traffic between Peasant (Goldschmidt) and his principals continued, and the signals of ONB (Call-sign dedicated to Goldschmidt on behalf of the Hamburg Abwehr / K.d.M. station Domäne) were heard as late as May 1, 1945, one day before the entry of British military↓

→forces into the city. Since the occupation by British forces of the city of Hamburg, no further signals have been heard from the control station (ONB call-sign sent by Hamburg Domäne), and on this occasion incoming messages 39, 40 and 41 were received, and outgoing messages 124 and 125 were transmitted (notionally /virtually) by Peasant (= Goldschmidt). It is noted incoming 39 was a repeat message having been previously received by Peasant (Goldschmidt) on April 10, 1945. It appeared the control station was not certain that Peasant (Goldschmidt) had acknowledged receipt of this message, it being recalled the signals of both stations were weak on that occasion. It is noted on April 15, 1945, conditions were adverse. As far as could be determined, ONB (Hamburg) had not changed transmitters on this date.

WE RECOMMENDED FURTHER WORK IN THE OLD WAY AS LONG AS (THERE IS) A CONNECTION. WE (Hamburg) ARE INSTITUTING PROVISION IN THE MANNER MANNER YOU PROPOSED. NUMBER 39. STILL CONSIDER THAT INSTRUCTION TO OUR BRAZIL REPRESENTATIVE MUST TAKE PLACE BY LETTER THEREFORE TIME IS NECESSARY THEREFORE OUR QUESTION ABOUT DIRECT TRANSFER FROM PORTUGAL.

IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION YOU MUST FIGURE ON TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF SUPERVISION. #40. NEVERTHELESS PLEASE STAND BY FURTHER TO RECEIVE, IN CASE YOU CANNOT HEAR US TRANSMIT MESSAGES ON HAND TO US BLIND, EACH GROUP DOUBLE. WE WILL TRY TO CONFIRM. NO. 41. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF ROOSEVELT'S DEATH? WHAT ARE THE IMPRESSIONS ON YOUR CIRCLE OF ACQUAINTANCES AND ON THE PUBLIC?

FROM RIO DE JANEIRO 6 - 22 - 45 (22 June 1945) NR 102 6:10 p.m. EWT (Eastern War Time)

PEASANT CASE (Goldschmidt Case) RECOMMENDED BUREAU AUTHORIZE ME TO REQUEST POLICE TO ARREST STRECHT (Ribeiro) FOR QUESTIONING USING ONLY INFORMATION SET FORTH YOUR LETTER MARCH 31 LAST, WITH SOME OTHER (name of double agent made invisible) INFORMATION. BELIEVE FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF STRECHT HERE UNWARRANTED ?? HE IS NOT DEVELOPING INTO A DOUBLE AGENT AS EXPECTED (hoped for). HE CLAIMS TO KNOW NOTHING OF JAPANESE ACTIVITIES. CAN ARRANGE INTERROGATION BY AGENT OF THIS OFFICE (US office in Brazil).

The last contact with the Germans in this case was on April 28, 1945. The Germans indicated their probable future inability to make contact and requested that Peasant (Goldschmidt) transmit his messages "blind". The German radio station (Hamburg Domäne) was last heard on May 1, 1945, the day prior to the occupation of Hamburg by British troops. Since that date, which marked the beginning of the total collapse of Germany, Peasant (Goldschmidt) has sent messages "blind" as instructed: however, there have never been any indications that these messages were received. In addition, the German collapse was so complete that the possibilities of such messages ever being received are extremely remote.

AOB: Rudolf Staritz visited at the end of April the compound of Domäne in Wohldorf twice. He himself was stationed in Lübeck and was on "duty" there. Most astonishingly: the guard noticed: mmm Staritz Staritz we have a Staritz here on the premises (im Hause). The name Staritz isn't very common in Germany. Astonishing: it was Rudi's brother whom shortly before had arrived from Northern Norway! Rudolf applied for taking his brother with him to Lübeck, because he could use some assistance. The Officer in charge wasn't cooperative and demanded a special request from Lübeck. Rudi had to return to Lübeck as to obtain a special order for the transfer of Gfr or Ogfr. Karl Staritz. It all worked out ultimately well.

However, Domäne was in chaos - as they were burning documents, packing matters, among it Enigma's (Schlüsselmaschinen).

AOB: that the German military services counted with the possibility that they could remain operating had its origin in the fact - that they expected that the Western Allies would soon experience a warlike affair with Russia. In that case, they could join the Western Allies against an offensive towards Russia; as they possessed the best knowledge about Russian military services.

It happened not yet this way, but soon the geopolitical situation changed and it became quite soon apparent that the Germans should become engaged with the NATO alliance. In 1956 the new Western German military Service named "Bundeswehr" shared the western powers. And became a member of the NATO. Albeit, in the early stages, under strict American control. (Waffenkontrollgesetz)

The operation of this case has been exceptionally successful. In spite of the numerous handicaps, the case developed to the point where regular radio contact with Germany was maintained. This channel of communication was utilized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to transmit deceptive information to Germany. That the Germans had confidence in Peasant (Goldschmidt) indicated by information received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the effect messages sent by Peasant (Goldschmidt) were later relayed by the Germans to the Japanese.

Another objective of any double agent operation is to attempt to identify and locate German espionage agents. In this case, we were successful in identifying two German agents who were dispatched to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. (AOB: but legally still not under US jurisdiction) These agents are under extensive investigation in Rio de Janeiro. Another objective which was accomplished in this case was the maintenance of contact with the German Intelligence Service for the purpose of studying its modus operandi. The numerous messages exchanged in this case give considerable information along this line.

At this stage, there is nothing further which can be done along any of the above lines and the only remaining objectives are:

1. To establish contact with what remnants, if any, are left of the German Intelligence System.

2. To attempt to obtain the money which the Germans promised they would send Peasant (Goldschmidt) through his intermediary in Rio de Janeiro.

In connection with number 1, the only action necessary is to arrange for routine monitoring of Peasant's (Goldschmidt's) frequency at the scheduled times. This monitoring can be handled by the regular Laboratory personnel, and the two special operators can be assigned to regular duty.

With respect to number 2 above, there is nothing further which can be done here and appropriate stops for the intermediary can be maintained by the Rio de Janeiro Office (in the US Embassy)

For the above reason, a letter is being directed to the Washington Field Office suggesting that consideration be given to placing this case in a closed status, subject (the interrogation of Ribeiro- Strecht), of course, to being reopened if there are any developments of interest.

FROM RIO DE JANEIRO 7-17-45 (17 July 1945) NR 173 6-42 p.m. EWT (Eastern War Time)

PEASANT (Goldschmidt) ON BASIS OF INFORMATION FURNISHED US RIO DE JANEIRO POLICE ARRESTED STRECHT AT 8:00 P.M. YESTERDAY. SUBJECT ADMITTED HAVING BEEN EMPLOYED BY GERMAN ESPIONAGE IN PORTUGAL AND VOLUNTARILY IDENTIFIED PERSONS MENTIONED IN BUREAU LETTER MARCH 31. HE HAS GIVEN THREE MONTHS OF ESPIONAGE TRAINING INCLUDING RADIO OPERATION IN BREMEN, GERMANY, AND TRAVELLED TO BRAZIL AS AGENT OF THE GERMANS. SUBJECT HAD IN HIS POSSESSION THREE IDENTICAL MICRODOTS SHOWING DIAGRAMS AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR SETTING UP AND OPERATING SHORT WAVE, ESPIONAGE INSTRUCTIONS AND CODES. STRECHT DENIES ANY ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY SINCE ARRIVAL IN BRAZIL. QUESTIONING CONTINUING. FULL DETAILS WILL BE REPORTED EXPEDITIOUSLY.

As you will recall, this double agent operation was handled through simulation of Information Goldschmidt's (Morse) handwriting and telegraphic touch, while Goldschmidt actually remained in England.

The problem has now come up as to what disposition the British authorities should make of Goldschmidt. At the time this case was active, we had requested the British authorities to keep a close check on Goldschmidt and keep him in England in order that the case would not be compromised. The case, however, is now closed and there is attached a letter from Lynch (US Embassy in London) pointing out that the British are faced with the problem of handling a disgruntled (resentful) and unwanted alien who is without funds and that the Dutch authorities in England are also fed up with Goldschmidt, who is causing unnecessary trouble by going from one Government department to another asking for a position and he is the type of person who finds it difficult to earn his living. British, of course, want him out of England.

The problem also arises as to how much Goldschmidt should be told about his notional activities in the United States. In other words, if Goldschmidt, upon his release, encounters a member of the German Intelligence Service and the latter brings up Goldschmidt's work in the United States, Goldschmidt would know nothing about it and the intelligence office would then know that we had simulated Goldschmidt's (Morse) handwriting and telegram touch. On the other hand, iif we were to brief Goldschmidt on his notional activities, it might place him in a position of either writing a book or holding himself out to the Dutch authorities and Dutch people as a unsung hero.

It is recommended that the British be advised that we now consider the case closed and that they may dispose of Goldschmidt as they see fit, and that we not feel it desirable that he be briefed on his notional activities in the United States.

For completion of your files, you are advised that upon interrogation Dr. Friedrich Karl Homann, alias Dr. Carl Hellwig, furnished the following information relative to Peasant (Goldschmidt).

Peasant (Goldschmidt) was a Dutchman who was originally recruited by Tornow of I M Ast Hamburg. He was turned over to I T/LW in the latter part of 1943. Thereafter he was trained in Hamburg in W/T and was otherwise briefed, which process consumed about six months. W/T training and handled by Ii (Trautmann, or his office) and Homann was unable to recall what specific persons handled peasant (Goldschmidt) in this matter.

In ~~1944~~ 1943 Peasant (Goldschmidt), in company of Mohr of IT/LW, travelled to Spain and then to Lisbon where he appealed to the Dutch Consul for help. He was apparently successful and proceeded to London, from which point he corresponded with Ast Hamburg through Portugal. The stay in London was merely a matter of transit, and Peasant (Goldschmidt) then proceeded to New York, from which point he again wrote to his principals through Portugal.

Thereafter Peasant (Goldschmidt) set up his W/T set. About 90% of his messages were about money which he said he needed. Nothing of value was transmitted concerning aircraft, but certain political matters were reported such as the activities of international commissions, et cetera. Homann advised that he doubted there was anything very secret about the information sent by Peasant (Goldschmidt) and feels now that he may hve been controlled. His messages were received over the Abwehr station at Wohldorf-Hamburg (Domäne) known under the cover name Domäne, where Peasant (Goldschmidt) was known as Lutina. Peasant (Goldschmidt) continued to broadcast until Domäne fell to the Allies. The location of Peasant's (Goldschmidt's) was not known to Homann, but he felt that it might be somewhere in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. inasmuch as Peasant (Goldschmidt) started he was going to Washington to obtain a job of some sort probably an oil company.

Homann did not recall that type of secret ink, of any, Peasant (Goldschmidt) used and said that Peasant (Goldschmidt) was paid about $5,000 leaving Germany and later $2,000 were sent to him but its appeared never to have arrived. This sum was given by an agent Hamann, cover name Lemback, in Portugal to a sailor en route to Philadelphia. The sailor was to mail the money to Peasant's (Goldschmidt's) post office box, but noting more was ever heard of this deal.

Homann stated that his Referat (Section) definitely had not other agents in the Western Hemisphere.

For completion of the file in this case, it is pointed out that upon interrogation (at Camp 020 in London) Herbert Christian Wichmann, head of the Hamburg Abwehrstelle, furnished the following information concerning Goldschmidt whose cover name is Lutine:

"Lutine: Left for the U.S.A. via Portugal and has been a link since the middle (August) of 1944. Controlled by Hamburg (RSHA Amt) VI T/Wi/T. Information required was about the air industry, especially inventions and new constructions. Results to date were poor. There was trouble with the W/T traffic".

We have reached the conclusion of the Helmuth Siegfried Goldschmidt's file series.

I don't know what to believe and think about this person.

I have not been able to discover what happened with Helmuth Siegfried Goldschmidt after he left England.

In my perception - he may not have returned to The Netherlands.

Maybe, he went to Middle or South America, as no-one knew there who he was; and apparently he spoke the language sufficiently; as he was supposed to communicate with Hamburg in a mixture of languages, among it Spanish.

He had lived for a while in Colombia; somewhere in the 1930s.

AOB