Chapman-Zigzag-2

Chapter 6 (31-5'21) Please click at the Chapter number as to continue directly at Chapter 6

Chapter 7 (3-6'21) Please click at the Chapter number as to continue directly at Chapter 7

This is, in my perception, the best photograph of Chapman I have encountered, including on Wikipedia and elsewhere on the web

During the course of our Survey we encounter a far more sympathetic photo of Chapman

Albeit that it is a forged Irish document on behalf of the Germans; which Chapman brought in when he landed on 16th December 1942 in Cambridgeshire

When mentioning his Norwegian girl-friend Dagmar Lahlum, during his first interview on 29th June at Camp 020, Chapman that he had told her that he was an Englishman and, in reality, working for the British Government. He had complete confidence in her as she was herself anti-German. When he left Oslo he asked the Germans at the Dienststelle to look after her and pay her 600 Kroner a month from his money, the balance of 110,000 RM, which was in deposit at the Dienststelle. Her last address was: 4a, Tullingsgate, Oslo.

In view of the foregoing, care has been taken to obtain, by questioning Chapman and listening to his frequent references to her, the fullest information on the kind of girl Dagmar Lahlum is. The information thus acquired is set out hereunder:

As his second interview, Chapman related that he first saw this girl, whose full maiden name is Dagmar Mohne Hansen Lahlum, at the Ritz Restaurant, whilst he was staying at the Hotel Forbunds, Oslo. This was probably in April 1943. At first, all attempts on his part to get to know her failed, but eventually, he succeeded in in making her acquaintance a few days later when she was accompanied by her friend Mary Larsen. In due course, Chapman got to know Dagmar intimately.

At the time of their first meeting, she was living in a flat at 15, Frydenlundsgate, Oslo. Her parents lived at Eidswold, north of Oslo. He met the mother on one occasion. Dagmar Lahlum has a brother who is at present believed to be in the U.S.A. where he had proceeded some time before the (German) invasion of Norway (9th April 1940) took place. Dagmar Lahlum was married but divorce proceedings had been instituted. Apparently, at the time of the marriage, Dagmar Lahlum's parents had been over a considerable dowry (wedding gift) to the husband who was not prepared to return this money to his wife, and there was a law-suit in this connection. Later, when Chapman moved to 15, Kappelveien, he persuaded his girl-friend to live there with him, explained at the same time, that he had sufficient money for them both.

Chapman says that he has never met this girl's husband and does not know his name.

Chapman led Dagmar Lahlum to believe that he was a German, which frequently led to this girl's embarrassment, since and Norwegian association with Germans were automatically ostracised (not accepted, disliked) by their compatriots. Some five month after their first meeting, approximately August/September 1943, Chapman deliberately told Dagmar, when they were alone on the yacht one day, that he was working for the British. Chapman denies that he was under the influence of drink at the time, or that he risked losing her if he continued impersonate a German. Dagmar Lahlum was curious to know more details about Chapman's work for the British, but he says he told her nothing. Whilst she expressed a certain amount of surprise at this information, she said she had suspected from his accent that Chapman was not German.

Chapman eventually told Dagmar that he would probably be going back to England in the near future, and asked her, during his absence to remain in contact with the various members of the Abwehr in Oslo, and to keep her eyes and ears open for information that might later be of interest. He impressed upon her that she was to trust nobody unless she was approached by somebody who gave as password, her full name - Dagmar Mohne Hansen Lahlum.

Some time later, when Chapman was in Paris, he received a letter brought by Stube (Stübe) from his girl-friend, in which she indicated that she was having a good time and had met a certain Sturmbannführer (S.S. Major), From these remarks, Chapman gathered that she was continuing to receive the monthly payment of 600 Kroner, above referred to. The reference to the Sturmbannführer indicated that she was continuing to make contact with personnel of the Oslo Ast (AOB, about now re-designated as: K.d.M. instead and no longer Ast was used) (Kommandomeldegebiet). The letter was addressed to Chapman c/o the Paris Leitdienststelle, and bore the Feldpostnummer 42619. Chapman observed that another letter received from Dagmar though the normal post, had been opened by the German's Zensur (censorship)

Chapman appears anxious at every opportunity to talk about Dagmar Lahlum. Once while giving descriptions, he broke off to say that he gave long consideration to the idea of telling her that he was working for the British. Further details he let drop were that she was not a: fast" girl, but had married a man elder than herself, who wanted her to stay at home and look after him. She, at twenty-one, was not prepared to forego her the opportunity for a divorce, which was ? train at the time Chapman met her. The husband, to whom Dagmar had handed her 20,000 Kroner dowry for safe keeping, refused to give her the money back to her unless she returned to him. She refused. Chapman told her not to worry; → (page 42)

he had plenty of money. Dagmar was not prepared to accept this offer, and Chapman then decided, to override her scruples, to pay her in the form of wages, 600 Kroner monthly. He told her that he was not a German, which she already suspected, and that he was working for England. She could be of use to him. He gave her at no time, particulars of his work, but she knew he would one day leave her to return to England.

Chapman fully realised that he was putting his life in Dagmar's hands, but says that he was quite satisfied that she had not been "planted" by the Germans in the café when he first met her. Describing how he picked her up on that occasion, Chapman ways that it was not easy to persuade her to go out with him. He was, presumably, a German, and Dagmar was self-conscious and blushed when meeting Norwegians in his company. For this reason, they did not frequent restaurants and bars used only by Norwegians.

Following his confession to Dagmar, Chapman encouraged her to accept invitations from Graumann, when she would be alone with him, and left her frequently in the company of other members of the Dienststelle. Although Chapman knew the address of the Dienststelle. he gave Dagmar the test to obtain it fro Graumann; this she did and furthermore, she obtained discreetly, a number of photographs of Chapman's contacts. Photograph thus obtained of:

are hidden, Chapman says, in the attic at 15, Kappellveien, Oslo, unknown to Dagmar.

Chapman says that, had Dagmar double-crossed him, either then or later, he would at once observed a change in the attitude of the Germans towards him. Such a change never took place tight up to the time of his departure from Paris in June. On the contrary, up to the end, he was treated as the King-Pin among agents, pointed out as "the man who has already been over there for us", and generally feted and respected.

Chapman hopes one day to meet Dagmar again after the war. One of his objects will be to reinstate her with her compatriots by asserting that she had double-crossed the Germans and to ensure her financial position should she not have been paid her salary as arranged by him, by the Germans.

Dagmar is now living under the "protection", to put it no higher, of the Oslo Dienststelle, at a flat obtained for her, a Norwegian, under difficulties, by Holst. This flat is close to the Sicherheitsdienst Headquarters in Oslo.

The foregoing is Chapman's version of this girl and his relation with her. There is, however, one more fact given us by Chapman which, unfortunately tends further to complicate the → (page 43)

unofficial introduction of this girl into the service (how does he dare!) of the British Government. This fact is brought out by an incident related by Chapman which occurred while he was walking in the street with Dagmar. She stepped suddenly into a small tobacconist's shop, returned almost immediately and told him that the Allies had invaded Sicily (July 1943) She intimated, without revealing the names of any of her contacts, that this information came through patriotic Norwegian Jøssings. The news about Sicily had not at the moment been broadcast in Norway. (AOB, and in England?)

It appears clear, therefore, that Dagmar is in contact with Norwegian underground movement, at the same time has the confidence of a British Secret Service agent, and is at present being maintained by the German Secret Service.

Since the fascinating case Chapman is still unfinished, the foregoing account of his story, covering his fifteen months as guest of the German secret service, cannot be considered complete. It has been written on the basis of a few interviews with the man, which, in the interests of an early report, were somewhat rushed, Chapman is still with us and missing detail can always be obtained for a later interim or liquidation report.

In the meantime I am of opinion that the courageous and ruthless Chapman has given satisfaction to his no less ruthless German employers. They paid him out for services they considered rendered, and, for the duration of his stay with them, he has survived who knows what tests. Chapman does not appear to boast, but incidents he has mentioned as occurring in Oslo, if true, would only enhance the high opinion of the Germans have of his ability and courage.

Chapman stood out for his reward for the Germans, and got it. He was apparently able to match their best drinkers without giving the show away, and to lead as hard a life as any of them.

Against Holst he had shooting match with revolvers during which Chapman shot down 16 electric bulbs at 8 metres, before Holst hit the target, (AOB, I really wonder, noticing facts and circumstances, which had not been subject of this report. Does this imply, that the report only reflects a composition of what they at Camp 020 would like to bring to notion to whom this report actually was meant to?) He collected 100 Kroner from Holst, and that he got away with this in a German camp says for his standing and popularity. (are they really his friend?)

There is the incident when he beat up a Norwegian Legionaire for a fancied slight to his girl-friend in the Löwenbräu (also not covered within this report); on another occasion, Chapman says, he obtained the immediate release of a young friend of Dagmar, from out of a crowd of rounded-up students. To do this he had an argument with a German soldier and a German officer, in the street.

Chapman's sailing exploits off Oslo, when he put out against all advice and survived the loss of his sails, would only enhance his stock at the Dienststelle, where , no doubt, one of the Chiefs, his friend Graumann, was proud of his protégée, It should not be forgotten that Graumann was protecting a man who had 'made' him in the German Secret Service.

Be that all as it may, Chapman is a difficult subject and a certain percentage of his loyalties is still for Germany. One cannot escape the thought that, had Germany been winning the war, he would quite easily have stayed abroad. IN England he has no social standing; in Germany, among thugs (brutes), he is accepted.

It is not easy to judge, the workings of Chapman's mind; he is bound to make comparisons between his life of luxury (always a delicate aspect in the minds of quite many British Civil Crown Servants!) among the Germans, where he was almost a law unto himself, and his treatment here, were he has still the law to fear.

The operational code described below was given to Chapman for use when communicating with the Germans when transmitting from this (English) country. It is a double transposition code and does not vary in principle from other codes received of this kind.

This code is based on a word of 31 letters, the following word having been chosen in this case.

(It is most unlikely, that this word had ever been selected within Abwehr of Mil Amt communications, but is a engendered within the mind of someone in England)

This word is written along the line from left to right, leaving a blank between every letter until the 16th letter has been reached. The remaining letters of the key word are then written in the spaces commencing with the blank which corresponds to the number of the month in the year in which the message is sent. On reaching the end of the line a start is made at the beginning again when the remaining spaces are filled in. The sequence of letters thus obtained in written across the top of the paper and numbered according to the position of the letters in the alphabet:

Please compare the copy above as to determine the exact interposition to the various lines!

The columns, starting with column 3 (follow the next number sequence; 3 was the day of the month the message was supposed to be transmitted)., are read downwards and written under the numerical equivalent of the key letter horizontally. Should the numbers of letters in the message not be divisible by 5, no additional letters are added.

This is carried out in the same manner as above, starting with column 3 (the supposed date of transmission), and written in the form to right before. The resultant text is then divided into groups of 5 for purpose of transmission.

The control sign is 'Dagmar' which may be inserted at any point in the message, and when used shows that Chapman is transmitting without control of the British. Should, however, he be under control, 'Dagmar' is omitted and 'Fritz' is used as signature.

The Transmitter, Receiver and Transformer of the Transmitter-Receiver 99/10 are combined on a from panel. Under the lid, at the rear, space is provided for earphones and (aerial) insulators.

The Transmitter is a quartz controlled apparatus with an AL5 transmission valve. The three quartz are built in under a detachable lid and can be changed over with a screw-driver. Cutting out (switching?) of the quartz is obtained by the appropriate knob. Quartz of about kHz to about ... kHz can be used. Tuning on the crystal frequency is done through the knob marked "Tuning". The aerial is tuned in by means of the knob "Ant. Tuning".

The Receiver is a three calve apparatus with a HF circuit. The first two are Pentodes EF 12, the other a double triode (?) DDD 11 (EDD 11?) The aerial socket (Anschlüsse) for the Receiver are at the rear. The Receiver covers a wave range of 8040 to 3935 kHz or from 37.4 metres to 76.3 metres.

The Transformer (Power Supply) is fitted with an EZ 12. The apparatus is ensured for an output of one ampere (1 A fuse) It cannot be used with direct current (DC). When the switch is turned to "Ant", the built-in (moving coil) instrument shows approximately the aerial current; when tuned to "AC" the grid tension. If the grid tension is unknown the apparatus must be adjusted at "Top of Transformer (Netzgerät)" to 220 Volts before the first switch on. Adjust with screw driver.

Aerials: Four sockets (connections), 1 to 4, are provided from the transmitting aerial; the socket "G" for the ~~de-poling~~? (meant: Counter-Poise!) (Gegengewicht). The following aerial and counter-poise lengths are most suitable for the quartz frequencies. (AOB, please notice, that sometimes agents operated in B-K mode (= braek-in), where transmitting- and receiving frequencies differ; allowing the fact that albeit someone transmits, he is still able to receive the counter station as well)

The below given frequencies being valid only for Chapman for the expected period of the year.

(AOB: being myself a Radio HAM for almost 60 years the discrepancy between 7518 kHz and 7426 kHz hardly makes a wavelength difference allowing a 10 metres longer aerial to be operated)

The aerial can be the same length as the counter-poise. The aerial should be mounted (erected as high as possible and free as possible. The lengths are to be understood as inclusive (feeding) leads.

Camp 020. 30.6.44 WB = pointing at W. Brown the same one whom signed the previous report.

Flight-Lieutenant Cholmondeley rang up today and said that after discussion with the D.M.O. it had been agreed that barometric readings could be given by Zigzag, provided:

(3) slight errors either way should be introduced (it is suggested that readings should be taken before the aneroid (Barometer) is tapped)

(4) one reading a day only should be given: this if possible, not repeat not, in the morning.

Confirming my verbal message, R.S.S. (Radio Security Service; the Service monitoring Abwehr wireless communications) report that Zigzag control yesterday evening was 20 miles East of a line from Le Havre to Paris. As I gather the bearings were not very precise, I think we can assume that this means the control was in or near Paris.

Control used call-sign IMN but it should have been, according to our list (likely provided by Chapman's papers), NMI.

R.S.S. are also quibbling (hair-splitting) about some call-signs in column (2) commencing 12th July and reading downwards, should be a repetition of the call-signs in column (1), commencing 1st July, but there are slight discrepancies in column (3) call-signs on the 12th (July 1944), 14th, 16th and 18th. I have looked at the system of making the call-signs available can be used, in which case these call-signs are quite probably correct. Perhaps you would let me know at your convenience.

B.3.b. 8th July 1944. Sgd. R.L. Hugh (albeit that the signature originates from someone else)

This letter is dealing with the subject of V 1 (flying) (buzz) bombs, which the Germans, since 13th June 1944, fire at the London area

We spoke this afternoon about Zigzag messages. I enclose the first message which has just come to me for approval.

With the greater part of it I agree, and indeed I discussed it with Wilson before it was drafted. There are, however, one or two points on which think we should exercise some care.

Although as Wilson says, an agent tries to report what he thinks his masters will want to hear, I think that we have too much at stake here to allow reports to the (rather bald) effect that "people are scared". Could we not safely say something like the reports given in the report which you left with us, viz., that people are cautious, but remain quite calm and show no signs of undue alarm and certainly no sign of panic.

The second point is that, for our deception policy, the important thing is is to give really precise times, and I do not think that we can do this credibly, in view of the line taken by Garbo (Pujol), Brutus (Czerniawski / Walenty/ Hubert) and the others except in relation to the bombs actually seen or heard by Zigzag (Chapman). Could he not say, as I think you suggested, that he cannot give exact times for all incidents and that he proposes to concentrate on those which fall in the hearing. These he will time exactly and and then go out to find the actual locations. Something on these lines will give us sufficient scope for our purposes and go some way to corroborate Garbo and the others.

The third point is the barometric pressure one. Ought we not to get a firm view from the experts before we embark on a series of readings. If we start by giving the facts we may be embarrassed later on.

AOB: this expertise had been dealt with in minute 365b d.d. 10.7.44 (KV 2/459-2, page 22)

Please bear always in mind: that the sequence of reference in respect to the increasing PDF page numbers, they run, instead, backwards in time!

KV 2/459-2, page 37 (minute 352a) It concerns the query put forward on to F/Lt Cholmondeley dealt with (D108) (D108return)

Zigzag's (Chapman's) mission in this country included instructions to report on the effects of flying bomb, giving the exact time and exact details where they land and of the effect. He was also instructed to supply barometric reports which he would do by taking a reading about one hour before he transmitted, He was not asked to give any other type of weather report. He himself has no doubt that the barometer reading was to be given for some purpose connected with the flying bombs. He was not expressly told why they wanted the barometer reading, but the instructions to give it were given by the same person and at the same time as the other instructions about flying bombs.

As he arrived in this country with plenty of money, there is no plausible reason from the point of view of his case why he should not have purchased a barometer, and therefore be in a position to carry out that part of his instructions. I shall therefore, be grateful if you could let me have an early decision whether a barometer reading can be given in his transmissions, starting from 1.15?? (a.m. /p.m.?) on 6.7.44.

I met Zigzag (Chapman) at the R.A.C. (likely: Royal Automobile Club) yesterday afternoon after he had returned from Camp 020. He said that he was anxious to write to Freda (she once was his girl-friend with whom Chapman had a child, be she married in the meantime to someone) to tell her that he was back in London, but to indicate that he was very busy at the moment and would communicate with her in a few day's time. I suggested to him that he might delay this letter for a few days longer until his position was clearer, but when he told me that the letter was only to be a short one, I said that I really could not see and serious objection to sending it, but that I would confirm that it would be all right on Tuesday and let him have Freda White's address. (AOB, it was agreed upon before Chapman left - end of Febr. 1943 that Freda and their daughter should be paid eachone £5 weekly as long as he was abroad; for which Chapman left at B.1.a office £375).

I discussed with him the possible traffic for Thursday, and he said that he wanted to make a report on the flying bombs. He thought he should give the time and the date on which the flying bombs fell at Regents Palace Hotel, and in Kensington, and I (knowing the directive) suggested to him that he might also include some of the damage in north London. He also wishes to send a barometric reading. I pointed out to him that there would probably be some difficulty in obtaining one, but he said that there was a barometer at Rugby Mansions and another at Hendon. We might, however, be able to persuade him not to send this if the meteorological people insist that it shall not be dealt with. (on 10th July it was decided that under some conditions it may be done)

Zigzag (Chapman) said we also might consider mentioning that he has been in contact with Darry, an ex-crook (prison) friend of his, whom he had proposed to recruit as a sub-agent for going to airfields with the other transmitter and, as a consequence, Zigzag (Chapman) would like the enemy to send him the details of the equipment which they had in their hands in connection with night-fighters (I suppose meant: Pathfinder Mosquito fit with Oboe) and anti-submarine devices, as Darry might be able to get some information about this while he was in industrial area. I told him we would consider this proposal.

I handed Zigzag (Chapman) £80 and he signed a receipt for £100 as an advance to include the £20 which I had given him previously. I also gave him 50 clothing coupons.

I asked him if he had any objection to receiving a National Registration identity card in his own name Chapman. He said that he had none.

I gave Zigzag (Chapman) the telephone number WHI* 6789 to ring up in case of any difficulty instead of GER 4850 which is on the small switchboard. I told him to ask for me (Mr. R.T. Reed of B.1.a at M.I.5) and if I was not available to ask the switchboard to get a message through to "the chief" (T.A. Robertson?), leaving a telephone number where he could be contacted. I will tell him to alter this today so that during the evening he contacts the N.D.O. and I will see that a memo is left with the N.D.O. saying that "the chief" is Colonel Robertson. During the daytime, if I am not available, I shall ask him to speak to Miss Curdon as he already knows her.

1. Radio set, No. 187, with provision for external crystal frequencies. Small envelope containing three fuses. Both in metal container (Hansen type).

5. Mains power pack for the above transmitter with tappings (taps) for 110, 125, 140, 160 and 220 volts, with main plug.

Manfred Bauriedel - sent me an e-mail about this bakelite fast transmitting device which he found at the website of the: Militärhistorischen Museum Dresden.

Also the Russians operated similar products, as Russian codes were consisting of numbers only.

9. Aerial wound on wooden former with the words written on it "Sendeantenne und Gegengewicht" (counter-poise).

12. Brown corrugated (ribbed) box containing spares and comprising the following:-

L Squared sheets of paper showing methods of connecting up small transmitter and coding device.

M Brown paper envelope containing "Verkehrsplan" giving frequencies of transmission and call-signs.

P Crystal frequencies used by Norwegian Dienststelle. will you please pass this property on to B.1.a (M.I.5), who have asked for it by telephone this morning. It is urgently

Dr. Page examined Zigzag (Chapman) yesterday and said that his condition was not as bad as it might be. He (Dr. Page) has given him some medicine and has recommended treatment, but thinks it will be necessary for a rather more concentrated treatment to be started next week. Meanwhile he considers that Zigzag is well enough to be interrogated, and in fact the man seems mentally quite fit though he is physically tired.

Zigzag (Chapman) told the German intelligence that he would transmit on either Friday or Saturday the 30th June (1944) or the 1st July in order to indicate that he was all right. he believes it would be possibly to commence transmitting early next week without serious prejudice to his case, but he thinks it would be advisable to send a short message on Saturday, and to this end we prepared the following:

Do you see any objection to this transmission being made from 35 Crespigny Road? If not I will set up the apparatus there on Saturday morning, for our first transmission is at 14.17 DBST (? British Standard Time) to Oslo, and the second time 17.14 DBST) to Paris, We may not find it necessary to transmit both times, By saying that we (he - Chapman) shall transmit again next Thursday (6th ~~June~~ July) we should have time to have Zigzag (Chapman) interrogated by Camp 020 on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, and if (Camp) 020 agree on Sunday also.

Zigzag (Chapman) was interrogated yesterday morning by Colonel Stephens (Head of Camp 020) between 10.30 and 2 p.m. who states that he believes that Zigzag (Chapman) is playing straight. This is my own view also. While it would be an advantage to have a full interrogation report before anything is done with this man (Chapman), I think it would be in the interests of the case to commence transmitting in order to safeguard if for the future.

B.1.a. 30.6.44 Sgd. R.T Reed (Captain) Albeit that the signature is made by A.G? Gudon?

I have been looking into certain points in connection with the steps to be taken to safeguard Zigzag's (Chapman's) position here. I find that when he (Chapman) was last here (very early 1943) lived under the name of Edward Simpson. This identity was not supported by any documents other than a letter (at minute 78a Vol. 2) which was carried by F.S.P. in whose charge he was. This letter contained a photograph of Zigzag (Chapman) and stated that the bearer was engaged on special duties for the War Office and was accompanied by Zigzag (Chapman), and asked that any questions about Zigzag (Chapman) should be referred to Room 055. As far as I can see Zigzag (Chapman) carried no documents whatsoever.

So far as the home Office were concerned the only information which I can find is contained at minute 57 in Vol. 1 from which it appears that D.B. explained the circumstances of the detention under Arrival from Enemy Territory Order. What should be done on the expiration of the 30 days cover by this Order was left for future consideration. As Zigzag (Chapman) was released before the expiration of the Order presumably no question arose for further consideration, and I cannot find that the Home Office ever heard any more about the case.

It will be remembered that one of the main anxieties last time was that Zigzag might be recognised and arrested by a zealous policeman. In this connection I see that, as appears at (minute) 83a in volume 2, Major Langdon advised that it would be better not to say anything at all to the Police about Zigzag (Chapman), but to take a chance. In fact, so far as I am aware, Zigzag (Chapman) was never recognised by Police, although one or two of his friends did recognise him.

If he is going to be here for any length of time it is quite clear that he must have identity documents, and it is perfectly easy to provide him with a complete identity in the name of Edward Simpson. I am not clear, however, whether this really gets us very much further, for the people, who know Zigzag (Chapman) will recognise him whether he calls himself Chapman or Simpson, while the people who → (page 21)

do not know him will be no wiser about him even if he goes under his real name. I see that there was some sort of understanding, of which Zigzag (Chapman) has by now doubtless repented (regretted), that if he ever came back would marry Freda White. If he marries her he cannot very well do so under the name of Simpson. My own view, therefore, is that it would be better to regularise his position completely and have him landed and registered in his own name. It is perhaps early for anybody to say whether or not Zigzag (Chapman) will be sent back to enemy-occupied territory. Whether he goes back or not, however, I do feel that this exploits to date have amply earned him a pardon for the various outstanding crimes which he is alleged to have committed. I think, therefore, that consideration should be given to getting a pardon for Zigzag (Chapman) now if that is possible.

I saw Zigzag (Chapman) this morning (28.6.44) with Major Hughes R.S.L.O. Cambridge. Zigzag landed by parachute early this morning in Cambridgeshire (for the second time; once on 16 December 1942 and June 1944). He had with him two wireless sets, one transmitter and receiver combined and one transmitter only; two Leica cameras with fittings and £6,000 in money. There were various other bits and pieces which he brought with him, which i will not bother to make a note here.

He said that the two wireless sets for his use and the use of a friend of his to enable them to send information to the Germans about the assembly of American aircraft for raids on Germany. One Leica camera and £2,000 of the money which he had brought with him are to be handed on by him to someone else whose particulars he has not got. He is not quite clear whether the man is already in this country, or whether he is to follow. He did, however, mention that he might have to deposit the money and the camera at an hotel. He will not, however, receive final instructions as to the disposal of the camera and the money until he has established W/T communications.

I think that in all probable the money and the camera are intended for Brutus. Most secret Source refer to the possibility of money being sent to Brutus (Hubert) (Czerniawski) by way of Zigzag (Chapman), and Brutus has already asked for his own camera to be sent to him. This, we know, is a Leica camera with the necessary fittings to enable him to take photographs of documents. One of the cameras which Zigzag (Chapman) has brought with him has these fittings.

In the course of conversation he said that he had been in Norway for a year an had a splendid time there; had bought himself a yacht and sailed round the various fjords; had been in close association with Graumann (@ Rittmeister von Groening). He has not, however, mentioned to me the names of of any agents who passed through the hands of the Abwehr authorities in Oslo. This to my mind is a point which may be very useful if there is at any time a suggestion that he may be holding back information.

Although I think this unlikely, it must always be borne in mind that he has a very close connection and high regard for Graumann, whom he regards as being anti-Nazi and liberal in his outlook.

I met Zigzag (Chapman) at the Naval and Military Club this morning with Colonel Robertson and Major Hughes of Cambridge, and after a short discussion took him round 39 Hill Street where he said he would like some sleep. On the way up in the lift the porter asked his name and was said Edward Simpson.

As he was feeling rather tired I did not interrogate him at length, but I understand that he believes he has £6,000 with him, though it is not all for himself, as part of it, together with one of the Leica cameras which he has, is to be deposited somewhere on instructions which he is to receive on his radio set so that another person in the U.K. can pick it up. His main mission in this country appears to be;

1. To find details to take back either the plans or the apparatus which is used to detect U-boats.

2. Similarly to take back either the plans or the apparatus used by our fighters. (AOB, likely meant Mosquito Pathfinders fit with Oboe)

3. To report on the effect of the flying bomb, giving the times and details of where they land.

5. To send a sub-agent to the regions (like notionally: Brutus/Hubert does) where bombers take off and assemble for raids on Germany so that the German defence can come in action on receipt of his message.

He is supposed to return in about 4 to 6 month by obtaining a small boat, travelling 10 miles from the coast, where he will be picked up by a five seaplanes (Wasserflugzeugen) and escorted to the coast of Europe.

"No 22. For Ludwig (Luft) South. ref. Fritzchen (= Chapman) and Lehar. Rittmeister (Hptm. = Captain) von Groening (alias Dr. Graumann) was requested by Stoll on 7.6.44 at 2000 hours

to ascertain from IX Fliegerkorps whether operation (dropping Chapman above England) possible. So far no communication received from Groening. Ref. Bastia: enquiry was sent to 2nd

There have been two previous references to Lehar. On 25.3.44 Berlin passed to Paris a message from Hamburg which indicated that Lehar was due to arrive in Paris on 26.3.44 and that he was to report to Obstlt. Buchner (Büchner/Buechner?). On 24.4.44 Hamburg sent a message to Wiesbaden for Obstlt. ~~Schmitt~~ Schmidt stating, with reference to a message we have not received.

2. that the money was already being taken along for a V-Mann of III-F (Was Chapman a III-F V-Mann??)

The Air ministry state that the H.Q. of IX Fliegerkorps is a tunnel roughly mid-way between Paris and Amiens.

The last sentence of the Paris-Berlin message of 10.6.44 is probably not connected with the earlier part of the message.

B.1.a. Colonel Robertson.

Mr. Duff Cooper returned these reports to me yesterday when I went to get from him, the monthly report, and the report on 'Mincemeat'. he had discussed Zigzag at some length with the P.M. (Prime Minister Churchill) who is showing considerable interest in the case. Mr. Duff Cooper would like you to let him know if and when contact is re-established with Zigzag.

D.D.B. (Mr. D.G. White) 5.5.43

We have jumped unexpectedly towards Spring 1943, as you have noticed the dates above (and below)

In accordance with your instructions I have made enquiries following my telephone call to you this morning and have to report as follows:-

When the vessel concerned arrived at Glasgow a special search was made by officers of the F.S.P. who were described by our informant Earle as no ordinary Field Security Police and as a result of this search some T.N.T. was found in the bunkers following a search in the clothing left behind by Zigzag; a note was also found.

Earle also reported that the detonator was disconnected and that the man whilst on the voyage displayed a gold cigarette case valued £80 and a gold watch he stated was worth £100, and whilst ashore in the town where he went had approximately £100 in his possession in notes which he showed to the gunner of the ship.

On arrival at the destination (Lisbon) Zigzag (Chapman) was hit on the head with a beer bottle by one of the gunners because he refused to get out of the gunner's bunk. (Chapman's story differs quite) (notice (K108) he was instructed to go to the hospital and, according Earle, was there one day, was adrift for two days, and then deserted the ship about ten days before he left. Earle is definitely of his opinion that Zigzag (Chapman) is an enemy agent.

The Field Security Police at Glasgow, or the people who searched the ship, apparently informed the Master (Captain) that they had found some hidden note in the lining of some clothes belonging to Zigzag (Chapman) and apparently the Master (the Captain had been fully informed in advance by M.I.5 servants) has the impression that this note gave information relating to the bomb, and our friend (Earle) at the owners' office is rather perturbed (worried) about the whole matter and asked me for information today which I could not of course give without a consultation with you (TAR), and more and more or less jokingly said he did not mind taking our agents out but it was more or less unreasonable not to expect them to object to his leaving bombs behind.

This is the gist of the matter. Other and more detailed reports will be coming with other informants on the vessel.

The Marine Superintendent of the Line who carried this man to the place where he went had lunch with me this morning and reported that they had received the routine cable from their agents at the place where he went informing them that the man had deserted the ship and his wages etc. (balance) had been deposited with the British Consul at his Port of desertion.

I am afraid that Capt. Kearon's report is not very clear, but then he is not used to describe the activities of British agents and he talks as he dictates. It is quite impossible to get any coherent facts from him, although his will to assist cannot be questioned. Accordingly, I elucidate (clarify) here a few of the remarks which he has made in this report:

(1) The statement that Zigzag (Chapman) left some papers and a watch in the Captain's charge is connected with a package containing ration books, clothing card and money which I gave him in Liverpool. After the ship had left Liverpool Zigzag (Chapman) also handed to the Captain the sheets of blank writing paper on which he had written information in secret ink. The watch which he was wearing at Liverpool he also gave to the Captain, in case it should be stolen by one of the other members of the crew.

(2) I queried with the Captain why it was necessary to give Zigzag (Chapman) another £9, seeing that I had already placed. £50 in the envelope for him, to be given to him in Lisbon. Kearon told me that Zigzag £9 had been treating the members of the crew, who were under the impression that the money he was spending had been obtained from the proceeds of "smash and grab" raids in London. He required this further £9 as he had spent practically all of the £50 on board ship. I gave Kearon this £9 in Lisbon, in order to clear up the financial position, and told him to send the receipt through to me by hand of the N.C.S.O..

(3) Zigzag (Chapman) was not accepted by the enemy at first and was passed on to several addresses because whoever he contacted at the Rua Mamede did not have the password and instructions to recognise him. His contact took Zigzag (Chapman) in a taxi round to the address at 24 Rua de Buenos Aires. (The Embassy building, which was adjacent to KO Portugal the Service he wanted to contact; ultimately with success)

(4) Kearon is incorrect when he says that one of Zigzag's (Chapman's) contacts was Fonseca at 24 Rua de Buenos Aires. His contact → (page 50)

was Fonseca at Rua Sao Mamede, but as Kearon was never given any information about these addresses before I suppose the mix-up is understandable.

(5) Who "the head' is I am not quite sure. I suppose he is the man who appeared to be in charge at 24 Rua de Buenos Aires. (The Embassy?)

(6) Zigzag (Chapman) wanted us to know that at Rua de San Bernardo there was an engineer who was connected with the German Intelligence (at KOP) (annex to the address Rua de Buenos Aires).

(7) The suggestion to sabotage the ship was put forward by Zigzag (Chapman) and from what Zigzag (Chapman) told Kearon (at Camp 020?) it would seem that the German intelligence did not have a very good supply of explosives bombs in Lisbon. Ads he took the bomb on board on the 23rd, but started negotiating for it on the 17th, it seems to have taken the enemy some six days to obtain it.

(8) Neither Kearon nor I know why Zigzag (Chapman) wanted to put the piece of coal in such a place as to ensure that it would not be burnt before the vessel was a few days from home. I should think it was probably because the enemy did not whish the explosion to take place in Lisbon and, in view of its notional position on board, an explosion at any time during the next month would be suitable.

(9) The fight with O'Connor, the Assistant Steward, was a put up job by Zigzag O'Connor and the Captain and Zigzag O'Connor did not go to the company's doctor because he thought it would give substance to his story to appear bruised and cut at his cover address.

(10) In Liverpool the Captain was only told that Zigzag (Chapman) had been in contact with the enemy, was working for the British authorities and intended to desert in Lisbon. he did not know, therefore, that the disappearance of Zigzag (Chapman) did not require to be covered by him or to be made to look as if there was some excuse for it. When I told him that Zigzag (Chapman) had a perfectly reasonable excuse for deserting and that the enemy were, in fact. expecting him, many of his → (page 51)

apprehensions (worries) were removed, but as the entries in the log book which Kearon had kept were so realistic I decided that this should be given to the shipping office as it provided a very fine cover for Zigzag (Chapman).

(11) When I told Kearon that Zigzag (Chapman) was supposed to have had a friend in the London shipping office who could pull strings in order to put a man on board, he said that Zigzag's (Chapman's) position did not, therefore, appear suspicious.

(12) I am afraid these personal suspicions about an ordinary seaman from the Castillian have some foundation as I remember that Wilkie in Liverpool told me that this was one of his men.

(13) I think it was reasonable assumption on the part of Zigzag (Chapman) and Capt. Kearon that the enemy would know the convoy route as Focke Wulf's had been over the convoy during most of the voyage. Of course the Captain did not know that Zigzag (Chapman) had told the enemy that the convoy was proceeding to Freetown, but it would have been difficult for Zigzag (Chapman) not to know exactly where they were going as I think everyone else on board knew.

(14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19) These are replies to a short questionnaire which I gave to Kearon and which was self-explanatory.

(20) The copies of extracts from the official log of the "City of Lancaster" I said should be sent in without alteration.

(21) The N.C.S.O. in Lisbon is going to obtain a further description of the "slim dark girl dressed in black" from the gunners, and will make it appear as if he is trying to get information about Zigzag's (Chapman's) desertion.

(22) The note given by the girl to the gunners, in her own handwriting, I gave to Jarvis to retain. It had written on the address of the British hospital and I thought it far more likely that Jarvis might have other specimens of writing with which he could compare it. I asked, him to let me have a copy of the address, but I am afraid this has not arrived.

(23) It is highly unlikely, I think, that Zigzag (Chapman) will find it necessary to have recourse to this address, and he will probably forget it anyway, but it might consider someone seeing Miss Doris Neal to tell her that she should communicate with the British authorities if someone called Eddie ever obtained contact with her.

I (Mr. R.T. Reed) arrived in Lisbon by plane at 1730hrs on the evening of Tuesday, 23rd March and went to the office of Mr. Jarvis of S.I.S. Unfortunately my departure form Bristol had not been signalled through to Lisbon and Jarvis' secretary was told, on inquiring in the afternoon for me, that I had not left. Jarvis was away at Cintra but we managed to contact him by phone and as the City of Lancaster was not expected to leave Lisbon before the 25th March (1943) and no action could be taken that evening, Jarvis decided that we should meet first thing the next morning and discuss what plan we should carry out.

On Wednesday morning, therefore, I saw Jarvis and told him the latest state of our information from Most Secret Sources (M.S.S.) and he said that the Captain of the City of Lancaster, by name Capt. Kearon, had been called to the shipping office and had been seen by the N.C.S.O. Capt. Benson, and his assistant Mr. Braime and had denied emphatically that Hugh Anson had any connection whatsoever with the British Intelligence. Kearon had, furthermore, complained that he had not been told anything about Hugh Anson and said that if there had been any connection he should have been told of it by the Marine Superintendent at Liverpool. I told Jarvis that it I had personally seen the Captain of the City of Lancaster in Liverpool before his departure, together with the Marine Superintendent, Capt. Shepherd, and not only I had I told him that Zigzag (Chapman) had been in contact with the enemy, that he was working for the British Intelligence and that he was going to desert in Lisbon, but I had given him a sealed package which he was to open on reaching Lisbon and the contents of this package should have been handed to Zigzag (Chapman) for smuggling ashore.

Jarvis pointed out the difficulty of conducting these affairs discreetly with the Captains of the merchant ships if the N.C.S.O. was not taken into our confidence. Benson and Braime had been told that Zigzag (Chapman) was connected with British Intelligence and intended to desert, but no information whatsoever had been given to them concerning → (page 2)

sabotage plans. Affairs would have been comprised if Jarvis himself had seen the Captain or gone on board the City of Lancaster.

I told Jarvis that I thought the Captain was probably denying all knowledge of Zigzag (Chapman) owing to the instructions which I gave him in Liverpool that he should tell absolutely no one about about the connection and that once they had left Liverpool Zigzag's (Chapman's ) life would thereafter be in the Captain's hands.

Jarvis also gave me a disquieting report which said that Zigzag (Chapman) had been behaving in a most alarming manner on board ship. He had been involved in a number of fights and had a knife duel with one of the Assistant Stewards, as a result of which one of the men was now in hospital in Lisbon.

I arranged with Jarvis that I should meet Braime in Jarvis' office at 11 o'clock and that Braime would then contact the Captain and bring him a lunch at the Royal British Club, where I should be passing under the name of Mr. Johnson. It was considered that I might perhaps have seen another Captain in Liverpool, as the normal one had been on leave for a few days at the beginning of March and I might have interviewed his deputy.

I met Capt. Kearon and Braime at the Royal Club as arranged, and recognition between the Captain and myself was immediate - he was the man I had seen in Liverpool. Kearon said he was glad to see me as he had quite a lot of things that he wanted to tell me and, after lunch, he said straight away that Zigzag (Chapman) had given him a piece of coal, which was at the moment in his safe on board ship, which was supposed to cause an explosion in one of the the boilers. He was very keen to get this off the ship. Zigzag (Chapman) had brought this coal on board in his pocket on the morning of the 23rd and had handed it straight to the Captain (AOB, all in line with Chapman's story told during his second interrogation series and of June early July at Camp 020, 1944) He had also given the Captain some other information concerning his cover address he had been to in Lisbon and people whom he had contacted. This information the Captain had written down in his notebook, which was also in the safe on board ship.

piece of coal from the Captain and take it to the N.C.S.O's strong room the next morning and that Kearon should dictate a report to Braime, who would type it, on what had occurred during the voyage and the instructions which Zigzag (Chapman) had given him to pass onto me. Kearon said that Zigzag (Chapman) had behaved "magnificently" during the voyage and had lived up to his reputation as a jail-bird very realistically. Most of the crew were however, sympathetic towards him in spite of his behaviour. Kearon said also that he believed Zigzag (Chapman) had already deserted, as he had made an arrangement with him that if Zigzag (Chapman) was absent for more than twenty-four hours from the ship he would assume that he had gone. he would be able to confirm this the next morning.

Later, in the name of Johnson - a member of the Ministry of War Transport - I went with Braime to visit the Speiro (a military or merchant vessel?), which was lying in Lisbon harbour and had sprung a leak which was causing some delay in her departure. Braime discussed technicalities, with the Captain while I tried to look intelligent, and I wrote out a telegram containing the substance of my interview with the Captain for transmission to London.

The next day I met Braime again at the Royal British Club and received Kearon's report from him. It appeared that a Focke-Wulf reconnaissance machine had been over the convoy during most of the voyage Zigzag (Chapman) and he had decided that no harm would be done by giving the position of the convoy to the enemy, and it was agreed that Zigzag would have had access to the Captain's log book, which was kept in his cabin. Zigzag (Chapman) therefore made a not on a slip of paper of the noon position of the ship each day, and of the approximate course which was being steered. The Captain also told Zigzag (Chapman) that seven ships were missing from the convoy and that he believed three of them had been sunk by a submarine and that the rest had been destroyed by collisions and the proximity of an ammunition ship. The Captain requested that I should pass on the fact that he had given this information to Zigzag (Chapman) to the Admiralty. I concluded from this that the report which we had seen on Most secret Sources concerning this submarine attack → (page 4)

and the convoy position had therefore been given to Zigzag (Chapman). Braime also gave me a slip of paper on which was written the address of the British hospital in Lisbon, which the gunners of the City of Lancaster had received from "a girl in black" at Georges Bar and which was the address to which Zigzag (Chapman) could go for medical attention to his face, as it was cut in a fight on board ship (City of Lancaster). I arranged with Braime that it should see Kearon again the next day at the Royal British Club.

In the evening I went with Braime to the British seaman's Institute in Lisbon where we met, and accepted his story without reservation. by chance, the skipper of the Algericas and the 2nd Officer of the City of Lancaster. During a discussion on the necessity of providing seamen with such institutes the 2nd Officer of the City of Lancaster said that it was obviously essential to provide such clubs in order to avoid the sort of thing which just had occurred on board his ship. He related how the Assistant Steward there had been absent for forty-eight hours and it was thought that he was living ashore with a woman. This man, he said, had been put on board the City of Lancaster by the prisoner's Aid Society and had served three years in Lewes prison for "smash and grab" and was rather a tough character. He had got into the bad books of the Captain through his behaviour.

On Friday I again saw Capt. Kearon, to clear up one or two outstanding points in his report. Unfortunately this is not yet to hand, though a carbon copy of it had been given to Jarvis for transmission to London by bag on the previous day.

Zigzag (Chapman) had contacted the enemy at Rua Sao Mamede when he went ashore on either the 16th or 17th March (1943). Apparently there was some difficulty for, on reporting to this address, they had said that they had no instructions about him and they went by taxi to another address at 24 Rua Buenos Aires (which I understand from Jarvis is their head office (AOB, two adjacent buildings: the Embassy and the KO Portugal (KOP) offices annex) where they found the instructions pertaining to Zigzag (Chapman). They had been very pleased to see him and accepted his story without reservation. (L 109) (L109return) (These two latter links will guide you through the true story, as they in March 1943 weren't yet informed correctly and most of what was then put on paper were guesses) As → (page 5)

Zigzag (Chapman) had discussed with Kearon on board ship the possibility of obtaining explosives material from the enemy, he had put them to them the proportion that should sabotage the City of Lancaster and the City of Lancaster and the enemy had agreed. They had not the necessary material at that address, however, and said they would obtain some for him. This they (Sdf. Dr. Baumann the cover name of Leiter Section II, sabotage, in KO Portugal, his real name Dr. Blaum) would obtain some for him. This they later did, and Zigzag (Chapman) took it on board on the morning of the 23rd March and gave it to the Captain immediately.

On the first day that he contacted the enemy Zigzag (Chapman) had taken his revolver with him, but as he had been accepted without any suspicion he brought it back to the ship and gave it to the Captain as a present. I subsequently asked for this, as the number probably known to the enemy and if at some time the City of Lancaster or its Captain were captured by the enemy this revolver would prove rather incriminating. It is being sent by bag (often diplomatic bag, as these couldn't be opened by, in this case, Portuguese officials) to London.

Zigzag (Chapman) had said that arrangements had been made for him to travel by plane back to Germany (actually from Madrid by train firstly towards Paris) and that (on the morning of the 23rd) he expected to leave at once. I understand that this was confirmed on Most Secret Sources. (apparently, not precisely the latter route mentioned, though, he got on his way, via Madrid to Paris)

Zigzag (Chapman) and Captain Kearon had arranged for a fight to take place on board ship in which Zigzag (Chapman) would be concerned, between Zigzag and another steward, which gave rise to the previous report I had received from Jarvis about Zigzag's (Chapman's) behaviour. No substantial damage had been sustained by either party, and later Zigzag (Chapman) had started a fight with O'Connor, another steward, which had been fought by the "Marquess of Queensbury" rules and which had been terminated by the steward butting (ramming) Zigzag (Chapman) in the face and thus causing one of his eyes to swell slightly. Zigzag (Chapman) had been reported to the Captain for his misdemeanour and the Captain had "logged" him and fined him half a day's pay. Kearon had recommended that Zigzag (Chapman) should go to the company's doctor for treatment to his face, but as Zigzag (Chapman) had not reported there and had not been on board ship for the past thirty-six hours it was concluded that he had now deserted. Zigzag (Chapman) considered that such an injury to his face would → (page 6)

give confirmation of his story to the enemy that he had had a rough passage at the hands of his companions on board ship.

Later that day, the 26th March (1943), I received a request from Capt. Benson, the N.C.S.O., to discuss the situation with him and I went to his office. I discussed with him the possibility of carrying out sabotage in Lisbon on board the City of Lancaster, but Captain Benson was opposed to this as he considered and the political complications probably embarrassing. Benson told me that this was the first attempt on the part of the enemy to use explosive material and that all other attempts had been carried out with incendiary apparatus. I said it would appear from Zigzag's (Chapman's) report that such explosive was not general supply in Lisbon, for the enemy had had to make special arrangements to obtain some for Zigzag (Chapman) (maybe it was generally stored somewhere in Spain, as Section II attempted more regularly sabotage about Gibraltar). I was considering the possibility of bringing this piece of coal back with me in the plane to London, but Capt. Benson did not think this very wise and later in the day, when I saw Jarvis, we decided agaist this action.

Captain Benson said that it would have been valuable to him if he had been advised that Zigzag (Chapman) was working for the British authorities, but I told him that if complications had not arisen he would have heard no more of Zigzag (Chapman) than that he was a deserter, and I said that even now that he knew that Zigzag (Chapman) was, in fact, working for us (M.I.5), it was essential that he should still be reported as a deserter and that the usual formalities should be maintained with the shipping authorities and the police. It was absolutely essential to convey to the enemy the impression that we were trying to find Zigzag (Chapman) now that he had deserted. Benson agreed, and said that he would see that this was fully carried out.

Although Zigzag (Chapman) had said that the explosive in the coal was worked by a detonator which became active under the application of heat, it was possible that the enemy had planted on him explosive apparatus which was activated by an acid delay. Jarvis pointed out that it would → (page 7)

be most unfortunate in an explosion were to take place in the plane during my return journey home, both for the plane, the political consequences and myself, and as three British Overseas Airways aeroplanes had recently sustained damage in Lisbon a further accident would attract unnecessary attention. It was arranged, therefore, that the explosive coal should be placed in a heavy iron box and padded with cork to deaden the force of the explosion should one occur, and sent to Gibraltar in the care of the Captain of the City of Lancaster. I told Jarvis that we would make arrangements for dealing with it there.

Original in File No.: PF 603066 (Schoeneich; no longer existing) B.A.O.R. (British Army over the Rhine) Dated: 7.9.45

(AOB, Schoeneich was, in my perception, an S.D. man, maybe also connected to R.S.H.A. Amt IV. Amt IV possessed their own representative at the Embassy in Lisbon: https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-560-wrede-artist.htm Part_VII + Part_VIII + Part_IX )

33. The start made in December 1942. Chapman only took with him a W/T set. He told his briefers that he would obtain far better identity cards from his friends in London who would also provide him with any sabotage material that he would need. Chapman landed by parachute 60 km north of London and reported by ST his safe arrival to Nantes.

34. He kept in touch with Nantes, reporting his journey by train to London, also his contact with members of his "gang" (Chapman had quite a criminal career). He stayed in London for some month (3½ months) and at last about March 1943 said he found a friend ready to help him and was about to carry out his mission. Schoeneich (was he at that moment directly engaged with Abwehr matters?) presumes he carried a good deal of English money on his journey over (£1000 in 1942 and £6000 in June 1944, of which £2000 was meant for his expenses).

35. He reported towards the end of March that he would do the job next day. (notional destructing some transformers at the De Havilland Works (M110) (M110return)) The next day he reported: O.K., and about a week later reported that information about his (notional) sabotage was to be found in a certain newspaper.

36. Previously he had been told he could always regain contact with the Germans by reporting to Dr. Blau, Lisbon (AOB: likely an understandable mistake as the Leiter of Sabotage was Dr. Blaum alias Dr. Baumann of KO Portugal section II).

Dr. Blaum ran an Anlaustelle in Lisbon (?) had a number of Portuguese V-Leute in Lisbon. Anybody wishing to get in touch with the Germans in Lisbon would be given the address of one of the V-Leute and a code word. (AOB, all most unlikely, because this could blow the organisation. Dr. Blaum in particular was engaged in sabotage maters and in so-called "Stay-behind" operations) The rest is skipped due to its pertinent nonsense; albeit that "Le joli Albert" "joli Albert" was indeed correct, albeit, that according to what we know from Chapman's interrogation the pass word was: "joli Albert" lacking the preposition "Le") (AOB, in my perception, Schoeneich might have got notice, maybe even read the according papers; but what he further knew was more like "hear-say")

37. By procuring some seaman's papers reached Lisbon ~~May-June~~ March 1943. he was passed on to Madrid then to Paris and finally, to Oslo whether Groening, his "starter" had been transferred (indeed he was already settled in Norway).

38. Chapman had been promised the phenomenal sum of 100,000 RM and now wanted to collect the reward and set up a small business. (Schoeneich's incorrect guess) Payment was not forthcoming, but Chapman did collect some 60,000 RM. Further difficulties arose through the Stelle at Oslo being disbanded (Schoeneich from R.S.H.A. Amt IV?, might be a bit confused; as after May 1944 the merging of OKW Ausland/Abwehr and SS controlled Amt VI converted into a new organisation named Amt Mil headed by Obst Hansen together with Schellenberg, albeit Hansen took part in the failed assassination attempt on Hitler and was arrested on 22 July at Belinde)

39. He went once with Groening to Berlin to discuss with Obstlt. Dewitz another mission but this was shelved as it was decided at this stage that sabotage against England was useless in view of the rapid replacement of machinery etc., that could be obtained from America. It was decided that far more important was direct espionage, particularly about means of helping the U-boat war in the Atlantic. It was therefore recommended that Chapman should be handed over to I M (Marine) Oslo under von Bonin, Schoeneich thinks that Chapman may still be in Oslo.

KV 2/460-1, page 5 (minute 488b) apparently the succession of storage went wrong.

25. There are four snippets (scraps, leftovers) of information given out by Schoeneich gleaned while he was working at ALST (Abwehrleitstelle) in Paris that are perhaps worth while to be given separate headings.

The only successful sabotage that ever seems Chapman, Schoeneich's knowledge of this was gained from hearsay and through having once seen the file while referent Northwest in Berlin. His account of the case is as follows:

29. In summer 1942 Rittmeister Groening, Leiter der Aussenstelle Nantes, Gruppe II (sabotage), announced to Brandenstein, Leiter II Paris, that he had found a man who would be suitable for a sabotage attempt against Great Britain. This man was Edward Chapman whom the Germans had found in jail either → (page 6)

Jersey or Guernsey. The Ic officer (the officer in charge of intelligence against their enemy) of the Channel Islands Occupying Force had submitted to Aussenstelle Nantes a list of such people found in jail and von Groening had chosen Chapman as likely material.

30. Chapman was a member of a gang of house-breakers, well known to the English police, and at the time had been serving a sentence in the Channel islands. He was sent to Nantes (AOB, not entirely correct: he was first brought to a prisonercamp Romainville and somewhere in early 1942, after a kind of agreement, moved to Ans (Abwehrnebenstelle) Nantes) for training in W/T and instructions in the German language. he was already acquainted with the use of explosives through his previous profession (career).

31. Schoeneich cannot give a name of the man who trained him in W/T but says there were four men for that purpose stationed in France, at Paris, Nantes, St. Jean de Luz and one in reserve. He can, however, remember the following names.

Uffz. (N.C.O.) Praetorius (Walter Henry, KV 2/524; he had studied in Southampton) who spoke perfect English and went with von Groening to Oslo later.

32. The training of Chapman lasted some three (actually it lasted until, say December 1942) months and he announced that he was ready The possibility of a sabotage mission was touted round the Abwehr Berlin but only the Luftwaffe seemed to have any job to do. Finally Chapman was briefed by Obstlt. Dewitz of the Luftwaffeführungsstab, who gave him the following mission. (Dewitz's name wasn't noticed during Chapman's interrogation in late December 1942 and early 1943) It was decided to destroy if possible the De Havilland aircraft factory (Mosquito) at Hatfirld which was engaged on making a certain type of propeller out of hardwood (Mr. Schoeneich is confused, actually this was the: Weybridge Airscrew Works) continued at the foregoing KV 2/460-1, page 3.

Last night I had my first serious talk with Jigger about Zigzag (Chapman). He was somewhat unwilling to accept proposals I put to him which automatically implied that he was not under British control. Thus, I said that I was quite certain that Zigzag (Chapman) was not in England now, although Jigger said he knew for certain that he was.

As a result of this conversation I have asked Jigger to write a note on Zigzag (Chapman). What I usually do with his notes is to go through them with him, which results in certain amplifications (form of deceptions?), and then make them into report form and send them home; you may perhaps have seen one or two of the reports I have sent so far. I will send the one on Zigzag (Chapman) to you.

During the conversation, two points of interest arose, upon which you may perhaps have some comments.

Jigger said that Von Eschwege, Leiter II (sabotage) Paris, was very doubtful about Zigzag (Chapman). When he first mentioned this to me about a month ago, he said that von Eschwege had told him he thought that Zigzag was controlled by the British (actually TAR's Office in M.I.5). During the discussion last night, I dilated (opened) at some length upon the incompetence of agents and said that I thought very often they just did nothing when they got into the country where they were supposed to operate, and therefore counter-intelligence organisations in the countries concerned never came across them. Jigger immediately jumped on this and that now he remembered that von Eschwege did not actually say that he thought Zigzag (Chapman) was under control, → (page 8)

but that when he went to England he did nothing and lied to Abwehr II about his activities. When von Eschwege took over from his predecessor at Paris he apparently had the idea, which is not unknown to any of us, that nothing which had been done before was any good. Apart from any genuine feelings of about that he might have had about Zigzag. In any case, just about the time that he arrived, or soon after, von Groening, who evidently was on e of the "don't-tell-me-what-to-do-I-know" type, went to Oslo and as far as I can understand maintained control over Zigzag (Chapman) (actually his German cover-name was: Fritz or Fritzchen) and all his subsequent operations from there. I remember of course the business about Zigzag (Chapman) being in contact with the Iceland chaps. (Sverrir MATTHIASSON and Magnus GUDBJORNSSON KV 2/126 - KV 2/127 - KV 2/128)

Jigger also said that he remembered certain things that Zigzag (Chapman) had reported having done in England (was Jigger a British agent active in Norway?). One of these was the starting of a fire in a factory; another was an explosion, Jigger thinks in a tunnel but he says himself that he is not sure about the tunnel; a third thing was that Abwehr II was asked by Abwehr I (section for espionage) to verify a War Office address near Trafalgar Square and did it through Zigzag (Chapman) (AOB, quite near to Trafalgar Square was situated M.I.5's HQ. at 55 St James' Street) Jigger thinks that they wanted this done to check up on certain information which they had been sent by one of their (Abwehr I) agents in England.

When Zigzag (Chapman) did his explosion or fire, Jigger does not remember which, Zigzag (Chapman) told Abwehr II that they would find details of it in the times of the appropriate day. A frantic (desperate) search was made by Abwehr II, who were in a great state of excitement, and ultimately it was found (AOB, for practical reasons, the newspaper notice was only published in the editions meant for foreign countries like was Portugal, maybe also Spain) (Chapman especially brought such an newspaper edition with him, and most likely was handed over to Dr. Blaum (alias: Dr. Baumann of Leiter of section II in Portugal) It took up the attitude with Jigger that my dignity was hurt that something of this sort should go on in England and without my knowing, and I now think that he thinks either that it did happen and I knew nothing about it and was hurt as a result of my having an exaggerated idea of my importance in → (page 9)

the counter-sabotage world, or that it did not happen and that Zigzag (Chapman) made it up.

The position is rather tricky about Jigger because he is far smarter than some of the people who saw him before I took over, and I think he knows very well the extent to which D.A. work goes on, both on our and the German side. However, I know I have put across him that Zigzag (Chapman) is not under our (M.I.5's) control, but nothing I think will persuade him (Jigger) that Zigzag (Chapman) was a loyal servant of Abwehr II. Jigger has as low an opinion of Abwehr II's activities from the point of view of their childishness as we have; more so infact, because von Brandenstein (file does no longer exist) who was Leiter II Paris at one time, literally refused to do anything because he had a sort of fussiness (pedantry) mania which prevented him ever risking any operation in case it might go wrong.

However I shall be sending you a report in the next few days based on Jigger's view of Zigzag (Chapman).

I forgot to mention above, that when I asked whether Abwehr II ever sent aircraft over to do a reconnaissance of alleged damage that the saboteurs had done, Jigger looked very surprised and asked if I really thought that they had the power to get the Luftwaffe to do this. (AOB, please consider that a simple verification does seriously risk an hardly to replace fully equipped aircraft. The Germans fought a war on two fronts, of which Russia demanded huge quantities of men (millions) and supplies in the broad sense) He said that he had heard some very sarcastic conversations between members of Abwehr II and Luftwaffe pilots on the subject who did the most damage. Jigger says that the whole of the Abwehr had a very high opinion indeed of the impregnableness of England from the point of view of Abwehr activities.

KV 2/460-1, page 11 (minute 444a) (U113) please digest the following page [ (X115) (X115return) ] is explaining one of the nuclei of the problem: his guiding officer at M.I.5 Major Michael Ryde!

This is curiosity a procedure mainly maintained by S.I.S (M.I.6), and far less than by M.I.5

Often names of particular persons being noticed and then they blank sometimes a single word but also sections of it. Sometimes even an entire page being blanked and only the according minute reference number remaining.

However, reading the visible lines also curiosities being dealt with I therefore will deal with this aspect also, as to enhance our understanding in respect to the Zigzag Chapman case.

4. I have suspected that Zigzag (Chapman) had no regard whatever for the necessity of observing complete silence regarding his connection with us (M.I.5). Riesen recently called at the flat to take Zigzag (Chapman) out to Hendon for a transmission. On this occasion Riesen found a number of people in the flat, one of whome was Jimmy Hunt (the closeted friend out of the criminal passed of Chapman), who was already known to him. Hunt immediately approached Riesen and said, "I suppose you have come to take him (Zigzag) (Chapman) away for a job". Riesen naturally did not pursue the remark in the presence of some others, but he felt quite certain that Hunt knew the nature of the job to which he referred.

5. In these circumstance it is necessary to consider whether the Zigzag (Chapman) case can be pursued. The only interest in the case at the present time is its interest to the Admiralty. Montagu will have to decide whether in view of the inflammable situation caused by Zigzag's (Chapman's) indiscretions to his very doubtful friends, he wished us to continue this aspect of the case further.

6. This act of Zigzag's (Chapman's) does of course provide a first class excuse for closing with him in the wrong and for the administration of a very firm rebuke (reprimand) in which it can be made clear to him that he has broken the most elementary security rules, and has had a complete disregard for the security of his own position and the interest in the case. In these circumstances it seems to me that we should dismiss him, explaining that he has broken his side of the bargain and that from now on he need expect no assistance from us in any trouble he may find himself in in the future. (this chap is rather naive and quite arrogant)

7. Having seen so much of Zigzag (Chapman) during the last month or two, this recent revelation (leak) of his irresponsibility does not surprise me. Furthermore it increases my suspicion that he has at least told Graumann, his German master, of his connection with us in this country. With this in mind I (Mr. M. Ryde) recently led a conversation with Zigzag (Chapman) onto the subject of Graumann (does he not know after so many years how some names being correctly spelled?) and his position.

8. Zigzag (Chapman) has always spoken of Graumann in the highest terms and has expressed something akin (alike) to affection for 'the old man'. In my conversation with Zigzag (Chapman) we touched on the subject of the security of the case and as to whether the Germans have any suspicion that he is being worked under control. When I remarked to Zigzag (Chapman) that even if Graumann did suspect this it was unlikely that he would reveal his suspicions as it is in his own personal interests to keep the case going as long as possible, Zigzag (Chapman) agreed without moments of a hesitation, and added that of course Graumann was his best security. When asked to explain what he meant by this, Zigzag (Chapman) said that Graumann makes a great deal of money out of the case. For example when Zigzag asked for £6,000 Graumann probably drew £12,000 (how did Chapman knows for certain?) and pockets the exchange. My impression was that Zigzag (Chapman) knew perfectly well what was in my mind but was not going to admit it, and my earlier suspicions were strengthened.

9. If it is true that Graumann is aware of Zigzag's (Chapman's) position in this country, it is very unlikely that anyone other than Graumann (AOB, in my perception: I get the strong impression that the quality of the new (younger) Secret Service personnel (in M.I.5 at least) is deteriorating, when we digest the series of Chapter 6) → (page 13)

knows and there probably little danger to us at the present. However, it may show that Zigzag (Chapman) has withheld us this very important piece of information and it is against our principles to run a case with anyone who is found not to be absolutely open with us.

10. I discussed three developments with Colonel Robertson (TAR), Commander Montagu and Mr. Marriott today. Commander Montagu explained the Admiralty view by saying that any benefit which might accrue from the delivery of photographs to Lisbon is small. That if it is decided to close the case the Admiralt do not attach sufficient importance to the photographs to prompt them to urge us to keep it running.

11. Colonel Robertson (TAR) took the view that as the Admiralty rate the value of the case to them so low, we should close it now. So far as the Germans are concerned Zigzag (Chapman) is notionally away containing the courier and should he never reappear on the air again the assumption will be that he has been arrested whilst attempting to make the contact.

12. Colonel Robertson (TAR) is anxious that Major Cussen should see Zigzag for the final closure of the case and explain his position to him as forcibly as possible. One of the most important points which must be made is that Zigzag (Chapman) can expect no assistance from us in any future trouble in which he may find himself. I should be opposed to paying Zigzag any further money, for once we do this now we lay ourselves open to further approaches and the value of taking advantage of this opportunity to close the case with Zigzag (Chapman) in the wrong will be lost. We can now say to Zigzag (Chapman) that he can expect no further assitance from us either financial or legal, we have obtained for him from the police a clean sheet, he has had a large sum of money which he would never have obtained without assistance, he has now let us down badly and should be thankful that we are not going to lock him up. he must understand that he must now stand on his own feet and that all those officers who have had any association with him, e.g. Mr. Riesen, Mr. Horsfall, myself (Mr. Ryde) , have received instructions that any approach Zigzag (Chapman) may attempt to make to them is to be reported to this office. Should he attempt to make any such approach we, the office, will consider whether he should not be interned or otherwise disposed of. (be killed or life-long interned?)

(AOB, Major Michael Ryde was a quite unsuccessful officer - whom also operated in the Trompke case in South-Africa)

I have cost me considerable work to peu à peu reconstruct the state of affairs in regard of the German links of Communications.

I have for practical reasons, considered only the main W/T links, as otherwise this map cannot be employed anymore; but essentially it tell you already some.

Roman I/xx tells us that 'I' is the W/T station: Domaene (Domäne) of Ast Hamburg (Ast-X)

There existed other serials as well, but these are in our Survey of no relevance.

I would like to transcribe the first RSS (R.S.S.) summary running from 24.4.42 up to 25.6.42; the rest you have to digest their contents yourself.

27.4.42 ISOS 25977 Nantes-Paris. Will arrive on 27/4 at about 1230 hrs. in Montparnasse for consulting with Chapman in the camp (Fort Romainville). Please have met and book rooms. Sgd. von Groening.

29.4.42 " 26107 Paris-Nantes. Shall arrive Nantes before Thursday noon. Details to follow. Praetorius (Walter KV 2/524) to hold himself ready to fetch Chapman in Paris on Saturday Erna? (Paris?) Sgd. von

11.5.42 " 27212 Nantes-Paris. One pair of trousers 11 cm long, 2 shirts size 40 and 4 pairs urgently needed for Chapman. Please get these things ready and hand them to Uffz. (N.C.O.) Weber when he passes

through. Uffz. Weber is probably on Tuesday 12/5. Toni sgd. von Groening, Rittmeister (= Hptm. = Captain)

??.5.42 " 28016 Paris-Nantes. (We) urgently require 4 photographs of (or : from) Chapman. Erna? (Paris) sgd. Von Brandenstein Obstlt. (Leiter II in Alst Paris)

31.5.42 " 28977 Nantes-Paris. Funk-training of Chapman (has progressed) so far that early despatch of the Funk-apparatus (Gerät) is desirable. Funk = W/T Toni Sgd Karl Barton (KV 2/2461) Fwb. OK.

3.6.42 " 30788 Nantes-Paris. Steps taken with a view to obtain generator. Uffz. Weber back from Angres. Continue CUC = C's?) W/T training intensively. Sgd. Toni.

11.6.42 " 32700 Nantes-Paris .. necessity of the dental treatment is being investigated. In spite of German nationality, the written decision of the divisional M.O. in Angres will be procured for denture treatment. ...

13.6.42 " 30789 Nantes-Paris. State of Chapman's training by Hptm. Müller and me. Good and thorough knowledge in the production of Spreng-Material (explosives). Skill and caution in this direction are

noteworthy. (Has reached) a dead point at present in W/T training without his interest and application having flagged (highlighted). Progress is noticable in this too, and a greater speed may be

16.6.42 " 30433 Paris-Nantes. Fritz (Chapman) is to receive treatment by a French dentist. The costs will be charged to the agents (VM) fund. Erna (Paris?) Sgd. von Brandenstein.

17.6.42 " 33190 Paris-Nantes. The cover name Fritchen (like Fritz but like a child) is to be used for Chapman, the undertaking concerning him will receive the name Friesse. Erna (Paris?) Sgd. von Brandenstein

18.6.42 " Nantes-Paris. Report of the day. Air-raid alarm in Nantes on 10/6 from 0000 hrs to 0200 hrs. No damage. Rittmeister von Groening and Hptm. Dr. Mueller in ...

18.6.42 " 30840 Nantes-Paris. (above message continued) Arrived Nantes. For Fritzchen's training 15 detonators ((Gluehzuender) (N111) (N111return) required. Toni Sgd. Barton Fwb.

22.6.42 " 30909 Paris-Nantes. Uffz. Praetorius will hold himself to proceed to Paris with Fritzchen on Wednesday morning. Is to report at Rue de Luyned. return on afternoon of same day. Erna(Paris?) Von

22.6.42 " 33282 Nantes-Paris. Daily report. W/T and sabotage training of Fritzchen. Departure of Gfr. Kruesch at 1404 hours on 23rd arriving Paris (station) Montparnasse at 1950 hrs. I am ill, please met the night

service today, dear (lieber) Martin, of if you desire, you can receive also. All quite. Mueller

24.6.42 " 31186 Nantes-Paris. Gfr. Kreusch has gone on leave and will return on 9/7. The practice morse transmitter is working irregularly and was taken to be repaired. W/T instruction of Fritzchen will lapse in the

meantime. Uffz. Praetorius (alias Thomas) and Fritzchen are being sent to Paris tomorrow, and will arrive at 12.42 ...

25.6.42 " 31324 Nantes-Paris. According to a report of the Feldnachrichtenkommandantur at this end the Morse practice cannot be repaired in Nantes. → (page 21)

KV 2/460-1, page 21 (not being transcribed, thus please digest their contents yourself)

Please apologise that I would like to skip the Nantes-Paris communications as these do not add much to the understanding of Chapman's first episode in France in respect to the Germans;

KV 2/460-1, page 32 + 33 The first section deals with the episode when Chapman is still in German held Europe and not yet drop above England

10.6.44 ISBA 2793 Paris-Berlin. No 22 for Ludwig (1 Luftwaffe) South. ref. Fritzchen and Lehar. Rittmeister von Groening was requested by Stoll on 7.6.44 at 2000 hours to ascertain from IX Fliegerkorps whether operation possible. So far no communication received from Groening. ref. Bastia. (AOB, The latter reference likely pointing at an Amt Mil background) Enquiry was sent on 2nd Fliegerdivison by W/T, so far no answer. Brita.

21.7.44 ISBA 3307 Paris-Wiesbaden. No. 68. ref Hubert (Czerniawsky/Walenty (P111) (P111return) Employment of Lehar will not take place. Money is in Hamburg (Ast or K.d.M.Hamburg) Ref. Hubert. Employment of Fritzchen (Chapman/Zigzag) with money and Leica for Hubert was carried out with success. Please get in touch with Rittmeister von Groening at the Dienststelle at this end. (AOB: Likely von Groening was reachable at Oslo, he was the guiding officer of Zigzag/Chapman. The Leica camera and £2,000 meant for Czerniawski/Hubert was already with Chapman's re-arrival in England in late June 1944; but Chapman had no idea for whome the money was meant)

31.7.44 " 3319 Paris-Hamburg. No. 68. ref. Hubert. For ~~Fierrwzpfqrm~~ Fritzchen. What suggestion for delivering camera and money ( £2,000) to other man? Have you found suitable person to work small set? Warn us some time ahead when you are ready for test traffic (AOB: maybe Chapman/Zigzag also brought-in from the continent a new transmitter for Hubert; but he did not know his of his existence) (Q112) (Q112return) Lilly Well (likely "Dagmar Lahlum" from Oslo) love (Text in English).

8.8.44 " 3432 Paris-Wiesbaden (Wilja). No. 37. (AOB: Hubert/Czerniawski was guided by Wiesbaden) For Major Jennestein . ref. supplying Hubert. Fritz (Chapman / Zigzag) proposes that it be disposed at a cloak room and the ticket of deposit be sent to Hubert, or that the articles (£2,000 and the Leica camera inclusive outfit) be concealed in central or North London whereupon Hubert would be informed from your end about hiding place. report your decision. Born. (AOB, Hubert mainly communicated via Ast / K.d.M. Wiesbaden)

23.8.44 " 3631 Wiesbaden - St. Menenhold (Westerwald) (AOB, in the meantime, Alst Paris was abandoned and they retreated to Brussels for a few days only until 3rd September '44) 3000. Message 39 from Fritz of 21/8, received 22/8 1705 CET. Contents: must have immediate answer to my comeback Dagmar (Chapman's close girl-friend). I am ready to do (15 corrupt) excellent prospects. You promised support, Must have it. Send numbers asked for by this evening. Time limited. Must have decision. (text mostly in English)

22.8.44 " 3634 Wiesbaden-Hamburg (Domäne) No. 11 from Rapp (Obersturmbannführer at RSHA Amt VI-C in Berlin). According to statement of Rittmeister von Groening, who has been transferred to this end Fritzchen traffic is to be transferred to Wilja (= K.d.M. Wiesbaden) (like was Hubert's) Please report immediately by W/T frequencies that have been used. Also send to this end all messages received from Fritzchen since 10/8.

5.9.44 " 3680 Hamburg-Wiesbaden. No. 243. Joint monitoring of Fritz (Chapman / Zigzag) at your end (Wiesbaden / Wilja). After conclusion of traffic please begin traffic with Domaene (Domäne was the W/T station of Ast / K.d.M. Hamburg) at next full hour. Both sides to begin on I (likely quartz frequency no. 1) contact traffic as hitherto Acknowledge.

5.9.44 " 3681 Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 244 Message No. 49 from Fritz. Jobs you ask me to do cost much money. Spent great deal of Manchester job. Must have at least £6,000. Can you send by parachute to Yorkshire or Scotland. Dagmar (= Chapman's close girl-friend)

6.9.44 " 3693 Wiesbaden - Berlin. 10. For Hptm. Apitz. Signal no. 39 from Fritz received 5/9; Job you ask me to do cost much money. Spent great deal on Manchester job. Must have at least £6,000. Can you send by parachute to Yorkshire or Scotland? Dagmar. Domäne addendum: Fritz awaits answer. QRX arranged for tomorrow. Wiesbaden addendum: Assignments given to Fritz (Chapman) not known here. Jennewein, Major.

9.9.44 " 3715 Wiesbaden-Berlin. No. 22 Hptm. Apitz. Signal No. 50 from Fritz (Chapman). received 8/9. Waiting from reply Dagmar (Chapman's Norwegian admired girl-friend in Oslo) What about my sending photographs?

16.9.44 " 3767 Berlin-Lisbon. 70. Most Secret (gKdos = Geheimekommandosache) For Forros (= Obstl. Frederici, Leiter KO Portugal). report urgently whether cover address John Casadmont Chalet, Affonso. Lisboa, Parede can be used for Fritzchen. Otherwise communicate a new reliable address. HIOB (Heer I Ost Berlin) No. 3396/44 (g.Kdos.)

15.9.44 " 3814 Wiesbaden-Berlin. Domaene (= Domäne the W/T station of Ast / K.d.M. Hamburg in Wohldorf) Nr. 3. For Fritz (Chapman in England). very urgent. For Burg (= Berlin) Nr. 44 for information for Hptm. Apitzch. Answer to your 49. Matters will be arranged. Will fix you as soon as possible.

23.9.44 " 3867 Lisbon-Berlin/ 708. HIOB ref. 3396 (ISBA 3767/16/44) (referring to the second foregoing message) Most Secret (Streng Geheim) Address can no longer be used (but - text doubtful) cover address no 77 which was sent to HIOB in letter 201 Most secret can be used. Please inform us of password and language. Forros (Leiter KOP)

4.9.44 " 3893 Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 239. From Fritz no. 45 of 4/9. Contents: for coupling direct to the squid MK J indicator controller as suggested by the late Capt. Walker I consider that we owe much to its elimination of those errors which used to occur in the heat of battle. Dagmar. (Chapman's great love in Oslo)

4.9.44 " 3895 Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 241. No. 47 from Fritz of 4/9. Contents: I hope to visit Manchester again soon and am looking forward to having another of our discussions which have proved so fruitful (9 missing due to corrupt) last 3 years. Yours sincerely signed A.D. (or: Z) Wood, Dagmar (Oslo).

20.9.44 " 3901 Wiesbaden-Hamburg. Nr. 6. In accordance with an order to hand this end. Fritz traffic is to be taken over by Wilja (= Wiesbaden). Please state when taking over can take place.

4.9.44 " 3908 Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 236. No. 42 from Fritz, composed 4/9., received 10018 : Achtung! have got submarine detector device, also letter from prof. A.B. Wood Admiralty Research Department. contents of letter follows. Dagmar.

4.9.44 " 3909 Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 238 No. 44 from Fritz of 4/9. contents "A standard deviation of +/- 15 feet is a wonderful improvement on the old method of depth-finding and my only regret is that our present target is incapable of greater-speeds. Dagmar. Note Domaene (Domäne the W/T station of Hamburg in Wohldorf) "Standard" may read "~~Sttactrd~~".

4.9.44 " 3910 Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 242. No. 48 from Fritz (Chapman) of 4/9, received 4/9/ 1200 and destroyed. You must get photographs from all angles and destroyed (meant : you must destroy it?). You must get photographs and letter immediately. What suggestion? Instant reply wanted Dagmar (Oslo?)

15.9.44 " 3923 Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 249. Your No. 3 for Fritz cancelled, as message of similar content already handed in by Otto on 11/9/ Your no 3 has not been sent.

20.9.44 " 3924 Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 251. Fritz No. 53 sent 19/9 received 19/9 1221 hours. Contents; Will get Farni Daniels to help get photographs to Lisbon, but don't trust any sailor. Must have money. If I find place and send my preference within a few days can you drop money immediately? Photos explain Wood letter. getting working quickly. let me have reply now. Dagmar. (still fro Oslo?)

24.9.44 " 3925 Wiesbaden-Berlin. 88 For Hptm. Apitsch. from fritz No. 54. Will take time to get photos to Lisbon. Meanwhile do you wish me to work or not on this night fighter equipment? Have no money left for expenses, so, if no money, sorry cannot work. What proposals? Must pay people who are working for me. Jennewein, Major.

21.9.44 " 3944 Wiesbaden-Berlin. No. 76. For Hptm. Apitsch. Message 53 from Fritz. Will get Farni Daniels to help to get photos to Lisbon, but don't trust any sailor. Must have money immediately. Photos explain Wood. better get working quickly. Let me have reply now. Addendum Wiesbaden. 1) Daniels already previously named as a person dealing with Fritz. 2) Fritz notified that delivery of money depends on usefulness of the photos. Immediate payment out of the question. 3) Which cover address in Lisbon is to be used? Jennewein.

21.9.44 " 2942 Wiesbaden- Hamburg. no. 9. To Fritz. Immediate delivery of money out of the question: will depend largely on usefulness of photos. Please announce despatch of photos in good time, giving name of ship and (remainder unreadable; thus corrupt).

30.9.44 " 4021 Wiesbaden-Hamburg. 12. W/T message Fritz. When can we expect photos in Lisbon? Stefan Obst.

24.9.44 " 4065 Hamburg-Wiesbaden. message No. 54. from Fritz of 23/9. Received 23/9 1725 hours. Wilee take time to get photos to Lisbon (Dagmar). meanwhile do you wish me to work or not on the night fighter equipment? (AOB: Oboe) Have no money left for expenses so if no money sorry I cannot work. What proposals? Must pay people who are working for me.

29.9.44 ISTUN 4034 ?-Wiesbaden. Most Secret. message is of 27/9/44/ (see ISBA 3944, dated 21/9) To K.d.M Wiesbaden. ref. message no. 76 from Wilja (= Wiesbaden) Ref. 3) Jose Augusto Viera, Lisbon, Rua Marques da Silva 87. R/C.

5.10.44 ISBA 4177 Wiesbaden-Hamburg. 1. To Fritz. Please report on badges of troops you notice, giving total numbers of troops you notice, giving the total numbers of badges you saw and stating whether British or American units, which number or numbers had these units, where or what direction were they coming from from and where or whart direction were they going to.

5.10.44 " 4115 Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 253. fritz No. 57 of 5/10/44 1138. Serious danger to me when he brings money back if you make him suspicious. He will think he is smuggling. Must have reply. Do not know how long he will be here. Dagmar.

5.10.55 " 4116 Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 254. Fritz No. 56 of 5/10/44 1131(time of reception) Have found seaman who might take photos. You must not under any circumstances tell him what → (page 35)

I am doing. before I give him photos, must have your guarantee he will know nothing. Dagmar.

3.10.44 " 4176 Wiesbaden- Berlin. 14. For Apitzsch. very urgent. Message No. 55 from Fritz. Am still waiting for proposals, trying to find seaman to take photos and bring money. This is very dangerous and may take time, am forced to take risks by your lack of support. (text original in English).

6.10.44 " 4214 Wiesbaden - Berlin. 33, For (Hptm.) Apitzsch. Message no. 56 from Fritz. (text identical with ISBA 4416 and 4115, II/3276 Hamburg to Wiesbaden of 5/10, plus the following in German in the original:) (6 corrupt) new address requested as soon as possible.

I have been discussing with Masterman and Stopford the question of recruiting a seaman who could take Zigzag's photographs to the Lisbon address and who could return with the money which they promised to Zigzag (Chapman) by the Germans.

I understand that B.1.L. have an agent who they consider would be most suitable to carry out this mission. In discussing procedure with them was felt that proper thing to do would be to take Zigzag (Chapman) to Glasgow where he could personally contact the seaman agent, give him his instructions and hand over him the package. Zigzag (Chapman) would also hand over £10, informing the seaman the seaman that he would receive a further £40 when he delivered the package to the Lisbon address. Furthermore, he would say that on handing over this parcel which would be given to him in Lisbon on his return to this country he would receive a further sum of money.

Since this general scheme was discussed I have consulted Masterman and rather favour his suggestion that it would be better to have no contact whatever between the seaman and Zigzag (Chapman). Zigzag (Chapman) has already told the Germans that he is looking to Frani Daniels for assistance in recruiting a courier, and furthermore Zigzag (Chapman) has complained that their refusal to deliver the money by parachute the Germans are forcing him to take grave risks. The new suggestion is that Zigzag (Chapman) should now tell the Germans that he does not propose to make any personal contact with the courier, but that he is leaving the whole matter in the hands of Daniels. If this plan is proceeded with it will probably only be necessary to give the courier a description of Frani Daniels similar to that which Zigzag (Chapman) has already given to the Germans.

As I have said I favour the plan which was evolved during my discussion with Masterman, but perhaps B.1.L. will make their comments and pass the papers to A.D.B.

Extract from C.S.D.I.C. (connected with France) report on the case of Krause-Brandstetter, German agent.

39. At the beginning of August 44, Buchner (Buechner?) told PW that a Hptm. van Vleuten and a Rittmeister (= Hptm) Groening were arriving in Paris (think of May/June 1944; because Chapman arrived by means of a parachute in England in late June 1944) with an Englishman who had already been dropped in England by parachute, had returned to France and was dropped again. Buchner (Buechner?) said that they were not going to have anything to with this enterprise and mentioned that just previously a report had been received in the office of major Buttlar that a Ju 88 with a crew of five and two agents on board had flown from Avignon to North Africa, and after having wirelessed over Tunis that everything was in order had not been heard of since. (AOB, might this have been related to Wimmer-Languet?)

40. PW met van Vleuten, who hung around in Paris for about fourteen days, and learned from him that he was to have been a pilot. He never actually saw Groening or the agent but gathered that von Groening had either known the Englishman (Chapman) before the war or had been connected with him on his previous drop into this country (England) Van Vleuten was on the staff of Major Gartenfeld whom PW had visited in Johannistal (Joachimsthal?), and is known to have connected with the droppings of agents. He thinks Gartenfeld (once the leader of KG 200) was sacked some months in March or Feb. this year (1945)

41. As stated above, PW did not see the agent (Chapman), but van Vleuten described him as small, wiry type a pure adventurer, and he gained the impression that the man had previously been in the Navy. (nonsense)

I enclose a copy of Zigzag's (Chapman's) card from Abwehr II, obtained by Jigger (Uffz. Herbert J.W. Bechthold) from Hotel Lutetia (S113) (S113return). I do not know whether this will be of any real interest to TARobertson, though it is obviously of considerable sentimental interest. If you wish me to obtain Trevor Wilson's and Major Holcomb's permission to send the original to you, please let me know.

Sachgebiet: (z.B. IH West, IH Ost, ILuft. I Wi, II oder IIIF) II (AOB, Sabotage)

With further reference to the Zigzag-Brutus (Hubert) tie-up, you may be interested in the following message which was received by the Brutus W/T on 21.9.44:-

"With regard to the delivery of the package, it is not necessary to make contact with the other person, but do you not think that the name given on the envelope may endanger you if the bearer is not quite reliable?"

I am passing this to you as it seems that the Germans are still somewhat dubious about Zigzag's integrity.

B.1.a. 25.9.44 (curious that in the Brutus/Czerniawski Hubert context Chapman has been introduced?) Sgd. Hugh W. Astor

Propsed developments of the Zigzag (Chapman) Case in the light of recent Traffic.

The Germans have indicated that they are extremely interested in Professor Wood's letter which Zigzag (Chapman) has transmitted to them verbatim. They are also anxious to obtain the photographs of the apparatus which Zigzag (Chapman) stole from the factory at Manchester and have indicated their willingness to provide him with the sum of money for which he has asked.

Lt. commander Montagu is willing to allow suitable photographs to be sent, subject to the proviso that when the case is closed it is done in such a way that the Germans have no grounds for suspecting that it has been run in this country under control.

The Germans suggested to Zigzag (Chapman) that it would be safer and more convenient for all concerned if he could find a reliable sailor to take the photographs to Lisbon and who could bring back to England the money which they are prepared to pay him. They have tentative (cautious) agreed that, should Zigzag (Chapman) be unable to find a reliable sailor, they will endeavour to deliver this sum of money by parachute. There is no doubt that in agreeing to deliver this sum of money the Germans hope that Zigzag (Chapman) will be able to obtain more details of the anti-submarine detection devices and possibly some information of night-fighter equipment (Oboe).

Accordingly, Zigzag (Chapman) has today transmitted a message in which he has stated that he will try to get Farni Daniels to assist him in finding a sailor who will take the photographs to Lisbon. he has also indicated that he would not trust a sailor with the money and has asked the Germans whether, if he were to provide → (page 48)

them with the map references of a suitable place for the Germans to deliver the money to him by parachute, they would be willing to do so immediately.

Farni Daniels is known to the Germans for it was he who assisted Zigzag (Chapman) to get the necessary papers (notionally) to enable him to travel to Lisbon as a seaman when he returned to the Germans after his last mission (March 1943).

In the light of this message that Zigzag (Chapman) has sent,, he must wait a few days for a reply from the Germans as to whether they will be able to deliver the money by parachute. If, as is likely, the Germans procrastinate (delay, postpone) and the case looks like hanging fire (AOB: remember that Germany's capabilities were diminishing due to their delicate strategic situation; losing an aircraft - including their crew and spoiling some quantity of gasoline might have been too much for them), I feel that Zigzag should next send a message stating that he has found a sailor whom he is not prepared to take into his confidence, but who he could ask to deliver a present to a girlfriend of Zigzag's (Chapman's) at a hotel in Lisbon. It would be up to the Germans to to provide the name of a hotel in Lisbon. (AOB: KO Portugal stood still in lively contact with Germany; by means of W/T as well as still quite regular airline connections (Lufthansa) up to April 1945!) It would be up to the Germans to provide the name of the hotel amd a girl friend. At the same time Zigzag (Chapman), having completed his part of the bargain, could press the Germans for some finality in regard to the question of the delivery of the money by parachute.

The probability is that money sent by parachute would be genuine, whereas money coming from Lisbon would be (likely) forged. I think that it would be important in closing the Zigzag case to destroy his faith in the Germans. Zigzag's (Chapman's) only interest in the case is the money he can make out of it, and if we are able to get the money from Lisbon and then prove (cheating him?) to him that it was forged, we shall have gone a long way towards shattering the very high esteem which he undoubtedly has for Graumann and others with whom he came into contact when on the continent. (Great men?)

In order to bring this about, I suggest that we can, at any stage in the future development of the case, suddenly announce to the Germans that Frani Daniels has told Zigzag (Chapman) that he, Daniels knows of a business friend who has just received an exit permit for a brief visit to Lisbon. This friend could be built with large interests in the black-market. Zigzag (Chapman) would claim that he is not prepared to discus the real work which he is engaged for the Germans in this country, but would ask the friend to → (page 49)

take a small present to a girlfriend in Lisbon. he would ask the Germans to arrange with their contact, the girlfriend, that on receipt of Zigzag's generous present, he should ask the business friend if he would take a present to Zigzag (Chapman) from her.

I think that everyone is agreed that as soon as this next stage in the case in completed it should be closed and the introduction of the business friend will provide us with an opportunity of closing the case in one of two ways:

a) if the money with which he returns is in fact all counterfeit (forged), Zigzag will probably send an unprintable message, closing the case himself, or

b) the business can be used for the purpose of notionally blowing Zigzag (Chapman) to the authorities.

(AOB: In my perception Mr. Ryde is handling in some respect 'perfidiousness' - as you might remember his foregoing (but later in time) clash with Zigzag's (Chapman's) life-style (U113) (U113return) signed on 24.10.44, whereas this just forgoing reference was signed on 19.9.44; thus one month earlier but with the similar attitude.

Due to lacking reference: Viewing the Buzz-bomb (V1s) hits on the London centre area. Maybe include are also the V2 ballistic rocket impacts

No matter what decision is arrived at this afternoon's meeting in the Twenty Committee (XX-Committee) regarding the suggested closing of this case, we have to make contact at 10.20 tomorrow morning, and I think that we should be ready to say something about rumours of the explosions, in view of the fact that other agents are making reports on this.

Would you please ask Drew whether he would approve an entirely non-committal message on the following lines:

"Heard many rumours of explosions of gas works and mains but no information of the cause.. making enquiries."

I have tried to to get Drew on the telephone this morning, but he is engaged. As he will no doubt be attending the Twenty Committee meeting this afternoon, perhaps you could get his approval to the above suggested message.

With reference to the scheme whereby Brutus should receive £1,000 from Zigzag at the Wings Club ) (you will jump into the Brutus (Hubert) file series where this reference originates from), you may be interested in the following message which was received from the Germans on 12.9.44:-

"As already reported, the money is already in England (the money was among the money which Zigzag / Chapman did bring in when he landed by parachute on British soil about the end of June 1944), but I am yet not in agreement with your proposal. Is there no risk for you in the event of the bearer not being quite reliable? If there is no danger for you, I shall execute it."

I am proposing to reply that the scheme for effecting the delivery provides the maximum security for Brutus, but that in principle he does not wish to be put into touch with with any other organisation about whom the Germans have the slightest doubt.

I feel sure that you will be pleased as I was to hear the results of the latest squid trials. The official report will reach you through the usual channels after the usual delay!

A standard deviation of plus or minus 15 feet is a wonderful improvement on the old method of depth-finding and my only regret is that our present target is uncapable of greater speeds. Doubtless 13 knots is is as much as the enemy is likely to reach in this war but we must always keep a 'jump' ahead, preferably two jumps!

I thought you might like the enclosed photos of the standard and remote setting depth charges fuse for coupling direct to the squid Mk J indicator controller (as suggested by too its elimination of those errors which used to occur in the heat of the battle.

I hope to visit Manchester again soon and am looking forward to having another of our discussions which have proved so fruitful during the last three years.

KV 2/460-2, pages: 14 + 18 + 22 + 26 + 30 All the damages shown next once had been caused by the German V1 Buzz-bombs; no V2 bombs yet.

AOB, Chapman received a photographic training during his second stay with the Abwehr; and he was equipped with two Leica cameras, of which one was, in due course, to be passed on to Brutus.

AOB, please notice the working going on in reconstructing at least one of the buildings

I am returning herewith the fly bomb damage photographs taken by Jock (Supporter) for Zigzag (Chapman). I am afraid that we cannot approve of their being sent over, since they would be of considerable value to the enemy, and naturally those that would be of no value to the enemy would stand Zigzag himself in very little stead.

AOB, May we now conclude that the reproduced above where considered to be passed onto the Germans?

Reference your PF 65101/B.1.a/MR of 30th August, 1944. Our Section dealing with such matters states that these are a high-grade set of instructions, in that the Germans have told the Agent highly secret information about the state of their knowledge; they have disclosed knowledge of which they would not think we would aware, i.e. things we only knew from most secret sources; there are also points in it of which we did not, in fact, know that the Germans were aware, even from our knowledge gained from most secret sources.

2. The section also informed me that it would be most unlikely that we would wish to try any deception plan on these lines, as the German knowledge is too near the knuckle (projection) for us to try to tamper with it at this stage.

I had an interview with Zigzag (Chapman) the other day at my Club, as I understood that he was expressing dissatisfaction at the way in which his case was being run. (X115) (X115return) [In my perception: Major Michael Ryde's attitude lays at the base of Chapman's dissatisfactions!]

He said that he felt that more ought to be done to exploit his case or that the case should be closed down and that he should be released from our service. I (T.A. Robertson) discussed this with him tentatively, and put forward certain other proposals for making use of his services, such as helping the Allies when they get in Paris to identify people who may have gone to ground (stay-behind) there who are known to him to be German agents. I also asked him what he himself felt about his future activities and he did not seem to have and very clear ideas on this subject.

He is quite clearly restless and is likely to be so, as long as he is asked to perform the rather humdrum (dull) business of tapping a Morse key at our instructions.

I subsequently discussed the case at some length with Marriott, and Major Ryde, and we came to the conclusion that Zigzag (Chapman) had served his purpose so far as we were concerned, had done an extremely good brave job, and that the best thing to do with the case was to shut down and pay Zigzag (Chapman) off by giving him a fairly substantial sum of money. I suggested ed. £5,000, the payment of which I said I would get agreed by Brigadier Harker.

It seems that it may be necessary just to keep the case going in order to comply with Drew's and possibly Montagu's wishes for some weeks longer. Mr. Marriott undertook to explore the views of these officers.

our decision to him, with which he entirely agreed. he is quite convinced that Zigzag (Chapman) is a man without any scruples who will blackmail anyone if he thinks it worth his while and will not stop even at selling out to the opposition if he thinks there is anything to gain out of it.

I agree with him in his views but I still maintain that we are bound to give Zigzag (Chapman) a square deal from a financial point of view, at any rate, as he has done a very considerable service for his country. Mr. Burt also agrees with this view and has suggested-and I agree-that he should have another talk with Zigzag (Chapman) and try to draw him, with a view to seeing what he expects from this department as a payment for his services.

I think, for various reasons, it would be wise for Major Ryde to continue running this case, as it needs a lot of attention at the present moment, which in view of Dreadnought's (Ivo Popov KV 2/867 .. KV 2/869) arrival in this country, D.I.Wilson. will not be able to give it.

Next an unexpected aspect: about the origin of the banknotes Chapman brought in when he arrived in England again in June 1944.

I have more or less completed my investigations into the origin of the notes (totally £6,000) brought back by Zigzag (Chapman) on 29.4.44 . At this stage of the warm and our knowledge of Bank Notes, there has not seemed to be any point in trying to trace evey one of the notes which Zigzag (Chapman) brought back. I have, however, enquired about all those notes which seemed likely to yield some information of interest.

In the result, the information has not proved to be very striking, and most of the notes concerned were issued from this country before the war to Continental Banks. There are one or two instances of notes having been issued to German nationals and these cases I am investigating as far as I can.

I do not imagine that you will want a complete table of results, but you may like to know that the £10 notes K/186 18644-50 were issued by Barclays Chief Foreign Branch to H. Albert de Bary & Co. (owned by Deutschebank), Amsterdam, on 24.5.38, and the £10 notes K186 22991-23000 and 28002-4 to the same people on 25.5.38.

Zigzag's (Chapman's) notes afford 7 separate links with other payments by the enemy to agents. These are as follows:-

Zigzag's (Chapman's) £5 notes A/253 94306, 94312-3 and 94322-3 come from a block of 100 notes numbered A/253 94301-400 which were issued on 21.1.37 by Westminster Bank, Lothbury, to the Bank Jordaan, Paris. From this block of notes numbered 94314-20 were brought by Hansen on 30.9.43 and S.I.S. informed me on 29.4.44 that the notes 94330-2 had been found on an enemy agent captured in Italy.

Zigzag's (Chapman's) £5 note B/180 31738 comes from a block of 500 £5 notes numbered B/180 31701-3200 which were issued on 8.2.39 by National Provincial bank, 15 Bishopsgate, to Lloyds and National provincial Bank Foreign Bank Ltd. Threadneedle Street, who subsequently sent them to their Brussels office. From this block the notes numbered 31743 was brought back by Snow (Arthur Owens) on 28.10.39.

Zigzag's (Chapman's) £10 notes K/135 46524 and 46531-3 seem almost certainly to be connected with the notes K/135 46530 and 46525-8 which were brought back in his earlier payment on 16.12.42 (Chapman's first landing on 16 December 1942). These notes were all issued to Lloyds Bank on 20.5.35, but unfortunately their records in regard to then have been destroyed.

Zigzag's (Chapman's) £10 K157 3724 and 3732-3 come from a block numbered K157 3724-38 which were issued on 15.9.39 by the Westminster Bank, Lothbury, to J. Tchernine & Co., Paris. The notes from block numbered K/157 3725-6 were brought by Hansen on 30.9.43.

Zigzag's (Chapman's) £10 notes K/169 27435-50 and 27450 come from a block numbered K/169 27435-50 issued by Midland Bank, Overseas Branch, to Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Indusrie, Paris, on 15.6.37. From this block, the notes numbered K169/ 27436-8 and 27440 were brought back by Zigzag on 16.12.42. (Chapman's first jump)

Zigzag's (Chapman's) £10 notes K/180 25918-25 seem almost certainly connected with the note K/180 25926 which was brought by Dragonfly (Ivo Popov) on 4.1.41. unfortunately records in regard to the original issue of these notes have now been destroyed.

Zigzag's (Chapman's) £10 notes K/198 54296-7 come from a block of 400 notes numbered K/198 45001-45400 which were issued on 18.3.39 by National Provincial Bank, 15 Bishopsgate, to Lloyds and National Provincial Foreign Bank, who sent them to their Monte Carlo office. From this block the notes numbered K/198 45271 was brought back by Zigzag (Chapman) on 16.12.42 (Chapman's first parachute return).

In addition to the above, there are two other somewhat curious sidelights on Zigzag's (Chapman's) notes.

His £10 notes K/160 23506-8 and 23579-80 were issued on 23.11.36 by the Bank of England to the Westminster Bank, Lothbury, whose records have been destroyed. These notes seem certainly to be connected with the notes K/160 23539-1 which was issued at the same time to the Westminster Bank and which were paid in at the Westminster Bank, Park Lane, on 17.6.43 by M. Bianchi.

Secondly, Zigzag's (Chapman's) £10 notes K/197 53432-3 come from a block of 100 notes numbered K/197 53401-500 issued on 4.3.39 by Westminster Bank, Lothbury, to the Banque Belge, London. From this block the notes numbered K/197 53478 was also paid in at the Westminster Bank, Park Lane, by M. Bianchi on 17.6.43. I have passed his information on to Mrs. Pitt, B.1.G.

The most interesting thing about Zigzag's (Chapman's) notes, from my point of view, is that they have afforded a good many opportunities to make further enquiries about certain Bank Notes. For instance, from the A/253 series of £5 notes, we know that 3 enemy agents have now been paid; the notes numbered 94321, considerable interest. It is not lessened on discovering that it was paid in to a Bank in Torquay in December last. From the point of view of enquiries of this sort, Zigzag's (Chapman's) latest parcel of notes seems to be considerably more promising than any I have had for a long time.

B.1.b. 9.8.44 Sgd. H.J.L. Withrington (AOB, I never encountered his name before)

1. On the assumption that we succeed in clearing the message prepared for today, Zigzag (Chapman) will notionally depart immediately for Manchester for the purpose of breaking in in to Ferranti's or metro-Vick and photographing such documents or devices as the Admiralty may prepare. It is probable that on 10.8.44 we shall receive a reply to today's message discussing methods of passing the camera and money to Brutus (Hubert) (Czerniawski formerly also Walenty) (Y115) (Y115return). I (D.I. Wilson) suggest that we should take any such message blind and consider, after we know what is in it, whether we shall make a fresh contact. , thereby committing ourselves to having got it. If we do take the message, then a further stalling reply will have to be worked out, and Zigzag should presumably make an interim report on his progress in Manchester. If necessary, to account for further absence from London and inability to report about the buzz-bombs (V1's), he should say that he is going to Cardiff or some such place to recruite the seaman courier who will ultimately be necessary to carry his photographs to Lisbon. mr. Horsfall is taking photographs of bomb damage which will have to be sent to Lisbon with the material about anti-submarine devices in due course. Zigzag (Chapman) says he was taught to develop such photographs as he might take, and we can therefore develop such photographs as he might take and we can therefore develope them and inspect them before despatch.

At some stage Zigzag (Chapman) should fix a time a few days in advance for testing his second set. As we do not intend to use the second set, I suggest that at the time fixed we should not in fact attempt to make contact, and proceed on the basis that the set was put out of action at the time of Zigzag's (Chapman's) arrival but that he cannot discover exactly what has gone wrong with it.

2. If there is any traffic, copies should be sent, if possible in advance, to G.C. & C.S., as there is an indication on most secret secret sources that the reception end is now Hamburg, who may be expected to pass his message back to Paris (more likely to Wiesbaden ( = Wilja)).

3. R.S.S. (RSS) have been asked to D.F. the receiving station for today's transmission, and it may be as well to get this repeated when Zigzag (Chapman) next goes on the air.

4. Zigzag (Chapman) himself is going to the dogs, He claims to be making quite large sums of money by backing the winners of races which have already been fixed. He says that he himself is not directly concerned in the dirty work involved, but in any case, to take advantage of other people's dirty work to fleece (cheat) the bookmakers cannot be regarded as a desirable occupation. I imagine it was because he saw the possibility of making a profit with the dogs that Zigzag (Chapman) cut an appointment on 4.8.44 when he was due to go to Hendon to transmit. He claims that he sent an express letter addressed to me at the Imperial House which ought to have given me advance notice of that and which contained the suggestion that Riesen might be the actual transmissions. This letter has not yet come to hand.

5. I am not sure that it might not be sound policy to take the risk of running the transmissions entirely by ourselves. It is obviously a considerable risk, because Zigzag (Chapman) has a distinctive style and Riesen is not very confident of being able to imitate it very exactly. On a previous occasion when Riesen thought he could exactly imitate the agent concerned, the expert view on Riesen's transmissions was not entirely favourable.

8. As far as I know no final decision has been taken whether we should out of our own funds in any way supplement what Zigzag (Chapman) from the Germans (£6,000 - of which £2,000 should be handed over to another agent; we know meant was Brutus (Hubert) (Czerniawski / formerly Walenty). It has been suggested that if we could put up some firm business proposition it might not be possible for us to help him with the capital he would need for that purpose. It is obvious, however, that we cannot assist him financially if his ideas of business is to work the dogs.

9. Zigzag (Chapman) has himself withdrawn his original suggestion that he might form a West End Club, which he later modified to the suggestion of starting a club in Southend. He has now dropped this because he has been advised locally that it is not unlikely that any club would survive than a month or two, irrespective of who was managing it, because of the opposition of vested interests. As an alternative Zigzag (Chapman) is considering taking an interest in a Hotel in Southend. (AOB, why such a remote place?) he is in touch with a woman whose name he has proposed to give us, who holds the licence of the "Ship", Southend, and has applied to the brewers, → (page 52)

Mann Crossman, to take on the licence of either the Hope Hotel or the Minerva Hotel, Southend. The brewers are asking a premium of £2,000. Zigzag (Chapman) mentioned this last proposition when he was met Burt, and Zigzag (Chapman) has been advised that it is a waste of money for him to try and take an interest in licensed premises if the police are going to try to close them down as soon as they out that he is in fact behind the business, even if the licence itself is not in his own name. It was agreed that the only thing to do was to put the essential facts before the Chief Constable. It the latter, notwithstanding Zigzag's (Chapman's) passed record, appeared willing to give his new venture a fair chance so long as the hotel was properly conducted, then it might be worth while for Zigzag (Chapman) to go on with it; but he himself accepts that it would not be sensible for him to start such a venture if the Chief Constable reactions were unfavourable. Zigzag (Chapman) is to let us know the name of the woman concerned, and I have told R.S.L.O. Cambridge we will pass this name to him with the results of the look-up. He is prepared to put the matter before the Chief Constable of Southend.

I have not had an opportunity of discussing this matter further with Burt since Burt met Zigzag (Chapman), and i think his views should be obtained. I must add, too, that this matter was discussed before Zigzag (Chapman) admitted that he had returned to the dogs, and this factor seems to make it even less likely that he would be a successful hotel manager. If the hotel scheme is possible at all, it would I think be preferable, if it is possible, for him to hold the licence in his own name, rather than for his interest to be concealed one with a nominee as licensee.

10. Zigzag (Chapman) mentioned to me a man he had met at Nantes, who was a trained radio man and saboteur and who, or whose family, had a house at Rennes. This man's name was something like Cousins, and Zigzag (Chapman) thought he had given particulars on his previous visit, but on looking up the first Camp 020 (Late 1942 and early 1943) report I cannot connect this man or the rough description Zigzag (Chapman) gave me with those whose particulars are recorded. It might therefore be as well → (page 53)

11. Zigzag (Chapman) says that he is writing an autobiography. he has been told by Burt and myself (D.I. Wilson) that it is impossible for him to disclose during the war, and in all probability for a long time thereafter (AOB, somewhere about 1957 a publication on behalf of Chapman appeared in France; and Chapman faced legal problems in England), anything about his work for the Germans or ourselves, and Burt also advised him that if he disclosed facts relating to his criminal past he would probably render himself subject to action. if not by the police then by some of the parties whose goods he had stolen. Zigzag (Chapman) replied that he realised that publication would be impossible, but that he still felt inclined to set down his recollection of what had happened to him while it was still fresh.

12. I have sent to Chrimes of the Ministry of Labour the necessary form for Zigzag's (Chapman's) registration under the National Service Acts, and Chrimes should let me have a card which can be passed on to Zigzag (Chapman) so that he is properly documented in this respect. Chrimes is holding the papers and arranging that the ministry take no action so long as need Zigzag's (Chapman's) services.

13 Wethered of B.1.b. is endeavouring to obtain a photograph on the one Jeffery in whom he is interested, and who may have been seen by Zigzag (Chapman) in Oslo.

14. The Air Ministry was supply a list of aerodromes to be submitted to Zigzag (Chapman) to see if he can recognise the names of the east Anglian aerodromes which he was to try and report on to the Germans.

15. I have asked commander Senter of the S.O.E. if he can find anything in their records of Zigzag's (Chapman's) girl friend Dagmar (Lahlum) (in Oslo).

B.1.a. (Mr. D.I. Wilson)

R.S.S. (RSS) (Radio Security Service) this morning passed the following information by telephone, in reply to a request made to him by Mr. Hughes.

At 0915 GMT today Service 2/2006 (II/2006) Control (thought to be Oslo) was placed by d/f at approximately Hamburg (Domaene / Domäme) / Lübeck.

For what it is worth, Major Howard said that the R.S.S. operator (a very able and experienced one) stated that the sending from this end was very definitely English, and reminded him of the "good old pre-war days" of amateur radio.

(AOB, the Abwehr preferred to recruit radio HAMs or in German practice: (DASD) licensed 'DE' amateur, no HAMs as their number was restricted in pre-war Germany to 475 call-signs. But, to obtain a DE licence (allowing the possession of receivers up to the bitter end in 1945!) one had to pass a thorough Morse examination. Further, maintained a great number of German Radio amateur their pre-war wireless practice including their Q-codes and amateur like abbreviations. I wondered already before that Chapman obtained their way of running communications. The British wondered about their freedom to maintain it. It might also in Germany out-rules, but it was maintained throughout. (Z 115) (Z115return)

The D.G. (Director General) returned this file to me today saying that he was not proposing to minute it. His views were, hoever,

b. that he was worth keeping sweet and retaining as he might, at a later stage, be useful to the C,C.I.B. in Germany and Austria (after Germany surrendered).

I attach the prints made by Hedger of such parts of the film found in Zigzag's (Chapman's) Leica camera as had been exposed. The somnolent gentleman is Holst, the lady is Zigzag's girl-friend Dagmar (Lahlum) and the house at Greffen, which Zigzag said was sometimes used for wireless training, and where he hid various photographs of members of the Abwehr, etc. He states that if you go through the window on the first floor shown in the photograph, you find yourself in the bedroom. The door of this bedroom opens into the passage, and immediately outside the bedroom there is a trap door leading to the attic from the passage. In the attic the girder supporting the rafters is covered with a strip of sheet iron or some such metal. The photographs are concealed under the sheet iron strip.

I suppose: Dagmar Lahlum is Chapman's great girl-friend (fiancée) during his Oslo days

AOB: the entire file is about the implications of the explosive hidden in what looked like a real block of coal. Photos available at page 60 + 62

Though, this is quite outside the scope of our Chapman Zigzag Survey; I therefore would like to skip this entire file series.

AOB, in my perception, his photograph is to me far more sympathetic than the rather criminal like face we have used so far.

1.-(i) If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interest of the state -

(a) approaches inspects, passes over or is in the neighbourhood of, or enters any prohibited place within the meaning of this Act; or

(b) makes any sketch, plan. model, or note which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy; or

(c) obtains, collects, records, or publishes, or communicates to any other person any secret official code word, or pass word, or any sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document or information which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy;

2.-(i) If any person having in his possession or control any secret official code word, or pass word, or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information which relates to or is used in an prohibited place or anything in such a place, or which has been made or obtained in contravention (disobeying) of this Act, or which has been entrusted in confidence to him by any person holding office under His Majesty or which he has obtained or to which he has access owing to his position as a person who holds or has held office under His Majesty, or as person who holds or has held a contract made on behalf of His Majesty. or as a person who holds or has held a contract made on behalf of His Majesty , or as a person who is or has been employed under a person who holds or has held such an office or contract, -

(a) communicates the code word, pass word, sketch, plan, model, article, note document, or information to any person, other that a person to whom he is authorised to communicate it, or a person to whom it is in the interest of the State his duty to communicate it, or

(aa) uses the information in his possession for the benefit of any foreign power or any other manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the States, or

(b) retains the sketch, plane, model, article, note, or document in his possession or control when he has no right to retain it or when it is contrary to his duty to retain it. or fails to comply with all directions issued by lawful authority with regard to the return or disposal thereof, or

(c) fails to take reasonable care of, or so conducts himself as to endanger the safety of the sketch, plan, model, note, document, secret official code or pass word or information;

1. I have read the above Sections of the Official secrets Act, 1911, as amended by the Official Secret Act, 1920. They have been explained to me and I understand them.

2. I fully understand the whole of the matters arising from my connection with officers of the British Intelligence Service are matters arising from my having been employed under persons who hold or have held → (page 25)

office under His Majesty, and /or through having been entrusted in confidence to me by officers of the British Intelligence Service who are all persons who hold or have held office under His majesty.

3. I fully understand that any disclosure by me, whether during or after the present war, of facts concerning these matters or relating to the undertaking upon which I have been engaged in connection with the officers already mentioned will be an offence against Sections 1(i) or 2(i) of the Official secrets Act, 1911, as amended by the Official secrets Act, 1920, punishable by imprisonment.

4. I undertake upon my honour to abstain (refrain) from any such disclosure which I recognise will entail the risk of jeopardising the interest of Great Britain, her Allies and the Powers associated with her.

A.O.B.: following the long foregoing story - why does Chapman had to sign such a contract now, as he was already engaged in the Service since, say, December 1942 / January 1943? Was this - because M.I.5 was about to terminate contacts with Chapman; might this have implicated - that before this date (2nd November 1944) - Chapman did not at all signed such a contract earlier?

AOB: The Chapman Zigzag file ends here. We have a strange question: "Zigzag" (again) enters the scene about January 1945 (maybe even earlier).

But nothing being documented within Chapman's (Zigzag's) file series; as it is entirely filled with French post-war Newspaper copies!

There is a part of the story missing; in as far as Chapman's identity (Zigzag) remained to be exploited, but since 2nd November 1944 he was, supposed, no longer to be in touch with M.I.5.

Indeed it is, because the first reason taking up Chapman's files was Zigzag's apparent engagement as German Double-Cross agent: Draht.

We know now, and will prove at least : by sound indications - that he was not at all engaged in the 1945 games M.I.5 played with the Germans; up to the bitter end.

But in the Brutus (Hubert) file series "Zigzag" seemingly still plays a major role as a considered contact between the Germans and Brutus. Including a wide range of communications in 1945, apparently virtually, between M.I.5 and the Germans, via Portugal; and they (KO Portugal) communicated, mainly by means of W/T towards Berlin.

It is not very likely that Chapman's cover-name Draht did not exist, why should they then exchange messages, albeit, later by airmail instead of W/T.

This might have been the trick: no longer transmitting (against repeated German complains) - but mailing to Lisbon, have been the matter - as to covering-up the lack of Chapman himself - with all his HAM like W/T peculiarities, to maintain communications?

AOB: I must admit - that I have not foreseen this aspect before; - on the other hand I do not really wonder - because M.I.5's attitude versus Chapman changed on a way, that deep in myself I had the feeling that dirty games were building-up in their minds.

Now, I understand - that the forced signing of the Secrets Act on 2nd November 1944, was a deliberate plan to eliminate Chapman; and to replace Zigzag virtually!

Wikipedia taught me: that they had fired him on the day that he signed this very Secrets Act. (see later quote)

They played the game in a way, that it was directly not visible what dubious game they were actually planning.

It was already more or less clear that sooner or later they would play the Chapman game, but, smart as they were: they did not record it on paper; with some minor exceptions - which you find duplicated in this final survey Chapter.

With reference to the scheme whereby Brutus should receive £1,000 from Zigzag at the Wings Club (M120) (M120return) (you will jump into the Brutus (Hubert) file series where this reference originates from), you may be interested in the following message which was received from the Germans on 12.9.44:-

"As already reported, the money is already in England (the money was among the money which Zigzag / Chapman did bring in when he landed by parachute on British soil on 29 June 1944), but I am yet not in agreement with your proposal. Is there no risk for you in the event of the bearer not being quite reliable? If there is no danger for you, I shall execute it."

Let us quote from 11.1.45, which had been already been noticed long before its execution on 13 September 1944 (see foregoing reference)

11.1.45 (Isk 133514) Berlin-Lisbon. 29. Secret (Geheim) Ref. your 92 of 8/1 para 1. For Harry (= Leiter I KOP Dr. Schreiber) for Feder (= Ballhorn / Brandes). Please give orders by quickest route to Draht to send Squadron Leader Romone (Ramon) Wings Club, Grosvenor Place by some inconspicuous means as a small parcel or a letter £ 2,000 English notes. These can be sent over by messenger or by post. Draht must manage the payment in such a way that he himself can in no way be compromised, Money must be advanced by Draht in London and will be supplied in Devisen as desired. Report when commission has been sent off to London. Babette Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen Obstlt. KV 2/1975) 12773/12.

I am quite sorry for those who would not believe that such dirty games is on the menu of M.I.5; but apparently there are piling-up to much evidence.

Quoting from the second paragraph:

As a prelude to the move, I suggest that Brutus (Hubert) should inform the Germans that Chopin may shortly be moved back to London by his firm, which presents considerable financial difficulties, as the flat where the W/T set was formerly installed has now been surrendered and it will be necessary for him to rent a new flat (that is the story told to the Germans). This would open the way to a considerable exchange of messages relating to the financial transaction which has been in abeyance for some time. Whereas before we were slightly wary (cautious) about carrying out this transaction as it would involve Zigzag (Zig-Zag) (Edward Arnold Chapman) (KV 2/455 .. KV 2/463) (AOB, might Zigzag have been the German agent 'Draht' ; considering the reference in this M.I.5 reference, it is not unlikely that Draht = Zigzag, we can now press for it without fear of any evil consequences. When the Germans admit that they are no longer able to effect the transaction, we will be able to discuss again the possibility of a parachute.

B.1.a. 30.11.44 Sgd. Hugh Astor.

On 2nd November 1944, we may suppose that Chapman had been, most likely, forced to sign the Secret Act. According Wikipedia: this very day - he also was kicked out of MI5 engagement.

What a deliberate historical masquerade, which had been, for some time, reflected by the wordings on behalf of Major Michael Ryde.

AOB: I must admit, that actually I do not much wonder by the games played, but I did not expect a conclusion like this one.

They actually could play the game like this, because they refused communicating by means of W/T - as then Chapman's operating peculiarities would (then) obviously coming to bear; but communicating by air-mail instead, via Lisbon, they elegantly solved this nuisance.

There hardly could have existed another means, as otherwise the G.P.O. mail-censor would have blocked communications;

We may now safely consider that M.I.5 did not break off communicating with the Germans; but why using Draht instead of usually Fritz or Fritzchen?

AOB: After 12th February 1944, the Leiter of the entire O.K.W Amt Ausland/Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, had been suspended from office and was soon thereafter replaced by Obst. i.G. Hansen. At the same time it was decided that the Abwehr should merging with the (SS controlled) R.S.H.A. Amt VI, ultimately forming Amt Mil (headed by Dr. Schellenberg, albeit, that Hansen was heading Amt Mil, for a while). After the failed assassination attempt on Hitler, on 20th July 1944, the Abwehr was forced since to merge with Amt Mil quickly.

Let us consider that Chapman was sent to England on 28/29 June 1944, still by the Abwehr organisation. It is clearly visible since by the RSS transcripts. New terms and names are appearing (such as Babette Mate and others). Isn't it likely that also, fore whatever reason, the name Fritzchen had been abandoned and replaced by respectively Fundus and Draht? Without communication between M.I.5 in England and the German control - such a move hardly could have been arranged.

When it actually was managed we cannot deduce from the remaining materials left in the file series.

The evidence that something had been manipulated is clear, due to the discrepancy between the notice of content stamped at the file jacket; like KV 2/463: Main File; whereas its content consists of French newspaper page copies only; of late 1945. Which I refuse to consider that this is the content of Chapman's "Main File" genuinely!

'Volume 1' should normally mean: That KV 2/463 once was meant as the main file series; instead of consisting newspaper page copies.

Originally - the file numbers consisted of a PF xxxx numbers only. I suppose somewhere in the 1950s they introduced, for practical reason, the KV 2/xxx serials.

Furthermore, I consider that the files had been "weeded" - or in the 1990s and/or beyond.

Crucial in this entire context was - that I was confronted with the:

https://www.cdvandt.org/carre-bleicher-walenty.htm#325b

file series case before.

Wouldn't I have digested the latter file references seriously first, we would never have possessed the knowledge of the

dubious games M.I.5 once did play, this time!

When we approach the latter link we learn that already some contacts between at least Fundus and Draht, might have existed before Chapman return to England in late June 1944.

I don't see a solution to close the gap of our knowledge, and have to live with the left open queries.

We must even have to count with other games played - of which we have not the slightest ideas, yet.

During this period he was also involved in dropping of dogs in greyhound racing and was associating with criminal elements in West End nightclubs, He was indiscreet about the sources of his income and so MI5, being unable to control him, dismissed him on 2 November 1944. Chapman was given £6,000 payment from MI5 and was allowed to keep £1,000 of the money the Germans gave him (actually it should have been £2,000 which should be notionally handed over to Brutus/Hubert). He was granted a pardon for his pre-war activities and was reported by MI5 to have been living “in fashionable places in London always in the company of beautiful women of apparent culture. (AOB, £6,000 just was the sum of money the Germans provided him with; M.I.5 handled again similarly as they did in early 1943. After Chapman arrived on 29th June 1944 with £6,000 of which £2,000 was supposed to be hand over to another agent; of whom we know it was: Brutus (Hubert))

Chapman had two fiancées at the same time, each in opposite war zones. He was still betrothed (engaged) to Freda Stevenson (in the files noticed as Ms White, because she was married to someone else) in Britain when he met (in Oslo) with Dagmar Lahlum in Norway. Stevenson was being financially assisted through MI5 (from Chapman’s deposited fund of £375 as a part of what he had brought -in on 16^th December 1942) …

He abandoned both women after the war and instead married his former lover Betty Farmer, whom he had left in a hurry at the Hotel de la Plage in 1938. He and farmer later had a daughter Suzanne in 1954. … They (Dagmar Lahlun) met again briefly in 1994. Chapman died (11 December 1997) before he was able to redeem her name.

On his retirement, MI5 expressed some apprehension (worry) that Chapman might take up crime again when his money ran out and if caught would plead for leniency (clemency) because of his highly secret wartime service. As predicted, he mixed with blackmailers and thieves and got in trouble with the police for various crimes., including smuggling gold across the Mediterranean in 1950. more than once he had a character reference from former intelligence officers who confirmed his great contribution to the war effort.

Chapman had his wartime memoirs serialised in France to earn money, but he was charged under the official Secrets Act and fined £50. A few years later, when they to be published in the news of the World, the whole issue was pulped. However, this book The Eddie Chapman Story was eventually published in 1953.

Chapman ghost-wrote the autobiography of Eric Pleasants, a British citizen who joined the Germans and served in the British of the Waffen – SS during the war. Chapman claimed to have met Pleasant while he was imprisoned in Jersey. I killed to Live – The Story of Eric Pleasants as told to Eddie Chapman was published in 1957. In 1967, Chapman was living in Italy and went into business as an antiquarian.

Chapman and his wife later set up a health farm (Shenley Herts) and owned a castle in Ireland. After the war Chapman remained friends with Baron Rittmeister a.D. Stephan von Gröning (Groening), his Abwehr handler (wartime alias Rittmeister Dr. Graumann), who had fallen on hard times. Von Gröning later attended the wedding of Chapman’s daughter. Eddie Chapman died of heart failure on 11 December 1997. He was survived by his wife Betty, and a daughter.