Kraemer Karl Heinz
Siemsen Nina Anna
Webpage initiated on 30 December 2022
current status: 27 January 2023
Chapter 2 (5 January 2023)26
Chapter 3 (8 January 2023)
Chapter 4 (10 January 2023)
Chapter 5 (13 January 2023)
Chapter 6 (16 January 2023)
Chapter 7 (23 January 2023)
Chapter 8 (21 January 2023)
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Chapter 18 (since 1 March 2023)
Chapter 19 (since 4 March 2023)
Chapter 20 (since 8 March 2023)
Chapter 21 (since 10 March 2023)
Chapter 22 (since 13 March 2023)
Chapter 23 (since 15 March 2023)
Chapter 24 (since 21 March 2023)
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Chapter 27 (since 4 April 2023)
Chapter 28 (since 8 April 2023)
Chapter 29 (since 14 April 2023)
Chapter 30 (since 19 April 2023)
Chapter 32 (since 24 April 2023)
Chapter 33 (since 1 May 2023)
Chapter 34 (since 12 May 2023)
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Chapter 37 (since 23 May 2023)
Chapter 38 (since 26 May 2023)
Chapter 39 (since 29 May 2023)
Chapter 40 (since 31 May 2023)
Chapter 41 (since 5 June 2023)
KV 2/151-1, page 68
Dr. Karl Heinz Krämer
photo typically taken at Camp 020, after Kraemer's arrest on 15th May 1945 and his arrival at Camp 020 on My 17th
AOB: all these Camp 020 photos are typically bearing the separation between two background cover plates.
KV 2/145-2, page 50 (minute 180a)
Dr. Karl-Heinz Kraemer; with wife and child, photo taken, likely, in his Stockholm flat
Siemsen, Nina Anna
AOB: I always enjoy these kind of jackets, as they pass-on the significance of a file under consideration.
We first notice 4th July 1961
But, as this certainly had been gathered in a foregoing collection - there must have existed foregoing jacket versions.
Consequently, as usually practised, the concerned file series have been seriously restructured and been "weeded".
Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer's
All together, I have once (in 2017) counted 2541 page copies.
Consequently: this should become a quite huge endeavour; for which I would like to apply for your patience.
AOB: Why do I re-approach the Kraemer file series again?
During the course of approaching Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer's file series again, I reconsidered my late 2017 contribution on
In it I encountered a self drawn map (AOB), which can pass on a better understanding, in which Kraemer's engagements in Stockholm has to be considered within the European context.
The cover-names of some European major cities being added as well as, some times, the Abwehr Service cover-names
I trust that this map provides some useful information for you, during the course of our current endeavour.
Our main subject today - has to do with a recent engagement in the website case of:
KV 2/2128 on Pierre Garnier the French Military Attaché in Stockholm,
erroneously suspected of his spying for Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer.
Not the smartest approach on behalf of British S.I.S. causing a row with the French authorities.
An indication of reshuffling of the file series is the fact, that the minute serials do not start with minute number 1a, though actually here with minute number 19a
KV 2/144-1, page 2
As to start with I would like to go integrally through the first shown minute, as to make you a bit more familiar with the particulars of such pages.
29.9.43 B.1.b (section of M.I.5) Note to B.3.b (a not so regular M.I.5 office) acknowledging note re Josephine. 19a
1.10.43 Note from R.S.S. (Radio Security Service, a service in particular dedicated intercepting German Secret Service W/T Communications; officially it was named MSS which stood for Most Secret Source). What it is about will be explained when we deal with minute 20a actually) to B/3/b/ re Josephine. 20a
2.10.43 Note from B.3.b to B.1.b. forwarding (minute) 20a 21a.
4.10.43 To S.I.S. (= Secret Intelligence Service, dealing with foreign intelligence was part of M.I.6) further to 17a. 22a
From S.O.E. (M.I.6)
statement made by Mederic re Gilman
From French Authorities re Gilman
18.10.43 From French Authorities further to 24a 25a
I saw Vaudreuil of the B.C.R.A about the S.O.E. report at (minute) 23a. He told me that he had instructed that copies of the report he had received should be sent to M.I.5. and M.I.6. Ours. apparently, was not despatched.
The story as he received it are filed at (minutes not yet reproduced) 6a and 7a, and the details are, in general, similar to those given to us by S.O.E. with the addition of the alias of the informant and the means of transmission of the information.
Can you suggest how it would be possible to identify this person who, in the S.O.E. report, is said to be secretary of Sir Stafford Cripps? I believe M/S have a contact at the M.A.P. - perhaps they could do something.
KV 2/144-1, page 3 (minute 27)
Mederic, head of the Fighting French clandestine organisation "Ceux de la Liberation", and reputed to be a reliable person. says that his friend Gilman learns from his brother Dr. Gilman, that the latter, while on a visit to Berlin, was told by a representative of the German F.O (Foreign Office German abbreviation A.A.) "who had had a certain amount of drink and may have been boasting", that some of the immediate entourage of Sir Stafford Cripps is sending information out to this country to Germany by wireless under the pseudonym Hector or Natan! (AOB: like Josephine, Kraemer used also the cover-word Hektor, which was a second cover-name for a sort of secret information source; but differently from Josephine) If we can accept all the various informants as reliable, I should say that the representative of the German F.O. was putting over what he thought to be a good story when he was tight. It is moreover extremely unlikely that any ordinary member of the German F.O. (A.A.) was putting over what he thought to be a good story when he was tight. It is moreover extremely unlikely that any ordinary member of the German F.O. (A.A.) would be acquainted with a matter of this kind, although of course there is a link there with the Abwehr (military intelligence or counter-intelligence). Lastly, as far as we know there is no wireless evidence. deeply sceptical as I am about the whole story, I suppose we ought to do anything we can to clear it up. Perhaps you would have a word with me.
23.10.43 From S.I.S. further to (Minute) re Hector 28a
26.10. To S.I.S. in reply to 28a 29a
1.11.43 From S.I.S. further to 28a re Kastl 30a
5.11.43 To S.I.S. in reply to 30a re Kastl 31a
11.11.43 From S.I.S. further and in reply to 29a re Josephine (no person but a type of Source) 33a
KV 2/144-1, page 8: to become acquainted to some chaotic keeping of this file:
3.9.43 Secret cross reference to most secret source information (first minute) 1x
5.9.43 From S.I.S. - copies of telegrams from Stockholm to Berlin. 1a (AOB, there existed a leakage in the Telex (Fernschreib) Office in the German Embassy but this time the origin will later enfold differently)
6.9.43 D.D.B. note on meeting with Cowgill - explanation of 1a 2a
B.1.B. Mr. Hart. (M.I.5) 3
B.1.a Colonel Robertson (TAR)
B.1.H. Mr. (Guy) Liddell (signed)
7.9.43. Signed Dick G. White
8.9.43 Note by B.1.a. (Mr. Marriott) to Colonel Robertson (TAR) re Josephine 4a
11.9.43 From S.I.S. with ref. to 1a and further information re Josephine 5a
11.9.43 From S.I.S. with further information re Josephine (they didn't know anything yet) 6a
11.9.43 From B.1.H. to O.B.1.H. enclosing summaries of Pandora documents received by S.I.S. in Switzerland 8a
14.9.43 Note by Mr. Hart re Josephine traffic 9a
14.9.43 From S.I.S. further information re Kraemer 10a
15.9.43 To S.I.S. further to 7a 11a
KV 2/144-1, page 9
D.G.S.S. (minute 12)
This is the last case of an agent reporting as from the U.K., known to us from Most Secret Sources and from S.I.S., who have obtained some information in Switzerland as to the existence of his agent. In our view it is extremely unlikely that the material handed over in Switzerland was intended as a plant, for the reasons explained at 9a.
You will be interested to see that the quality of the reports from this source is as poor as most of those that appear on our most Secret Sources. This observation is true also of an other spy supposed to be working here, and who bears the name Jacob, and reports to the Germans through Switzerland. In both cases the information is of such a quality as to lead us to believe that it is made up, either by the agent in the U.K. or by the master abroad.
B.1.b. 17.9.43 Sgd. H.L.A. Hart (though signed by someone else)
17.9.43 From S.I.S. in reply to 11a 13a
minute 15 Major Liverside stated on the telephone to-day that the message no. 3 in the enclosure to Colonel Gowgill's letter at 1a should be dated 26.6.43 (and not 42)
Sgd. H.L.A. Hart
KV 2/144-1, page 10
14.12.43 From S.I.S. further to 6a re Kraemer 36a
16.12.43 To S.I.S. in reply to 36a 37a
22.12.43 From French Authorities forwarding copy of telegram re Josephine 38a
B.1.a. (Colonel Robertson) (TAR) minute 39
Please see (word made invisible) letter of 36a, enclosing a sketchy questionnaire found in Stockholm and meant for an agent believed to working in the U.K. called Josephine (nonsense as Josephine constitute the cover-name for the kind of information source). Past researches into the information supplied by Josephine which has appeared on Most Secret Sources as well as in reports from from S.I.S. representatives, has shown that the information is wholly incorrect and is almost certainly invented. You may, however, have some comments on the seriousness or otherwise of the intelligence displayed by this sort questionnaire. It apparently originates from I (military air intelligence): Technische Luft. Please return file.
B.1.b. 22.12.43 H.L.A. Hart.
KV 2/144-1, page 11
31.12.43 Extract from report on Axis (Berlin-Rome-Tokyo) Intelligence Activities in Sweden giving information re Kraemer dated 21.12.43 42a
8.1.44 From S.I.S. re 41a, enclosing 8 further telegram summaries re Josephine, Kraemer etc. (AOB: how did they intercept? The Germans communicated mainly by means of telex (FS), implying telephone cables. We have not yet dealt with the aspect that the 'maid' (Helen Fiedler whom trusted her Austrian friend Anna Erikssen) serving at Kraemer's household 'borrowed' for a short while message copies and 'lend' this to someone of 'Section V' in Stockholm) 44a
Minute 46: Major Blunt.
Please see the enclosures to Cowgill's letter of 8.1.44. (54a); some of the reports purport to emanate from Diplomatic sources in this country (England). I am endeavouring to obtain a check on the veracity of such a statements of fact as are contained in the messages.
B.1.b. 12.1.44 H.L.A. Hart
17.1.44 Note from B.1.b. Capt. Courtenay Young to B.1.b. Mr. Hart re Josephine 48a
KV 2/144-1, page 17 (minute 21a)
Dear Hart (M.I.5),
With reference to my (S.I.S.) letter of 11.2.44 CX/ /28/V.B. (Section V B?), our representative in Stockholm has provided information about Karl Heinz Kraemer. On the night of the 5th/6th February, 1944, Kraemer had a long meeting with Hans Schaefer, the Deutsche Lufthansa representative in Stockholm, in the course of which he made the following remark:
"I know that the British are trying to get rid of me. I do not mind as I have one very good friend in the Swedish Foreign Office".
Bearing in mind means of possible leakage which we discussed at our last meeting, this may well be significant.
Our representative has also reported that Hans Schaefer has an intimate Swedish friend, by name Nils Sundgren, who is a heart specialist. Sundgren's surgery is at Hornsgatan 54, Stockholm; his private address is Karlaveien 27, Stockholm. The association between Schaefer and Sundgren is believe to be a business one, but not medical, i.e. Sundgren is believed to busy himself with espionage. His clientele is largely German although he has one friend in the British Legation. Sundgren is also reported to be an air force doctor and in very close touch with Swedish air force circles.
A report has also been received stating that Alexander Von Bentheim during his visit to Sweden, was in contact with an individual in the Swedish Air Ministry.
I have asked our representative in Sweden to discover:
(a) The name of Kraemer's friend in the Swedish Foreign Office.
(b) The name of the individual in the Swedish Air Ministry seen by Alexander von Bentheim.
(c) The name of Sundgren's friend in the British Legation/
Our source insists that Karl Heinz Kraemer visited the U.K. shortly before the outbreak of the war in 1939, and thinks that he stayed at Oxford or London. It is just possible that he used the name of Ruediger (Rüdiger) born Kassel 5.5.16.
Could you please check if anyone of this name did in fact visit the U.K. at the time stated?
In conclusion, it certainly looks as though Kraemer has plenty of opportunities of seeing certain confidential material in the Swedish Foreign Office or the Swedish Air Ministry. We have already discussed the dangers of possible leakage of information from the U.K. through Swedish channels.
Sgd, by someone of (S.I.S.)
KV 2/144-1, page 18 (minute 68a)
Draft Letter to Captain Vaudreuil.
For signature by Captain Beaumont.
Date 2nd March, 1944.
Many thanks for your note of 24.2.44 and its enclosure, which we will examine in detail. It may, however, interest you to know that since September 1943, we have had a number of reports from many different sources to the effect that the Germans have an agent in the entourage of Sir Stafford Cripps, who reports important information to them, and in these reports the agent has usually been designated by the names of Josephine or Hektor or Natan (AOB: again: Josephine and Hektor do not constitute individuals, but only provide information of the kind of source). In all cases, however, when have checked the information supplied by this agent to the Germans, we have found that it has been completely wrong and bears all the marks of invention. Curiously enough we received some time a report almost identical with the one sent us by you, save that
(1) the number of bombers was stated to be 500 per month (not day)
(2) the conference was stated to have taken place in the week beginning the 21st June and not on the 21st/22nd June, as in the present report. Needless to say the report in the present form is rubbish and in the other form from quite untrue.
Notwithstanding the obviously fictitious nature of this alleged agent's information we are always interested to receive these reports. If, moreover, you could discover for us further details about how the agent is supposed to send the reports to Germany, what department receives them and what personalities in the German Secret Service control this agent, we would be most grateful. Our own view at present is that they are manufactured somewhere on the continent and that no agent in England is responsible for these reports.
KV 2/144-1, page 21a + 22b (minute 76a)
D.B. through B.1.b. Mr. Hart.
Comments by Ops on this B.J. (Blue Jacket; these particular file series were only to be accessed by especially authorised servants) 128537 are as follows:
1. Dates unpleasantly near.
2. Not untrue concerning Teheran Conference proceedings.
3. There has been a quarrel between the Air Force Chiefs.
Thinking that the source might be in some way related to the Josephine material (actually indicating the source of which information originated), I rang Cowgill and spoke with Ferguson in Cowgill's absence. Ferguson consulted Liversidge, whose view is that the information was probably obtained by Kramer (Kraemer!) of Eins Luft Stockholm. I asked whether it was known that Kraemer had specially good contacts with the Americans. Ferguson had no information on this. I then said to Ferguson that the B.J. looked as though a genuine leakage had taken place and that Air Commodore Buss was very worried. I do not know whether there is anything further we can do from this end.
D.D.B. Dick G. White (M.I.5) 23.2.44
My comment on the above is as follows:-
It is quite true that Kraemer, the Abwehr I. Luft (Air) officer in Stockholm, communicates his reports back to Berlin via the Minister (highest diplomat in charge), Thomsen, to the Foreign Office for further forwarding to the Abwehr, and we have several examples at 44a of this file, showing this. All the reports provided by Kraemer in this way have been either Josephine or Hektor (both 'names' only indicating the kind of information source being concerned) all of which have on checking proved 100% rubbish. However, at 54a on the telegram No. 2800 you will see that Kraemer has stated that he has an agent in a key position in the M.A.P. (Ministry of Air Production or Parts) of Irish origin, and related to the Ministry of LAW (Justice?). This agents work is in connection with American supplies to the U.K. and U.S.S.R. At the time we supposed that Kraemer was referring to Josephine (the latter name is only indicating: a general source from which the information originates from), and since Josephine reports are plainly invention, we were not much worried. D.3. (S.I.S?) gave us the names at (minute) 68x, para 1 of persons in the M.A.P. concerned with the functions described by Kraemer. None of them seems to fit the detail.
The present B.J. (Blue Jacket), however, suggests that the agent is probably a source of Kraemer's and is much better placed and more genuine than Josephine. He may be the agent described by Kramer at (message number) 2800 of of 54a, and I think we might intensify the description given.
I will speak to Group Captain Archer about this.
B.1.b. 23.2.44 Sgd. H.L.A. Hart
(U996 U996terurn) (U998 ↕↕↕↕ U998return) (W999 ↕↕↕↕ W999return) (B1000 ↕↕↕↕ B1000return) (C1001 ↕↕↕↕ C1001return) (D1002 ↕↕↕↕ D1002return) (E1005 ↕↕↕↕ E1105return)
(H1007 ↕↕↕↕ H1007return) (K1010 ↕↕↕↕ K1010return) (M1012 ↕↕↕↕ M1012return) (N1014 ↕↕↕↕ N1014return) (P1015 ↕↕↕↕ P1015return) (R1018 ↕↕↕↕ R1018return)
(S1019 ↕↕↕↕ S1019return) (V1024 ↕↕↕↕ V1024return) (W1027 ↕↕↕↕ W1027return) (X1030 ↕↕↕↕ X1030return) (F1037 ↕↕↕↕ F1037return) (L1042 ↕↕↕↕ L1042return) (M1044 ↕↕↕↕ M1044return) (U1054 ↕↕↕↕ U1054return) (X1060 ↕↕↕↕ X1060return) (L1076 ↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓ L1076return) (T1086 ↕↕↕↕ T1086return) (W1090 ↕↕↕↕ W1090return)
* KV 2/157-3, page 41, Quoting from the McCallum Report of the mid 1970s: By now (February 44) information from Kraemer was beginning to appear in the Stockholm B.J. (restricted accessible Blue Jackets files) and SIS by lucky chance had been able in December 1943, to penetrate his household. This came about when his maid and a friend were searching his bureau for chocolate and discovered a number of what were described as "compromising, highly secret, documents". The friend, an Austrian Anna Erikssen, was pro-Allied and offered these papers to a representative of SIS who copied them before handing them back to be returned to the desk. The maid, Helen Fiedler, was unaware of what was being done. (E1003 + ↑↑ + E1003return) In April 1944 MI5 were asked by SIS to have a key cut from a scale drawing; this was done and the result, when handed over, was said to be "a great success and fits perfectly". It is not stated whether the key was for Kraemer's flat or his safe - presumably the letter since bundles of draft telegrams, or notes for telegrams, continued to be passed to MI5 for checking'; together with long lists of dollar notes in his possession, and details of innumerable journeys taken from various passports. ...
(2) (5 January 2023)
KV 2/144-1, page 23 (minute 65a)
(Blue Jacket serial) No. 128353.
The following was learnt from a delicate source:
On 10.2.44 the Minister (the highest in Charge of the German Legation) Thomsen in Stockholm stated that they had obtained a report from an agent, who in turn obtained reports about Second Front intentions in the U.K. (when true most alarming, indeed)
17th February 1944.
KV 2/144-1, page 25a + 26b (minute 63a)
PF 66365 Name, Karl Heinz
Original in file No: PF 65917 Sergueiew
Original from: S.I.S. Under ref. CX/ /28/ V.B.
With reference to my (typically S.I.S. practice all name being deleted of 14.12.43 on the subject of Karl Heinz Kraemer, our (Section V) representative in Stockholm has managed to copy a letter borrowed from Kraemer's flat. For explanation: (U996 U996return). A copy of the original French is attached.
This confirms, if any confirmation was still required, that Kraemer is an important Eins Luft (I L) officer. On present evidence this letter appears to be a copy of the one sent at Dr. Kliemann's (KV 2/278 PF 600252) behest by "Treasure" (KV 2/464 - 465 - 466 PF 65917) from Madrid in September 1943, arranging a forwarding address in Stockholm for letters from the U.K. (Vide our report forwarded to TAR (M.I.5.) under CX/ /EO of 3.10.43 para 10)
Incidentally Karl Heinz Kraemer is, I think identical with the individual named in the attached slip particularly when para 2 of my letter name deleted as usually dated 14.12.43 is taken into account.
In view of the delicacy of our source, (borrowed by means of Kraemer's household maid; handled by section V for photographing) I would prefer that no action is taken with "Treasure" as regards the letter found in Kraemer's possession, provided you are satisfied that this letter was in fact written by this individual named "Treasure".
KV 2/144-1, page 28 (minute 60a)
S.I.S. number CX/ /V.B. dated 9.2.44
I regret to inform you that we have received information from our representative in Stockholm saying that Mrs. Kraemer's (Kraemer's wife) brother is called Pontow. In spite of this blow, I still think it might be worth while checking up on the prisoner of war Georg Michael's background.
some name of S.I.S. made invisible
H.L.A. Hart Esq. M.I.5.
KV 2/144-1, page 29a + 30b (minute 58a)
Extract for File No: PF 77365 Name Kraemer Karl Heinz
Extract from report re Axis intelligence Activities in Sweden - dated 21st January 1944.
1. Karl Heinz Kraemer, reported in December 1943 as engaged in collecting air intelligence, is now believed to be on his way to Switzerland again. He paid a previous visit to that country in the spring of 1943.
In November 1943 Kraemer attended an important meeting in Paris where he stayed at the Ritz Hotel. At this meeting according to a most reliable source Obstlt. A Kleyenstueber and Alexander von Bentheim were present. The latter is an important Abwehr officer engaged in the air intelligence work in Lisbon.
Shortly after Kraemer's return to Stockholm Bentheim arrived. No doubt the latter came to see him, though special precautions were taken to keep his visit secret. It is evident that there is a close collaboration between the German air experts in Lisbon and Stockholm, and it is now known that Kraemer is also interested in troop movements in the U.K. At the same time he is collecting both air and military intelligence about Sweden.
Frau Kraemer (Kraemer's wife) is a native of Göttingen, Westphalia. She has a brother who is a prisoner of war in the U.K. and her father is a doctor. Further enquiries are in progress about her family.
KV 2/144-1, page 32 (minute 53a)
S.I.S. CX/ /V.B. dated 3.2.44
We have received information from Norwegian Intelligence to the effect that Hans Schaefer, Deutsche Lufthansa representative at Bromma airport Stockholm, forwards reports about all Norwegian planes leaving Bromma for the U.K. You will recall that this individual was previously engaged in espionage in Denmark prior to the invasion in (9th) April 1940. He is also mentioned in my letter 5.B.22682 of 14.12.43.
The above information is a very vague nature but I think that Stopford may care to see it as the Norwegian source in question is a very well placed one and has stated quite definitely that Hans Schäffer (Schäfer) is an agent of the German intelligence.
Name deleted or not being copied
Dick G. White, Esq. O.B.E. M.I.5.
KV 2/144-1, page 36 (minute 52a)
S.I.S. CX/ /28/V.B. dated 25.1.44
We have just received a report giving the names of German officers staying at the Ritz Hotel in Paris on 21.11.43. When this is compared with my letter 5.B.22682 of 3.1.44 concerning Karl Heinz Kraemer, it seems within the bounds of possibility that Karl Heinz Kraemer has a rank of Obst. (his rank actually was Lt. or sometimes noticed as Sdf.) For one so young this proves, if correct, that Karl Heinz Kraemer must be a key figure in the German espionage machine in Sweden.
I think that one can also safely say that Karl Heinz Kraemer is identical with "Ruediger".
Within S.I.S. usually signature made invisible
H.L.A. Hart, Esq. M.I.5.
KV 2/144-1, page 38 (minute 50a)
B.1.63/B/1/b./HLAH (= H.L.A. Hart at M.I.5) 21st January 1944
This is in reply to Cowgill's letter (usual S.I.S. practise name deleted) of 8.1.44 and your letter under the same (CX/...) of 18.1.44 (minute 49a) about Josephine and cognate sources.
We are still engaged in checking up the information contained in the closures to Cowgill's letter; so far it is clear that all reports dealing with the Moscow Conference are rubbish. We are pursuing the identity of the official in the M.A.P. but with no success as yet. B.J. (Blue Jacket) No 124289 of 27.10.43, emanating from the German Minister (the higher diplomat in charge at the Legation), refers to Air Commodore Taylor and mentions "a reliable source in London" as is in this respect rather like para 1 of messages 3119 and unnumbered of 30.11.43.
With regard to your further enquiry about Georg Michael, I should like to be sure I understand the point before I take the matter up with M.I.19. Is it your theory that the dr. Georg Michael sentenced in Stockholm in 1940 mau be identical with Major i.G. (im Generalstab) (this latter indicates that this person was a professional/career officer) referred to in the second of the three messages enclosed in your 5 B 22682 (these type of reference serials I have never encountered in different files before) of 14.12.43 and that one or both of these are identical with Georg Michael now a P.o.W. who has been in British hands since May 1943, since Major i.G. Michael was according to the message in which he is mentioned in Stockholm in 1943. In any case, the collection of the names Georg Michael must surely be very common in Germany (AOB: in my perception not quite) I will, of course, make any enquiry you wish, but I should like to get your point quite clear before doing so. By the way, what about my query in the last paragraph of my letter of 26.10.43 to Cowgill (M.I.6) (see your letter of 10.1.44).
KV 2/144-1, page 40 (minute 48a)
B.1.b. Mr. Hart.
With reference to the Josephine (Kraemer's cover-name for the kind of source concerned) messages at (minute) 54a in B.1. Registry Folder No. 63 (at M.I.5), I have looked through our B.J.'s (Blue Jacket; as highly sensible collection of documents; only accessible by especially authorised servants) with, I fear, rather inconclusive results.
With reference to No. 3119 of 5.11.43 you will observe B.J. 124926 is from the Military Attaché (Swedish, Russian, Spanish, French or Turkish?) in London and is, curiously enough, on exactly the same date as the Josephine message (Kraemer's source group cover-name also related to the kind/sort of informations). There is no exact tie-uo, but the gist of paragraph 3 of the B.J. bears some resemblance to Paragraph 2 of the Josephine message.
With regard to paragraph 1 of 3119 and unnumbered of 30.11.43 there is reference to Air Commodore Taylor in B.J. 124289, also attached. The text of the B.J. and the text of Josephine messages do not correspond, but it is perhaps significant that the B.J. referring to Commodore Taylor is alleged to have emanated from the German Minister (Thomsen) in Stockholm on 22.10.43. The heading of the Josephine message "reliable London informant" and the B.J. "reliable source in London" is also possibly significant.
Sgd. Courtenay Young (M.I.5)
KV 2/144-1, page 41 (minute 47a)
B.1.63/HLAH 13th January 1943
Dear (name S.I.S. servant as usually deleted) (referring to minute 36a) of 14.12.43, and your enquiry therein concerning the existence of a German P/W in this country (curious, as most P.o.Ws had been sent from Tunisia, by the Americans, to P.o.W. camps in the U.S.) named Michael, I find on enquiry that there is here a P/W named Georg Michael, who was captured in Tunisia on 13.5.43 (about the German Capitulation in Tunisia) and arrived in the U.K. on 11.8.43. This man comes from Westphalia and has no brothers or sisters alive.
M.I.19, is passing this information, have asked us to take no action without reference to them. I assume that this means that the man is the subject of some special directions. Will you therefore let me know if you attach any, and if so, what, significance to Georg Michael, on these facts, and I will then take up with M.I.19 the question of any further action.
I have now received a further appreciation of the report about W.G. Nicholls and Co., which was enclosed in your letter, and I must correct my observations about this report contained in my 63/B.1.B. of 28.12.43. The firm of W.G. Nicholls has five places of storage in Manchester and district, but in no case does it store ball bearings of any kind. They are in fact employed by the Ministry of Supply to store clothing and certain ammunition components, but the story with reference to ball bearings from Sweden is wholly untrue. (it will later be noticed that there, indeed, were shipped Swedish ball bearings from Sweden to England by means of MTBs)
H.L.A. Hart (M.I.5)
addressed onto S.I.S.
KV 2/144-1, page 43 (minute 44a)
(S.I.S.) dated 8.1.44
My dear White (Dick G. White of D.D.B. M.I.5),
Reference your letter No. 63/B.1.B./HLAH (Hart) of 28.12.45. I now attach a fresh batch of eight submarines of what purport to be telegrams sent in cipher from Stockholm to Berlin.
All of them seem to indicate leakage of information about happenings in this country. No. 2800 (AOB: please notice next translated copy) may possibly lead somewhere. If so, will you please let me know so that I may inform Mrs. Archer.
Hart has a record of previous "indiscretions" by Air-Commander Taylor, but they proved to be nonsense.
Josephine, Henrietta and Kraemer are all well known to you.
We have no previous record of ?? or of a likely Alexander. ??liel? in No. 3151 is, I think, a gloss for Henrietta.
Dick G. White M.I.5.
KV 2/144-1, page 44a (minute 54a?) (T1020 ↓↓↓ T1020reurn)
From: Thomsen (Minister of the German Legation) in Stockholm.
To: F.O. (Auswärtiges Amt) Berlin.
Date: Submitted Oct. 12th, 1943
No: 2800 Priority (SSD)
Secret Cipher. (Geheimschlüssel)
Kraemer not prepared to reveal identity of telegram sent Oct. 11th (copy not supplied) (meant not received in England) but explains is official in key position Ministry Air Production (M.A.P.) of Irish origin and related (Irish?) Minister Law. His work is in connection American supplies to U.K. and U.S.S.R.
D 3 (= S.I.S.)
KV 2/144-1, page 45b (minute 55a)
From: Thomsen, Stockholm.
To: Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), Berlin
"Chi 5. For Abwehr. Luft (Referat I L-E) No. 50
Josephine (particular kind of source group) reported October 5th Vickers Amstrong's strike Barrow considerably affected Lancaster production. Strike due to Communist agitation. At Cabinet discussion of strike Cripps accused Bevin false policy and inefficiency.
KV 2/144-1, page 46c (minute 52a)
From: Thomsen, Stockholm
To: Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin No: 2878
Secret Cipher (Schlüssel 5). For Abwehr (Referat I L-E) No. 52
Reliable Source in touch British Bomber Command reported October 10th eight U.S.A. Air Force embittered that bombing policy proposed by Washington forcing them make costly offensive for political reasons strengthen American fighter losses laughable. D3 (= section of S.I.S.)
KV 2/144-1, page 47d (minute 54a)
To: Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin.
"Geh. Chi 5. For Abwehr (Referat I L-E (No. 54)
Alexander reports Nov. 4th Air Commodore Taylor left by air Oct. 30th for Egypt to assist (British Foreign Minister) Eden at Turkish conference. Previously had conference Portal, Sinclair, Churchill. Taylor had worked out Royal Air Force eastern Mediterranean deployment plan including Turkey.
War Office information independently confirmed by Turkish Military Attaché London. Contrary to expectations Soviet agreed Moscow conference to Anglo-Saxon Balkan invasion (AOB: a strategy favoured by Winston Churchill) This due to improved position Soviet southern armies which precludes possibility Anglo-Saxons establishing themselves first in Balkans.
KV 2/144-1, page 49e (minute 54a)
To: Auswärtiges Amt maybe: A.A.
"Geh. Chi 5 For Abwehr (Referat I L-E)
Henrietta reports Nov 27th Swedish Legation learn from (British) Foreign Office officials and M.P. (Members of Parliament) Barnes, Southby, Stockes that military results Berlin raids very satisfactory but strength resistance population disappointing. Riots had been expected. Threatened German reprisals taken very seriously by British."
KV 2/144-1, page 59 (minute 36a)
Your reference B.1. No. 63/B.1.B/HLAH
Reference our (S.I.S. deleted reference) of 11.9.43, concerning Karl Heinz Kraemer; our Representation in Stockholm has managed to obtain further information about this individual.
Kraemer and his wife live at Essingestraket 39, Store Essingen, Stockholm, (Tel: Stockholm 51 11 79) appears to be very wealthy, has been in Stockholm about fourteen months, has a child aged two years and employs on servant (Helen Fiedler). He is a Berliner by birth, while his wife is a native of Göttingen. Her father is a Medizinalrat (name unfortunately unknown) and she has a brother who is a prisoner of war in the U.K. (AOB: likely after all untrue)
The Kraemer's are not popular in the German Legation and the majority of his not
frequent visitors are Swedes. His most regular German visitor is Hans
Schäfer of the Deutsche Luft Hansa (Lufthansa)
and Major Friedrich Busch (Friedrich
all a great enemy whom tried to accuse him severely!),
Assistant Air Attaché (Kraemer's
deputy for a while?)
at the Legation in Stockholm, visits him occasionally. Another occasional
visitor is an Austrian Graf
The husband travels extensively and visited Paris in the middle of November 1943. On this occasion his parents-in-law, who had been staying with him, accompanied him back to Berlin. (Note. The text is not clear as to whether they returned with him from Paris to Berlin or from Stockholm to Berlin. Presumably the former is intended as a sea crossing is necessary from Stockholm although a railway ferry does, I believe, still function.)
On an earlier visit he went to Switzerland and brought his wife a string of pearls back from this excursion. (Note. Another source has reported that Kraemer left Stockholm by air for Berlin on 13.10.43, and returned via Malmö on 16.10.43.
He is a member of Eins T/Luft and is said to hold the rank of Standartenführer
(presumably from the days when he was in charge of a Hamburg Concentration Camp)
His secretary, Fräulein
Simson Siemsen, is an ardent member of the Nazi party. In
spite of of this, Kraemer is reported as having made sarcastic remarks recently
about the Nazi hierarchy and to have got in touch with a minister of the old
régime. He is also said to have visited the U.K. prior to the war.
In this connection Heinz Cramer, the D.N.B. (Deutsches
who left the U.K. in August 1939. (Vide our letter 5.B.22682 of 11.9.43) A
photo of Heinz Cramer would be helpful to our investigation.
(E1036 ↓↓↓↓ E1036return) (E1093 ↓↓↓↓ E1093return)
Stora Essingen Essingenstråket 39
Quite a luxury environment to live, I suppose.
KV 2/144-1, page 60b cont.
In addition to the above our Representative has obtained three scraps of paper "borrowed" from Kraemer's flat (please consider W999 W999return). These are attached in the original german with English translation (AOB: most of the genuine German text documents has been lost, sadly) I have not yet gone into the detail of these pieces of paper or traced the names properly, but the preliminary following comments are, I think relevant.
(a) According to source, "Klugenstueber" Kleyenstüber was very badly written, the name might been "Klergenstüber." I suggest that it was Obstlt. Kleyenstüber, well known to us as the head of I-L (in Berlin).
(b) I suggest Rüdiger is the cover name of Karl Heinz Kraemer. (Vide attached slip which shows that Rüdiger was in Paris in the middle of November and was associated with Kleyenstüber
(KV 2/1494, PF 601503).
(c) Both Ludwig and Ludwig Theodor disclose the Eins Luft background in the messages. (Vide the report that Kraemer is a member of Eins T/Luft.)
(d) I suggest that the reason for the meeting of the Eins Luft representatives of Portugal and Sweden (vide attached slip) might be well be for a general discussion as to ways of improving channels of communication between these neutral countries and the U.K. and also possibly to avoid overlap in reporting press articles, etc. to Berlin which they both obtain from British newspapers. (Note. The irregular Stockholm service is an argument against the latter.)
(e) Dr. Georg Michael was sentenced in Stockholm in March 1940 to ten months hard labour for espionage concerning the transmission of shipping Intelligence received from Narvik. The 1940 Stockholm Telephone Directory shows a Dr. Georg Wilhelm Michael as medical adviser to the German Legation and gives his address as Stockholm Linnegatan 58. (query. Is there a P.o.W. in the U.K. called Michael?)
(f) F. Commonwealth presumably means A. (Austrian) commonwealth. I believe, though I have not yet checked this that the "Boomerang" is an aircraft now in production in Australian.
(g) Siegfried might possibly stand for "S". This is, as you know, a common practice.
(h) The odd thing is that Josephine is referred to as a man in one reads the German text as "Welche Division ist dem Mann als höchste Nummer bekannt?".
(i) The reference to "English Scottisch books" (vide attached slip) is not without interest.
(j) The date 17.11.43 is worth noting.
Further comment will follow in due course, but I would be grateful for your views on the above.
name made, as usual S.I.S. practice, invisible
Dick G. White Esq. O.B.E. M.I.5.
(3) (8 January 2023)
KV 2/144-1, page 61 (minute 35a)
B.1.63/B.1.B./HLAH 18th November, 1943.
Dear Cowgill (S.I.S.)
Thank you for your (CX/ /?) of 9.11.43. I note what you say with regard to the inference to be drawn as to J's source of information from the texts (Do they refer to one of the many 'borrowed' messages photographed from papers copied from Kraemer's flat?)
We have been able to check up some of the reports enclosed in your letter of 23.10.43 and you may care to have appreciations as follows:-
1st Report. We assume Harrison is a mistake for Harris of Bomber Command. This being so, the facts are although discussions were going on about the date of this message concerning the bombing of Berlin, all the rest of the information is quite incorrect and is considered of no value at all. In particular, Harris made no such report as is attributed to him here.
3rd Report, dated 27.9.43. No meeting ever took place between Sopwith and Donald Nelson.
We have not yet checked up the 2nd message, but will let you know the results when we get them.
With regard to your query at the end of your letter, we have assumed that Archibald Sinclair was intended in the reference to Sinclair in this message.
Dick G. White
(AOB, albeit that below and the top are suggesting that it should have signed H.L.A. Hart)
Lt. Colonel J.F. Cowgill, OBE.,
We have reached now the KV 2/144-2 serial
KV 2/144-2, page 3 (minute 21a)
From B.3.b. Mr. R.L. Hughes To B.1.b. Mr. H.L.A. Hart
I pass you herewith a note from Morton Evans and the message. Please let me have them back. He does not really think it likely that this is Josephine (AOB: Josephine is no individual, but a description about the channel and sort of information; this aspect was not well understood before the Germans did surrender on 8th May 1945) traffic, but it is the only good long (W/T) message amongst the unidentified traffic at about the right time. The message, of which this is only part, contained 416 groups (regularly each group consisting of 5 characters) and was dated 12/9 by the original operator but was not intercepted until 0728 on 13/9 (1943). Compare this with the long Josephine report which contained 686 groups and was transmitted from Berlin to Rome at 2030 on 13/9 (1943).
Date 2.10.43 Signature R.L. Hughes
KV 2/144-2, page 5, (minute 20a)
(this actually is the letter referred upon in the forgoing page 3)
Mr. Hughes, B.3.b.
Thank you for your note of 28th September about Josephine. We have not been able to identify any messages amongst the unsorted as being the wanted ones, though there was one part-message whose particulars are not inconsistent with the case. We will watch the frequency on which that message was sent, though I am afraid there is little more that we can do at present.
I enclose a copy of the message in question.
K.M. Morton Evans
Lt. Colonel Royal Signals
Deputy Controller, R.S.S.
KV 2/144-2, page 7 (minute 18a)
B.1.b. (Mr. H.L.A. Hart).
I am attaching for your information a copy of a note I have prepared for Morton Evans (R.S.S.) on the Josephine problem with a view to guiding him in a search of the considerable volume of unidentified traffic. You will see that I have mentioned once or twice in this text that your views are not entirely in agreement with my theories on certain points. I will just point out that the long message on 13.9.43 starts by stating that it is a report on the Italian situation and also preparations in England. I suggest that this is a combination of at least two original reports from the U.K., and that the dates referred to in the first part deal with our intentions against Italy, and not to proposals for a landing in France. In that case, Josephine (non individual, but Kraemer's designation for a kind of information source) definitely knew that the invasion date for Salerno was the 15th of September (1943), and if so, this seems to me to have been an important leakage. You will see how I arrived at this conclusion in my note to Morton Evans.
Regarding the part of the message which deals with the amphibious operation in the channel, I still think that Josephine has somehow had access to the findings of the umpires in this exercise. In other words when he speaks of the landing operations I do not put forward very strongly the idea that the reference is to the amphibious operation, and that what Josephine is intending to convey is that the umpires' conclusion was that owing to certain lack of cooperation between assault craft and air cover, and I I think insufficient paratroops, one of the landings would have been repulsed, had the grand fleet tried to land on the French coast. presumably the plan for this exercise did include objectives on the French coast and plans for how to develop the landings had they been effected in reality.
The fact that the message acquired by S.I.S., dated 25.6.43 from Stockholm to Berlin, is from Legationsrat Grote at Stockholm does rather suggest that the source of leakage is through Diplomatic channels, and the dating all though does not seem to me to be so close as to rule out Diplomatic Bags or secret writing letters carried on the planes to Stockholm.
B.3.b. 28.9.43 Sgd. R.L. Hughes.
KV 2/144-2, page 8
Lt. Col. Morton Evans,
Deputy Controller, S.C.U.3.
I spoke to you yesterday about the so-called Josephine reports. The position is that a number of messages have appeared going from Berlin to Rome on Service 2/56↕
AOB: My reconstructed map - showing the main German intelligence links; leaving out those of less significance; as otherwise the map becomes unreadable
Please click at the map, as to open it in PDF
However, for some reason, the line 2/56 hasn't been covered on this map, but it at least is explaining that the Germans maintained a rather extensive W/T communication network on the Occupied European Continent.
I came to the conclusion that the various W/T link line numbers being provided by the British organisations; thus the German designations must have been quite differently organised.
continuing: giving information obtained from Josephine, which information is fairly accurate and fairly up-to-date. I have this morning examined the messages with some care, and think Hart (M.I.5) has been rather over estimating the up-to-datedness, but if it is not too much trouble to your people I think it would be worth while to have a look around any likely unidentified traffic to see if there are any message of suitable length. The messages are as follows:-
1) 0800 on 3.9.43 which says that Josephine reports on 25.8.43 concerning re-equipment of the 6th Bomber Group in the U.K. and saying that this information applied to the middle of August.
The number of groups in this message is 186.
2) 2030 on 13.9.43 saying that Josephine reports on the evening of 11.9.43, and according to my interpretation of the information (with which Hart is not in agreement) he states that the original date of 15.9.43 was being adhered to for the main invasion of Italy was planned for the 15th but it was advanced to the 8th, and I am personally inclined to deduce from this that the source in the U.K. must have reported Josephine who for a reason which I will explain later, I believe to be in Stockholm, somewhat before the announcement of the landings at Salerno, which announcement was made about 1 o'clock on September 9th. The announcement was made about 1 o'clock on September 9th. The message then continues with a criticism of the officially published report on the amphibious operation in the channel (Straight of Messina), which report was issued on the 9th September. I am inclined to think that this criticism is fairly well inspired although again Hart is not entirely in agreement with me quoting, with justice, that a number of facts in the Josephine report are incorrect. There is, therefore, a slight discrepancy in my reasoning as the message appears to contain knowledge of the report on the amphibious operations which were announced on the 9th, but no knowledge of the landings at Salerno (AOB: which was an US operation) which took place at the same time. This, however, can be accounted for very reasonable by assuming that the →
KV 2/144-2, page 9b
Josephine report from Stockholm is actually the result of compiling information received from the U.K. in the form of two or more separate messages.
The Berlin to Rome message consisted of 686 groups (5 Morse characters each one), and all the information in it refers to occurrences on or about the 9th. Unidentified of the 8th, 9th or 10th might provide some clue.
3) 2325 on 14.9.43 which is from internal evidence almost certainly a Josephine report. It contains fair comment on the Salerno operations and the reaction in London to the initial setback, but most of the information in this message could have been deduced from press reports.
This message contained 206 groups. it would seem to me that this information, if it came from the U.K. at all, must have been passed between the 11th and 14th of September inclusive.
To sum up then, the information in message number 1 must have been passed to Stockholm between the 15th and 25th of August, that the message number 2 on the 8th, 9th or 10th September (only part of it could have been passed on the 8th), and in message number 3 on the 11th, 12th, 13th or 14th of September.
There are several reasons for believing that the Josephine messages are passed from Stockholm to Berlin; namely S.I.S. have picked up information both in Berne (Switzerland) and Paris to the effect that there is in Stockholm and agent named Josephine (AOB, time and again, Josephine wasn't a person but a cover-name for a source or kind of information) in contact with the U.K. Furthermore, S.I.S. have acquired by some obscure method ('borrowing' copies from Kraemer's flat) a message from Stockholm to Berlin dated 25.6.43 (AOB: what I previously already suspected - that the 'borrowing' started already before September 1943) which says that it is from Legationsrat Grote for Abwehr Referat I/Luft-E. This message which is attributed to Josephine in England, contains information from English est country troop and material movements, and is of the same type as the Josephine messages which have occurred in (on the communication link between Berlin and Rome, British designation 2/56 or II/56). Perhaps you will consider that it is worth while to have a search of identified traffic for the three message which on (or, the communication link) 2/56.
M.I.5.(B.3.b.). 28.9.43 Sgd. R.L. Hughes.
Copies to: Mr. H.L.A. Hart, B.1.b.
Capt. Ryle, R.I.S. (Radio Intelligence Service)
KV 2/144-2, page 14a (minute 11a)
15th September 1943
Further to my letter of 12.9.43 about Josephine. We have now ascertained that no Swedish diplomatic bag left this country during June and July 1943 apart from two bags which left on the 11th July. Accordingly, Josephine could not have conveyed to Stockholm the information given in messages 1 and 2 attached to your letter of the 9th (4th?) September by such a route.
We are continuing our enquiries to find out whether there was any diplomatic bag which could account for the other Josephine reports which have appeared on our Most Secret Source, but from a preliminary survey I gather that this is unlikely. If we can exclude diplomatic bags Josephine's information must be conveyed to Stockholm either by W/T or possibly it may be carried by air crews, if there were on the appropriate dates flights of Mosquitoes or other planes from the U.K. to Stockholm. I am also making enquiries on this last point, but on the whole our view is that if Josephine communicates with Stockholm at all from this country she does it by W/T.
I have now obtained some appreciations of the Josephine messages which I set out in detail below. As you will see, where she (Josephine was not a person, but the cover-name for the kind of source) is almost always wrong, though some of the speculation is not unintelligent. The general flavour of these reports reminds one strongly of the Felipe and Ostro (Paul Georg Fidrmuc; KV 2/196 .. KV 2/201) (AOB: I would like to take up on Ostro again, in due course, at least after the Kraemer endeavour has been completed) reports, and encourage the idea that they are being manufactured by a source with access to newspapers but little other important information.→
KV 2/144-2, page 15b
The appreciations are as follows:
a) No: 63190. The statement that a regular departure of Wellington squadrons of the 6th Bomber Group to North Africa was to be expected is untrue. It is also untrue that between the 1st and 15th August fortyfive squadrons of the 6th Group left for Africa. With regard to the other information of this report, the re-equipment of groups of Lancasters is happening throughout the Air Force and is a gradual replacement which is commonly known. It is also true and a reasonable calculation that Wellingtons which have become obsolete are used for very distant work in Africa and Burma (now known as Myanmar)The Air Ministry's general appreciation of this report is that it contains no factual information of importance but might be intelligent speculation plus invention.
b) No: 57936. This has proved very difficult to check up. The Admiralty does not think the figures of two million tons unreasonable, and the figures for the normal amount of shipping in Halifax is considered about accurate. We will make further enquiries from the ministry of War Transport to establish the degree of accuracy of this report.
c) No: 64292. This very long report where it descends to fact is almost entirely wrong, though a few general statements are quite intelligent deduction from what is public information. This truly reports that the big scale manoeuvres which have just concluded were manoeuvres and not serious attempts to invasion. The date of 15.9.43 is nonsense. The aim of the manoeuvres as a dress rehearsal for the invasion in the near future is therefore a mistaken description. The suggestion that the manoeuvres involved landing operations is completely untrue. They were embarkation manoeuvres and not landing practices. No air landing and parachute troops were employed in the manoeuvres nor were any troops of the R.A.F. Regiment. There was some concentration of squadrons on some aerodromes, and dummies were in fact used to encourage the belief that there was an intensive concentration. The →
KV 2/144-2, page 16c
15th September 1943.
reference to the cancellation of weekend leave is mistaken, and finally the reference to a bridgehead action is pure cover plan. We cannot say, of course, whether or not Josephine is reporting faithfully the remarks of anybody consciously disseminating the cover plan. The sentence beginning "in no wise" at the end of the full page of the report is a shrewd deduction, but is not considered beyond the powers of an intelligent reader of newspapers. the reference to the weather as being the cause of the pause in the bombing war is true.
d) With regard to the report enclosed in your letter of the 11th September, the plan referred to in the second paragraph of the report of July 21st has never been under serious consideration at any time during 1943, but we have not yet heard whether the Norway Foreign Minister (in exile) made representations attributed to him in the first paragraph.
This is all the appreciations which we have at present, but I will of course pass on to you the rest when we get them.
Surveying all the evidence we have, I think the facts certainly point to the conclusion that in handling the Josephine information over the German responsible has not been attempting a pl?? and I gather that name deleted who has discussed the case with Hart is disposed now to take this view.
We will of course be most interested to hear any further information that you get from your representative abroad, or from (the US) O.S.S. on the whole subject.
invisible but certainly signed by H.L.A. Hart
Why am I so sure?
Because the header of this letter notice: B.1.No.63/B.1.b/HLAH
However, sometimes, albeit the header notice HLAH, it is signed by D.D.B. Dick G. White
Lieut. Colonel Cowgill,
KV 2/144-2, page 18 (minute 9a)
I spoke to Major name deleted about the Josephine case today. He agrees with me that Isk No. 57396 and 63190 (Enigma decrypts) plainly refer to the same Josephine as are the subject of Cowgill's (S.I.S.) letters. On this footing it seems to me (and name deleted agreed) virtually impossible to consider that the information handed out by the German in Switzerland is a plant. The grounds for this conclusion are as follows:
1. It would be very extraordinary on the plant theory for the Germans to give us the name of an agent, albeit it a cover name, whose reports they were distributing as late as the 3rd September (see Isk 63190 = Enigma code message) to Rome, presumably for the information of the G.A.F. (German Air Force). There is no apparent reason why as part of the plant the Germans should give us the very name Josephine (actually a non existing person, but a cover-name for the kind of source) by which their agent was known to them, since the giving of the name would not advance the plant and the plant could proceed perfectly well if a fictitious agent were invented ad hoc.
2. The messages which relate to Pandora information would, ? if we had not the Pandora traffic, lead us believe that the German Minister (the highest in charge at the Legation) in Dublin was n fact spying on behalf of the Germans. (exceptional, because German Diplomats regularly behaved very anti-espionage matters) It is extremely unlikely that the Germans as part of the plant, however ambitious, would jeopardise their position in Ireland which for the last three years they have so elaborately safeguarded. At the very least they must anticipate that we might use the information handed out to us as the basis of a complaint to the Irish government, which might make things very awkward for them.
3. Much of the Josephine messages is low grade information where it is not absolutely wrong, and in any event is capable of easy verification by us. One would expect that the Germans would start a plant by giving us either information which we could not conclusively check, i.e. about matters inside Germany, or information which would be shown to be true on being checked here, It is quite true that the delay of Josephine reports on the Isks (Enigma decrypted messages) shows that the Germans consider her a reliable source, but they can have no certainty they would not use them as the basis of a plant.
I agree with the view expressed by Mr. Marriott (M.I.5) that the Isk messages of the 21st August between Paris and Berlin have nothing to do with the present subject, and Major (name deleted) also agrees that it is unlikely. On the other hand, it would appear that the information originating from the Ballet Organisation does refer to the present subject and, though it is unlikely that there should be a leakage both in |Paris and in Switzerland about the German espionage activities in the U.K., it is theoretically possible that this is not a leakage but a deception being consciously operated in Paris and Switzerland. This, however, seems to me and to Major name deleted the only substantial point in favour of the plant theory.
Major name deleted is entertaining the hypothesis that Josephine may be Josephine Schrumpf Perron (Wrong! as the name Josephine indicated only the cover-name of the kind of source where the kinds of information originated from) flew from Berlin to Stockholm a character with a name resembling trying to obtain further details about this character so as to establish the identity if it exists. I am also checking whether diplomatic bags went from the U.K. to Stockholm on dates corresponding with the Josephine messages.
B.1.b. 14.9.43 Sigd. H.L.A. Hart
KV 2/144-2, page 30a + 31b (minute 2a)
I today called on Cowgill (S.I.S.) and asked for a further explanation of the attached letter and report. He outlined the full story as follows: on the 19th August a representative of (U.S.) O.S.S. in Switzerland was approached by an unidentified Irishman, who introduced an alleged courier of the Berlin Foreign Office (A.A.), who offered to do business with O.S.S. This courier produced 7 messages which he declared were verbatim copies of telegrams received in the Wilhelmstrasse, from diplomatic Missions abroad. Upon examinations, it was seen that three of the messages were from Dublin and 4 from Stockholm/ The three Dublin telegrams are undoubtedly genuine, as they can be matched with messages appearing in Pandora. The four Stockholm telegrams have a genuine appearance, for it is known that the Legationsrat Grote is the Abwehr point in the German Foreign Office (A.A.), while Thomsen is the German Ambassador in Sweden; Kraemer has yet to be identified from more than 100 alternative recorded personages of that name. Nothing is so far known concerning the Irishman but enquiries are being made in Switzerland to discover who he is. The courier, whose name is Ritter appears from descriptive details to be identical with a German agent of that name who, as long ago just before the war, was used by German Intelligence Service plant deception material upon British Naval Intelligence. (AOB: I suppose they do not point at "Major Ritter" (alias Dr. Ranzau) once Referatsleiter I L in Hamburg, whom dealt with Arthur Owens)
It is to be noted that it was on the 19th August that the courier handed over the Foreign Office (A.A.) telegrams to O.S.S. in Switzerland. On the 21st August we find Paris, on an Isk (machine encrypted, like Enigma) service (Bletchley Park), asking Berlin whether there is a channel in Switzerland through which deception material can be passed. On the 25th August, an agent is picked up by Dunderdale's organisation in the Paris area and brought to this country (England) On arrival here he reports having received information from an S.I.S. organisation in Paris called the Ballet organisation, two of whose members had been captured and shot some months before. The Information was to the effect that the Wilhelmstrasse (German Auswärtiges Amt?) was receiving speedy information on the deliberations of the British War Cabinet and, in particular, matters concerning Sir Stafford Cripps, through Stockholm from a source called Hektor (AOB: like Josephine, also the cover-name for the kind of source of information and where it was derived from) and another called Julliette.
The circumstances reported above suggest the possibility that the Abwehr is baiting a hook for us by allowing genuine (German) Foreign Office (A.A.) telegrams to fall in our hands. Denniston of G.C.&G.S. reports that, since Dublin, Stockholm and Buenos Aires (one of Buenos Aires B.Js (Blue Jacket folder, very delicate secret materials - only accessible by especially authorised servants) has also been passed over to us) are on different keys of the German diplomatic cipher, possession of telegrams handed over to us would not necessarily assist in breaking the cipher. The enquiry from Paris of the 21st August (1943), a date after the initial move had apparently been made in Switzerland, runs contrary to this theory but may have been an explanation in previous correspondence between Paris (ALST) and Berlin on the same subject. Paris would be the place from which Spielmaterial would probably be put out, if it is in the interest of the defence of the west. What therefore, remains to be seen is whether or not the Germans have some major deception plan to put across through channels which they have now created by the handing over of the diplomatic telegrams. Instructions have therefore, been sent to S.I.S. Switzerland and O.S.S. Switzerland to express considerable interest in what the courier can further produce to encourage him and to report immediately and new material which is handed on.
As far as M.I.5. is concerned, our interest in this matter must be confined to the question of whether or not Josephine and Hektor messages represent a genuine leakage of information from this country. So far Section V (sub-section of S.I.S.) have checked up through Major Morton on the continent of the messages and have the genuine impression that they are not accurate. The figure of 500 heavy bombers per month in Message 3 was considered by Morton to be much too high. I have told Cowgill (S.I.S.) that we shall be checking up the content further and will let him know what our estimates of the information is. Apart from this, further enquiries appear to me be more on S.I.S. side of the fence than on ours.
D.D.B. = Dick G. White M.I.5.
(4) (10 January 2023)
New series: KV 2/145-1, page 1
Kraemer Karl Heinz
Siemsen Nina Anna
Please consider in particular the number of stamps related to the 1970s.
These, most likely, have been initiated by MacCallum's endeavours, as to clear, historically, the dubious aspects of the genuine serials. Which, in their genuine days, definitely not careered a KV 2/xxxx reference; though only its PF 66,365 reference.
KV 2/145-1, page 5a + 6b (minute 82)
B.1.b. Mr. Hart.
There are three reasons why the serials mentioned in your minute 88 do not necessarily establish the Josephine (AOB: actually, never clearly understood was, that Josephine was not an individual, but the cover-name for one of Kraemer's sources of information) is a man:-
a) In the telegraphic circumstances, it seems clumsy and unnecessary for the expression "ist dem Mann" to have been used if the reference was to Josephine: "ist ihm" would have been both more natural and more economical. On the other hand the specifying of the "man" would have been appropriate if the reference was to some contact of Josephine, whose opinion on the military matters would be of value. Why should this sentence have been taken out and put to the "man" when the rest of the questions were put to Josephine without further specification in the same questionnaire? It seems to me just possible that the "Mann" might refer to Josephine's husband. In this case it does not fit Mrs. Owen but if the reference is to a particularly qualified military contact of the agent, then this increases the possibility of Josephine being identical with Mrs. Josie Owen, who has at least two such contacts.
b) The reference to a man in connection with the request for information from the agent, Josephine, is in any case made by Germany to Stockholm. Josephine's master in Stockholm, presumably Kraemer, night easily not have informed Germany of his U.K. source's identity, so that Germany would assume the agent to be a man in normal way of things.
c) Nowhere does the French information particularise Josephine as a man. It is alleged that this person is in close contact with Cripps and is variously known as Josephine, Hector, Nathan, etc. hector is a pseudonym, and Nathan is a rather more common as a surname than as a Christian name, and, therefore, equally applicable to a woman.
I do not see why the French should not be mistaken in assuming that Josephine and Hector (Hektor) @ Nathan are one and the same person. The French sources in this file appear to have received much the same information on the activities of Josephine and Hector (Hektor) as has reached us from the other sources in this file. It seems clear that Hector (Hektor) @ Nathan and Josephine are sources reporting to the same master, but I do not see why because of that they must be taken as identical.
Assuming, therefore, that the French have no further reason for believing the two be identical (and no such reason is apparent in this file), the separation of Hector's (Hektor's) and Josephine's activities is to be remarked by a comparison of the only factual information that we have on them, which is the intercepted cables (meant: the timely "borrowed" messages from Kraemer's flat). Their dates and subjects are, for Josephine:- 25.6.43 - embarkation and landings: 14.7.43 - naval aircraft operation: 23.7.43 - Norwegian military politics" 3.9.43 - R.A.F.: 13.9.43 - military manoeuvres and plans: 6.10.43 - M.A.P. type: 10.11.43 - to provide specific military information. For Hector:- 26.6.43 - M.A.P. meeting: 14.7.43 - M.A.P./R.A.F. talks.
Then there are the three "J" (Josephine) message at 36a, which have to my mind been attributed to Josephine on insufficient evidence. These are 27.8.43 - Air Ministry talks: 27.8.43 - Further Air Ministry talks: 27.9.43 - Aircraft manufacturing talks. French sources have said that Kraemer's presumed agent in M.A.P. was Hector @ Nathan @ Juliette. The similarity between the "J" messages and Hector's type of information makes me believe that "J" is Juliette for Hector, and that the subsequent addition by the French of Josephine to Hector arose through this very confusion of "J" @ Juliette for Hector, and that the subsequent addition by the French of Josephine to Hector arose through this very confusion of "J"@ Juliette @ Hector @ Nathan, and this source being operated by Josephine's master.
The separation of Josephine and Hector seems to me to be further indicated by Germany's questionnaire to Josephine, which was for purely military matters. We have, therefore. Josephine a specialist in military and Scandinavian affairs, and Hector @ Nathan @ Juliette @ "J", an agent within M.A.P. The only thing that tends to upset this apple-cast is Josephine's message of 6.10.1943, but I suggest that there again it is just that possible that further confusion arose through "J" standing for Juliette and or for Josephine.
If Hector is necessarily identical with Josephine with Josephine because both these agents are operated by Sweden, then surely all the sources at (minute 54a should logically be identical. That Josephine, "reliable source", Alexander, Heseliel, Henrietta and "reliable London informant", but I take it from S.I.S.' letter at 54a that Henrietta is a specific agent known to you, and it is clear from the telegram of 12.10.43 at (minute) 54a that Kraemer is prepared to run more than one than one source in the U.K. with his introduction of the Irishman, whom you do not take to be identical with Hector. This telegram also, incidentally, bears out my contention (b) in paragraph 1, for there is Kraemer refusing to disclose to Germany personal particulars of one of his agents.
R.C./ RS 31.3.44 Sgd. Robert Seeds.
KV 2/145-1, page 21 (minute 139a)
CX/ /28 dated 4.9.44
With reference previous correspondence concerning Karl Heinz Kraemer ending with our CX/12736/28/V.B. of 15.7.44.
Our Swedish Police contact has informed us that Kraemer has been meeting on several occasions an employee of A.B. Aero Transport. One meeting which occurred in Kraemer's car on 7.2.44 particularly aroused their suspicion.
The Swedish Police either do not know or have not yet disclosed the A.B.A. employee.
Can you please let me know if Swedish aircraft were during this period flying to the U.K., and if so what crews were so engaged.
H.L.A. Hart Esq. M.I.5.
KV 2/145-1, page 23 (minute 131a) Letter sent by S.I.S.
CX/ deleted/580/V.B.9 dated 7.8.44
A well-placed source states that Dr. Hans Schaefer, head of the Deutsche Lufthansa in Stockholm, supplies the Leiter of K.O. (Kriegsorganisation) Schweden Dr. Hans Wagner with weekly lists of British courier-planes. These list contain particulars of the crew, passengers, times and departure and so on. Schäfer it will be recalled, is a close associate of Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer) and is known to have been working for the German Intelligence, both in Denmark and Sweden, well before the latter's arrival on the scene.
In source's opinion this information is without doubt obtained from Carl Florman senior, of A.B.A.
A further not about Schäfer's activities should be available shortly.
signed by Mr. Clarabut
H.L.A. Hart, Esq. M.I.5.
KV 2/145-1, page 27 (minute 133a) Letter sent on behalf of S.I.S.
CX/12736/28/V.B. dated 15.7.44
Reference previous correspondence concerning Karl Heinz Kraemer, ending our (S.I.S.) CX/deleted/28/VB of 14.7.44.
Herewith a further list of what purport to be telegrams obtained by source ("borrowed" from Kraemer's flat by Section V, with the support of Kraemer's household maid Helen Fiedler and her friend Anna; Please notice (B1000 B1000return). Telegram A (ISTOC) (= AOB: decrypted teletype / Fernschreiber message) and B. were apparently obtained from the Kulturabteilung as they were in a pouch (folder or Umschlag) belonging to this department. It is not without interest of the Carlton Club was also obtained in the same pouch. I cannot hazard a guess as to why this should be so.
Your appreciations in due course would be of interest.
Name made invisible
For the translation of the telex messages↓discovered in the fore called 'pouch'.
Addressed onto: H.L.A. Hart Esq. M.I.5.
KV 2/145-1, page 30a (minute 102a?)
The British translation might have been the 10th carbon copy; though there exists a copy in German language, which is perfectly readable.
A. 1142 2/6/ Gesandtschaft Stockholm.
Berlin aus 2/6 Stockholm an 6/6/44.
Gesandtschaft Lissabon wird gemeldet.
Bei den hiesigen neutralen Diplomaten und bei den britischen Satteliten-Diplomaten vorherrscht die Auffassung dass die Auffassung dass trotz der alliierten Offensive in nächster Zeit nicht mit einer groß angelegten Invasion zu rechnen ist. Diese Auffassung wurde auch von der erfahrenen Umgebung des portugiesischen Staatspräsidenten geteilt. Die Ansicht begründet sich im besonderen auf die Erwägung, dass Meinungsverschiedenheiten der Alliierten vor allem auf politischen Gebiet, wie in der Frage der zeitlichen Abstimmung der Offensive an den verschiedenen Fronten so groß seien, dass Engländer und Amerikaner ihr Kriegspotential nicht vor einer Bereinigung dieser Streitfragen in die Waagschale werfen würde. Die Äusserungen Marschall Smuts (President of Union of South Africa) über den Verlauf seien dazu bestimmt gewesen Insinuerenden? gegenüber öffentlicher Meinung ein Zeitgewinn zu rechtfertigen, ohne das Kernproblem zu berühren. Dem gegenüber hat der portugiesische Gesandte in Ankara drahtlich berichtet, dass nach seinen Informationen aus britt. u. amerik. Quellen ein Angriff anglo-amerikansicher Truppen auf dem Balkan unternommen werden soll. Diplomatische Mitglieder der amerikanischen Gesandschaft erklärten einen neutralen hiesigen Missionschef vertraulich unter Angaben von Einzelheiten, dass im Stab General Eisenhower, ebenso wie in britischen militärischen kreisen Besorgnis über einen Zusammenbruch der Wiederstandsbewegung in den besetzten Gebieten namentlich in Frankreich und Belgien herrsche. Auch die hochmütige Behandlung des französischen Befreiungskomitee und die zum teil ohne jeden miltärischen Nutzen Bombenangriffe, hatten nach der in London vorliegenden Information zu einer zunehmenden Verbitterung bei der Bevölkerung der besetzten Gebiete geführt. Diese entwicklung äussert sich bereits in der Einstellung der Emigranten Behörden gegenüber militärischen und zivilen Stellen in London, und finden ihren Niederschlag auch in den Beziehungen der britt. und amerik., Auslandmissionen, zu der Vertretungen der Satteliten Staaten. Die Kampfmoral der in Großbritannien
KV 2/145-1, page 31b
befindlichen Truppen, namentlich die amerikanischen, habe den Hochstand überschritten. Bei der britt. Zivilbevölkerung nach Angesichts der einschneidenden Maßnahme,, namentlich auf dem gebiet des Verkehrs, die Nervosität.
B. Aus Berlin an 15 Juni 21.05 (Uhr)
In Stockholm an 15. Juni 22.30
Für deutsche Gesandtschaft in Stockholm.
Nr. 1242/14 Antwort an Kurier oder Geheimchiffre Gesandtschaft Lissabon drahtet den 12. Juni.
Die Nachrichten über die Invasion werden in Portugal, abgesehen von Freudenäusserungen politisch völlig unbedeutender Personengruppen die zum teil finanziell von der englischen Botschaft oder englischen Firmen abhängig sind, mit Zurückhaltung aufgenommen. Hierzu beitragt auch die offenbar auf Rechtsopposition beruhende Haltung der Mitglieder der britischen Botschaft, welche in Ihren Äußerungen keinerlei Optimismus and den Tag legen. Nach hier eingegangenen Informationen sollen sich in französisch Nordafrika starke und mit besten modernen Material ausgerüstete Alliierte Truppenformationen befinden, von denen bisher keine Kräfteteile für die Front in Italien abgezogen seien. dies ist offenbar der wesentliche Grund für die auch bei den hiesigen neutralen Missionen verbreitete Ansicht, dass eine alliierte Landung and der französischen Mittelmeerküste bereitstehe. (AOB: Indeed the invasion of southern France did happen, in August 1944) In der gestrigen hier bekannt gewordenen Schließung der spanisch-französische Grenze wird eine Bestätigung dieser Auffassung erblickt. Ein gut unterrichteter neutraler Diplomat bestätigt in diesem Zusammenhang die mit Drahtbericht vom 3. Juni (Nr. verstümmelt) gemeldete Tatsache, dass die britische Regierung gegenwärtig intensive Anstrengungen zur Verstärkung ihres Einflusses bei dem französischen Befreiungskomitee und bei der neuen anti-faschistischen italienischen Regierung mache, um den sowjetrussischen Zugriff auf das Mittelmeergebiet entgegenzutreten. Nach seinen Informationen, ist aus diesem Grunde die Einstellung Großbritanniens gegenüber der Türkei keineswegs unfreundlich wie die Erklärung Churchills vor dem Unterhaus vermuten lassen könnte.
AOB: these two curious messages, are expressing more a German propaganda talk then that it expresses realism.
What also is apparent: is, that the German text are at quite some places really incorrectly spelled; I have, in most occasions corrected it, but my general impression, regarding knowledge of German spelling, is of far less than average level. One matter we can be certain: that Germans never would have made such irregular grammatical errors.
KV 2/145-1, page 50 (minute 122a)
Letter sent on behalf of S.I.S.
CX/12736/28/V.B. dated 11.6.44
In view of your letter PF 66365/B.1.b/Hart of 7th June 1944, we are instructing our representative in Stockholm not to obtain further lists of dollars.
Speaking personally, I must say I feel somewhat surprised by your reply, as I should have thought that any airline pilot on the Swedish run with any of these particular dollars in his possession would have been well worth enquiry by your department.
Sgd Keith L???
H.L.A. Hart M.I.5.
AOB: generally speaking Dr. Karl-Heinz Kraemer was officially a Military Attaché for Air Affairs. And diplomats weren't checked regularly.
KV 2/145-1, page 61 (minute 119a)
PF66365/B.1.b/Hart 7th June 1944
Dear (name deleted; someone of S.I.S.),
reference your CX/12736/28 of 5.6.44 we do not think it is worth while checking the numbers of dollar bills, since we have no means of knowing through what hands they may have passed before reaching any given person.
KV 2/145-1, page 65 (minute 117a)
CX/12736/28/VB dated 5.6.44
With reference to our CX/12736/28/VB of 19.5.44, our representative in Stockholm suggests as regards dollar bills that visitors to the U.K. from Sweden, in particular pilots, should be searched on arrival to see if any of those dollar numbers are in their possession.
Our representative feels that if these dollar bills are of any interest to you he will tell his source* to stop taking them.
Can I please have your views?
H.L.A. Hart M.I.5.
* May we notice here the same "borrowing" procedure handled by Section V in Stockholm in regard to Kraemer's household maid? (For your information: C1001 C1001return)
KV 2/145-1, page 66a (minute 116a)
D.D.B. (= Dick G. White)
Lt.-Colonel T.A. Robertson (TAR)
Please refer to source Eileen's two reports dated 19th May and 2nd June 1944, where she states that the two Swedish Air Attachés, Carlberg, and possibly other members of the Swedish Legation are obtaining facilities for forwarding periodicals, in addition to aircraft parts, and possibly other material, to Stockholm, through the offices of a Colonel Balchan of the American Air Corps.
Colonel Balchan is, in fact, the United States Air Officer of their Air Transport Command, who is in charge of the Special Service to bring back Norwegians from Scandinavia to this country.
There is very diverse information on the unreliability and lack of discretion of Colonel Balchan contained in L159(1065) (L159/1065), and on the instigation of the United States Air Transport Command enquiries are being made by Special Branch (in Scotland Yard) in connection with leakage by Colonel Balchan to the subject of the file, an unsatisfactory Irishman called Colonel J.C. Fitzmaurice.
I had a meeting this morning with Mr. Hart, Major Cussen and Captain Courteney Young, when we discussed the significance of the Eileen's report in connection with information received from S.I.S. (Section V Stockholm?) on the Kraemer case, from Stockholm; and it was agreed that I should speak to Colonel Robb of SHAEF and ask him to consider SHAEF taking steps either to close the service down for the time being, or to make thorough examination of the aircraft Leuchars.
I also undertook to speak to Mr. Byrde, E.1.a/U.S.A. and Captain Corin, E.1.A/S. I did this. Captain Corin's information on the Norwegian project is scanty and somewhat behindhand (overdue), but Mr. Byrde produced the information about Colonel Balchan.
Colonel Robb is going to take the matter up immediately with SHAEF.
I also spoke to Colonel Baxter, L.R.C., who stated a party had been brought over from Stockholm on the 10th of May, another party on the 27th May, and that according to the information he has at present, there are two of three more aircraft now waiting in Stockholm for a suitable opportunity.
The information on Colonel Balchan in the Fitzmaurice file was passed to London Region through S.L.B. (2) (Special Branch in Scotland Yard) and B.1.H., but it did not assume special importance without the knowledge of the special project referred to.
I have spoken to D.B. this morning about this, and he requests that I provide him with material suitably camouflaged so that he can take up the matter at once with the Findlater Stewart Committee and the Foreign Office.
B.1.L. 3.6.44 Sgd. J.R. Stopford.
KV 2/145-1, page 67 (minute 115a)
S.I.S. CX/12736/28/VB dated 1.6.44
The attached information (presented next) about Karl Heinz Kraemer's movements has been obtained from looking at various passports in his possession. (AOB likely "borrowed" also from Kraemer's safe by his household maid, according (D1002 D1002return)) you may be interested in seeing how this extraordinary character get himself about.
H.L.A. Hart Esq. M.I.5.
KV 2/145-1, page 69a (minute 56a) (Q1017 ↓↓↓↓ Q1017return) (S1051 ↓↓↓↓ S1051return) (G1070 ↓↓↓↓ G1070return) (S1085 ↓↓↓↓ S1085return) (X1091 ↓↓↓↓ X1091return)
+ KV 2/145-2, page 1b
14.7.39 Via for U.K. granted Hamburg
Visa granted for France and Belgium
17.6.39 Entered Denmark
19.6.39 In Copenhagen
30.6.39 Left Denmark
7.7.39 Entered U.K. via Southampton
21.8.39 Left for U.K.
25.8.39 Entered Holland
3.9.39 Left Holland
5.9.39 In Brussels
16.9.39 Entered Holland
22.9.39 Entered Denmark
2.2.40 Entered Switzerland
23.2.40 Entered Norway, Kongsvinger
25.2.40 Left Norway
3.4.40 Entered Belgium
6.4.40 Left Belgium
8.4.40 In Budapest
10.4.40 In Yugoslavia
21.4.40 Entered Italy
1.5.40 In Budapest
2.5.40 Left Budapest
27.6.40 Entered Budapest
2.7.40 Left Budapest
9.8.40 Various visits
14.11.40 to Budapest
14.11.40 Entered Yugoslavia
15.11.40 Left Yugoslavia
15.1.41 Visa for Turkey granted Hamburg (maybe Kraemer had already contacts with Ast Hamburg)
31.8.40? Arrived at Malmö
July 1941 Arrived Stockholm
9.8.41 Left Stockholm
31.8.41 Arrived Budapest
1.9.41 Entered Rumania
29.9.41 Arrived Stockholm
29.11.41 Left Stockholm
17.2.42 Arrived Basle (Basel)
16.3.42 Entered Denmark
23.3.42 Left Stockholm
8.4.42 Entered Switzerland Basle (Basel)
10.4.42 Left Switzerland
23.4.42 Entered Rumania
27.4.42 Arrived Budapest
7.5.42 Arrived Stockholm
29.6.42 Left Stockholm
23.7.42 Entered Sweden
24.7.42 Entered Portugal (this had been commenced in cooperation with Ast Hamburg and, likely, Major Wenzlau)
31.7.41 Left Portugal
16.9.42 Entered Switzerland
24.10.42 Entered Budapest
25.10.42 Left Budapest
KV 2/145-2, page 2, (minute 114a)
CX/12736/28/V.B. dated 31.5 44
With reference to your letter B.1.B. of 3.5.44 concerning our (S.I.S.) request for a key (AOB: perhaps a new key?)*, I am glad to be able able to inform you that it was a great success and fits perfectly. Our representative (Section V) was very grateful for same.
H.L.A. Hart M.I.5.
KV 2/145-2, page 16 (minute 105a)
(S.I.S. reference) CX/12736/28/V.B. dated 19.5.44
Reference my letter CX/12736/28/V.B. of 7.5.44, our (Section V) representative in Stockholm has discovered that Kraemer visits three times a week very secretly Albert Hilding Kinberg, who has been subject of previous correspondence between yourself and us ( our reference CX/ ?5 of 17.8.38). Kraemer's mother is stated to be German and friendly with (Hermann) Goering. He has four telephones in his flat. In addition he is a personal friend of Hans Schaefer (Schäfer; the Lufthansa Representative in Sweden) deutsche Lufthansa manager in Sweden. Kraemer as you know figures in our Swedish Primer.
You comments on the above would be appreciated.
H.L.A. Hart Esq. M.I.5.
KV 2/145-2, page 21 (minute 101a)
probably German. Was in London before war as secretary to some American, Now
secretary to Important Official of German Secret Service.
B.1.b. (M.I.5) Priscilla Wilson for H.L.A. Hart.
B.1.B./PW/ for HLAH
KV 2/145-2, page 29 (minutes 46a) this fits to KV 2/145-2, page 2
CX/12736/28/V.B. dated 26.4.44
Could you please arrange through one of your contacts to have three copies made of the key of the model of the attached drawings which are made made from impressions and are exactly on scale. (dealing here again with a copied safe key of Kraemer's private safe, which was accessed by the household maid Helen Fiedler and her friend Anna Eriksson, when the Kraemer's weren't at their home during the afternoon, in their flat; document had been "borrowed" from Kraemer's safe by mean or the fore-called safe key)
We would like to make the following suggestions:
(a) Care should be taken to see that the internal diameter of the barrel is, if anything, greater than that shown on the drawing. It should on no account be less, even the smallest fraction of an inch.
(b) Care should also be taken to see that the external diameter of the barrel is, if anything, less than that shown on the drawing. It should on no account be greater.
(c) The result of this may be that the structure of the barrel is thinner than that of the original key, but this of course does not matter.
(d) In the case of the ward, the error should be, if anything, to make it smaller than the drawing, both in side-elevation and the end-elevation. The drawing, however, can be taken as accurate, since allowance has already been made for the distension of the butter mould made in withdrawing the key from it.
As the diameter is somewhat urgent and as the original key belongs to Karl Heinz Kraemer, subject of previous correspondence to you ending with our CX/12736/28/V.B.
dated 14.4.44, I would be grateful if this could be treated as very urgent.
H.L.A. Hart Esq. M.I.5.
(5) (13 January 2023)
KV 2/145-2, page 53 (minute 84a)
A.D.B. (Dick G. White?; M.I.5)
I attended a meeting at L.C.S. this afternoon when put forward his scheme for making a diplomatic protest in Stockholm against activities of Eins Luft, and against Kraemer in particular (you can try so, but chances, like in Kraemer's case being likely nil). The security grounds for the protest are, I understand, undisputed, and both L.C.S. and S.H.A.E.F. were strongly in favour of the scheme of deception grounds. Name deleted had prepared a draft paper setting out the evidence against Kraemer (AOB: truly? Telling the Swedes really that you saw what copies Kraemer possessed in his flat?) and included in this was a letter written by Treasure (KV 2/382, PF 65917; Nathalie Surgueiew) from Madrid to her cover address in Sweden which was found in Kraemer's room (AOB: how did the British Service knew this?). It was suggested that the protest should not only refer to this letter, but should state in terms that other letters had been written from England to Sweden by Treasure, and that copies should be produced.
I told the meeting that we were perfectly prepared to sacrifice Treasure in the general interest, but I do not think that we could have agreed to the production of other letters written by Treasure, since this would, in my opinion, have demonstrated that Treasure was a special agent. To this there are numerous objections, including the fact that her parents are in German occupied territory (France), and the fact that we do not want the Germans to know that we allow special agents to leave the country. Fortunately, however, this question did not arise, since everybody present was agreed that the case against Kraemer would scarcely be strengthened by bringing in this evidence, and it was agreed, therefore, that it should be wholly excluded from the protest. In point of fact, apart from the one letter found in Kraemer's possession, there is no evidence that Kraemer anything to do with Treasure at all. Indeed, so far from assisting her case, he seems to have done his best to prevent it from getting under way.
Name being deleted informed that the evidence in support of the protest would not compromise the Josephine run by Stopford (B1L), nor would it affect the Josephine who appears of Secret Sources. Liversidge is now attempting to obtain approval from his own Chief.
Sgd. J.H. Marriott
B.1.a. (M.I.5) 4.4.44
(AOB: behaving like poor children sometimes do - losing their brains - as they apparently do not know how diplomatic matters respond; nothing at all happened, but wasting smartness)
KV 2/145-2, page 55 (minute 81e)
Summary of letter from Capt. Guy Liddell to S.I.S. dated 30.3.44.
In the course of investigation into certain leakage of information it was found possible to abstract a copy of a letter from Carlsberg of the Swedish Legation to A.B.A. in Stockholm. (AOB: Carlsberg should have been aware of the all-over censorship; and in my perception, should have considered the letter content being ridicule). from this letter it was apparent that one, James Stanton, personal assistant to Lord Beaverbrook, had give Carlsberg a good deal of confidential information regarding the future of civil aviation (really a criminal act!). This was brought to the notice of Lord Beaverbrook and he promised to take no action in the matter, but in fact dismissed Stanton from M.A.P. within a quarter of an hour.
KV 2/145-2, page 64 (minute 81e) (J1009 ↓↓↓↓↓ J1009return)
CX/12736/28/V.B. dated 29.3.44
With reference to previous correspondence concerning Karl Heinz Kraemer, we have now received information from our representative (S.I.S. Section V) in Stockholm with the text of what appear to be two further messages, which were found among Kraemer's effects in Stockholm. (AOB: notice again foregoing page 53 minute 84a: actually S.I.S. Section V "borrowed" Kraemer's documents with the support of Kraemer's household maid, Section V photographed it and returned it in time) (AOB, we have encountered an attempt, on behalf of the British Secret Service, where they supposed to hand over an official protest against Kraemer; as to get him, consequently, expelled. What would have happened with those latter Services - when their institutional breaches on Swedish Territory would have caused a German complaint?) (E1005 E1005return) On the outside of these messages the words 'Für Hasso' were written. (AOB: Hasso was one of Kraemer's aliases) ('Für Hasso' this notice may point at the very fact: that it was handed over, or received, by whatever communication means, via the German Legation in Stockholm, someone has to know to whom it should be handed-over) There are various traces of Hasso in the material with which your are familiar (supplied by Section V), and it is not possible to say to which this particular Hasso refers.
I would be grateful if you could let me have your opinion of these two messages, which appear to be part of a general aviation questionnaire.
H.L.A. Hart Esq. M.I.5.
KV 2/145-2, page 65a + 66b (minute 81c?)
AOB: I this time will, sometimes, expressing it in the way the German "Fragebogen" might had been worded.
Decoded secret telegram (copy) "borrowed" from Kraemer's flat) Attachment to CX/12736/28/V.B. of 29.3.44
Ludwig (Abwehr Referat I L, in Berlin) telegraphs (communications went via telegraph-cables) with 11 396/44 Geheim (gKdos?)
Regarding : Mosquito.
According to "Aeroplane" 28th Jan 44, a long distance reconnaissance Mosquito unit built in Canada is in service in the Mediterranean area (literal translation). This proves the repeat rumour that Mosquitoes have been delivered to the American Airforce (not true). Are these solely Canadian Mosquitoes or are they Mosquitoes supplied from England? (No) How many were (are) delivered in all? and how many are to be supplied in future? What is known about an intended manufacture of Mosquitoes in U.S.A. (no plans). Befehlshaber der Luftwaffe Führungsstaffel Fl, 81 61/44 Geheim.
Anhänge 5 Grete
Rom: Bombers (and?) U.S.A. (The "U" in original is not clearly written and might be "W")
Flugzeugproduktion geschätzt auf 14500 (1450) to 15,000 (1500 Einheiten.
Einzelheiten so schnell wie möglich wie die Zahlen sich zu den Angaben verhalten /verteilen.
Of urgent interest are closer particulars of armament and equipment versions 340B40 previously not identified in operations. When can operation (Wenn kann einen Einsatz erwartet werden?) When can operation B-29 be expected? Performance and armament of B 32.
On what airfields have "Wellingtons" (very old fashioned aircraft) been delivered by air. The fact that personnel for making Stirlings (also quite old fashioned) serviceable is not available, does not yet prove that delivery by ship has been interfered with but may be caused by later priority. All nearer details about delivery of the Stirlings are of interest. The interference with deliveries by ship appears improbable for the present, since there are no reports about uncrated fuselages or creates with corresponding dimensions.
According to reports from another source, a greater number of "Fortresses has been concentrated on the Azores. Is anything known about an increasing? of the Azores establishment?
Regarding information American anti-aircraft artillery.
To what extent is the American anti-aircraft artillery being used for the air-defence of English towns? What weapons have been identified in this connection? Calibre Mobility? Where do these American anti-aircraft units come from?
Parts of the invasion army?
Parts of the ground organisation of the American Airforce?
KV 2/145-2, page 69a + 70b (minute 81a)
27th. March 1944.
Re:-Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer.
With reference to the attached memo. from B.1.b. (Mr. H.L.A. Hart) asking for information regarding the above-mentioned subject:
Fortunately the present occupier of No. 9 Sussex Place, W.2, a boarding-house, has been the proprietor of this establishment for about eighteen years. This is Mr. William Donnet, who is an ex-Officer of the British Army. He obtained a Commission in cavalry regiment in 1914: served throughout the Great War of 1914-18, at the termination of which he was a Staff-Officer in the 41st. Division. Being on the reserve of Officers, Mr. Donnet volunteered for service on the outbreak of the present hostilities, but was rejected on account of his age. He is now a Section Officer in the local fire service.
The register of boarders at No.9 Sussex Place for 1939 was produced and it showed that 'Dr. Kraemer" (in his own hand-writing) stayed from 8th July 1939 until the 29th of the same month, occupying the ground-floor front room. He gave his address as Hamburg 30.
Mr. Donnet was anxious to talk about the subject in question, and expressed his surprise that he had not had an official visit on this matter before. He says that he was always took a particular interest in any alien staying at his boarding-house, particularly Germans, and endeavoured to draw them out as much as possible. He had on occasions telephoned to Scotland Yard regarding any alien of whom he was suspicious. In the case of Dr. Krämer (Kraemer), he states, he remembers this man particularly well because when the visitor first arrived he seemed to court the society of Mr. Donnet and to question the latter at length on conditions in this country: in fact. Mr. Donnet says, he seemed to be putting him through the 'third degree". This suited Mr. Donnet very well, however, as he had nothing to give away, and it gave him an opportunity of cross-questioning Kraemer. He says that the subject was undoubtedly a very brilliant man, who had travelled widely. Kraemer was then about thirty-five years (actually not yet 25 years) of age, of medium height, rather thin build, but very upright. He had an authorative air about him which suggested to Mr. Donnet that he was a man who "must be on top". It was when Mr. Donnet commenced to lead the conversation between them that Kramer suddenly shut up and after this he left the proprietor severely alone. Mr. Donnet formed the opinion that the subject was in this country on a special mission. On one occasion he told the proprietor that, in the event of war between the two countries, Germany would bomb Great Britain to smithereens, and he became very angry when Mr. Donnet told him that we were a much better position to bomb Germany than vice versa. Although Kraemer behaved quite well as a guest, and conducted himself properly in the house, Mr. Donnet describes him as a most fanatical German who considered every other nationality inferior.
Dr. K.H. Kraemer (or Krämer) left No.9 Sussex Place very suddenly or, as Mr. Donnet put it, "in a hell of a hurry" after the receipt of a telegram. The proprietor remembers this so well because he was having lunch at the time when Kraemer rushed in his dining room in a most excited manner to settle his bill, and he had a large not to change. Kraemer said he was returning home at once and was in a "frightful state, shaking, and nervous".
Mr. Donnet said that he had had but few Germans staying at his establishment. he considered it strange, therefore, that there were two other there at the same time as Kraemer. Although they did not arrive or depart together, they seemed to be friends, and Mr. Donnet thinks it very likely they were on the same mission. According to the hotel register the other Germans at No.9. Sussex Place at the time as Kraemer were: Heinz Buermann, home address No. 22 Ingelheimer Strasse, Bremen, who stayed at the boarding-house from the 3rd July to the 5th August 1939: and Ober-lieutenant von Harrow or Hasbrow who stayed from the 25th May to the 15th July 1939. In the case of this second German, the writing is so bad that this name may not be quite correct, and his home address is undecipherable.
There is no trace of dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer or Krämer at A.R.O.1.
KV 2/146-1, page 1
Kraemer Karl Heinz
Siemsen Nina Anna
KV 2/146-1, page 6
26.12.44 Letter from S.I.S. re Kraemer and Riedel 156a
12.1.45 Letter from S.I.S. re Kraemer and list of books he obtained from Stockholm 159a (AOB: I suppose, still obtained from "borrowed" information via means on behalf of the Kraemer's household maid)
13.1.45 Note from B.1.b. to D3 enclosing aircraft production figures 161a
16.1.45 Letter from S.I.S. enclosing further telegrams of Kraemer's and translation 164a (Obtained by means of the safe-lock key copy, "borrowed" from Kraemer's safe, photo-copied by S.I.S. Section V, with the aid of the Kraemer's household maid Helen Fiedler)
18.1.45 From D3 in reply to (minute) 161a, check up on Aircraft Production figures. 166a
KV 2/146-1, page 8 starting with minute 179
4.2.45 Letter from S.I.S. re Kraemer report to Berlin on coming British offensive in the west. 179a (information, likely obtained from the telex (Fernschreib) office at the German Legation. Section V bribed (since January 1945) two persons of which one was a Czech, for a considerable sum of money, fore it they provided the message copies in German language, of course. These were addressed mainly to the German Foreign Office (A.A.). Most of Kraemer's materials were then transferred to the Military Abwehr)
5.2.45 Report of "Kraemer" intelligence forwarded by A.D.B. (Dick G. White) to D.B. (Sir Stewart Menzies?)
6.2.45 Letter from S.I.S. ref. interrogation of Kliemann re Kraemer 184a Emil Kliemann (Paris) (AOB: KV 2/278 PF 600252) was the German controller of Double-Cross; whom had also contact with Treasure)
8.2.45 From D3 comments on 180a re aircraft Production Figures leakage. 186a
KV 2/146-1, page 10
14.2.45 To N.I.D. 12. requesting check on information re British Capital ship "Vanguard".
16.2.45 From N.I.D. 12 in reply to 202a (foregoing minute) 207a
KV 2/146-1, page 13 (minute 207a) Please compare this message with the foregoing according minutes.
From Lt. Cdr. Clackson, R.N.V.R. To Major M. Ryde (M.I.5.)
Dated 16th February 1945
With reference to your PF 66365 (Kraemer's)/B.1.a/MR, the building yard and date are correct, but the correct tonnage is 42,300 tons. Armament given is not correct. Correct length is 813 ft. 6 ins., draught 29ft. 10 ins.
Sgd. Lieut. Commander R.N.V.R.
KV 2/146-1, page 14 (minute 206a) (Please consider also the foregoing pages 8 and 10)
S.I.S. CX/12736/28/V.S.6 (V.S.6. is the code of the servant currently working on this file) dated 16th February, 1945
Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer)
Please refer to message 126 and the attachment to my letter to you dated 5th February, 1945, under reference CX/12736//28/V.S.6.
You will be interested to know that the text of these two messages is word for word the same as ZIP/JMA 10324 (AOB: ZIP is pointing at ADM (Admiralty intercept) and of 10th February, 1945) This is Kraemer Intelligence and it is also interesting to note that the Japanese Military Attaché Onodera in Stockholm gives the origin of the information as London, January 11th, whereas Kraemer while giving the same date, attributes it to the Finish source, Quelle 12. (AOB: Kraemer used cover-words for his various sources, such as Josephine, Hector, Quelle 12, Zuckerhut and that like. We, later, will have to deal with these kinds of aspects.)
signature made invisible
H.L.A. Hart M.I.5.
KV 2/146-1, page 15 (minute 205a)
S.I.S. CX/12736/28/V.S.6. dated 16th February, 1945
Dear Hart (M.I.5)
Please refer to CX/12736/28/V.S.6. dated (2) dated 24.1.45 and also attachment to my letter 5.2.45 (minute 181a) In this you will observe that Hektor (Hector) message, refereeing to a five page report on British Aircraft production, is obviously message 512 which is missing from our text. The reference to "Kraemer" is rather interesting and I am wondering if it has any significance to Kraemer Intelligence. It is rather difficult to understand just why our source omitted to give us this message.
So far as further comparison between the two texts goes the only point of interest is that the Czechs do not receive messages concerning British Foreign Policy, Anglo-American relations, Polish question and Russian-Czech relations. (AOB: we should, again, be aware that the forgoing quite cryptic text that S.I.S. (Section V?) did pay two persons of which at least one being of Czech origin, a lot of money as to supply S.I.S. in Stockholm with copies of all messages sent from the Telex (Fernschreib) Office of the German Legation, in Stockholm. Towards the end of these series we will be confronted with them).
KV 2/146-1, page 17a (minute 203a) (G1006 ↓↓↓ G1006return)
Foreign Office, S.W.1
14th February, 1945
Dear Major Ryde,
Thank you for your letter PF 66365/B.1.a?MRyde of tje 10th February about Karl Heinz Kraemer @ Horst Ruediger.
I have consulted Sir William Strang, who says that he was at the Embassy in Moscow from July 1930 (Karl Heinz Kraemer born in 1914 was then just 16 years of age!) till October 1933 and was not living in Moscow in 1934 or 1935.
Seebacher is, he thinks, the name of the person who used to come to the embassy to read German with his wife for a few weeks in Moscow in 1932 or 1933. If so, she was governess to the child, and companion to the wife, of Herr Hilger, Commercial Counsellor of the German Embassy in Moscow. She was at no time employed by Sir William Strang as governess or in any other capacity.
He has never, to the best of his recollection, either met or heard of Herr Kraemer either in London or in Moscow.
Sgd. Dr. Bromley
Major Ryde, M.I.5 ↕↕↕
(6) (16 January 2023)
KV 2/146-1, page 20 (minute 201a)
D.3. (G/Capt. Archer)
I should be grateful if you would check the veracity of the following information which is known to have reached the enemy (in casu Kraemer).
Strength of Coastal command.
15th Group 60 Sunderland Total
20 Catalina machines 300
16th Group 120 Beaufighter
20 Hudson 280
17th Group 60 Beaufighter
20 Hudson 230
18th Group 40 Beaufighter
20 Hudson 430
Grand total 1230
Mosquito Production - The Mosquito assembly plants are in Hatfield, White Waltham, Portsmouth, Paisley and Abbotsinch.
B.1.a. 14.2.45 M. Ryde (Major)
KV 2/146-2, page 23 (minute 198a)
Personal 13th February 1945.
I attach herewith a copy of Hart's memorandum (180a) on JMA (Japan Military Attaché, Onodera). You will see from the concluding paragraph that there is at least a suggestion that the more important and accurate information may have leaked through the Cervell-Turner combination. When I saw you the other day you suggested that a possible method of testing this out might be through planting some rather hot information on Turner or Cervell. I mentioned this to Blunt (M.I.5.), who feels that this would be well worth trying, but it is quite certain that the only kind of information that Cervell would really be interested to pass on would be something connected with the technical side of aircraft.
Major-General Sir Stewart Menzies, KCMG, CB, DSO, MC,
KV 2/146-1, page 24a + 25b (minute 197a)
CX/12736/28/V.S.6. , date 13.2.45
With reference previous correspondence concerning the case of Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer); I feel that it will be to our mutual advantage if we keep each other fully informed as to the investigations being undertaken by both our departments. Otherwise I forsee possible duplication and waste of effort.
We for our (S.I.S.) part are at present engaged on the following:
a) Classification of our material. (Bill Shanks has already sent you our CX/12736/28/V.S.6 of 5.2.45 a first instalment.)
b) Identification of cover-names or symbols. (We have already identified several and will be forwarding the results within the next few days.)
c) Sub-division of alleged sources into nationalities. (We may then discover the various liaisons which Krämer (Kraemer) claims to have with pro-Axis or neutral Intelligence Services.)
d) The discovery of the source or sources in Swedish Government circles in Sweden divulging-secret information to Krämer (Kraemer).
e) Veracity checks on Krämer (Kraemer) material where such material is not appertaining to Great Britain or the British Empire. (We hope that this will help us to determine which sources are factual and are notional (imaginary /virtual).)
You (M.I.5.) for your part are making appreciations of all material relevant to the U.K. and the British Empire.
The results of your research in conjunction with my (S.I.S.) para e) should help us to decide whether Kramer's (Kraemer's) sources really exist or are products of his ready imagination.
You are also, I am sure, following up the clues - to discover the source or sources (if factual as I think they are - not notional) of leakage from the U.K. Even if the source is (or these these sources are unconscious and neutral, I am sure that you will agree that ways and means must be found to stop a flow of information which is apparently reaching the German authorities in Sweden from London.
We have, as you know, warned our Swedish Police contacts of the possibility of a serious leak occurring in one of their (Swedish) Government departments. If there is anything more we can do which may be of assistance to you (M.I.5), will you please let me know?
Herbert L.A. Hart, Esq., M.I.5.
After some consideration, I decided to deal with the next minute 196a; only towards its end the clue of this paper comes to light:
KV 2/146-1, page 26a + 27b (minute 196a)
I would be most grateful if you could check the following information which is known to have fallen into the hands of the German secret Service:-
(1) The H.Q. of the 1st British Army Command (AOK) (the according German designation: Armee Oberkommando) in the South of London in the Aldershot/Guilford area.
(2) The Norwegian Army has two infantry divisions. One part of the second division is in Iceland and Greenland. Further, the Norwegians have a small number of special units and Commando troops. The small units employed in North Norway belong to the first division.
(3) The main interest in military circles in London is the crisis in Eisenhower's staff caused by failure of the 1st Army, lack of Anglo-American cooperation. It is learnt that the English protested in the War Cabinet in order to produce a readjustment of cooperation in France.
According to the same source relations between Montgomery and Eisenhower cannot be adjusted without considerable alterations in Eisenhower's staff. The War Cabinet suggested to Eisenhower an exchange with Alexander, but this does not alter the position. The War Cabinet rejects all other changes. believed that a further deterioration may be expected even if subordinate commanders such as Bedell, Smith or Hodges are replaced.
(4) Learned from conversations that between 3,000 and 3,100 gliders are now in G.B., some of them repaired after employment in Norway and Holland. The entire production is going to France, where between 1,600 and 1,700 new gliders are available, all delivered from the U.K. and U.S.A. since October.
Sgd. M. Ryde
B.1.a. (M.I.5) 10.2.45
It would be easier to check definitely if we were given a date.
2. Strength of Norwegian Forces in U.K. is about 1800, organised in special units. There are no portions of a Division in Iceland or Greenland.
3. Nonsense - there is no such crisis. Eisenhower knows "Monty" very well and has worked satisfactorily with him since the North African campaign. (AOB: this statement may be regarded for local consumption. Actually Montgomery's star wasn't brightly shining in the American eyes, since "Monty's" clumsy operations about Caen after D-Day and the operations about Arnhem (Arnheim)) The transfer to Field Marshal Alexander to the Western Front was discussed in high quarters, but there is no suggestion of leakage.
4. No British gliders in France - unable to check American. Total gliders in U.K. 1854 (according to M.A.P.)
Ops 13.2.45 Sgd. Major M.B. Heywood.
KV 2/146-1, page 33 (minute 193a)
D.G.S.S. (Director General Secret Service?) (L1011 ↕↕ L1011return)
I believe Captain Liddell has mentioned to you the subject matter of the attached papers.
1a (180a) which I suggest you may care to read first, is an analysis made by me of a series of Japanese intercepts (Japan's Military Attaché Onodera communicated, apparently, by W/T means with Tokyo; these communications were commenced by a Japanese coding machine which carried the US code-name J25; the Americans kept, according their mutual exchange of information agreement, the British Services informed. Likely with a certain delay in time.) showing information about this country (U.K.) which was received by the Germans in Stockholm and handed on to the Japanese. The German in Stockholm responsible for this is called Kraemer.
2a (179a) contains the last piece of information which we know, not from intercept sources but from S.I.S. (The latter's Section V had bribed two men of whom at least one of Czech origin for quite some money; these men were employed in the telex (Fernschreib) Office at the German Embassy. S.I.S got copies of all duplicates. Communications went via regular telephone cable-trunks, via the Baltic Sea to the Isle of Rügen and from there to the German Foreign Office in Berlin. At least Kraemer's messages had been sent by means of coding-telex machines), to have been obtained by Kraemer, and has caused a considerable excitement here. As you will see, Captain Liddell suggests that it may have originated in the same quarter in this country as the information contained in the Japanese intercepts.
A.D.B. (M.I.5.) (Dick G. White) Office, though Sgd. Herbert L. A. Hart
KV 2/146-1, page 36a (minute 194a) (W1026 W1026return) (X1028 X1028return)
Report (Camp 020) on Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer) by Hauptmann Peter Riedel,
formerly Eins Luft (I L), Sweden.
Krämer (Kraemer) works exclusively for Abwehr I L and his work is supervised by Major Wenzlau, Einz Luft (I L) (AOB, not entirely like this. Albeit that Wenzlau was a Major and Kraemer (Krämer) a Lieutenant (Lt), in practise Karl Heinz Kraemer was the leading person. Karl Heinz Kraemer was employed at the Diplomatic Service and was the Military Attaché concerned with Air matters. However, Wenzlau and Kraemer knew each other for quite a long time, as both were once engaged by Ast Hamburg in Lisbon, they cooperated rather well), who replaced Major Friedrich Busch (an enemy of Kraemer) (KV 2/529, PF 602057) in the beginning of September 1944. Prior to that, however, Krämer (Kraemer) operated without control from Sweden and was not subordinated (and not really thereafter) to Colonel Dr. (Hans) Wagner of the K.O. Schweden.
Krämer (Kraemer) passed intelligence to Berlin principally on air matters (Luft) such as the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. Battle Order, movements, production etc., small amount of political information and still less on the Mediterranean. Krämer (Kraemer) told Riedel that he was not interested in Sweden from an intelligence point of view. Krämer (Kraemer) is a shrewd man with a "lone wolf" outlook. he works very hard and gets on well with the Legation, and as so far as the quality of his intelligence is concerned Riedel believes that some of his reports went to Hitler himself. (AOB: quite likely)
Riedel is unable to say where Krämer's (Kraemer's ) of information are, but Josephine and Hektor were cover names for two sources most frequently quoted, (Riedel's own guess is that Hektor is Krämer's (Kraemer's) own cover name, which is nonsense). Riedel also learnt from Busch (Kraemer's great 'enemy'!) who quoting Krämer, said Krämer (Kraemer) had a man in London who had the job of passing information to the Americans and who sent the same information was first given to the Swedish Legation in London whence it was transmitted to the Swedish Foreign Office in Stockholm, there it was decoded by the head codist, whom Krämer (Kraemer) maintained was an agent of his, and the relevant material was passed by him to Krämer (Kraemer). Riedel cannot remember the name of the codist, but added that Busch considered the latter part of the story to be rubbish as he knew the head codist personally and did not think him capable of such an act. Riedel emphasised that Krämer's (Kraemer's) reports came from England in a few days (presumably a days from the date of the information), but both he and Busch considered this impossible.
Despite the fact that Krämer (Kraemer) was regarded by Berlin as far and away the most reliable source on U.K. intelligence he is suspected by Berlin of fabricating a certain portion of his intelligence and every effort has made by them to discover the extent to which he is doing so.
KV 2/146-1, page 37b
Peter Riedel, himself, was asked by the head (General Dessen?) (https://www.cdvandt.org/ktb-chef-tlr.htm) of the of the section TLR-Rü (Technische Luftrüstung), which deals with American aircraft industry, if he considered Krämer's (Kraemer's) reports to be genuine. Arno Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber), former head of (Referat) I Luft (in Berlin) (since Leiter K.O.Spain), came over to investigate this aspect of Krämer's (Kraemer's) intelligence, but was soon won over by Krämer (Kraemer) and was convinced either of the genuineness of his reports or else of the folly in exposing the fact that they were not. Similarly Wenzlau, who was also asked to check up on Krämer's (Kraemer's) material when he joined Eins Luft Sweden, allowed himself to be convinced by Krämer (Kraemer) who was an old friend of his (They joined commitments in Lisbon KOP, both engaged by Ast Hamburg). Riedel added that there was also the fact that Obstlt von Dewiz? (Ohletz; KV 2/106 PF 602785; Mil Amt-C), who is Krämer's (Kraemer's) chief in Einz Luft (actually the old/obsolete designation), is a very ambitious man and is probably hand in glove with Krämer (Kraemer) so that even though he may have proof that Krämer (Kraemer) is fabricating some of his reports he dare not reveal it.
Riedel is convinced, however, that Krämer (Kraemer) does indeed fabricate a part of his intelligence. In one particular instance he was asked by Krämer (Kraemer) for the loan of the current American Air Force Order of Battle, and some time later Riedel observed a message from Krämer (Kraemer) to Berlin which was based on that report. Apart from this he studied very carefully newspapers, journals and also "Geheime Kommandosachen" (gKdos) to which he had access, particularly during the Heimann's period of office as Air Attaché. Krämer (Kraemer) was very well in with those handled this matter material and Berlin (Amt VI / Mil Amt-C) suspected Krämer's (Kraemer's) use of this material/ Riedel's own chief Obst-Ing. Dietrich Schwenke told Riedel in 1943 to keep an eye on Krämer's (Kraemer's) particularly to see if he had access to Geheimsachen (nonsense as these materials were an integral part of their business) material. He was incidentally, also worried as he believed Krämer (Kraemer) might be working for Great Britain.
Despite this evidence to show that Krämer (Kraemer) does ni fact invent part of his intelligence Riedel equally convinced that Krämer's (Kraemer's) source in England and the Swedish Foreign Office are genuine. He quoted three instances to substantiate this:
1) Just after the parachute landing at Arnhem (Operation Market Garden) a furious telegram arrived from Berlin to Major Golcher, the Air Attaché, to the Air Attaché (Kraemer, whom was actually the Air Attaché), demanding to know why Krämer's (Kraemer's) report on a parachute landing had not been teleprinted in time. Apparently Krämer had reported a parachute landing some fifteen hours before it took place although Riedel is not sure whether Arnhem was mentioned. ↓
2) Riedel saw a very secret report on Swedish/English and Swedish/Russian relations. This was just after a very secret mission fro Russia to Stockholm and concerned eventual effect should Sweden enter the war, etc.
3) Ernest Hepp told Riedel that there was a very heavy leakage from the Swedish Foreign Office Stockholm to the German Legation (just where our Karl Heinz Kraemer was a Military Attaché), Stockholm
AOB: this interesting document ends here abruptly.
KV 2/146-2, page 41 (minute 188a) related to: (G1006 G1006return)
PF 66365/B.1.a/MR 10th February, 1945
We, in conjunction with S.I.S, are making enquiries regarding a member of the German secret Service in Stockholm named Karl Heinz Kraemer @ Horst Rüdiger.
The S.I.S. representative in Stockholm has reported that Kraemer was at one time well known to Mr. Strang, former Counsellor in Moscow amd who is now at the Foreign Office. This acquaintanceship apparently began when Kraemer was in the U.K. on behalf of the Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft between 1929 and 1931. ↓↓
Skipping the rest, for obvious reason
KV 2/146-1, page 51 (minute 181a)
CX/12736/28/V.S.6 dated 5th February, 1945
With reference to my previous correspondence concerning Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer), I now enclose a copy of the latest batch of messages sent by Krämer (Kraemer) to the R.S.H.A. (Section Amt VI/Amt Mil) Berlin. I have also drawn up the gist of these reports under their respective sources which will give you a ready indication of the type of material which source supplies.
The Eisberg source (= Switzerland). You may be interested to know that when Krämer visited Berlin in February 1944 there appeared in his list of subjects for discussion "Eisberg Klappt". (Schweiz / Switzerland in Ordnung /O.K. or that like?) It was on March 8 (1944) that Eisberg (Switzerland source) first appeared in the special material (AOB: "borrowed" from Kraemer's private safe?) as a source of information on Southern Italy.
Herbert L.A. Hart, Esq. M.I.5.
KV 2/146-1, page 52a (minute 181a)
Outgoing Message. 28.12. 44- 15.1.45 (Report 16.1.45)
AOB: message copies obtained by bribing a Czech and someone else engaged in the telex/Fernschreib office in the German Legation in Stockholm
The serials xxx W constitute the telegram number sent towards the German Foreign Office in Berlin, and when appropriate transferred to Amt Mil (Mil Amt)
We later about the McCallum and some earlier; we will encounter the real messages.
Anderson Hasso = Karl Heinz Kraemer.
1. "Z" V-Mann via Anderson-Hasso. Anglo-American Relations (486 W.)
2. " " " Brit. Home and Foreign Policy (568 W.)
3. V-Mann " Report on Polish Crimes. (517 W.)
4. No Source " German Swedish Relations. (127 O)
1. 488 W. Source 27 via Petterson-Hasso (Kraemer) 1st French Army Composition.
2. 489 W. " " Marseille harbour installations.
3. 490 W. " " Brit. Army Command H.Q. location.
3. 491 W. " " Re establishment of the 2nd French Army.
4. 492 W. Source 24 " Anglo-Am. formations Gironde-Pyrenees.
5. 504 W. Eisberg " LLD s in Ardenne Area.
6. 507 W. V-Mann " Inventor of US Norden Bomb Sight.
7. 510 W. No source " Norwegian Army Units in G.B.
8. 511 W. Hektor " New Handley Page Civil aircraft production.
9. 513 W. " " Re. Aircraft factories in England
10. 519 W. " " Re. Denny Bros. Dumbarton.
11. 520 W. " " Failsworth part in aircraft production.
12. 523 W. Zuckerhut I (Finland) F.A.A.T.F. disbanded mid-Nov.
13. 524 W. Z V-Mann " 4 engined bomber production.
14. 525 W. Eisberg (Switzerland) Bari, Brindisei, Ancona harbours.
15. 526 W. Z V-Mann " British harbour figures.
16. 527 W. No source " Re Petrol Production in England.
17. 528 W. Z V-Mann " RAF Bomber Command Strength
18. 529 W. " " 8 FC strength.
KV 2/146-1, page 54b
Summary of outgoing messages re Andersson, Petterson, Hasso, Liang, Gunther.
Andersson. Political Subjects.
All Military Subjects except the inventor of the
Bomb Sight instrument report (507 W)
drawings originally had been stolen
In New York by
Major Ritter of Ast Hamburg, Leiter Referat I L.
Petterson-Hasso. Plane production, Brit, air strength, Army info, re location and disposition, Harbour intelligence, Brit. air disposition, Personnel in supreme H.Q. Inventor Norden Sight instrument, Petrol production, Soviet aircraft and guns production,
Petterson-Liyang. Plane production, Brit. air strength, German counter-offensive effect, Soviet raw materials production.
Petterson-Günther. Brit. plane production, USAAF strength, US 14th Army and new Aachen-Köln offensive, gliders in G.B.
(7) (18 January 2023)
Quite debatable, but after some thoughts, I would, nevertheless, like to deal with the next document copy:
KV 2/146-1, page 73a (minute 181a)
Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer) case.
36/1931(running serial number)/26.1.45.
1. No. 487. When was the last meeting of the 1922 Committee (20 or XX Committee?)
2. No. 490. Did an aircraft with courier arrive in Sweden on 26.12.44 (apparently point at an aircraft crew under way to Kurland (Curland) did land in Sweden)
3. No. 494. Is Haifish (Harfish) in V.I. index.
4. No. 507. I saw in the paper that Karl Norden (?) was likely to undergo trial in the U.S. for activities prejudicial to the United Nations.
5. No. 509. This is odd as Günther is under arrest.
6. No. 516. What is Air Marshal Groom's job? Which neutral Attachés has he seen 1944? Is he a friend of Turner's.
7. No. 518. Is it known if the Swedes and Czechs in London are on good terms?
8. No. 522. (Refer to 516). Can Groom remember with whom he has discussed the question of Gliders in accordance with this message?
9. No. 537. The Norwegian Air Attaché is obviously not the source of this information but he is possibly in touch with the source. Did group Captain Gillam have such a conversation with the Norwegian Air Attaché? If so when?
- - -
10. Portugal Information from KOPortugal was quite often conveyed by wireless means; and therefore considered in the Isk serials.
11. Information in our possession shows that Krämer (Kraemer) landed at Zürich on 30.4.43.
12. A further report was received showing that he arrived Zürich on 8.8.43 and stayed at the Hotel Baur am See (Baur an Lac) (this Hotel still exists).
AOB: next no list of successive queries, but more an abridgement and/or summary
KV 2/146-1, page 74b
13. 36/3428/5.2.44 (AOB: these messages concerning 1944 most like were accessed by Section V in Stockholm by means of "borrowed" (H1007 H1007return) copying and returning in Kraemer's private safe at his own residence) Reports that Krämer (Kraemer) returned from Berlin (almost all his flights were maintained by regular Airline flights) on 1.2.44 having visited Switzerland and Hungary (de facto, he was a regular Diplomat).
14. 35/2635/21.12.43. Shows that Krämer had in his possession 30,000 Sw. Kr.; 15000 US dollars, 10,000 Swiss francs. (Dec. 44 19,000 Swiss francs)
- - - -
15. Krämer arrived at Malmö on 23.11.43 travelling from Paris (by train and ferry, or airline?)
- - - -
16. Has Kliemann (KV 2/278, PF 600252) been interrogated about his knowledge of Krämer (Kraemer)?
- - - -
17. 36/3491/9.2.44. Reports a meeting between Krämer (Kraemer) and Hans Schäfer on 5.6.44 at which Krämer (Kraemer) made the following remarks:
"I know the British are trying to make the Swedes got rid of me. (see reference KV 2/145-2, page 64: (J1009 J1009return).
I don't mind as I have very good friends in the Swedish Foreign Office.
- - -
18. Has 36920 found anything against Sundgren?
- - -
In view of the Swiss connection 36700 must investigate at once background of Harry Willstandt, Swiss national, born Geneva (Genève) 2.5.04. It is worth remarking that this individual, while at Uppsala, worked with a Professor R. Barany, presumably Hungarian national.
- - -
Could the leakage in Sweden by Reinhold Frederik Rundbeck (Grundböck?) (Treasure case) (KV 2/464 ...466; Nathalie Gergueiew, FR, PF 65917) ?
- - -
21. Where is Lord Forbes?
- - -
As regards the French leakage where is Nina Polignac? (CX/12736/28/V.S.6 (AOB: the latter serial constitutes the S.I.S. CX/ reference number dedicated to Karl Heinz Kraemer (Krämer)) 10.3.44 refers) Can you take this up again?
KV 2/146-1, page 75c
Reports that von Bentheim (AOB: a note in my dbase: The man in charge of radio communication for the Abw. I in Spain was Oblt. Von Bahrfeld, alias von Bentheim who came to Madrid at the beginning of 1942) applied for a visa for Finland and it was refused by the Finish Attaché (Military)
- - -
Makes a mention of Eisberg (= Switzerland).
25. Will V.S.6 discuss with 21901 Finnish national Aari?
- - -
Reports that subject (Kraemer) was visited by Dr. Schmidt Gyulane of Budapest. Report also states that a visiting card with the address 32 Rue de Moscow, Paris 8e was found in Krämer's (Kraemer's) possession. ("borrowed" from Kraemer's private safe in his own residence; notice: (K1010 K1010return)
Ask VB (VB is section of S.I.S. and/or the one whom is concerned with keeping Kraemer's file) about addresses. If a report has been received from our representative (Section V, Peter Falk in Stockholm?) on this address: Kraemer's at (Stora Essingen Essingenstråket 39?) ( My minute of 26.7.44 refers) (reference to minute 180a, is pointing at KV 2/146-1, page 1a)
In Switzerland Krämer (Kraemer) is known to have stayed with Hans Daufeld (KV 2/141 ...143; PF 45727, born 20.1.1908) who at the end of 1943 was a prominent figure in the section of (R.S.H.A.) Amt VI dealing with the U.K. At the time the following comment was made on Daufeld's work: He had no source in the U.K. but made up his reports from the newspaper.
KV 2/146-1, page 76 (minute 180a)
You may care to see this appreciation of J.M.A. (Japanese Military Attaché Onodera) "K" (Kraemer) intelligence. Paragraph Four, relating to aircraft production and Air Force matters seems to me the best illicit intelligence derived by the enemy from this country, which I have seen in this office (M.I.5).
A.D.B. 5.2.45 Sgd. Herbert L.A. Hart.
KV 2/146-2, page 1 (minute 180a)
J.M.A. "K" Intelligence.
1. Since July 27th 1944 at least and probably since a much earlier date the Japanese Military Attaché in Stockholm has transmitted to Tokio (Tokyo) at irregular but frequent intervals, messages under the heading of "K" Intelligence (K = Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer) (Please notice also: (L1011 L1011return), relating chiefly to the organisation and movements of British and American Air forces, especially in the U.K. and the European Theatre, and to British and American aircraft production. This information is supplied to the Japanese in Stockholm by a German Intelligence officer (incorrect, Kraemer was a diplomat; by the way: his military rank was only Lieutenant!), Legation Sekretär (Military Attaché is someone whom is accredited) Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer , who is denoted by the letter "K". Krämer is, and has been for some time, head of the Abwehr I Luft in Stockholm and is a German Intelligence Officer of importance and standing, of whom we have known from several sources. His particular sphere of work, for which he has obtained considerable credit, is British and U.S. Air Forces and aircraft production intelligence, and since at least the summer of 1943 he has purported to get information on these matters from secret agents in the U.K. We have in fact obtained, from both PAIR sources and S.I.S. ordinary channels (Section V in Stockholm), a number of reports since the summer of 1943 (M1012 M1012return), stated to have been produced by these secret agents, two whom go by the names of Josephine and Hektor (AOB: Josephine and Hektor both are no individuals as the British Services suspected, but only an indication as to what kind of source it had been obtained from). These reports were almost without exception either so vague that it was impossible to determine whether in fact, they were completely and even ludicrously untrue, with the result that we reached the conclusion that the agents alleged to produce them did not in fact exist, but after the familiar Abwehr model their reports were invented? in Stockholm before transmission to Germany. (AOB: Kraemer's messages, as he was employed as a Diplomat, by the German Foreign Ministry (A.A.); being a Military Attaché, all communications from and toward were accomplished by the regular telex (Fernschreib) services of the German Legation in Stockholm. All went via postal cable-trunks crossing the Baltic Sea via the Isle of Rügen towards Berlin. Be it, that the Abwehr and later R.S.H.A. Amt VI /Amt Mil operated via coding telex (Geheimschreiber) provisions, some of which were of the unbreakable Siemens type SFM T43! Operating true one-time-path techniques via two punch-tapes (mixing); which succeeded the Lorenz type SZ 40/42 and thus the Colossus system by far) In addition to the reports produced by Kraemer's alleged secret agents in the U.K. we have also obtained through S.I.S. a number of questionnaires sent by Berlin to Kraemer, on obtaining answers to which his agents were to be employed. These questionnaires made it clear that either Kraemer's secret agents besides ???, whose reports we have never seen (Kraemer likely conveyed delicate reports when using his frequent flights; and as a Diplomat is wasn't searched at Stockholm Airport Bromma), was in November 1943 believed by the German to be able to make enquiring in England at Metropolitan Vickers, to make observations at factory aerodromes in the U.K. including ??ford and at the M.A.P. Dark? at Hullavington? The only hint ever obtained by us as to the identity of these secret agents was in a message from Stockholm to Berlin stating that Kraemer refused to disclose to his masters the identity of the secret agent concerned, but had stated that he was in an official position in the M.A.P., of Irish originate? related to "Minister of Law", and worked on U.S. and British supplies to Russia. We were unable to identify any individual fitting these particulars and accordingly the conclusion which we had reached as a result of the ???? and often complete falsity of the agent's reports to be strengthened.
2. With one or two exceptions where the source explicitly stated to be a secret agent in England, the J.M.A. "K" intelligence is of a very different character from that of the reports attributed to Kraemer's secret agents, Josephine, Hektor, ?? Not only, as will be seen below, is an appreciable portion of the information obtained in the "K" ??? relating to Air Force and aircraft production matters true, but even when they are false, as they frequently are, especially in relation to military matters, they are categorical and specific, and entirely different both in style and content from secret agents messages??
It will be convenient? here to indicate is general terms the distribution among the various topics of the "K" messages. The great majority relate to British Air Force and Aircraft production matters. Next in quantity are messages relating to U.S. Air Force, primarily in →
KV 2/146-2, page 2b (Z1032 ↓↓↓↓ Z1032return)
the U.K. and the European Theatre of War, and to U.S. aircraft production. Third in quality are messages relating to British military matters, especially movements and composition of airborne divisions. Fourth come composition and movements of the American divisions in the U.K. and the European Theatre. Fifth, Naval matters, including one accurate message about the squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm. Lastly, alleged British estimates of Russian industrial production and some vague information of a political character, e.g. concerning the Quebec and Teheran Conferences.
In point of quality, the messages relating to the British Air Force and aircraft production are easily the highest, and as is shown below, contain at least some information of importance as well as accuracy. We have unfortunately been unable to obtain any check on the veracity of many of the reports relating to American aircraft production, but apart from these and one or two reports on Naval matters, the level of accuracy of the other messages is very low, and certainly in some cases, e.g. those containing alleged but in fact non-existent British estimates of Russian production, must have been consciously invented either by Kraemer himself or some source from whom he obtained them.
- - -
4. Messages Relating to British and American Air Force and Aircraft Production.
- - -
These are the most accurate of the series, and the most important of them, together with the best appreciation we can obtain of their veracity are set out as follows:-
For simplicity I would like to suggest to you please read the content and the according Appreciations yourself.
Would you please mind to do the same for the next page, as the layout in html is merely impossible for all various operating systems in use.
KV 2/146-2, page 3c
KV 2/146-2, page 4d
AOB: I am quite astonished what Kraemer did obtain and I suppose:
that in peace time - a serious journalist of a "broad sheet" newspaper, will not do (perform) much better even in the cases of civil occurrences.
I would like so focus my attention onto another kind of aspect of our rather vivid history.
KV 2/146-2, page 15 (minute 177a)
On behalf of S.I.S. CX/12736/28/V.S.6 dated 31st January, 1945.
Reference my previous correspondence concerning Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer), you will remember that Harald Swallving, Goods Transport Chief for A.B.A., was reported as one of Krämer's (Kraemer's) contacts. This has now been definitely established and the method of contact is as follows,
Krämer (Kraemer) telephones from a public call box (Telefonzelle) to Swallvings's office, he then drives his car to Birger Jarlsgatan (where the office is) and leaves his car some distance away and then walks to the office. By this time Swallving is outside on the pavement ready to meet him. Four such meetings have been observed since Christmas and Swallving has been seen to slip a piece of paper into Krämer's hand while Krämer (Kraemer) passes money over to Swallving.
It is believed that Swallving, in addition to his supplying lists of passengers and freight carried by Swedish and British aircraft, is also possibly a link in a chain of communication from Great Britain.
Unfortunately searching enquiries were made of Swallving to Bertil Florman. If, therefore, as is suspected, Bertil Florman is a German agent Swallving is blown.
An interesting side-light on this source is that Swallving's daughter is reported be living with Nina Siemsen, Krämer's (Kraemer's) secretary.
You may be interested to know that just before Christmas Krämer (Kraemer) received Kr. 19,000 and that on the 27th of December, 1944, he asked Berlin for 30,000 Swedish Kr., 3,000 U.S. dollars, £300 or 3,000 (it is not clear which) in clean £5 notes, 3,000 Swiss francs, and last but not least ten bottles of whisky.
Will you please let Stopford see the above report on Swallving?
Herbert L.A. Hart, Esq., M.I.5.
KV 2/146-2, page 35 (minute 169a)
SF.84/Japan/2/B.1.b. (= M.I.5)/AFB
19th January 1945.
Dear Marsden Smedley,
I have taken over from Courtenay Young the business of examining the series known to us as J.M.A.s to see if they do in fact afford evidence of a serious leakage from this country, and we are in the process of obtaining appreciations or the veracity of the various reports which appear to originate in this country. I should therefore, be very grateful if you could tell me whether two J.M.A.s (Japan Military Attaché Onodera) which appear to give British estimates on Russian production are true in any respect. The numbers are: JMA/MEW (Ministry of Economic Warfare)1976 of 13.11.44 and JMA/MEW/1824 of 1.1.45.
What I would like is whether there were any such British estimates were secret and how and among whom they were distributed here. As you have probably noticed the investigation described in JMA/MEW/1676, paragraph 2, must from internal evidence, have been made after August 1944, and before the 26th October 1944. Unless the whole thing is imaginary, this conveniently narrows the field, and I should be very grateful if you could give me your views on these two J.M.A.s.
certainly some of the intelligence about Air Force matters which have passed through this particular series has been sufficiently accurate to disturb us.
Herbert L.A. Hart
B.Marsden Smedley Esq.
KV 2/146-2, page 39a + 40b (minute 167a)
Please digest the foregoing (first) document yourself
Ops. Captain S.G. Watts.
Attached is a schedule of information which we know from Top Secret Sources to have reached the Germans and Japanese in Stockholm. We have seen enough from this particular to make think that certain genuine information is leaking from this country, and I would be grateful if you could help us further to assess this source by:
(a) Obtaining appreciations of the veracity of the attached (see above) statements.
(b) By indication what degree of secrecy is attached to the information if it is true.
(c) By indisc??? if the information should have been confined to a small circle, who the person ??? to know it are.
B.1.b. (M.I.5) 19.1.45 Herbert L.A. Hart
KV 2/146-2, page 44a + 45b (minute 165a)
18th January 1945.
This is to thank you for your letter of 10.1.45 to Antony Blunt with its enclosed comment slips. These veracity checks have proved very valuable to me (Herbert Hart) as I have just been put on to the task of forming as estimate of the significance, if any, of the apparent leakages of information from this country appearing in the J.M.A. series.
For the moment I am confining myself to the "K" (Kraemer) Intelligence is the most important and accurate of any, but we cannot come to any conclusion here until some past messages in this series have been checked. A good many of these hitherto unchecked messages concern the the Air Ministry, and I would be very grateful if you could do your best to get a appreciation of them. I attach a schedule setting out the statements whose truth or otherwise we should like to have appreciated in a form which does not show the nature of our source, though I have added the number of the relevant J.M.A. for reference in each case. Some of these statements, I imagine, can be fairly easily checked, but others may be difficult. If at the same time you could tell me, not only if the statement is true or otherwise, but in cases where it is true, the degree of secrecy attached to the statement, and whether the knowledge of it be confined to a small or relatively large number of persons.
Hitherto it certainly looked as if the "K" Intelligence concerning this country may have originated from the Swedish Air Attaché. and we have had it from many sources that Krämer (Kraemer) in Stockholm get his information from one of the other of the Swedish official departments, which would be consistent with the Swedish Air Attaché being the originator of the source. We cannot, however, come to any final conclusion of this until a much greater portion of the "K" messages has been checked than has hitherto been done. We therefore attach great importance to the checking of the rest of this series.
Herbert L.A. Hart
Flight Lieut. C. Cholmondeley (Air Ministry A.I.S.4)
KV 2/146-2, page 47 (minute 164a)
S.I.S. CX/12736/28/V.S.6. dated 16th January, 1945
Reference our previous correspondence Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer), attached are a further list of telegrams obtained in this usual way. (AOB: since January 1945 S.I.S. Section V bribed two men employed in the telex (Fernschreib) Office in the German Legation; a Czech and someone else provided Section V with telegram copies)
Reference telegram B, the name Pettersson is new to us and so far we have no idea who this might be. It is interesting to see Josephine crop up again. Both Eisberg (= Switzerland) and "Quelle 27" are new sources and it is interesting to note here, and in telegram H, that Krämer (Kraemer) seems to be framing a new set up of sources indicated by numbers.
Message L is rather odd and we have not yet been able to identify D. Clinger. It is not a telegram, but was written in the manuscript and was lying amongst the telegram. (This latter situation is referring to the "borrowing" of papers stored in Kraemer's private safe in his own residence. The maid of the Kraemer household and a friend facilitated Section V to copy documents for the time being the Kraemer's weren't at home (N1014 N1014return).
I shall be grateful for any comments you may have on this material.
as S.I.S practise no signature being visible
Herbert L.A. Hart, Esq., M.I.5.
KV 2/146-2, page 51 (minute 162a)
It is learned from (AOB:
I suppose S.I.S.)
sources of 29.12.44 that Major Caslavka reported that various Germans have been
expelled from Sweden, and that it is expected that Dr.
will also be expelled (AOB:
remember that he left somewhere in March or April 1945)
It is also expected (in
will be got rid of. (wishful
was an accredited Diplomat)
The source of information is to be found with the Swedish Military Attaché in
B.1.b. / AFB A.F. Blunt.
KV 2/146-2, page 52 (minute 162a?)
It is learned from (Swedish
Military Attaché in London?)
of 21.12.44 that
reported that Major Wenzlau and
both belong to the German S.D.
Wenzlau arrived in Stockholm on 1.11.44 and has replaced Busch.
B.1.b./AFB 13.1.45 Sgd. (Major) A.F. Blunt.
(8) (21 January 2023)
KV 2/146-3, page 3 + 4b (minute 149a)
S.I.S. CX/12736/28/V.S.6 dated 1st December, 1944
With reference to previous correspondence concerning Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer) I am enclosing the latest batch messages obtained from the usual source. ("borrowed" from Kraemer's private flat/residence) (notice: P1015 P1015return) After an interval of some three months it is interesting to find that Kraemer apparently, is as active as ever.
Telegram C. Sour 24 (Kraemer's designation) is quite new to us and considering the difference in the style of the symbol it is possible that this source, whether notionally or otherwise, is in Sweden and not in England.
Telegram H. This is of interest as part I is, I think, the first record we have had where Krämer's (Kraemer's) information has been found to be inaccurate. He also appears to have slipped up on the the information referred to in telegram D. Part B of telegram H is the first indication we have that Krämer (Kraemer) is interested in Eastern front and the particular piece of information given seems very much like coming from a source in the Swedish Air ministry.
Telegram I. This warrants careful investigation I think and I should be interested to know where "Seald Camp" is.
Telegram J. The Vöszköndy (Hungarian), the Hungarian Military Attaché in Stockholm. (Kraemer possessed good contact with Hungarian Services, also with the Fullep (Fullop) source actually was Hungarian organised and favoured Kraemer quite much) The context seems to suggest that III - F (German counter espionage) in Berlin in Berlin considers Vöczköndy unreliable. He was hitherto been regarded as strongly pro-German. Bagyoni (KV 2/3646, PF603873) is also Hungarian and has hitherto claimed to be pro-British and pro-American. Since Krämer (Kraemer), however, is used as a channel from Budapest to Bagyoni it seems pretty certain that he is a German agent.
Telegram K. This gives some indication how Hektor (one of Kraemer's designated kind of source) works. Apparently he is not in a position to get his information himself and has to use a cut-out.
It is very interesting to not that Krämer (Kraemer) has apparently given his H.Q. full particulars about this source in England, as this appears to make the possibility of invention fairly remote. I shall be most interested to hear your comments on the attached.
Name not visible
Herbert L.A. Hart, Esq., M.I.5.
KV 2/146-3, page 5a (minute 147a)
"K" Intelligence Reports.
The first "K" Intelligence received by us (originating from the US as they could decrypt the Japanese J25 code, and while British interest had been involved, they got also copies of these copies) is dated 27.7.44, and some thirty of these reports have been received. The majority of them give no indication as to their source. They are simply sent off from Stockholm to Tokyo. They mostly deal with Air Force matters, such as specifications of various planes, aircraft production, details regarding various commands, etc.
In two cases the source of the reports are given as a secret agent in England The first of these dated 7.8.44 stated that, according to a report from the secret agent in Great Britain, the number of the aircraft carriers at present possessed (27th July 1944) by 58th Task Force was 22, and it was equipped with 1,180 carrier born aircraft. (J.M.A. (Japan Military Attaché; Onodera) No. 747 of 7.8.44)/ In fact, the 58th Task Force has 13 carriers. The Admiralty state that the total number of U.S. aircraft carriers was 22, but that this latter figure must have been known to the Japanese more or less as the U.S. Government publishes all their launchings and all their losses, and that the Admiralty did not consider that this was a serious leakage. The other report quoting an agent in this country is dated 26.10.44 giving as its source a report from an agent in London in the first ten days of September (1944), stating that American deliveries of armaments to Russia had recently decreased sharply because of the sudden increase in the requirements of American forces and also because of internal political developments. It also stated that British deliveries of armament to Russia had dropped sharply from September mainly for political reasons. (J.M.A. 8604 unnumbered of 26.10.44). This report is entirely untrue, and indeed the opposite is the case. It is perhaps interesting to compare this message with a message sent by the Turkish Naval Attaché in London on 7.11.44, where he stated that he had received news that the transport of supplies to the Soviet Union from England had been stopped for the past 2½ months. He states he had heard this news two months before and it had so far been confirmed by three different persons. (B.J. (Blue Jacket) 138202 No. 263 of 7.11.44) It is possible to read any significance in the similarity of these two messages, but it is at least a curious coincidence.
Apart from the Air Force matters mentioned above, these reports give information regarding the strength of the 21st Army Group in July, and the statement that the main force of the 9th T.A.F. and the British 83rd Fighter group had gone to Normandy. (J.M.A. 7465 No. 740 of 28.7.44). In fact the information in this message had been passed to the Germans through various controlled channels with the exception of the mention of the 83rd Fighter Group. Regarding the 9th T.A.F. one source mentioned the 2nd T.A.F. and the 9th U.S. Air Force so that it is possible that there was some confusion if and when the report was passed on to the Japanese.
On 1.8.44 "K" Intelligence reported that the result of V.1 had become known by 27.6.42. The correct information contained therein had been published in the Press and a statement that the Diplomatic Corps had moved to the suburbs was, of course, untrue (J.M.A. 7837 No. 742 of 1.8.44).
There is mention in August of a source, presumably in India. It is stated that in the beginning of July "K" agent frequently met officers and men attached to the Indian 3rd Airborne Division somewhere in India. This report stated that the Indian 3rd Airborne Division was in support at the Burma front and that the British 7th Airborne Division had completed its organisation and equipment in Britain and it was expected to be transported shortly to India for operation in Burma and Sumatra. (J.M.A. 7552 No. 748 of 9.8.44).
Another report regarding Airborne troops was dated at the end →
KV 2/146-3, page 6b
of August and stated that the 1st Airborne Army in Britain consisted of a nucleus of 7 Airborn Divisions (5 American and 2 British) and that 5 American Division included the 1st and the 21st (notional division within Operation Fortitude II) which arrived in Britain from America in July. It also stated that the American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were under the command of the 1st Army, but were at present receiving replacements in Greta Britain and would probably be employed in France in the last days of September. (J.M.A. 8164 No 799 of 29.8.44) In fact the the statement regarding the composition of the 1st Airborne Army is about 75% overestimate of strength and the 1st end 21st U.S. Divisions did not exist in the European theatre. The 82nd and 101st U.S. Airborne Divisions were not under the command of the 1st Army and were employed on the Dutch front roughly in the period given. They were dropped at Nijmegen and Eindhoven as part of the 1st Airborne Group on 17.9.44.
"K" did not content himself only with the Air Force and Airborne matters, but has given information regarding the Quebec and Teheran conference (J.M.A. 8255 No. 55 of 16.9.44 and J.MA. 7992 No. 58 of 16.9.44 and J.M.A. No.63 of 23.9.44)
At the beginning of October "K" rather contradicted his earlier message regarding the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions as a report states that the following British and American Divisions had appeared on the Dutch front up to 28.9.44: the 1st British (destroyed); part of the 2nd British; and the 83rd American; part of the 11th American; the 101st American and part of the 1st Polish.
It also stated that there were still in England the 21st American (notional division in Fortitude II) the 82nd and the and 11th American (notional division in the Plan Fortitude) and part of the 2nd, 5th and 6th British. (J.M.A. 8251 No. 86 of 2.10.44) In fact the 82nd and 101st U.S. Airborne Divisions were in Holland, the remnants of the British 1st and Polish brigade were in the process of being returned to the U.K. (those not captured by the Germans!), where the 6th British were re-forming, and the rest of the message is invention.
In October also "K" gave a report regarding the number of men and women in the American Forces, giving as its source "an announcement of the American National Defence Ministry" (J.M.A,. 8239 No. 015 of 12.10.44).
In October "K" reported that the R.A.F.; were equipping Mosquito aircraft as torpedo-bombers, and might be using them in the Far East from December 1944. (J.M.A. 8645 No. 122 of 14.10.44). Later "K" also reported that the Mosquito would be used as a torpedo-bomber in the European fighting from December 1944, or January 1945, and was expected to be in use in the Far East by April, 1945. (J.M.A. 8811 No. 152 of 4.11.44)
It is understood that this message comes unpleasantly close to the truth, and that the true position is an extremely guarded secret. D Division in Kandy authorised a special agent to state that Mosquitos were being adopted for use on aircraft carriers. It is possible that there is a connection between this information as supplied by D Division and the "K" reports, though the connection is indeed rather remote, though it should be remembered that "K" claimed on one occasion to have a source in India.
"K" also provided information regarding FUSAG. (notional existence) (J.M.A. 8514 No. 125 of 18.10.44 and J.M.A. 8571 No. 136 of 25.10.44) A message of the same date gives the serial numbers of Barrage Balloon Groups stationed in Great Britain as from 30 to 34, and the serial numbers of the Squadrons as from 900 to 999. It added that of these the 34th Group had recently been sent to India. (J.M.A. 8607 No 137 of 25.10.44) The numbers of the Balloon Groups is correct, save that Groups 33 and 34 were disbanded sometime ago, and that the serial numbers of the Squadrons is also correct. The statement that the 34th Group had gone overseas is, however, →
KV 2/146-3, page 7c
On the same date "K" also supplied the serial numbers of the British Parachute Battalions as from 1 to 13, 15 and 16, with three battalions to a Brigade. The serial numbers of the brigades, so far identified, were serial numbers 1 and 2 of the 1st Airborne Division and 4 and ?5 of the 6th Airborne Division, and 3 of the 2nd Airborne Division. (J.M.A. 8720 No. 135 of 25.10.44) 1 to 13 as the serial numbers of the Parachute Battalions to a Brigade. In fact, the 1st and 4th Brigades were in the 1st Airborne Division, 3rd and 5th brigade in the 6th Airborne, and there is no 2nd Airborne Division. though there is the 2nd Independent Brigade.
The next day "K" reported that the R.A.F. had decided to equip the Mosquito with the new Napier Sabre engine and also that the 1st Canadian Parachute regiment was used in Holland and suffered devastating losses and the 2nd was in process of being formed in the U.K. (J.M.A. 8644 No. 143 of 26.10.44) It is true that the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion was in the 6th Airborne Division. The information of the 2nd Battalion was discussed, but it is understood that no action was taken. On the same day "K" broke new ground by giving figures for Russian metal production (J.M.A. 8826 No. 144 of 26.10.44)
It will be seen that the majority of the "K" reports have a strong Air flavour about them whether they report upon straight Air Force matters or on operations in Europe or Far East. In fact it can be said that the only times "K" leaves Air matters is in his messages regarding the Teheran and Quebec Conferences, and his report on Russian metal production. From a study of the messages it is impossible to deduce anything as regards the source of these reports, and unfortunately so far, in most cases, the Air Ministry has not given us their comments upon the vast majority of the material which, of course, directly concerns them. In other cases the report would appear to be more accurate than the general run of the Military Attaché's in Stockholm other reports, though the information supplied by the alleged secret agent is England is not up to this standard. From a study of the dates of transmission of these (German/Japanese) messages it appears that recently they have been arriving in bunches, i.e. there were seven reports sent of between 12.10.44 and 14.10.44 and eight between 18.10.44 and 26.10.44. It might be deduced from this that the Military Attaché's information reached him periodically and in bulk. As in all cases of leakage on Air Force matters, one is tempted to assume that the organisator of such reports is the Swedish Air Attaché, Major Cervell, though apart from the place of origin of the material, there is no other evidence, so far, to connect the "K" reports with such material as we receive from Major Cervell.
B.1.b./CTY. 18.11.44 Courtenay Young
KV 2/146-3, page 8a (minute 146a)
To Captain Courtenay Young
From: Lieut. Cdr. Montagu, R.N.V.R. M.I.5.
A copy of a note that I have given to A.D.N.I. (S), D.D.N.I., and D.N.I., about J.M.A. 8857.
Sgd. Euan Montagu
Lieut, Commander, R.N.V.R.
KV 2/146-3, page 9b
The Japanese Military Attaché in Stockholm.
The Japanese Military Attaché (General Onodera) in Stockholm reported, on the 14th October, about the numbers of the Fleet Air Arm Squadrons. According to him these come from "K" Intelligence (which he had previously explained as being from agents in London or India). This is the same source as that from which he obtained the information about Mosquitoes.
2 A check of his report against the C.A.F.O. giving a list of Fleet Air Arm Squadron numbers is attached.
It will be seen that the Attaché is not completely accurate, but he is extremely near the knuckle on the Squadrons that he has given.
KV 2/146-3, page 3
The following shows a comparison between information sent from the Japanese Military Attaché (Onodera) in Stockholm to Tokyo on the 14th October, 1944 (J.M.A. 8857), which he described as "K" Intelligence, and C.A.F.O. 1235/43
Please compare and digest the information yourself.
Original filed in "K" Reports (this current file series)
KV 2/146-3, page 11 (minute 145a)
S.I.S. CX/12736/28/V.S.6. dated 12/ 11/44
Dear Mrs. Spring,
Reference your letter P.F. 66365/B.1.B/D.S. dated 10th October, 1944.
Many thanks for your information on Frl. Kling. It fairly clearly establishes her identity, and the Kordt mentioned is presumably Dr. Erich Kordt 1st secretary to Ribbentrop, and would thus explain her boast that it was she who typed the declaration of war. She probably wishes she hadn't, and I am not sure it does not warrant her inclusion in the War Criminals List!
name not visible
Mrs. D. Spring, M.I.5.
KV 2/146-3, page 12 (minute 144a)
PF 66365/B.1.b./DSpring (M.I.5) 10th October
Dear (name made invisible as usual S.I.S. practice)
With reference to your CX/12736/28/V.S.6. of 26th September 1944, I am afraid the only trace we have for Frl. Kling and that is not possible to identify is the following extract from a telephone check on the N.S.D.A.P. headquarters in London, dated 30.11.38:-
"Outgoing to Frl. Stern, Embassy, asking if they have a Frl. Kling there. Yes, she is Kordt's secretary. She has not paid her Party subscription".
Mrs. D. Spring
KV 2/146 series
Please continue with Chapter 9
To be continued in due course
By Arthur O. Bauer