CQ des DASD
Mai 1943 - September 1944 + November 1944
Status: 24 November 2014
Before putting this 'genuine document' on the web, I have had to consider all the pro- and cons whether it is appropriate to add such periodical copy onto our website.
However, this document is showing how the amateur spirit survived even during these bleak wartime days.
About the mid 1990s, there was reflected, particularly from the American side, the opinion that Nazi Germany did not have had licensed HAM stations. And, that they consequently suffered a severe lack of communication- and electronic educated generation of engineers and technicians.
This actually wasn't the true state of affairs.
Doubtless, there indeed existed licensed HAM spirit. Albeit, that their license numbers had been kept limited. On the other hand a group of about 7000 à 7500 dedicated DE amateurs existed. Who were trained in CW communications and had to qualify for their DE certification. Like in most countries, they had to built their on rigs, maybe not that much in the US; but elsewhere it certainly was common practise. In their Club stations they also came in touch with HAM practise.
In a final report (HW 34-2) on German wartime Abwehr wireless, R.S.S. in Britain recognised that during these days quite many Abwehr W/T operators, as well as their counter parts on the directing side, must have had an radio amateur background; because of their frequent usage of HAM like operational practice (think of abridgements). Albeit, that Staritz told me, this wasn't always appreciated (liked) by their superiors; it nevertheless, maintained their daily practise, when possible.
During wartime days, there existed a lively HAM activity in Germany. Just over 180 active HAM stations got a: Kriegsfunkgenehmigung accompanied by a group of licensed DE stations.
Whatever the foregoing considerations, please bear also in mind, that the general population (public) within German controlled territories risked capital punishment when they listened to a foreign broadcast station on the blacklist of the German government.
Nevertheless, the licensed DE receiving stations were quite free to built their own gear, as well as to operate it on all amateur bands! Who noticed their off-band listening?
In those days, those who got a HAM license, had to encounter far less barriers than had their colleagues in pre-war times.
Was it all without an obligation?
Yes, and No.
But, none political pressure was involved!
However:
we will see that one of their main obligations was to join, when possible, the Rundspruch-Funkplan as well as the NWF-Sendeplan. Not attending wasn't a capital offensive, but might, on the long run, leading to the rejection of their DE permit. This will not imply, that they should be active listeners or HAMs the whole day.
But, let us first consider the astonishing changing attitude (mood) against those inspired by HAM spirit.
In a directive of: Ministrialblatt des Reichs- und Preußischen Ministeriums des Innern, Jahr 1942*
*Our document (volume) originates from the library of this 'Ministry of Internal Affairs'!
Text: Amateurfunkwesen (DASD)
RdErl. d. RF SS u ChdDtPol. im RMdI v. 25.3.1942 - O-kDO g4 (N3a) Nr. 100/42, Nr. 24
Der RdErl. V. 30.6.1941 (MBliV. S. 1226) wird durch folgende Bestimmungen ergänzt:
An die Pol.-Behörden -MBlV S. 627 (this is the actual page number)
To view the copy of this original document, click at the 'high lighted' text sections
Before the war, personnel engaged in military- and/or secret-service were not entitled to possess a HAM license. This restriction had been lifted during wartime days.
Therefore we can find Hannes Bauer D 4arr on the HAM list of 1941, whereas his name failes within the HAM list of 1937
By the way, this legal restriction was also maintained during most of the (former) DDR days, where military (intelligence?) personnel, with some minor exceptions, were prohibited from obtaining (possessing) a HAM license. Yesterday a former 'Y2' license holder told me during evening dinner:- that some restrictions had been lifted about 1988.
Therefore, in my perception, weighting all the ethic pro and cons, the balance turns into the green sector.
What were the German motivations, as to allow HAM communications during the war, whilst in most other countries it had been strictly banned?
Those in the possession of a wartime HAM- and receiver (DE) license, were, more or less, obliged to hand-in, regularly as possible, reception logs. These had to be mailed onto a central address.
These intercept reports possessed quite a value, as it provided a good source for propagation forecast; called in Germany Funkwettervorhersage.
These reports were then emulated into charts. The applicants were, of course, mainly military- or semi-military services.
Quite curious: German HAMs could operate their equipment up to the day of Germany's ultimate surrender, in May 1945, at will! For some time German HAM communicated with US HAMs; albeit, that successively this had be discouraged.
For those interested in this subject, please re-consider also our foregoing contribution:
I therefore strongly believe, that from the historical point of view it indeed does make sense taking notice of the periodical amateur wireless practice.
Please neglect or skip the few passages with a political content.
Before continuing this survey, I would like to explain a curious detail:
Please bear in mind, that in those days communication receivers were rather expensive devices and could be obtained by 'a happy few' only!
Most receivers were therefore 'home brew' with all accompanied downsides; especially in respect to frequency calibrations.
It therefore didn't make sense to give the accurate frequency for communication purposes, like is possible nowadays (often within 0.1 Hz). They provided so-called 'channel numbers' which pointed at a particular, quite small, band-segment.
Generally used was, on 80 metres, 'Kanal 14' which represented the frequency spectrum of 3565 to 3570 kHz.
The 'arc' scale points at a DASD receiver concept accompanied with a DASD tuning- knob and scale.
In my perception. the next reproduced CQ page shows us what kind of HAM communications being dealt with.
'Sendeplan' means transmitting-schedule
I must admit, that I don't know where the abbreviation 'NWF' once stood for.
On 23 November, I received a phone call from Rudolf Staritz in which he referred to various subjects, among it on the meaning of NWF: According him this was special DASD service, where HAM could call NWF listed HAM stations and then they were told what their exact frequency currently is. We suppose that these HAM stations had the provision of special R&S or Telefunken gear.
It is quite evident, that a quite rigid time schedule had to be maintained. Particularly, for the HAM operators 'on duty'.
Rundspruch-Funkplan, in my understanding, stood for a station calling (I suppose) CQ. Such action was calling another HAM station (or stations).
Not only HAMs had to engage, but also the larger numbers of DE amateurs; who also responded by sending-in their reception logs to the special DASD centre. And, of course, forwarding their QSL Cards!
A curiosity of the German call-sign system was, that the last letter of a call-sign pointed at the region where one was registered (living) at.
For example:
A = East Prussia
B = Berlin
L = Thuringia (Thuringen)
G = vicinity of Breslau or upper Silesia
These letters were known as: Landesverbandkennummer
There were many more regions, but my knowledge of the rest is insufficient.
Staritz told me, that the 'Länder' indicators not necessarily correlated exactly to the 'province' (Länder) borders.
When a HAM moved from one province (Land) to another, only the last call-sign letter did change. Whether this would imply that the call-signs had been built of two characters only, I don't know yet. But hopingly someone will teach we afterwards how this system once genuinely had been accomplished.
There existed 'D 4 xxx' and 'D 3 xxx' call-sign series.
A rather often encountered call-sign was that of: D 4 hpg
Wilhelm Lengersdorff
The way of communication was entirely on the line of HAM practice. That there nevertheless, existed a spin-off, was due to the fact that the reception reports added to the general forecasting of 'Funkwetter'. The prediction of what wireless links had to be scheduled when- and at what frequency favourably. All those acquainted to HAM shortwave communications, know, that the utilisation of wave band changes often happens quite fast. Therefore good knowledge is (was) rather essential. These are phenomena of significance also valid for the rest of the world.
This knowledge was particularly essential for Abwehr (Secret service) as spies used often quite low operating transmission power, as to keep a low signal profile as long as possible. The Germans, sometimes, used set utilising on 3 W antenna power. Therefore, operational frequencies should be selected optimally; without forecasting 'Funkwetter' knowledge such systems never could have operated effectively. Don't forget:- that W/T agents were sent into enemy territory and the quartzes should be chosen appropriately also for future periods.
Ground waves, is a bit different matter, but ground wave communications does provide often only quite short range communications, but might be sometimes also inflicted.
Another fact of interest: the German HAMs operated on: 80 m - 40 m - 20 m and in the 10 m band. There existed a special license group permitted to operate on 10 metres only. Please consider the 1941 HAM license list; take then also notice of the separate list of 10 m licenses.
Followed by:
Finally:
This list represents only those DE stations who once did send-in their reception logs
The first figures representing the according personal 'DE number'.
DE Anwerter is indicating that this member is having to prove still that he can fulfil certain technical- and CW qualifications. However, every DE amateur have had to go through such a selection procedure.
/L stood for Thuringia (Thüringen)
/G stood for the region of Breslau (Ober-Schlesien)
Quoting further from a foregoing DASD page:
It were not only radio hams, though, also listening amateurs (SWLs) who were encouraged to send-in their logs. Before the war there were about 7000 à 7500 DASD listening stations active, of which Helmut Liebich was one of them, he entered in 1938 at an age of 15. His designation was: DEM6950/G (DEM means: Deutscher-Empfangsmeister; G = region of Breslau, since May 1945 Wroclaw in Poland).
However, my good friend Rudolf Staritz, although engaged in military service, did send-in once, in the middle of the war, his DE log and was quoted: Punktabrechnung der DE's für das 3. Vierteljahr 1943; Staritz's DE number was: 7093/L obtaining 430 Punkte
I suppose, that those obtaining quite higher number figures, weren't engaged in regular military service; more likely in a civilian profession, or being too old or unfit for (regular) military service.
Rudolf Staritz especially pointed that I should consider the contribution of Hans H. Plisch D4 ahq formerly OK 2 AK
According Staritz, he was engaged at the DASD Geschäftsstelle in Berlin.
Later he became engaged in the Havelinstitut, the RSHA Abwehr research institute.
Please consider Plisch's paper of June (Juni) 1943:
Über Empfangs- und Sende-Antennen
Rudolf Staritz pointed also my attention onto W. Wichmann's (in post war days DL1SD)contribution on: SOS in der Wüste, issued in January (Januar) 1944
He describes, with the obligatory lacking details, how their aircraft (He 111) (of KG200?) had to make an emergency landing due to lack of petrol. He was the wireless operator.
This actually was a bold Abwehr action against the French held Fort Lamy. They successfully attack a petrol dump.
Interesting: In HW 14-1448 report on behalf of British R.S.S. they knew that the Germans were looking for Michelin Maps from the area of 'Lake Tsjaad', but had no idea yet what they could expect. This latter aspect was encountered more often in those days! They knew quite much, but just on essential points drawing inaccurate conclusions.
However:-
they encountered problems with the wind direction therefore expanding their flighttime. They consequently just not reached their home destination; failing just over 100 km. But in the Sahara it isn't easy to survive long periods when you are not prepared for it.
After some time has past they suffered from water and of course the high temperatures. Because the engines weren't functioning properly due to insufficient petrol supply the Heinkel 111 made a crash landing. Also their radio suffered. However, in some way or another, they finally could make, on a rather primitive manner, contact to an Italian group. Who just on time could pick them up.
The story told, is that Wichmann ultimately managed to make contact with one of the onboard sets. Whether his story, in some minor details, is exaggerating? But the major facts are according the truth.
DASD CQ Mai 1943 - September 1944 + November 1944
Please notice also our foregoing web pages on this subject:
and
By Arthur O. Bauer
