

KV 2/410

Wilhelm Kuebart

Part I

This document concerns mainly the course of Ausland/Abwehr (military Intelligence) from about early 1943 up to 20 July 1944; the date of the assassination attempt on Hitler. We follow the line of history of Wilhelm Kuebart, who became unexpectedly engaged in this theatre.

Part I deals up to about spring 1944. Kuebart is, in my perception, the key figure to throw light on what occurred with Johann Jebsen. Because Hansen was sentenced to death and was executed cruelly on 8 September, 1944, at Plötsensee Prison near to Berlin.

I suppose this contribution is providing an inside vision of the way it once had been managed.

This document constitutes: what in my perception is relevant to be noticed (to be remembered)

My comments are always recognisable by the three colours used: Blue, Red and sometimes green

Please do not multiply it, as it still obeys to Crown Copyright.

Its purpose is for studying aspects of history.

My comments in this contribution are quite frequent, because for several years I have studied this subject rather comprehensively. Therefore, considerable background information being supplied, which nowhere else can be found.

<http://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-josephine.htm>

For practical reasons, I have divided this contribution into several sections.

By Arthur O. Bauer

PF 601, 833
W3
397

FILE CLOSED
HISTORICAL

KUEBART WILHELM.

FILE CLOSED 10324

See Also

Officer or Serial No.	Section	Date	Officer or Serial No.	Section	Date

PF601833/V1

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date
KV 2/410								

S. 1630 Edn. 2

K5
 B2/cass
 R
 S3/cass
 PA
 K10
 D6/F12
 D6/F12
 D6/F12
 RE
 RNS
 D6/F12
 RNS
 3/4/96

26 FEB 1909
 3 DEC 1977
 28 SEP 1978
 23 FEB 1979
 12 FEB 1993
 27 MAY 1995
 19 OCT 1995
 17 JAN 1998

HISTORICAL

sending this file to another Section.
S. Form 298d

S. Form 23b

Y FILE

THIS FILE WHEN IN TRANSIT
MUST BE IN A CLOSED
ENVELOPE, ADDRESSED PER-
SONALLY TO THE OFFICER.
HELD by R. 5 A

The file should be passed for P.A. to R.S.
Transit slips in respect of this file should always
be forwarded to R.S.

PF 601, 833

FILE CLOSED

KV 2/410
Wilhelm Kuebart
PF 601833

MINUTE SHEET.		Reference. P.F. 601,833
	1	
4.5.45	Cable from the field re arrested of KUEBART.	1a
	2	
4.5.45	Cable from the field re KUEBART.	2a
	3	
5.5.45	Cable from the field re identity of KUEBART.	3a
	4.	
7.5.45.	Cable from 3rd Army to PARIS re KUEBART.	4a
	5.	
10.5.45	Note to W.R.C.4. forwarding folder for KUEBARTH.	5a
	6.	
12.5.45	Extract from the New Yorker mentioning KUEBART.	6z
12.5.45.	To 12th Army Group - War Room Note on KUEBARTH. <u>Filed 7.9.45</u>	6a
13.5.45..	Outgoing telegram to 12th A.G. re KUEBARTH. <u>Filed 28.5.45.</u>	6b.
	7.	
18.5.45.	W.R.C.4.A. Note on KUEBARTH.	7a.
	8.	
20.5.45.	Cable to the Field re transfer of KUEBARTH to Camp 020.	8a.
20.5.45.	Secret Cross REF. to information held by R.B./L.	8b
21.5.45.	Copy of captured document - Anti allied resistance movement	9.
21.5.45.	From 12th A.G. enclosing preliminary report on Wilhelm KUEBART.	9a.
22.5.45.	Incoming telegram from 12th A.G. re KUEBARTH. <u>Filed 28.5.45.</u>	9b.
23.5.45.	Incoming telegram from 12th A.G. re Wilhelm KUEBARTH. <u>Filed 28.5.45.</u>	9c.

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Destroyed on the authority of R8/MISS Labory 2.3.60.

OVER

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(REGIMENT)
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Quite some materials had been destroyed on 2.3.60, on an order. In my perception (AOB) this might have been done because Kuebart had entered service within a friendly organisation ,or that like. I suppose some had been left intact because this file being considered of Historical importance; albeit that destroying this was not very exceptional.

INTERIM REPORT
on the Case of
WILHELM KUEBART

INTRODUCTION

Oberstleutnant a.D. Wilhelm KUEBART, former head of Eins Heer Amt Abwehr, was on April 24, 1945, detained for further investigation at Michelau, Upper Franconia, after he had reported to U.S. Army H.Q. to obtain a pass and to make enquiries concerning the fate of his former chief, Oberst HAGEN, head of Abwehr I.

He was then taken to Coburg, where his personal particulars were recorded, then to Erlangen and next to Bamberg, where he remained for 14 days undergoing interrogation.

On April 27, KUEBART was transferred to Wiesbaden, and after further interrogation there, was flown to the U.K., arriving on the evening of May 24 at Camp 020. Here under interrogation he told the following story:-

PRISONER'S ANTECEDENTS

(Having regard to the subject's importance, and the fact that these are relevant as to character and background, these are set out with more than usual detail.)

March 4, 1913 Wilhelm KUEBART, a German national, was born at Trakhnen, East Prussia.

FAMILY:

Father: Friedrich KUEBART, architect.

Mother: Elise KUEBART, née ALART.

Brothers: Friedrich KUEBART: born circa 1899, deceased October 4, 1918. (Great War).
 Hans KUEBART: born September 27, 1904, married to Irene GRUETTERMEYER.
 Karl KUEBART: born May 10, 1910, married to Anna CORNELSEN.

Sisters: Margarethe ZWICKER: born May 3, 1907 (sic).
 Married to Eberhard ZWICKER, farmer.
 Anna KUEBART, born December 12, 1916, spinster,
 (probably now resident with KUEBART's parents).

Wife: Renate KUEBART, née TRIMMEL, born May 23 1911.
 Married April 8, 1938.

Children: Friedrich Wilhelm KUEBART: born July 5, 1942. Male.
 Hubertus KUEBART: born December 17, 1943. Male.

ADDRESSES:

(a) Parents: (i) Permanent: Trakhnen, East Prussia.

(ii) Last known: c/o KRUEGER (Farmer),
 Rottelsdorf, Kreis Bischofen, Near Halle.

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Address:

a) Parents: (i) Permanent: Trakehnen, East Prussia.
 (ii) Rottelsdorf, Kreis Eisleben, near Halle.
 (b) Wife :Permanent: Quitzoweg 1, Koenigsberg
 (ii) Last known: c/o/Decan Degretz, Horst Wesselplatz 4 Michelau, Upper Franconia.

ADDRESSES (Contd.):

(b) Wife: (i) Permanent: Quitzowweg 1, Koenigsberg.

(ii) Last known: c/o Decan DEGRETZ, Horst
Wessell Platz 4 (?), Michelau, Upper
Franconia.

EDUCATION:

1919 - 1925
1925 - 1932

School, Trakennen, East Prussia.
School, Gumbinnen. (Passed Abitur leaving exam.)

BUSINESS TRAINING:

April 1932 to
Autumn 1932

Business training with TEMZLAFF & WENZEL, Colonial
Importers, Koenigsberg.

EARLY MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE

October 1, 1932

Joined Kraftfahrabteilung 1, Koenigsberg, as Officer
Cadet, receiving recruit training at Marienwerder.

Early 1933 to
Summer 1933

M.T. School, Wuensdorf, and subsequent service at
Koenigsberg.

Summer 1933 to
October 1934

Dresden Infantry School.

October 1, 1934

Commissioned and posted as Leutnant to Kraftfahr-
abteilung, in Allenstein.

October 1934 to
Spring 1937

Subsequent service at Allenstein with this unit.

First Anti-Nazi Manifestation

KUEBART claims to have disapproved of the German
greeting, "Heil Hitler". At a social gathering
in 1934, used words, "Haile Selassie" publicly,
and was reported to Gauleiter of Koenigsberg.
Subsequent trouble settled by his C.O.

Summer 1937

Promoted to Oberleutnant.

Marriage

April 8, 1938

Married Renate TRIEBEL of Bellinen, East Prussia.

Autumn 1938

Appointed to command of 2nd rz. Sp. Kp.
Also studied for entrance exam. to Koenigsberg
Kriegsakademie.

Spring 1939

Passed Kriegsakademie Entrance Exam.

September 1, 1939

Although ordered to enter this Academy on this
date, it was closed owing to outbreak of war.

WAR SERVICE (EARLY)

Poland

August 1939

Ordered with unit to participate in Polish
campaign. At Graudenz. Meeting with Russian
forces at Siedlce.

Education :

1919 – 1925 School, Trakehnen, East Prussia.
1925 – 1932 School, Gumbinnen (passed Abitur leaving exam)
Business training:

April 1932 to
Autumn 1932 Importers, Koenigsberg.

Early military training and service.

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Summer 1937 Promoted to Oblt.

Marriage.

April 1938 Married to Renate Triebel of Bellinen, East Prussia

Autumn 1938 Appointment to command of the 2nd Panzer Speh Kompanie
Also studied for entrance exam. To Koenigsberg Kriegsakademie.

Spring 1939 Passed Kriegsakademie Entrance Exam.

September 1, 1939 Although, ordered to enter the Academy on this date, it was closed owing to outbreak of war.

War Service (Early).

Poland.

August 1939 Ordered unit to participate in Polish campaign. At Graudenz.
Meeting with Russian forces Siedlce.

Koenigsberg

September 1939

Recalled to Koenigsberg barracks.

Western Offensive

November 1939 to
May 1940.

With 2 Kie. der Aufklaerungs Abt. 1. at
Stenden near Aldekerk, Lower Rhine.

May 1940.

KUEBART's unit crossed Dutch frontier to the
South of Venlo, and fought their way across
the Albert Canal in direction of Alost.

May 22 1940.

Withdrawn for 8 days rest at Diest (Belgium).
Thereafter transferred to Northern France.

June 1 1940

Promoted to rank of Hauptmann.

June 5 1940

Participated in second German offensive,
ending up at time of France-German Armistice
at Marennas.

June 22 1940

After undertaking guard duties on Demarcation
Line for short period, unit quartered at
Bressuire.

Staff Post at Chemnitz.

End September 1940
to
beginning January 1941

KUEBART left his unit and posted to staff of
18 Pz. Div, at Chemnitz, Saxony. Three
months on Q. Staff, and as A.D.C. to G.O.C.

Staff Course at Kriegsakademie, Koenigsberg.

January 1941 to
March 1941.

Sent on Staff course at Kriegsakademie,
Koenigsberg. General instruction on all
branches of staff work, including I (C).
Training greatly condensed.
Passed finishing exam.

Illness

March 1941 to
beginning of June 1941.

Thyroid trouble necessitated protracted cure
at Bad Kudowa, preventing immediate posting.

Operations Branch of O.K.H.

June 1941 to
September 1941

KUEBART was then posted to the Operations
Branch of O.K.H. as assistant to senior General
Staff Officer Oberstleutnant CHRIST, working
as liaison officer between O.K.H. and
Heeresgruppe Mitte.

In this capacity he took part in the Eastern
campaign in the advance from Minsk towards
Smolensk. His duties consisted in keeping
operational maps from information received,
and in transmitting to O.K.H. the reports
received from Heeresgruppe Mitte.

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FIRST INDIRECT CONTACT WITH THE ABWEHR.

Fremde Heere Ost.

September 15 1941.

KUEBART's first contact with the Abwehr, though not a direct one, may be said to date from this time, when he was posted to Fremde Heere Ost, (Gruppe Vorderer Orient) at Zossen Lager, Zossen, under a certain (the Major) HANSEN, its Gruppenleiter, who is to figure so largely throughout KUEBART's subsequent story.

SUBSEQUENT MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES GENERALLY.

Fremde Heere Ost (continued)

KUEBART was posted to this department as Referent for Turkey, Persia and Iraq, and this group only of Fremde Heere Ost was stationed at Zossen, near Berlin. Since the German invasion of Russia, the remaining groups of Fremde Heere Ost had been transferred to the H.Q. of the O.K.H. at Mauerwald, East Prussia.

Qualifications

KUEBART states that he had little qualification for his new post. His course at Koenigsberg had given him only a very general and condensed instruction in I. (C) work, and he knew little of the countries allotted to his sphere. (He learned later that his posting was due to the fact that his personal papers indicated a knowledge of Ancient Greek learned at School).

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Subsequent movements and activities Generally.

Fremde Heere Ost (contined)

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Remaining groups of FHO had been transferred to HQ of OKH at Mauerwald, east Prussia. (Internally known as Nikolaiken, W/T name Atlas. It was situated in the vicinity of Hitler's HQ Wolfschanze)

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Trip to Turkey.


Reasons:

Kuebart, however, applied himself diligently to his new duties and by the spring of the following year 1942 it was decided to send him to Turkey for the following reasons:-

a) To gain first hand knowledge of the territories with which he dealt.

b) To obtain from the German Military Attaché in Ankara, detailed information regarding the Turkish's Army, i.e. details of its organisation, equipment and names of its formation commanders.

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Promotion.

Kuebart was promoted to the rank of major on June or July 1942

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KUEBART DEPUTISES FOR HANSEN

In November 1942, HANSEN was suddenly taken ill with a nervous affliction, which prevented his standing upright. (Later, when HANSEN was transferred to the Abwehr in early 1943, he was still obliged to walk with the help of a stick.) During this illness, KUEBART deputised for his chief, referring any points of doubt in connection with Fremde Heere to him at his home at Bad Schandau on the River Elbe.

KUEBART TAKES OVER GRUPE VORDERER ORIENT

When HANSEN in early 1943 was transferred to the post of Chef . Abwehr I in place of Oberst FLECKENBROCK, KUEBART in turn succeeded HANSEN in his former post with Fremde Heere.

FRENDE HEERE

In the summer of 1942, the name of the South East Group was changed from that of Gruppe Vorderer Orient to Gruppe Fremde Heere Suedost, and under HANSEN had achieved its partial independence, being directly answerable only to the General Staff.

Kuebart deputises for Hansen.

In November 1942, Hansen was suddenly taken ill with a nervous affliction, which prevented his standing up right. (according to what Hansen's wife told their children he suffered from "Ischias") Later when Hansen was transferred to the Abwehr in early 1943 (January 1943), he was still obliged to walk with the help of a stick). During his illness, Kuebart deputised for his chief, referring any points of doubt with Fremde Heere to him at his home to him at his home at Bad Schandau on the river Elbe.

When KUEBART succeeded HANSEN, probably on account of the former's youthful age the South East group became subordinate to and working under Fremde Heere Ost.

MOVE TO EAST PRUSSIA

In March, 1943, Fremde Heere Ost together with KUEBART's group was transferred to Mauerwald in East Prussia, probably due to the renewed attentions that Russia was showing towards the Balkans.

As to KUEBART's wife, she either stayed with her mother at Bellinen or at Koenigsberg.

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Move to East Russia.

In March 1943, Fremde Heere Ost together with Kuebart's group was transferred to Mauerwald (Nikolaiken) in East Prussia, probably due to the renewed attentions that Russia was showing towards the Balkans.

As Kuebart's wife, she either stayed with her mother at Bellinen or at Koenigsberg.

easier for KUEBART.

At the time of his attachment the establishment made no provision for a Gruppenleiter of Eins Heer.

His first main task was to ascertain the work of his new department, and he could readily appreciate that its then existing personnel were not fully capable of carrying on the work allotted to it. He resolved, therefore, first to set the Abwehr "Kopf" (Head Office) in order, and then to tackle its subsidiary branches. (In this he did not prove successful, and he estimated that it took him over a year to find his way around in his new job.)

KUEBART describes HANSEN as being the person responsible for "discipline" in I.H., but although KUEBART had not yet been officially accredited Leiter I.H., he was already in a position to make regulations affecting the three Untergruppen, viz. I.H. West, I.H. Ost Sued, and I.H. Ost Nord. As to the actual allocation of work, please see plan as prepared by KUEBART at Appendix 3.

The three main spheres of interest according to the Groups were Sweden, the Balkans, Turkey and Spain, and as little was happening in the Swedish sphere he mainly concentrated on the remaining territories.

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THE SETTING-UP OF AGENTS IN ENGLAND

At about the end of August, or beginning of September, 1943, Obstlt., then Major, MÜNZINGER, the Untergruppenleiter of I.H. Untergruppe Ost Süd, came forward to KUEBART with a plan regarding the setting-up of agents in England which KUEBART understood had already received HANSEN's approval.

The whole scheme was being run under MÜNZINGER's direction, but KUEBART understood that it was being engineered by a certain JEBSEN @ JOHNNY.

JEBSEN @ JOHNNY

According to KUEBART, JEBSEN used to work for the S.D. in Berlin before the war, chiefly in connection with currency matters. JEBSEN had been subsequently transferred to Abwehr I.H. to work under a certain Obstlt. THOERING, and, later, THOERING's successor, MÜNZINGER. In the autumn of 1943, MÜNZINGER had dispatched JEBSEN to operate in Lisbon, to deal with currency matters and the smuggling of agents to England via Spain and Portugal in connection with a certain IVAN.

JEBSEN was attached for certain administrative purposes only to K.O. Lisbon. His cover employment in Lisbon was with the H.V.K., an organisation connected with the O.K.W., which probably had something to do with raw materials, but KUEBART is ignorant of the meaning of the abbreviation "H.V.K." and its precise significance.

The Setting-up of agents in England.

At about the end of August, or beginning of September, 1943, Obstlt., then major, Munzinger (Münzinger?), the Untergruppenleiter of I H Untergruppe Ost Süd, came forward to Kuebart with a plan regarding the setting-up of agents in England which Kuebart understood had already received Hansen's approval.

The whole scheme was being run under Münzinger's direction, but Kuebart understood that it was being engineered by a certain Jebsen & Jonny. (AOB, **Johann Jebsen, a very wealthy young man, sheltered in Portugal as to escape German military duties. He had to accept a job, and he himself became engaged at the KO Portugal. But Jebsen was a British Intelligence Double-Cross agent; British designation 'Artist', in some connection with Popov ('Iwan' German designation). Jebsen's endeavour can only be understood delivering every German agent out to M.I.5 and/or M.I.6) (it was due to M.I.5.'s eager, neglecting proportional considerations, that they pushed Jebsen to unravel the secrets about Ostro (Paul Georg Fidrmuc). This endeavour finally has led to Jebsen's abduction from Lisbon, on 29th April 1944, and his death somewhere in early 1945).** (**Jebsen was attached for certain administrative purposes only. But his wealth, and businesses engagements, ultimately caused his death!**)

Jebsen @ Johnny.

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VISIT TO SPAIN

In the beginning of September 1943, HANSEN was going with Admiral CANARIS to Spain in connection with difficulties the Spanish authorities were creating owing some Allied démarche.

Visit to Spain.

In the beginning of September 1943, Hansen was going with Admiral Canaris to Spain in connection with difficulties the Spanish authorities were creating owing some Allied démarche.

They were to speak to Count JORDANA. KUEBART claims that he asked them whether he could accompany them in order to get to know the K.O. personnel in the Iberian Peninsula.

Very shortly afterwards, and at any rate before the middle of September, they all three set out by plane for Bordeaux. Here, KUEBART had discussions with Obstlt. SCHMIDT, Leiter I at the Bordeaux Ast Dienststelle. KUEBART explored with this man the possibility of establishing fresh contacts with North Africa which might be possible from Bordeaux owing to the shipping traffic between these two countries. SCHMIDT had, however, only arrived at the Dienststelle some 5 weeks previously, and nothing definite could be arranged in this connection.

Another matter that was discussed on this occasion was the establishment of the radio network which SCHMIDT had just started forming. The Leiter I complained, however, of difficulties with his Ast Leiter, Obst. LORSCHLEIDER, who supervised his every step. KUEBART believes that HANSEN later on arranged with the Ast Leiter to afford SCHMIDT greater freedom in his work.

They were to speak to Count Jordana. Kuebart claims that he asked them whether he could accompany them in order to get to know the K.O. personnel in the Iberian Peninsula.

Very shortly afterwards and at any rate before the middle of September, they all three set out for Bordeaux (AOB, following Hansen's private pocket diary: 1st October Friday arriving on 16.00 hrs in Bordeaux. Monday 4th leaving, by car, for Henday. 5th in Madrid) Here Kuebart had discussions with Obstlt. Schmidt, Leiter I at the Bordeaux Ast (Nest!) Dienststelle Kuebart explored with this man the possibility of establishing fresh contacts with North Africa which might be possible from Bordeaux owing to the shipping traffic between these two countries. Schmidt had, however, only arrived at the Dienststelle some 5 weeks previously, and nothing definite could be arranged in this connection.

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During his stay at Bordeaux, KUEBART also had a discussion with Oberst FIKSSTAG VON LORINGHOVEN, head of Abwehr II, who had travelled with them in the plane from Paris to Bordeaux. The discussion concerned the possibilities of an attempt to overthrow the HITLER regime, and is dealt with elsewhere on page 48 of this report in connection with the events leading up to the actual attempt on July 20th, 1944.

Next day, the journey was continued in French vehicles to Madrid. CANARIS and HANSEN went on together in the first car accompanied by a Spanish escort officer. KUEBART's car was delayed by some breakdown and he set out somewhat later, also accompanied by a Spanish officer. The whole party stayed the night in an attractive little town, the name of which KUEBART forgets, situated some 90 miles from Madrid. The advance party had already arrived in the course of the afternoon, KUEBART arriving there about 21.30 hours, when he found CANARIS and HANSEN conferring with a Spanish general, VIGOM.

Cover Names: KUEBART does not remember whether CANARIS used a cover name for this journey. He thinks he travelled on a ministerial pass. HANSEN travelled under the name of ROEPERT, and KUEBART under the name of KUEMNART. KUEBART used a Dienststelle pass in this name, and states that he sometimes went under this name and sometimes under his own during his service with the Abwehr.

They were to speak to Count Jordana. Kuebart claims that he asked them whether he could accompany them in order to get to know the K.O. personnel in the Iberian Peninsula.

Very shortly afterwards, and in any rate before the middle of September, they all three (Canaris, Hansen and Kuebart) set out for by plane for Bordeaux. Kuebart here had discussions with Obstlt. Schmidt. Leiter I at the Nest Dienststelle. Kuebart explored with this man the possibility of establishing fresh contacts with North Africa, which might be possible from Bordeaux owing to the shipping traffic between these two countries. Schmidt had, had only arrived at the Dienststelle some 5 weeks previously, and nothing definite could be arranged in this connection.

Another matter that was discussed on this occasion was the establishment of the radio network that Schmidt just had started forming. The Leiter I complained, however, of difficulties of the Ast (Nest) Leiter Obst. Lorschneider, who supervised his every step. Kuebart believes that Hansen later on arranged with the Ast Leiter to afford Schmidt greater freedom in his work.

During his stay in Bordeaux Kuebart also had a discussion with Obst. Freytag von Loringhoven, Head of Abwehr II who had travelled with them in the plane from Paris to Bordeaux. The discussion concerned the possibilities of an attempt to overthrow the Hitler regime, and is dealt with elsewhere on page 48 of this report in connection with events leading up to the actual event on 20 July 1944.

The next day the journey was continued in French vehicles to Madrid. Canaris and Hansen went together in the first car accompanied by a Spanish escort officer. Kuebart's car was delayed by some breakdown and he set out somewhat later, also accompanied by a Spanish officer. The whole party stayed the night in an attractive little town, the name of which Kuebart forgets, situated some 90 miles from Madrid. The advance party had already arrived about 21.30 hours, when he found Canaris and Hansen conferring with a Spanish general, Vigon.

Cover names: Kuebart does not remember whether Canaris used a cover-name for this journey. (He surely did: <http://www.cdvandt.org/canaris-intercepts.htm>) He thinks he travelled on a ministerial (diplomatic) pass. Hansen travelled under the name of Roepert (the name of his wife's grandfather/mother's side) and Kuebart under the name of Kuebart. Kuebart used a Dienststelle pass in his name, and states that it sometimes under his own during his service with the Abwehr.

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ARRIVAL AT MADRID

The party arrived in Madrid at about mid-day on the following morning, putting up at the K.O. Leiter's in northern Madrid - Kapitän zur See LEISSNER @ LENZ.

On the first evening they were invited to dine with General MARTINEZ CAMPOS, CANARIS' counterpart in the Spanish Intelligence Service. Present also were Count JORDANA and General MUNOZ GRANDE, the Commander of the Spanish Blue Division.

The next morning CANARIS interviewed Oberstleutnant KIEKENBUSCH (Leiter Eins), Sonderführer KUEHENTHAL (probably I.N.), Oberstleutnant von ROHRSCHEIDT (Leiter III) and the Paymaster PAGO (real

Arrival at Madrid.

The party arrived in Madrid at about mid-day on the following morning, putting up at the K.O Leiter's (address) in Northern Madrid – Kapitän zur See Leissner (real name, but he used a wide range of cover-names) @ Lenz.

On the first evening they were invited to dine with General Martinez Campos, Canaris' counterpart in the Spanish intelligence Service. Present also were Count Joprdana and General Munoz Grandes, the commander of the Spanish Blue Division (this Spanish division fought for some time against the Russians together with German forces at the Eastern Front).

The next morning Canaris interviewed Obstlt. Kiekenbusch (Leiter I), Sdf. Kuehenthal (half Jewish but with backing of Canaris he was once declared being Aryian), Obstlt. Rohrscheidt (Leiter III) and paymaster (Pago) (real name unknown) (AOB, Zimmer or Franzbach)

VISIT TO LISBON

KUEBART had received reports while at Zossen that the K.O. Lisbon was discharging its functions most unsatisfactorily, and indeed, lately no reports at all had been received from this quarter. In particular, he had received reports on this subject from Hauptmann d.R. KUERRER @ KAMMLER, then working with Abwehr I.H., who had previously been attached to that K.O. and had returned probably in about 1943 (date uncertain).

HANSEN and CANARIS intended to visit Portugal for a purpose of their own unknown to KUEBART, and he himself wanted to journey thither in order to check up and investigate the general state of this K.O.

Before leaving Madrid, he discussed the matter with HANSEN, and it was agreed that although he would accompany them to Lisbon they would travel as two separate entities and would not recognise one another, in order that KUEBART's connection with the Abwehr should not be readily identified by the Allies on arrival there through direct association with the others.

Cover Name: KUEBART was still travelling under the cover name of Oberregierungsrat Wilhelm KUEBART.

They accordingly took off, probably about the beginning of October 1943 (though KUEBART is not sure on this point), in the same aircraft for Lisbon, KUEBART sitting in front and the others behind.

Duration of Stay in Lisbon

KUEBART recalls that he arrived in Lisbon on a Friday, departing on the following Tuesday. (This, according to the 1943 calendar, would mean that if he went there in the first week of October, he arrived on October 4th and left on October 8th.)

Visit to Lisbon.

Kuebart had received reports while in Zossen ([Zeppelin](#)) that the KO Lisbon ([KOP](#)) was discharging its functions most unsatisfactorily, and indeed, lately no reports had been received quarter. ([neglecting Ostro, of course, though he was not part of KOP](#)) In particular, he had received reports on this subject from Hauptmann d.R. Kurrer @ Kamler ([Oblt. Otto Kurrer, alias Heribert](#)), then working with Abwehr I H who had previously been attached to that K.O. and had returned to probably about 1943 (date uncertain)([AOB, in a Isk 45158, W/T message decrypt, it was noticed that Kamler ultimately managed to obtain a plane ticket for a flight booked for: 11.6.43](#))

Hansen and Canaris intended Portugal for a purpose of their own unknown to Kuebart, and he himself wanted thither in order to check up and investigate in order to investigate the general state of KOP.

Before leaving Madrid, he discussed the matter with Hansen, and it was agreed that although he would accompany them to Lisbon they would travel as two separate entities and would not recognise one another, in order that Kuebart's connection with the Abwehr should not be readily identified by the Allies on arrival there through direct association with the others.

Cover-name: Kuebart was still travelling under the cover-name Oberregierungsrat Wilhelm Kuebart.

Duration of stay in Lisbon.

They accordingly took off, probably about the beginning of October 1943 ([AOB, the plane took off Thursday 7, October on 14.00 hours from Madrid heading for Lisbon. According Hansen's pocket-diaries](#)) ([Their return trip to Madrid was, for some reason managed by car to Madrid; Saturday leaving Lisbon 0700 and arriving in Madrid 19.00](#))

Kuebart recalls that he arrived on a Friday ([was on Thursday](#)) ...

ARRIVAL IN LISBON

By a previous K.O. arrangement, a certain Frd. GRAESS (K.O. Lisbon secretary) met KUEBART at the airport and took him to his hotel, the name of which he forgets. Frd. GRAESS later returned and fetched KUEBART, taking him along to her flat, where he dined. They were later joined by a certain Oberleutnant von WOLFF. The latter used the rank of Oberleutnant by virtue of his belonging to the reserve of officers, but in point of fact was employed in Lisbon as a representative of the firm of Otto von WOLFF, which KUEBART describes as an "Eisen Firma". Von WOLFF was at the time employing a prospective agent, one GELLMAN. GELLMAN was being run by BRUNZINGER, and the intention was for him to be set up in England or the U.S.A. This plan was, however, dropped, and as far as KUEBART remembers GELLMAN was transferred to Abwehr III F.

KUEBART is not of the opinion that von WOLFF was working directly for anybody in the Abwehr, although he (von WOLFF) was fully aware of the reason for his employing the prospective agent GELLMAN in his firm.

In the course of the evening a certain amount of cognac was consumed by all concerned, and service matters were not discussed, although KUEBART does recall some criticism on his part of the Abwehr.

2ND DAY IN LISBONMorning:

KUEBART went along to the German Embassy, and there met in the garden, and spoke to, the following persons:-

- a) Korvettenkapitän BEVOLDEN, Leiter I and Referent of I.M.
- b) Major SCHREIBER, Referent of I.H.
- c) I.Wi official (name unknown).
- d) I.i. Oberleutnant (name unknown).

Conversations:

a) With BEVOLDEN. Without letting him become aware of the nature of his enquiries, KUEBART asked this man how things were going along generally, and gained the impression that he was of little or no use and knew practically nothing of I.Wi matters.

b) With Major SCHREIBER. SCHREIBER, though discreet, was a little more outspoken, and said that things were in a bad state and that they were only running three agents:-

(i) IVAN

(ii) IVI (KUEBART knows little of this agent except that she was a woman over in England who had been sending reports on troops from this country and was still here at that time. He believes this connection was subsequently dropped as she appeared to be of little use).

Arrival in Lisbon.

By a previous K.O arrangement, a certain Frl. Craass, K.O Lisbon secretary met Kuebart at the airport and took him to his hotel. R = The name of which he forgets. Frl. Craass (she was well acquainted with Ostro's wife) she later returned and fetched Kuebart taking him along to her flat, where he dined. They were later joined by an Oblt. Wolff. The latter used the rank of Oblt. By virtue of his belongings to the reserve of officers, but in point of fact was employed in Lisbon as a representative of the firm Otto Wolff, which Kuebart describes as an "Eisen Firma" Von Wolff was at the time a prospective agent one Oelmann (AOB, Wolff was: Otto Wolff von Amerongen; Oelmann was Dr. Ender) Oelmann was being run by Munzinger (Münzinger?) the intention was for him to be set up in England or the U.S.A. This plan was, however, dropped and as far as Kuebart remembers Oelmann was transferred to Abwehr III F (counter-espionage)

Kuebart was not of the opinion that Wolff von Amerongen was directly for the for anybody of the Abwehr, although he (Wolff von Amerongen) was fully aware of the reason of his employing prospected agent Oelmann in his firm.

In the course of the evening a certain amount of cognac was consumed by all concerned, and service matters were not discussed, although Kuebart does recall some criticism on his part of the Abwehr.

2nd day in Lisbon.

Morning:

Kuebart went along to the German Embassy (annex KOP) and there met in the garden and spoke to the following persons.

- a) Korvetten Kapitän Bendixen, Leiter I Refereat I M (Marine)
- b) Major (Alois) Schreiber. Schreiber; Referent I H.
- c) I Wi (name unknown)
- d) Ii Oblt. (Leiter Nachrichtenverbindungen) name unknown (cover-name Diaz)

Conversations:

a) With Bendixen. Without letting him become aware of the nature of his enquiries, Kuebart asked this man how things were going along generally, and gained the impression that he was of little or no use and knew practically nothing of I H matters.

b) With Major Schreiber. Schreiber though discreet was a little more outspoken, and said things were in a bad state and that they were only running three agents:-

- (i) Ivan (Iwan) (= Popov, Yugoslav, and an M.I.5. Double-Cross agent!)

(ii) Iwi (Kuebart knows little of this agent except that she was a woman over in England who had been sending reports on troops from this country and was still here at the time. He believes this connection dropped as she appeared of little use.

Afternoon:

In the course of the afternoon, KUEBART drove out in company with von WOLFF to FIDRUCZ's "weekend house" which the latter possessed in addition to his residence in Lisbon. Von WOLFF knew him socially and KUEBART had arranged the meeting through von WOLFF at Frh. GRAASS's flat, the evening before.

HETEL d.R. FIDRUCZ @ OSEROW @ C.H.B.

KUEBART mentioned that this man had previously been a journalist and as such had travelled in the U.S.A. and England. He was an old V-Mann and was at present engaged in some business in Lisbon, the nature of which is unknown to KUEBART.

Although FIDRUCZ had originally done very good work as a V-Mann, his interest now appeared to be cooling off somewhat, possibly owing to the successes of the Allies, and at this particular period he was working for Obstlt. von CARNAPP of Eins Hear, Berlin, having previously worked for either Oberst SCHOLZ or Oberst MAURER of Abwehr I.H. He was attached to K.O.Lisbon only for certain administrative and pay purposes.

FIDRUCZ's intelligence transmitted to Berlin was on the following matters:-

- a) Aircraft production in England and the U.S.A. (This was considered reliable information by I.Luft since it was greatly appreciated by the evaluation section of the Luftwaffefuehrungsstab). This at that time was FIDRUCZ's main activity.
- b) Allied convoys, shipping movements and tonnage. (Although this was sent to I.M., KUEBART does not know whether it was regarded as reliable.)
- c) Reports on troop identification, divisional signs and/or numbers in England. (These were judged inaccurate by I.H. on checking with Fremle Heere.)

Channels of FIDRUCZ's information. KUEBART claims that he was unaware of the precise channels through which FIDRUCZ derived his information. When it was put to him that he, as FIDRUCZ's chief, should surely know this, he replied that he purposely did not burden himself with such details as he, in his capacity as head of Abwehr I.H., had little time for complete knowledge of these.

KUEBART's Opinion of FIDRUCZ. KUEBART was not prepared to say whether he considered FIDRUCZ's work good or bad. In some ways, such as the I.H. information from England, it was unreliable, but in others it more than balanced the information sent to I.H. On the whole, he was inclined to feel that the balance stood in FIDRUCZ's favour.

Before KUEBART's arrival in Lisbon, there was some talk of

Afternoon:

In the course of the afternoon, Kuebart drove out in accompany with Wolff to Fidrmuc's (Ostro) weekend house (Chalet Iglo, in Estoril, where he lived permanently) Von Wolff knew him socially (AOB, Paul Georg Fidrmuc kept himself outside the German community, as he wanted to keep a low-profile cover) which the latter possessed (rented) in addition to his residence in Lisbon. Von Wolff knew him socially and Kuebart had arranged the meeting through Wolff and Frl. Craass's flat, the evening before.


Hptm.d.R. @ Ostro @ C.H.B. (the initials of his wife's grandfather!) (AOB, Kuebart did not know the real state of affairs: Fidrmuc (Ostro) was, formally not a member of the Abwehr, possessing an exceptional status; being independent and only handing over his intelligence information onto "I H Ost", *in casu*: Oblt Wilhelm von Carnap, at Skarupa. But the Abwehr possessed no legal powers of direction versus Paul Georg Fidrmuc!) <http://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-josephine.htm> (chapter two).

Although Fidrmuc had originally done very good work as a V-Mann, his interest seems to be cooling off, somewhat, possibly owing to the success of the Allies, and at this particular period he was working for Oblt von Carnap of I H (Skarupa) Berlin, having previously worked for Scholz or Obst Maurer of Abwehr I H. He was (NOT) attached to K.O Lisbon. (AOB, they acted as posting box only. His messages were handed in covered within a double-sealed envelope, and only the KOP decided whether it should be conveyed instantly by means of W/T or send by mail or diplomatic bag, towards Berlin)

Please digest the following yourself.

Kuebart's opinion of Fidrmuc. Kuebart was not prepared to say whether he considered Fidrmuc's work good or bad. In some way, such as his I H information from England, it was unreliable, but in others it more than balanced the information sent to I H. On the whole, he was inclined to feel that the balance in Fidrmuc's favour.

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Before KUEBART's arrival in Lisbon, there was some talk of

Before Kuebart's arrival in Lisbon, there was some talk of:

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FIDRUCZ being awarded the Iron Cross for past services rendered, and he himself took steps to see that this went through, as he considered FIDRUCZ deserved it. As a result, FIDRUCZ was awarded later the Iron Cross, 2nd Class. KUEBART's decision to do this was also slightly influenced by stories he had heard of an attempt, by poisoning, on FIDRUCZ's life. (He knew few details of this, however, except that somebody unknown was said to have slipped poison into his tea and made him very ill. KUEBART was not entirely convinced of the genuineness of this poisoning attempt.)

MEETING WITH FIDRUCZ

FIDRUCZ's wife was also present at this meeting, providing them with tea, although actual service matters were discussed while walking about when she was not present.

KUEBART describes FIDRUCZ as a person of quite considerable intelligence who made a good impression but who was rather pessimistic about the general war situation and getting rather stale at his job. He expressed the wish to KUEBART that he would really prefer "to go to the Front". KUEBART discussed quite frankly with him his dissatisfaction with the K.O. Lisbon and said there would have to be a "general brush up" in that organization.

KUEBART impressed upon FIDRUCZ that he required more reports about troops and in particular divisional numbers, locations, insignia and invasion preparations. FIDRUCZ replied that he would do his best but he could promise nothing.

KUEBART and JOLET then returned to Lisbon.

MEETING WITH HANSEN & VON KARSTORFF

That evening, at HANSEN's telephonic request, KUEBART went along to see him where he had been dining with the K.O. Leiter, Obstlt. d. Luftw. von KRAMEER-AUERHODE & von KARSTORFF. KUEBART had deliberately avoided seeing KARSTORFF hitherto and the latter may have been rather offended that KUEBART had not paid his respects to him on the day of their arrival when CANARIS and HANSEN had done so.

Little other than social matters were discussed, though KUEBART, who was instinctively suspicious of JEBSEN, asked KARSTORFF what he thought of him. KARSTORFF merely replied that he was an extremely able man.

KARSTORFF, on this occasion, invited KUEBART to dinner on the following evening.

THIRD DAY IN LISBON

KUEBART, in the morning, made a sight-seeing trip of Lisbon with Major SCHREIBER of I.H., K.O. Lisbon.

At about mid-day, SCHREIBER took KUEBART along to meet BRAUNES at the latter's house. BRAUNES was a young business man from Berlin of about twenty-three years of age, and a very large shareholder in an armaments firm in Berlin. KUEBART does not recall the precise name of this firm, whose representative BRAUNES was in Lisbon.

Fidrmuc being awarded the iron Cross for his past services rendered, and he himself took steps to see that this went through, as he considered Fidrmuc deserved it. As a result Fidrmuc later was rewarded (at Hansen's house in May 1944, in Rangsdorf near Berlin. However, he got the K.V.K (Kriegsverdienstkreuz 2nd Class) ...digest this section yourself.

Meeting with Fidrmuc.

...

Kuebart describes Fidrmuc as a person of considerable intelligence who made a good impression but who was rather pessimistic about the general war situation (AOB, bear in mind: Fidrmuc was a party member throughout) and getting rather stale at his job. He expressed the wish to Kuebart that he would really prefer "to go to the Front" Kuebart discussed quite frankly with him his dissatisfaction with the K.O. Lisbon and said that there would have to be a "general brush up" in that organisation.

Meeting with Hansen and von Karsthoff (Ludovico)

The evening, at Hansen's telephonic request, Kuebart went along to see him where he had been dining with the K.O. Leiter, Obstlt. d. Lw. Ludwig Kraemer von Auenrode @ Karsthoff. Kuebart had deliberately avoided seeing Karsthoff hitherto and paid his respects to him on the day of their arrival when Canaris and Hansen had done so.

Little other than social matters were discussed, though Kuebart, who was instinctively suspicious of (Johann) Jebesen asked Karsthoff what he thought of him. Karsthoff merely explained that he was an extremely able man.

Karsthoff, on this occasion, invited Kuebart to diner on the following evening.

Third day in Lisbon.

Kuebart, in the morning, made a sightseeing trip of Lisbon with Major Schreiber of I H, K.O. Lisbon.

At about mid-day Schreiber took Kuebart along to meet Brandes at the latter's house. (AOB, Hans Brandes, was a quite young man, half Jewish, so not conscripted, though as to allow him to travel freely also entering Germany visiting their "Maschinenfabrik". Now M.I.5, in their eagerness to obtain information about Ostro/Fidrmuc; made a huge mistake!, approached Jebesen, who got M.I.5's cover-name Artist; the latter approached Brandes, not aware that "Ballhorn" (Brandes) was a member of the K.O. as well. Brandes informed someone at the K.O. which ultimately led to his abduction and ultimate death of Jebesen; it has to be noticed though, that Jebesen's financial dealings attracted SS interest) (will be, Deo volente, dealt with in Part II)

Brandes was a young business man from Berlin about twenty-three years of age, and a very large shareholder in an armament firm in Berlin. Kuebart does not recall the precise name of the firm, whose representative Brandes was in Lisbon. (It was his father's company, the latter, by the way, during the war got killed by the Nazis)

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BRANDES was a sick man and was Jewish, and for those reasons he was exempt from Wehrmacht service. During the war BRANDES had been successful in securing for his firm a contract from the Portuguese Government providing for his firm to supply arms to the Portuguese. He achieved this against a great number of trade competitors, but on account of his Jewish race, was unpopular with other commercial houses and the German Legation. He had, at one time, and indeed still nominally, operated as a "V" man for a certain Oberstleutnant SCHULZ-BACHHUSEN of Abwehr I, Berlin, and was now doing a certain amount of work for I.G. of K.O. Lisbon to whom he was supplying passports.

KUEBART conversed with him on the subject of the K.O. and was somewhat surprised at BRANDES' vision, since he appeared to share the same views as KUEBART on the K.O.

That afternoon KUEBART went swimming with WOLFF, Frl. CRAASS and FIDRMUC, and in the evening attended a dinner at KARSTORFF's country house in company with FIDRMUC and his wife, SCHREIBER, and Frl. MAUSI, (KARSTORFF's secretary).

On Monday KUEBART lunched with BRANDES and Frl. CRAASS and went out with the latter in the evening.

Brandes was a sick man and was Jewish, and for those reasons he was exempt for Wehrmacht Service. During the war Brandes had been successful in securing for his firm a contract from the Portuguese Government for his firm to supply arms to the Portuguese. He achieved this against a great number of trade competitors, but on account of this Jewish race, was unpopular commercial houses and the German legation (**but nevertheless was in some respect involved with them**) He had at one time and in deed nominally, operated as a V-Mann for a certain Obstlt. Schulz-Bachhusen of Abwehr I, Berlin, and was doing now a certain amount of work for I G (**Geheim, the section dealing with false papers**) of K.O. Lisbon to whom he was supplying false passports.

Kuebart conversed with him on the subject of the K.O. and was somewhat surprised at Brandes' vision, since he appeared to share the same views as Kuebart on the K.O.

The afternoon Kuebart went swimming with Wolff, Frl. Craass and Fidrmuc and in the evening attended a dinner at Karsthoff's country house (**quite near to that of Fidrmuc both in Estoril**) in accompany Fidrmuc and his wife, Schreiber and Frl. Mausl (**Frl. Sauermann; Karsthoff's mistress, with whom he later married**)

On Monday Kuebart lunched with Brandes and Frl. Craass and went out with the latter in the evening.

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CHANGES IN ABWEHR PERSONNEL

Portugal: After KUEBART's return from Paris towards the end of October 1943, he put in a full report to HANSEN, recommending that KARSTORFF of the K.O. Lisbon and FIEDLER of Nest Barcelona, should be removed and replaced. HANSEN was for the time being powerless to effect these changes, as the matter rested with CANARIS, but after the latter's dismissal in early 1944, KARSTORFF was replaced as K.O. Leiter, Lisbon, by Obst.d.Luftwaffe FREDERICI. KUEBART knows little of this man's past, believing him to have functioned for some Ast in the South East of Germany. He only met him in March or April, 1944, when FREDERICI was in Zossen immediately prior to taking up his new duties.

Spain: Somewhat before the spring of 1944, FIEDLER was removed, but not replaced, although Nest Barcelona was still kept open.

In this connection KUEBART insists that he had no power to order personnel changes, although he could recommend them, but only as regards personnel within his sphere of work.

Changes in the Abwehr personnel.

Portugal: After Kuebart's return from Paris towards the end of October 1943, he put in a full report to Hansen, recommending that Karsthoff of the K.O. Lisbon and Fiedler of nest Barcelona should be removed and replaced. Hansen was for the time being powerless to effect these changes, as the matter rested with Canaris, but after the latter dismissal early 1944 (12 February 1944) Karsthoff was replaced as K.O. Leiter (but this actually was not effected before the end of May 1944; where after Karsthoff (Kraemer von Auenrode) (Karsthoff left somewhere in the course of August 1944) Karsthoff was replaced as K.O. Leiter, Lisbon, by Obst. D. Luftwaffe Friederici (later cover name Forros)

Spain: somewhat before the spring 1944, Fiedler was removed, but not replaced, although Nest Barcelona was kept open. (business managed by "Frederico" own name Consul Rüggeberg and old diplomat)

In this connection Kuebart insists that he had no power to order personnel changes, although he could recommend them, but only as regards personnel within his sphere of work.

"V" Herr KLATT @ MAX:

KUEBART claims that this man did not function under K.O. Sofia but was controlled by Ast Vienna (Leiter Oberst Graf MAROGNA REDWITZ, hanged after July 20 1944).

KLATT worked in Bulgaria, operating against the Russians, as an agent for Eins Luft of Ast Vierma. He does not know whether KLATT operated elsewhere in addition, and claims he cannot give information concerning another agents working in Syria or Cyprus, though he was aware of their existence.

KLATT was considered to have had extremely good contacts in high Russian military circles, though even the Abwehr were vague as to the channels through which he obtained information.

ABWEHR OST-SÜD CONFERENCE IN BUDAPEST

In the middle of December, KUEBART left for Budapest to attend this conference, dealing with current problems in S.E. Europe. This meeting took place in a building where Obst. SCHOLZ, the Liaison Officer with the Hungarian "Abwehr", had his offices.

Present were:-

(See over)

Abwehr Ost-Süd Conference in Budapest.

In the middle of December, Kuebart left for Budapest to attend this conference, dealing with current problems in S.E. Europe. This meeting took place in a building where Obst. Scholz, the Liaison Officer with the Hungarian "Abwehr", had his offices:

Present were:-

Admiral CANARIS.
Admiral BUCHNER (Chief of Amt. Ausland);
HANSEN
KUEBART
Obstlt. von HARLING, representing Ic des Heeresgruppe Süd-Ost;
Obst. WAGNER, K.O. Leiter, Sofia;
Obstlt. SENSBURG, Kdo. Belgrade (working to Ic);
Obstlt. SCHUBERT (Zins Leiter, Sofia);
Hauptmann LEVERKLEIN, K.O. Ankara;
Obst. Graf MAROGHA-REINWITZ (Chief of Ast Vienna);
Obstlt. von BOXBERG (Leiter I, Ast Vienna).

At this meeting, CANARIS spoke first, discussing current problems and referring to the ban on the employment of Jews as agents, mentioning Sweden. (In this connection, KUEBART explains that Hpt. von LOSSOW of Abwehr I had originally employed a Jewish agent named KLAUS in Stockholm, but who was later taken on by the German Legation in that city.

Shortly after this speech, connections with this agent were severed by the Abwehr.)

K.O. Leiters then discussed their difficulties, and KUEBART took under his wing the problems of Obstlt. SENSBURG, who was setting up PAK's in Jugo-Slavia and suffering from shortage of material and personnel.

The only other incident of interest that occurred during KUEBART's stay in Hungary was a dinner given at a big hotel, whose name he forgets, by Obst. KADDAR, Chief of the Hungarian Intelligence. In addition to ordinary Hungarian officers, there were also present 3 members of the Hungarian Intelligence Service, whose names KUEBART no longer recalls.

In all KUEBART spent some two or three days in Budapest, before returning to Berlin, where he arrived in about the middle of December, 1945.

Admiral Canaris

Admiral Buerkner (Chef of Amt Ausland)

Obstlt. Hansen (Leiter Abwehr I)

Major Kuebart Leiter I H

Obstlt. Von Harling representing Ic Heeresgruppe Süd-Ost

Obst Otto Wagner (Dr. Delius) Leiter K.O. Sofia

Obstlt. Sensburg Kdo. Belgrade working to? Ic
Obstlt. Schubert (Leiter I Sofia)
Hptm. Leverkuehn Leiter KONO Ankara
Obst. Graf Margogna-Redwitz, (Leiter Ast XVII Wien)
Obstlt. Boxberg (Leiter I Ast Wien)

At the meeting Canaris spoke first. Discussing current problems and referring to the ban of employments of Jews as agents, mentioning Sweden. (Since 5 July 1943). (In this connection explains that Hptm. Von Lossow of Abwehr I had originally employed a Jewish agent named Edgar Klaus in Stockholm, but who was later taken on by the German Legation in that city. (AOB, Klaus had informed: that Russia may be willing to make peace with Germany, when it retreats to the borders before their attack on Russia. This had been briefed onto Hitler, who responded furiously and ordered that from now on (5th July 1943) it was prohibited to engage Jews in the German Wehrmacht. Causing panic at FHO and Abwehr, because their most important agent "MAX", who was in reality the Jewish Richard Kauder. As to come around this problem, Klatt was invited by the Hungarian Secret Service (transmitting Bully I and Bully II), to act on their behalf; but still informing Ast XVII directly)

<http://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-josephine.htm>


(Shortly after this speech, connection with this speech, were served by the Abwehr?)

K.O. Leiters then discussed their difficulties, and Kuebart took under his wings the problems of Obstlt. Sensburg who was setting up FAK's (Frontaufklärungskommandos) in Yugoslavia (think of the intense partisan warfare) and suffering of material and personnel.

The only other incident of interest that occurred during Kuebart's stay in Hungary was a dinner given in a hotel, whose name he forgets, by Obst. Kaddar, Chief of the Hungarian Intelligence. In addition to ordinary Hungarian officers, there were also present 3 members of the Hungarian Intelligence, whose name Kuebart no longer recalls.

In all Kuebart spent some two or three days in Budapest, before returning to Berlin, where he arrived in the middle of December.

KV 2/410-1, page 43



Meeting with Liaison Officer to the Italian Intelligence Service.

Kuebart's next call was on Obst. Helfrich (Leiter Abwehr in Italy), the liaison officer with the Italian Intelligence Service (on behalf of Mussolini) He appeared to get on all right with Berger (Berger did not obey to orders of ordinates Vorgesetzter), but did not have very much to do with him.

This visit was, however, more in the nature of a courtesy call.

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TRIP TO ITALY

Shortly after KUEBART's return to Berlin he was requested by the O.K.W. to endeavour to obtain information concerning the possibilities of an Allied landing in the Mediterranean.

REASONS FOR TRIP TO ITALY

At the time when KUEBART had joined the Abwehr, viz., the end of July 1943, it had practically no agents at all either in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Sardinia or Corsica. To remedy this state of affairs HANSEN had appointed Oberst MAURER as "Inspector for Italy" with instructions to establish an R-Netz, in case it should later become necessary for the Germans to withdraw from that country. In addition, CANARIS, at the end of December 1943, promulgated an Abwehr Order on the instigation of HANSEN for the setting up of mobile Kommandos and Trupps in substitution for the hitherto static system of Asts. Pursuant to this, a FAK Italy was sent to Italy under the command of a certain Hauptmann BERGER, to be subordinated to I.C./A.O. at I.C. der Heeresgruppe. Asts Wien, Munich and probably also Lyons were in addition to furnish such help as they could afford.

In practice, the plan did not prosper, however, and towards the end of 1943 MAURER reported that it was a virtually impossible task to

accomplish his mission. In consequence, he was got rid of in spite of CANARIS' objections.

At about the same period, Obstlt. ZOLLING of I.C. der Heeresgruppe Italy telephoned HANSEN in Berlin, asking for assistance and complaining he did not get on with Hptm. BERGER.

Trip to Italy.

Shortly after Kuebart's return to Berlin (mid December 1943) he was requested by the O.K.W. to endeavour to obtain information concerning the possibilities of an Allied landing in the Mediterranean. At the time when Kuebart had joined the Abwehr, viz, the end of July. (AOB, this is painting an incorrect picture, because he followed within Hansen footsteps. Hansen took over Piekenbrock's function in the early days of February 1943. However, formally he still was employed at FHO or FHW; but in practice he was already engaged at Abwehr I), it practically no agents either in North Africa, Sicily, Italy or Corsica. To remedy this state of affairs Hansen had appointed Obst. Maurer as "Inspector for Italy" with instructions to establish an R-Netz (stay-behind groups), in case it later should become necessary for the Germans to with draw from that country. In addition, Canaris, at the end of December 1943 promulgated an Abwehr order on the instigation of Hansen for the setting up of mobile commandos and Trupps in substitution for their hitherto static system of Asts. Pursuant to this a FAK Italy was sent to Italy under the commando of a certain Hptm. Berger, to be subordinate to Ic/Armee Oberkommando at Ic der Heeresgruppe. Ast Wien, München and probably also Lyons were in addition to furnish such help as they could afford.

In practice the plan did not prosper, however, and towards the end of 1943 Maurer reported that it was virtually impossible task to accomplish his mission. In consequence he was to get rid of in spite of Canaris' objection.

At about the same period Obstlt. Zolling of Ic der Heeresgruppe Italy telephoned Hansen in Berlin asking for assistance complaining that he did not get on with Hptm. Berger.

KUEBART and von SCHWERIN then continued their journey via Munich to Merano, where they called on what the former thinks is described as an I.E. Aussenpost (under the control of Abwehr Berlin).

Here KUEBART saw a Hauptmann who, he alleges, was responsible for all the communications (Abwehr) in Italy. KUEBART admits, however, he was not sure as to the correct nomenclature of the post in question or of its place in the Abwehr organisational set-up.

This unknown Hauptmann was having difficulties in getting radio contact with Rome where the FAK was established. He further did not hit it off with its C.O., BERGER.

KUEBART and the Hauptmann now left in the latter's car for Rome where KUEBART saw BERGER and asked him what steps he had taken in his twofold task of building up the R-Netz and setting up Frontkämpfer (these last were to penetrate the Allied lines and return with information).

BERGER explained that everything was most difficult and that

he was suffering from a shortage of material and radios. In addition, he did not get on with A.O.III of (C), with whom he was supposed to work. Moreover, BERGER complained of the unsuitability of his own officers.

Kuebart and Schwerin then continued their journey via München and Merano (Meran), where they called on what the former thinks is described as an I.E? Aussenpost (under control of Berlin) (it's W/T station was known as: Funkstelle Jakob)

Here Kuebart saw a Hptm. Who, alleges, was responsible for all communications (Abwehr) in Italy. Kuebart admits, however, he was not sure as to the correct nomenclature of the post in question (Jakob) or the place in the Abwehr set-up.

This unknown Hptm. Was having difficulties in getting radio contact with Rome (Togo, Kesselring's station? / near to Frascati) where the FAK was established. He further did not hit off with its Commanding Officer (Hptm.) Berger.

Kuebart and the Hptm. Now left in the latter's car for Rome where Kuebart saw Hptm. Berger and asked him what steps he had taken in his twofold task of building up the R-Netz (stay-behind facilities) Frontaufklärungskommando or Frontaufklärungstrupp (FAK or FAT) (these last were to penetrate the Allied lines and return with information).

Berger explained that everything was most difficult and that he was suffering from a shortage of material and radios. In addition he did not get on with A.O. III (maybe part of Adm. Buerkner's Amt Ausland branch, but III then constituted a different service than Abw. III) with whom he was supposed work. Berger complained of the unsuitability of his own officers.

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MEETING WITH LIAISON OFFICER TO THE ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

KUEBART's next call was on Oberst HELFRICH, the liaison officer with the Italian Intelligence Service. He appeared to get on all right with BERGER, but did not have very much to do with him.

This visit was, however, more in the nature of a courtesy call.

VISIT TO OBSTL. ZOLLING

KUEBART now visited Obstlt. ZOLLING of I.(C), der Heeresgruppe (Italy), who confirmed his dissatisfaction with BERGER, saying that he seldom bothered to come and see them. Another bone of contention was the fact that ZOLLING wanted to depart from the normal practice whereby the Kommandofuehrer ran his own financial affairs and wanted to control BERGER in this respect.

KUEBART now told ZOLLING that he would have to afford BERGER freedom in money matters, but that he would see whether BERGER could not be replaced on his return when reporting to HANSEN.

Meeting with Liaison Officer to the Italian Intelligence Service.

Kuebart's next call was Obst. Helfrich the Liaison with the Italian Intelligence Service (on Mussolini's side) (Helfrich actually was Leiter of Ast Italy) He appeared to get on all right with Hptm. Berger, but did not have very much to do with him.

This visit was, however, more in nature of a courtesy call.

Visit to obstacle Zolling.

Kuebart new visited Obstlt. Zolling of Ic der Heeresgruppe (Italy), who confirmed his dissatisfaction with Berger, saying that he seldom bothered to come and see them. Another bone of contention was the fact that Zolling wanted to depart from normal practice whereby the Kommandofuehrer ran his own financial affairs and wanted to control Berger in this respect.

Kuebart now told Zolling that he would have to afford Berger freedom in money matters, but that he would see whether Berger could not be replaced on his return when reporting to Hansen.

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MEETING WITH CANARIS

While he was in Rome, KUEBART received a telegram asking him to report to CANARIS at a small village whose name he forgets but which is probably situated in the Piave valley or its neighbourhood, somewhere in the mountains. Some ten days, therefore, after his arrival in Italy, KUEBART departed, with the same technician that had accompanied him on his inward journey, to this mountain village, where they arrived in the evening.

KUEBART now rendered a report to CANARIS on the situation, giving him a true picture of the unsatisfactory state of affairs and the discontent of I.(C). CANARIS, however, did not receive this news in a very pleasant fashion, and KUEBART, the following day, went on by car to Merano and from thence by train returned to Berlin, reporting to HANSEN.

Of CANARIS, KUEBART pictures a man who was extremely unapproachable and who disliked new faces, preferring those of his old colleagues. His relations, therefore, with KUEBART were not entirely satisfactory, but those with HANSEN were somewhat better.

RETURN TO BERLIN

HANSEN was naturally none too delighted with KUEBART's report on the Italian situation, but said that he had no-one with whom to replace BERGER for the moment. Very shortly afterwards, CANARIS returned, interviewed HANSEN, and informed him that he himself had had discussions with I.(C) in Italy and had found them entirely content with the situation. He also told HANSEN that KUEBART's report was untrue; there was, therefore, nothing for it but for BERGER to remain where he was.

KUEBART was extremely put out and offered his resignation to HANSEN, but the latter realised the true state of affairs in Italy and could see that I.(C) had presented the situation in glowing colours

to CANARIS, and therefore told KUEBART not to take the matter too much to heart.

Meeting with Canaris.

While he was in Rome, Kuebart received a telegram asking him to report to Canaris at a small village whose name he forgets but which is probably situated in the Piave valley or its neighbourhood, somewhere in the mountains. Some ten days, therefore, after his arrival in Italy, Kuebart departed, with the same technician, that had accompanied him on his inward journey, to this mountain village, where they arrived in the evening.

Kuebart now rendered a report to Canaris on the situation, giving him a true picture of the unsatisfactory state of affairs and the discontent of Ic. Canaris, however, did not receive this news in a very pleasant fashion, and Kuebart, the following day, went on by car to Merano (Meran, west of Bozen, Bolzano) and from thence by train returned (passing the Brenner) to Berlin, reporting to Hansen.

Of Canaris, Kuebart pictures a man who was extremely unapproachable and who disliked new faces, preferring those of his old colleagues. His relations, therefore, with Kuebart were not entirely satisfactory, but those with Hansen were somewhat better. (AOB, Hansen was also quite new for Canaris, because he became Leiter Abwehr I in January 1943, albeit, that Hansen joined rather many journeys with him; but this was still not too long ago. This, may have been the reason why Canaris when being arrested by Schellenberg in early


August 1944 he first said: Sagen Sie mir, haben Sie irgend etwas Schriftliches von diesen Narren Oberst. Hansen gefunden? [Schellenberg's "Aufzeichnungen", page 333 +]

Return to Berlin.

Hansen was naturally none too delighted with Kuebart's report on the Italian situation, but said that he had no-one to replace Berger for the moment. Very shortly afterwards turned interviewed Hansen, and informed him that he himself had had discussions with Ic in Italy and had found them entirely content with the situation. He also told Hansen that Kuebart's report was untrue, there was therefore for it but for Berger to remain where he was.

Kuebart was extremely put out and offered his resignation to Hansen, but the latter realised the true state of affairs in Italy that Ic (**Obst. Zollinger**) ??? situation in glowing colours to Canaris, and therefore told Kuebart not to much to heart.

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The Vermehren case. This case consequently was the point where the Abwehr was blown-up!

This case, which played a great part in the downfall of the Abwehr, occurred at about this period (exactly it happened about 8th February 1944, and Hitler's decision to merge the Abwehr with the (SS) RSHA ruled Amt VI into Mil Amt, happened on 12 February, because since about 10 February the foreign newspapers had reached Germany)

A soldier, one Vermehren had been employed at the K.O. Istanbul (**Istambul**) working in the Leiter's office (Hptm. **Dr. Leverkuehn**). Vermehren had proceeded on leave to Germany, with the convenience of the Foreign Office (**A.A.**) and some friend employed therein, succeeded in getting his wife out of Germany to Istanbul (**Istambul**). **Facts were a bit differently see next:**


22.9.43. Berlin-Istanbul. From SENIOR to POSTER. Ref. letter KO.NO. No.4/9/43
65475 Secret of 1/9/43, Amtschef has rejected VERMEHREN's application for his wife to enter the country, bearing in mind the state of leave on the front.

Source KV 3/3: Canaris informs from Berlin already on 22.9.43:

Berlin-Istanbul (**Istambul**). From Senior (**Hansen**) to Poster (Leverkuehn). Ref. letter KO.NO No. 4/9/43. Secret of 1/9/43, Amtschef (**Canaris**) has rejected Vermehren's application for his

wife to enter the country (Turkey), bearing in mind the state of leave on the other fronts. (source: <http://www.cdvandt.org/canaris-intercepts.htm> message range 4) (AOB, however, Vermehren's wife originated from a well-respected family and was also related to the German Ambassador von Papen) ... Foreign Press reports as well has handbills dropped by the R.A.F. over Germany disclosed that Vermehren had gone over to the Allies (AOB, and there they weren't trusted by the British within M.I.5., a very sad story, in my perception, not showing the best courage!)(KV 2/656 – KV 2/960)

Hansen subsequently told Kuebart that this incident provided the weapon which Himmler had long been waiting for to overthrow the Abwehr. He had used this episode to point out what was rotten, and corrupt treacherous organisation it was, and Kuebart believes that this was the spark of fire which finally consumed the Abwehr". To illustrate how unfair the Abwehr's treatment was, he contrasts a similar episode when an S.D. woman secretary at some place unknown to him, had gone over to the Allies without arousing undue comments. KV 2/410-1, page 44 + 45



Meeting with Brandes in Berlin.

At about this period, in early January 1944, Brandes came on business to Berlin, where Kuebart met him at his home. (Kuebart doesn't recall having ordered Brandes to Berlin.)

Brandes now asked whether there was any chance of getting clear of Obstlt. Schulz-Bacchussen, the man who nominally ran him and who had shortly before been transferred


from Abwehr I, Berlin, to Alst (**Abwehrleitstelle**) Paris I H. Kuebart agreed that he would arrange this, and after Brandes had reported on current matters concerning the K.O. Lisbon, invited him to submit personal to him on the K.O. in private letters.

Kommandos & Trupps.

At the end of December 1943, Canaris had, as described above, signed the Abwehr order for the conversion fixed Abwehrstellen into Kommandos and Trupps (**FAK and FATs**)

As a direct result of this order, Kuebart in ~~January, 1944~~, travelled to Baden-Baden by air with Hansen to attend an Abwehr I conference for the implementing of this order.

KV 3/3 Canaris W/T communications:



29.11.43. 74730 Paris-Berlin. 18. FULEI FRANCE to W/T control. For the duration of a conference of the West-Asts, which is being held under the direction of AMTSCHER in BADEN-BADEN, starting on 12th December, W/T connection is to be prepared from there with BURG and PAUL. PAUL will supply personnel and set. Please fix traffic times and call-signs for 8 days for the line BURG-BADEN, and notify PAUL.

29.11.43 Paris – Berlin. 18. Fulei (AOB, **Funkleiter**) France to W/T control. For the duration of a conference of the West-Asts, which is being held under the direction of Amtscher (Canaris) in Baden-Baden, starting on 12th December, W/T connection is to be prepared from there with Burg (AOB, **Berlin likely Belzig**) and Paul (AOB, **Alst Leiter Obst, Rudolph/Rudolf, in Paris**). Paul will supply personnel and set. Please fix traffic times and call-signs for 8 days for the line 74730 Burg-Baden, and notify Paul.

This W/T message is in full accordance with Hansen pocket-diaries: Leaving Berlin on 12 December 1943, and then likely 12 and 13 Baden-Baden conference.

<http://www.cdvandt.org/KV-3-3-Canaris-WT-transcripts-IV-1943.pdf>

A second point of conflict: within Hansen's pocket-diaries is noticed that on 14 December 43 Hansen continued his journey to Paris.

Abwehr Conference at Baden-Baden.

Kuebart recollects the following members of the Abwehr being present at this conference:-

Canaris	}	Amt Berlin
Hansen		
Kleyenstüber	}	Ast Copenhagen
Von Engelmann		

WICHMANN) PRAETORIUS)	Ast Hamburg
MERKERT	Ast Muenster
SERVAES) KRATZER)	Ast Brussels
RUDOLPH) WAAG)	Alst Paris
GARTHE) LIPS)	Ast Lyons
WEBER	Ast Angers
RUMPE	Ast Stuttgart
SCHMIDT	Ast Bordeaux
LEISSNER	K.O. Madrid
von KRAEMER	K.O. Lisbon
MEISSNER	K.O. Switzerland

Wichmann }	Ast -X Hamburg
Praetorius	
Merkert	Ast Münster
Serveas }	Ast Brussels
Kratzer	
Rudolf (Leiter Alst) }	Alst Paris
Waag	
Garte }	Ast Lyons
Lips	
Weber	Ast. Angers
Rumpe	Ast. Stuttgart
Schmidt	Ast Bordeaux
Leissner	K.O. Madrid
Kraemer von Karshoff?!	K.O. Lisbon
Kraemer von Auenrode K.O.P Leiter	
Meissner	K.O. Switzerland

CANARIS opened the conference and then the various K.O. Leiters spokr of matters connected with their own particular spheres of work.

HANSEN next outlined his proposals in regard to setting up the mobile FAKs and FATs, explaining that they were necessitated by the possibility of Allied landings. This conversion was planned to be completed by the end of February, but in point of fact it took until the end of May, 1944, and then attained only an emergency form.

KUEBART thereafter returned to Berlin, though HANSEN remained behind. HANSEN, for some purpose of his own, departed for Lake Constance.

Canaris opened the conference and then the various K.O. Leiters spoke of matters connected with their own particular spheres of work.

Hansen next outlined his proposals in regard to setting up mobile FAKs and FATs (**Frontaufklärungskommando or Frontaufklärungstrupp**) explaining that they were necessary by the possibility of Allied landings. This conversion was planned to be completed by the end of February (1944), but in point of fact it took until the end of May, 1944, and then attained only an emergency form.

Kuebart thereafter returned to Berlin, though Hansen remained behind. Hansen for some purpose of his own, departed for Lake Constance. (AOB, **incorrect, according to Hansen's pocket-diaries, he proceeded on 14 December to Paris. I suppose that Kuebart may be confused; though Hansen might have gone to Lake Constance, but surely not directly after 13 December**).

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DIFFICULTIES WITH THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN MADRID

In the end of January 1944, CANARIS had a meeting in Biarritz with a member of the German Madrid Embassy. Apparently the Allies had made a démarche with regard to the Abwehr activities in Spain and the Embassy had too readily acquiesced in the Spanish authorities' reiteration of Allied demands for the restriction of the Abwehr's activities. The German Embassy people's failure to stand up for the Abwehr greatly annoyed CANARIS, who forthwith ordered the removal of the Abwehr personnel from the Embassy buildings to an entirely separate building (standing outside diplomatic protection), namely the Maria Molina Haus. KUEBART can give no further particulars of this address, but adds that the K.O. in Madrid were now exposed for all and sundry to see and detect.

FIDRMUCZ

Throughout the whole of this period reports were continually coming in from FIDRMUCZ on convoy matters, aircraft production and troop

locations, insignia, etc. These were passed to Obstlt. von CARNAP of Eins Heer, who was running FIDRMUCZ from Berlin.

KUEBART further recalls FIDRMUCZ reporting that he had his own special agent (name unknown) who was in a position to furnish information concerning Allied air offensives twenty-four hours before they took place.

KUEBART turned this report over to Oberstleutnant KLEYNSTUEBER (Leiter Eins Luft at Amt Berlin), and does not know what further steps were taken or whether the matter was properly followed up.

Difficulties with the German Embassy in Madrid.


In the end of January 1944, had a meeting in Biarritz with a member of the German Madrid Embassy. Apparently, the Allies had made a démarche with regard of the Abwehr activities in Spain and the Embassy had readily acquiesced in the Spanish authorities' reiterations of Allied demands for the requisition of the Abwehr activities. The German Embassy people's failure to stand up for the Abwehr greatly annoyed Canaris, who forewith ordered the removal of the Abwehr personnel from the Embassy buildings to an entirely separate (standing outside diplomatic protection, namely the Maria Molina House. Kuebart can give no further particulars of this address, but adds that the K.O. in Madrid were now exposed for all and sundry to see and detect. (AOB, this is too brief, during the course of change, it was discovered that K.O. employed about 500 men personnel! And, quite some had to return to Germany, though, the remaining suffered from working permit troubles as they did not since belong to the German Embassy staff. What also may have counted, was the animosity of Foreign Office diplomats - that they were opposing Intelligence related matters. Therefore, in my perception, the Ambassador (Botschafter Dieckhof) did nothing to support the endeavours on behalf of the Abwehr. I understand, that the lack of diplomatic immunity later had been, in some way, solved)

Fidrmuc (Ostro).

Throughout the whole period reports were constantly coming in from Fidrmuc on convoy matters, aircraft production and troop location and insignia etc. These were passed on

to Oblt. Wilhelm von Carnap (Skarupa) of I. H. Ost. Who was running Fidrmuc from Berlin. (AOB, Fidrmuc had no relation to K.O. Lisbon; they were even not supposed to know him! But the KOP was functioning as a mail box, only) (Fidrmuc, was even not a member of the Wehrmacht!)(It proves time-and-again that Kuebart was not aware of this, exceptional, fact) <http://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-josephine.htm> Chapter II

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Return to berlin: Unification of German Intelligence Service.

On Kuebart's return to Berlin he learned that Canaris had been dismissed (but not yet arrested) from office and that in future there was to be one united German Intelligence Service under the ultimate command of Himmler. Nothing was, however, fixed at that period (beginning of 1944) from an organisational point of view in regard to unification.

Kuebart was aware that he had had many difficulties with Heydrich and his successor Kaltenbrunner. Kuebart add that Hansen had told him that Himmler had arranged Heydrich's death as he was jealous on the latter's appointment of Reichsprotector (of Böhmen und Mähren) for Czechoslovakia in which position he would be working direct to Hitler. (Considering Schellenberg's "Aufzeichnungen" the story was quite different)


This new order of Hitler's created great alarm and despondency in the ranks of the Abwehr and Kuebart himself applied to Hansen for his transfer to the front. Hansen, however, begged him to remain reassuring that by remaining with the Abwehr they would remain soldiers and would not become part of the S.D. (SS, because S.D. belonged to Amt IV and the new merger would be with Amt VI and Mil Amt) (always the same, those interrogated and their interrogators are negligence in using terms of which at least their interrogators should have known about better) Kuebart who did not like the idea of

abandoning Hansen at a time when he would be experiencing many difficulties, agreed to remain on, and later on April 1, Kuebart was taken on the establishment of the Abwehr as Leiter I H.

Fidrmuc.

At about this period, or possibly a little earlier, von Carnap was instructed to arrange for Fidrmuc to make preparations to leave Lisbon for Barcelona in the event of an Allied landing there (in Portugal). This was considered the most convenient place for him to report details of such landing. (AOB, in March 1945, Fidrmuc (Ostro) was more or less forced, likely due to Allied pressure, to change over residence to Barcelona. From where he still provided information onto Berlin. The Allied had to put quite some pressure at the Spaniards and about January 1946 Fidrmuc had to leave for the American controlled zone of Germany; maybe the foregoing preparations supported Fidrmuc to find refuge in Barcelona, about March 1945).

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Ivan (Iwan)

In the middle of March 1944, Ivan (who was a British Double-Cross agent, he carried the British M.I.5. cover-name **Trycicle**, was a Yugoslav Lawyer/business man) wanted the Germans to issue two navicerts for the safe passage of two oil tankers from Sweden (where these tankers were interned) to Portugal (name unknown). He announced that this scheme would result in his being appointed to the board of the firm in question and thereby ensure his post-war employment as a consideration of past services to the Germans. (In Yiddish they would say: **gotspe**) (They were Double-Cross agents. But his business partner and friend **Johann Jebesen Double-Cross name Artist**, finally was caught by the Germans and did not survive the war).

Termination of Part I