

**KV 2/3568**

**Dr. Aloys Schreiber**

**Mainly considered in respect to the Johannes Jebsen (Artist) case**

This file I once have studied about 2015; some of its content was still vividly kept in mind, but the very details not particularly.

However, the recent confrontation with the annoying nonsense found on Wikipedia, sparked my objective to put matters right; based on the many materials available here.

A chain of coincidences enfolded. Foregoing materials have been made accessible on our new webpage, but an often referred name is a blank page still: Dr. Aloys Schreiber, Leiter I H of KO Portugal. His file does have all together 36 pages. The reason is, that the bulk of interrogation were managed by USFET; hence it actually is not a British document.

In my perception, the US way of creating FIRs and that like, is superior than the Camp 020 interrogation reports.

Dr. Schreiber, provides a sound summary, where we get access to aspects hardly one is aware of.

It is a sad story, but on the other hand, it shows us how the circumstances truly were.

The selected text passages, are my choices. My additional comments usually recognisable due to the application of blue or red colours.

The purpose of this document is for studying only, therefore, do not multiply it; as some still obeys to Crown Copyright.

By Arthur O. Bauer

S. Form 83

Form 12/51 (Rev. 11-21-1970) 40x7/52 SAC Ltd. 615

PF 96,731.  
[Redacted]

SCHREIBER DR. ALOYS.

L1108

See Also

Officer or Serial No.	Section	Date	Officer or Serial No.	Section	Date	Officer or Serial No.	Section	Date
		21 JAN 1955						
		15 OCT 1957						
		19 OCT 1957						
		8 MAY 1959						
		1 MAY 1959						
		2 MAY 1959						
		20 MAY 1959						
		28 MAY 1959						
		28 MAY 1959						
		28 MAY 1959						
		10 JUN 1959						
		11 JUN 1959						
		13 DEC 1977						
		14 DEC 1977						
		15 APR 1991						
		15 APR 1991						
		15 NOV 2011						

2  
51

KV 2/3568

FILE CLOSED

PF 96,731.

KV 2/3568

Dr. Aloys Schreiber

PF 96731

Please notice the quite many times that this document had been considered (last time on 5 November 2011).

KV 2/3568, page 3

NOTE

B.1.B. pointed out to SSU that a previous interrogation of this man on 27th December 1945 gave much fuller information. It was agreed that no further briefing need be sent to USFET.

B.1.B.  
11.6.46.

*J. Chenhalls*  
J. Chenhalls.

Note.

B.1.B. (M.I.5) pointed out to SSU that a previous interrogation of this man on 27 December 1945 gave much fuller information. It was agreed that no further briefing need be sent to USFET (United States Forces European Theater).

B.1.B. (M.I.5)

Joan Chenhalls

11.6.46

15.10.46	Extract from USFET Report on von GRONAU	5a
15.10.46	Extract from USFET Report on von Gronau	
13.11.46	Note on Usfet Report on GRONAU mentioning SCHREIBER, STEIMLE and SANDBERGER	6a

13.11.46 Note on USFET Report on von Gronau (Jebsen's mistress) mentioning Schreiber (KOP) Steimle (RSHA Amt VI/Mil Amt) and Sandberger (RSHA Amt VI/Mil Amt)

KV 2/3568, page 5

CI-RIR/7  
6 Jan 47

HEADQUARTERS  
7707 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER  
APO 757  
US ARMY

CI Reinterrogation Report No 7

Prisoner: Obst/Lt SCHREIBER, Aloys I-H KO Portugal

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On the basis of reliable information implicating SCHREIBER in the abduction of the GIS agent Johannes JEBSEN from Portugal to BERLIN in April 1944, the prisoner was recalled for further interrogation.

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CONTENTS	Page
REFERENCES	2
REPORT	2
1. JEBSEN's Refusal to Attend Meeting in BIARRITZ	2
2. Conference with KUEBART in BIARRITZ	2
3. Conference with KIECKEBUSCH in MADRID	2
4. HOLDENHAUER's Connection with the Case	3
5. SCHREIBER's Plans	3
6. The Abduction	3
7. SCHREIBER's Connections with HOLDENHAUER and JEBSEN	4

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CIRIR/7

6 Jan 47

Headquarters

7707 Military Intelligence Service Center

APO 757

US Army

CI ([Center Intelligence](#)) Reinterrogation Report No. 7

Prisoner: Obstlt. Schreiber, Aloys

I-H KO Portugal

On the basis of reliable information implicating Schreiber in the abduction of the GIS ([German Intelligence Service](#)) agent Johannes Jebsen from Portugal to Berlin in April 1944, the prisoner was recalled for further interrogation.

## References

## Report

1. Jebsen's Refusal to Attend Meeting in Biarritz
2. Conference with Kuebart in Biarritz
3. Conference with Kiekenbusch ([Leiter I, KOSp.](#)) in Madrid
4. Moldenhauer's Connection with the case
5. Schreiber's Plans
6. The Abduction
7. Schreiber's Connection with Moldenhauer and Jebsen

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CI-RIR/7

REFERENCES

MISC CI-RIR/118, dtd 20 May 46

MISC CI-RIR/122, dtd 16 Aug 46

REPORT1. JEBSEN's Refusal to Attend Meeting in BIARRITZ

In the early part of April 1944, SCHREIBER received a telegram from Obst/Lt KUEBART, Leiter Abw Abt I, ordering both him and JEBSEN to report to Nest BIARRITZ for an official conference on or about 20 Apr 44. The telegram was addressed to both JEBSEN and SCHREIBER.

When presented with this order from BERLIN, JEBSEN showed extreme surprise and displeasure and finally refused to leave Portugal. SCHREIBER warned him that such an action would be considered desertion by any court martial, since JEBSEN must consider himself a soldier with a special mission in a neutral country and thus subject to military law. JEBSEN remained adamant, despite SCHREIBER's insistence that he comply with the order and despite his warning that he would have to report this refusal to BERLIN. In reply, BERLIN once again urgently ordered JEBSEN to proceed to the meeting in BIARRITZ and in a separate dispatch to SCHREIBER ordered him to proceed alone to the meeting should JEBSEN still refuse. JEBSEN again informed SCHREIBER of his decision to remain in Portugal and SCHREIBER went to BIARRITZ alone.

2. The Conference with KUEBART in BIARRITZ

In BIARRITZ SCHREIBER conferred with KUEBART and his adjutant Sdf WEISS. KUEBART was given a verbal order by HANSEN to see personally that JEBSEN reached German-occupied territory or at any rate to thwart any attempt on his part to reach Allied territory. Desertion to the Allies was to be prevented by any means. KUEBART further informed SCHREIBER that this order was of extreme importance to the war effort. BERLIN had proof, he stated, that JEBSEN had been working for both sides for some time and was now preparing to go over to the Allies.

SCHREIBER claims to have protested to KUEBART that the entire affair was a matter for Gruppe III, counter espionage, and that the execution of such an order was purely a police measure. Both KUEBART and WEISS agreed with him on this point, but said that HANSEN had decided that this case was predominantly of military interest, therefore an exception was to be made and an I officer chosen to execute the order. Once JEBSEN was in BERLIN, he would have to answer only to the military authorities and under no circumstances to the SD. Furthermore, HANSEN had given the strict order that neither Gruppe III nor the German Police in Portugal were to know anything about the affair and that the number of those taken into confidence be kept to a minimum.

Neither KUEBART nor WEISS could offer SCHREIBER any concrete suggestions on the actual way of carrying out the order, especially the way of getting JEBSEN to German territory. It was left entirely up to SCHREIBER, but there was to be no delay.

3. The Meeting in MADRID

SCHREIBER was anxious to confirm this order from BERLIN, and since there was no rapid means of communication between BIARRITZ and BERLIN, he requested KUEBART and WEISS to accompany him to MADRID, where KUEBART might radio BERLIN for confirmation. KUEBART agreed to this and the day after their arrival in MADRID, wireless confirmation of the verbal order for the delivery of JEBSEN to Reich territory was received from HANSEN, specifically charging SCHREIBER with the task.

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MISC CI-PIR/118, d.d. 20 May 46

MISC CI-FIR/122, d.d. 16 Aug 46

Report.

1. Jebsen's Refusal to Attend Meeting in Biarritz.

In the early part of April 1944, Schreiber received a telegram from Obstlt. Kuebart, Leiter Abw. Abt. I, ordering both him (Schreiber) and Jebsen to report to Nest Biarritz for an official conference on or about 20 April 44 (AOB, **there exist strong evidence that it was already scheduled for late in March**). The telegram was addressed to both Jebsen and Schreiber. (AOB, **bear in mind that Jebsen was already strongly suspected for some time**)

When presented with this order from Berlin, Jebsen showed extreme surprise and displeasure and finally refused to leave Portugal (**his considered safe haven**) and finally refused to leave Portugal. Schreiber warned him that such an action would be considered desertion by any court martial, since Jebsen must consider himself a soldier with a special mission in a neutral country and thus subject to military law. Jebsen remained adamant (**obstinate**), despite Schreiber's insistence that he comply with the order and despite his warning that he would have to report his refusal to Berlin. In reply, Berlin once again urgently ordered Jebsen to proceed to the meeting in Biarritz and in a separate dispatch to Schreiber ordered him to proceed alone to the meeting should Jebsen still refuse. Jebsen again informed Schreiber of his decision to remain in Portugal (**where he felt himself save for German actions**) and Schreiber went to Biarritz alone.

2. The Conference with Kuebart in Biarritz.

In Biarritz Schreiber conferred with Kuebart and his adjutant Sdf. Weiss. Kuebart was given verbal order by Hansen to see personally that Jebsen reached German-occupied territory or at any rate to thwart (**prevent**) any attempt on his part to reach Allied territory. Desertion to the Allies was to be prevented by any means.

Kuebart further informed Schreiber that this order was of extreme importance to the war effort. Berlin had proof, he stated, that Jebsen had been working for both sides for some time and was now preparing to go over to the Allies.

Schreiber claims to have protested to Kuebart that the entire affair was a matter of Gruppe III, counter espionage, and that the execution of such an order was purely a police measure. (AOB, **this would imply the S.D. as the GFP had no jurisdiction in Portugal**) Both Kuebart and Weiss agreed with him on this point, but said that Hansen (**Leiter of the Abwehr section of Mil/Amt**) had decided that this case was predominantly of military interest, therefore an exception was to be made and an I (Intelligence) officer chosen to execute the order. Once Jebsen was in Berlin, he would have to answer only to the military authorities and under no circumstances to the S.D. Furthermore, Hansen had given the strict order that neither Gruppe III nor the German Police (**SS controlled**) in Portugal were to know anything about the affair and that the number of those taken into confidence be kept to a minimum.

Neither Kuebart nor Weiss could offer Schreiber any concrete suggestions on the actual way of carrying out this order, especially the way of getting Jebsen to German territory. It was left entirely up to Schreiber, but there was to be no delay.

3. The Meeting in Madrid.

Schreiber was anxious to confirm this order from Berlin, and since there was no rapid means of communication between Biarritz and Berlin, he requested Kuebart and Weiss to accompany him to Madrid (**KOSp. W/T station Sabine**), where Kuebart might radio Berlin for confirmation. Kuebart agreed to this and the day after their arrival in Madrid, wireless confirmation of the verbal order for the delivery of Jebsen to Reich territory was received from Hansen, specifically charging Schreiber with the task.



In a conference attended also by Obst/Lt KIECKEBUSCH, I Chief of KO Spain, SCHREIBER claims to have assured KUEBART and WEISS that he would try everything in his power to get JEBSEN onto German soil in compliance with the order, but would not resort to any extreme measures. The discussions in MADRID led to no clear suggestions as to how SCHREIBER was to execute the order. KUEBART and WEISS returned to BERLIN and SCHREIBER proceeded to LISBON.

#### 4. MOLDENHAUER's Connection with the Case

In LISBON SCHREIBER learned that a close friend of JEBSEN's, a certain MOLDENHAUER, had arrived and was staying with him. SCHREIBER claims MOLDENHAUER was a GIS agent for Ast COLOGNE. He had come to Portugal on the pretense of contacting V-Maenner, but SCHREIBER suspected that he had no intention of returning to Spain, where he had previously been active.

Aware of MOLDENHAUER's good connections with Allied circles, SCHREIBER concluded from his discussion with KUEBART that JEBSEN and MOLDENHAUER were planning to desert to the Allies together in the very near future. He therefore felt it necessary to act sooner than he had intended and also to include MOLDENHAUER in the abduction, who otherwise might become suspicious and upset the plans. If innocent, MOLDENHAUER would have no trouble clearing himself with the military authorities in BERLIN.

#### 5. SCHREIBER's Plans for the Abduction

SCHREIBER decided to call both JEBSEN and MOLDENHAUER to his office for a meeting in the late afternoon of 30 April. At that time the office would be completely deserted. They would be knocked out and while unconscious placed in two large trunks in which they could be shipped by car the same evening over the Portuguese-Spanish and Spanish-French borders to BIARRITZ. To guard against all possible surprises at the borders, SCHREIBER also decided to drug them by injections.

Two assistants would be necessary to carry out the action. SCHREIBER chose BLHIL Inu, signal officer of KO Portugal, in whose name the car was registered and who, according to Portuguese law, had to accompany the car on a trip across the border and Karl MEIER, civilian motor officer of KO, who was thoroughly familiar with the car and if necessary could repair it.

SCHREIBER sent a wire to HANSEN in BERLIN to the effect that the sudden appearance of MOLDENHAUER supported their suspicions and necessitated his inclusion in the affair and that the planned action would be initiated without delay.

At noon 30 April he and MEIER purchased the two trunks, which SCHREIBER claims were large enough for a grown person and were fitted with adequately large openings for ventilation. The sleeping drug for the injections SCHREIBER obtained in a LISBON pharmacy.

Upon his return from LISBON SCHREIBER had asked JEBSEN to call at his office on the afternoon of 30 April, using as a pretext his intention of giving him detailed information about a decoration which BERLIN wished to bestow on JEBSEN. He had also asked him to bring along his friend MOLDENHAUER, ostensibly to question him on his missions.

#### 6. The Abduction

On Saturday 30 Apr 44 at 1800 hrs, JEBSEN and MOLDENHAUER arrived together at SCHREIBER's office. SCHREIBER carried on a general conversation with both of them for a short while and then called JEBSEN into another room. There he claims to have informed him of the true outcome of the discussions in BIARRITZ and of HANSEN's order to have him brought to BERLIN by force, since he would not go of his own free will. JEBSEN made a move for the door and SCHREIBER knocked him out. Meanwhile MEIER had also overpowered MOLDENHAUER in the adjoining room.

In a conference attended also by Obstlt. Kiekenbusch, I Chief of KO Spain, Schreiber claims to have assured Kuebart and Weiss that he would try everything in his power to get Jebsen onto German (ruled) soil in compliance with the order, but would not resort to any extreme measure. The discussions in Madrid led to no clear suggestion as to how Schreiber was to execute the order. (This in full accordance with Kuebart's statements on our webpage: <https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-560-wrede-artist.htm> ) Kuebart and Weiss returned (from Barcelona by car and Perpignan by train) to Berlin and Schreiber proceeded to Lisbon.

#### 4. Moldenhauer's Connection with the Case.

In Lisbon Schreiber learned that a close friend Jebsen's a certain Moldenhauer, had arrived and was staying with him. Schreiber claims Moldenhauer was a GIS agent of Ast (Nest) Cologne (Köln). He had come to Portugal on the pretence of contacting V-Männer, but Schreiber suspected that he had **no** intention of returning to Spain, where he previously been active. (Even there Moldenhauer was not really tolerated, because he belonged to Nest Köln which he evaded)

Aware of Moldenhauer's good connections with Allied circles, Schreiber concluded from his discussion with Kuebart that Jebsen and Moldenhauer were planning to desert to the Allies together in the very near future. He therefore felt it necessary to act sooner than he had intended and also to include Moldenhauer in the abduction, who otherwise might become suspicious and upset the plans. If innocent, Moldenhauer would have no trouble clearing himself with the military authorities in Berlin.

#### 5. Schreiber's Plans for the Abduction.

Schreiber decided to call both Jebsen and Moldenhauer to his office for a meeting in the late afternoon of 30 (?)April. (AOB, **actually about 19.00 hours, to be sure that all office personnel have been moved home**) At that time the office would be completely deserted. They would be knocked out and while unconscious placed in large trunks in which they could be shipped by car that same evening over the Portuguese-Spanish and Spanish-French borders to Biarritz. To guard against possible surprises at the borders, Schreiber also decided to drug them by injections.

Two assistants would be necessary to carry out the action. Schreiber shoes Beil fnu. signal officer of KO Portugal, in whose name the car was registered and who, according to Portuguese law, had to accompany the car on a trip across the border and Karl Meyer, civilian motor officer of KO, who was thoroughly familiar with the car and if necessary could repair it.

Schreiber sent a wire to Hansen in Berlin to the effect that the sudden appearance of Moldenhauer supported their suspicions and necessitated his inclusion in the affair and that the planned action would be initiated without delay.

At noon 30 April (?) he and Meier purchased the two trunks, which Schreiber claims were large enough for a grown person and were fitted with adequately large openings for ventilation. The sleeping drug for the injections Schreiber obtained in a Lisbon pharmacy.

Upon his return from Lisbon Schreiber had asked Jebsen to call at his office on the afternoon of 30 April, (**a contradiction, as elsewhere the 29<sup>th</sup> being given**), using as pretext his intention of giving him detailed information about a decoration (KvK) which Berlin wished to bestow on Jebsen. He had also asked him to bring along his friend Moldenhauer, ostensibly to question him on his missions.

#### 6. The Abduction.

On Saturday 30 April 44, at 1800 hrs (1900 hrs), Jebsen and Moldenhauer arrived together at Schreiber's office. Schreiber carries on a general conversation with both of them for a short while and then called Jebsen into another room. There he claims to have informed him of the true outcome of the discussions in Biarritz and of Hansen's order to have him brought to Berlin by force, since he would not go of his own will. Jebsen made a move for the door and Schreiber knocked him out. Meanwhile Meier had also overpowered Moldenhauer in the adjoining room.



According to SCHREIBER, he then informed both JEBSEN and MOLDENHAUER, after they had recovered in the presence of BLEIL and MEIER, how he intended to get them across the border and both of them submitted to the injections.

The party started out at about 2100 hrs to BADAJOZ with the two drugged victims in the trunks and SCHREIBER, BLEIL and MEIER as the other occupants of the Studebaker sedan. The Portuguese-Spanish border was crossed without incident between midnight and 0200 hrs, since BLEIL and MEIER knew border conditions and officials personally from previous trips both here and at the Spanish-French border in IRUN.

The trip through Spain was only interrupted by a few rests in the open and the Spanish-French border at IRUN was crossed at about 2400 hrs of the following night without incident. In BIARRITZ JEBSEN and MOLDENHAUER were immediately turned over to the local Stellen Leiter, Obst/Lt FUCHS.

A motor defect kept SCHREIBER and his two assistants in BIARRITZ until 4 May, when they returned to LISBON. JEBSEN and MOLDENHAUER, SCHREIBER claims, were transported a few days later to BERLIN in HANSEN's personal plane.

On the return journey SCHREIBER stopped off in MADRID to report by W/T to HANSEN in BERLIN. Shortly after his arrival in LISBON he received an answer from HANSEN expressing his thanks for the accomplishment of the mission.

In June 1944 SCHREIBER again had occasion to confer with KUEBART and WEISS in BARCELONA. They assured him that both JEBSEN and MOLDENHAUER had arrived safely in BERLIN, were under military arrest, but that the investigation had not yet been completed.

In the latter part of August 1944, during a short stay in BERLIN, SCHREIBER received the same answer from von BOELEN, Chief of the Iberian Desk at that time.

In November 1944 in LISBON SCHREIBER heard a rumor that MOLDENHAUER had recently been seen in the Hotel Ritz in MADRID.

#### 7. SCHREIBER's Connections with MOLDENHAUER and JEBSEN

SCHREIBER knew MOLDENHAUER only slightly. He is, however, certain that MOLDENHAUER was active in economic espionage for Ast COLOGNE and at times for Ast VIENNA and that he worked from MADRID.

JEBSEN was not an agent of KO Portugal, but was directly responsible to Abwehr HQ BERLIN, presumably to Obst/Lt MUNZINGER. SCHREIBER believes that JEBSEN worked mainly from PARIS and that his primary task was to maintain contact with his agent POPOV in England, with whom he had once studied in FREIBURG/Laden. JEBSEN received the reports from POPOV and handed them over to SCHREIBER to be forwarded to BERLIN, and SCHREIBER passed on to JEBSEN BERLIN's opinions of the reports and any other instructions for POPOV. JEBSEN was also engaged in smuggling prominent Jugoslavs to England via PARIS, MADRID and LISBON, of whom some acted as his paid agents.

JEBSEN had been called up as a soldier in the German Army, but in view of his relations to Allied circles and his connection with POPOV, he was considered indispensable and assigned to work on special missions.

In SCHREIBER's judgment JEBSEN was intelligent, but an opportunist.



According to Schreiber, he then informed both Jebsen and Moldenhauer, after they recovered in the presence of Bleil and Meier, how he intended to get them across the border and both of them submitted to the injections.

The party started out at about 2100 hrs to Badajoz with the two drugged victims in the trunks and Schreiber, Bleil and Meier as the other occupants of the Studebaker sedan. The Portuguese-Spanish border was crossed without incident between midnight and 0200 hrs, since Bleil and Meier knew border conditions and officials personally from previous trips both here and at the Spanish-French border at Irun.

The trip through Spain was only interrupted by a few rests in the open and the Spanish-French border at Irun was crossed at about 2400 hrs the following night (1 May 44) without incident. In Biarritz Jebsen and Moldenhauer were immediately turned over to the Stellen Leiter, Obstlt. Fuchs.

A motor defect kept Schreiber and his two assistants in Biarritz until 4 May, when they returned to Lisbon. Jebsen and Moldenhauer, Schreiber claims, were transported a few days later to Berlin in Hansen's personal plane.

On the return journey Schreiber stopped off Madrid to report by W/T to Hansen in Berlin. Shortly after his arrival in Lisbon he received an answer from Hansen expressing his thanks for the accomplishment of the mission.

In June 1944 Schreiber again had occasion to confer with Kuebart and Weiss in Barcelona. They assured him that both Jebsen and Moldenhauer had arrived safely in Berlin, were under military arrest, but that the investigation had not yet been completed.

In the latter part of August 1944, during a short stay in Berlin, Schreiber received the same answer from Bohlen, Chief of the Iberian Desk at that time.

In November 1944 in Lisbon Schreiber heard a rumor that Moldenhauer had recently been seen in the Hotel Ritz in Madrid.

#### 7. Schreiber's Connection with Moldenhauer and Jebsen.

Schreiber knew Moldenhauer only slightly. He is, however, certain that Moldenhauer was active in economic espionage for the Ast (Nest) Cologne (Köln) and at times for Ast Vienna and that he worked for Madrid.

Jebsen was not an agent of KO Portugal, but was directly responsible to Abwehr Merlin, presumably to Obstlt. Munzinger (Münzinger). Schreiber believes that Jenbsen worked mainly from Paris (lays here the link to Wrede?) And that his primary task was to maintain contact with his agent Popov (thus from the German perception Popov was run by Jebsen; both British Double Cross agents!) in England, with whom he once studied in Freiburg/Baden. Jebsen received the reports from Popov and handed them over to Schreiber to be forwarded to Berlin, and Schreiber passed on to Jebsen Berlin's opinions of the reports and any other instructions for Popov. Jebsen was also engaged in smuggling prominent Jugoslavs to England via Paris, Madrid and Lisbon, of whom some acted as his paid agents.

Jebsen had been called up as a soldier in the German Army, but in view of his relation to Allied circles and his connection with Popov, he was considered indispensable to work on special missions.

In Schreiber's judgement on Jebsen was intelligent, but an opportunist.