KV-2/1496-Kauder-Klatt

24.10.46 From S.S.U. (Strategic Services Unit) re Klatt special interrogation report No. 1. 80a.

Please see at 82a a letter from S.SU. to say that Klatt is to be released. (AOB: after the war the U.S. "ruled the waves" no longer Britain) In my view this constitutes a potential security menace, and although, presumably, it will be impossible to alter this American decision, would it not be advisable for the authorities on a high level both in the British and American Zones of Germany to be warned by the Security Service of the dangers in releasing such an able, young and successful agent. Commander Scott has confirmed that all but a special handful of persons in the American Zones of Germany are under guard of other Germans, and that the ruling at Nürnberg about Abwehr is being put into force immediately. Whilst we cannot criticise the wholesale release of this category of internee, I think you will agree that a special case could be made out of the detaining Klatt.

(AOB: Mss Chenhalls might have forgotten: that Richard Kauder was a born Austrian, and likely would return to Austria instantly; and that Klatt was by far not a candidate for a Nürnberg trial category)

(1) Commander Scott said that Klatt had been released from ?? custody on 11th March (1947) to C.I.C. Salzburg. One C.I.C. officer has been ?? made personally responsible for the surveillance of Klatt, but it is? doubtful how stringent a check will be maintained. (Q2122 ↕↕ Q2122return)

(2) Mr. Serpell (M.I.5) asked if he would expect further reports on Klatt's various interrogations. Commander Scott undertook to obtain reports on the interrogation conducted by Mr. Johnson (in the presence of Mr. Silver) on 27th and 28th of January (, which) terminated with Klatt's confrontation with Ira Longin. He also undertook to find out whether the points raised in Mr. Serpell's letter of the 13th February (1947) had been answered. (These concerned the flow of Max messages and OKW reactions to, and evaluation of, the messages.) Commander Scott further agreed to find out whether the Panda line of enquiry is being pursued.

(3) Mr. Serpell referred to the following points arising from Mr. Johnson's last interrogation of Klatt:-

(i) Klatt's account of his first meeting with, and subsequent recruitment of, Ira, which is not regarded as convincing or straightforward.

(ii) Klatt's pre-war record as revealed by Willi Goetz (Wigo). This item had been unsatisfactory handled at the interrogation.

(iii) Klatt's attempted suicide and its significance. Mr. Hanson is under the impression that Klatt had made two previous attempts. He will check on this.

(iv) The confrontation Klatt with Ira. Mr. Serpell suggested that Klatt's opening words showed Ira clearly that he had not been betrayed.

(vi) Klatt's claim to have voiced to von Wahl (guiding officer at Ast Wien) his suspicious of the source of Ira's reports in December 1941 and subsequently. This, Mr. Serpell suggested, might be regarded as a precaution measure for his own protection should the Abwehr become aware of Ira's Soviet agency.

We undertook to supply Commander Scott with a copy of the process verbales of the above interrogation.

(4) Mr. Hanson undertook to arrange for a search for Dr. Deutsch of the Klatt Meldekopf (LMK = Luftmeldekopf), whom we think sufficiently knowledgeable to merit interrogation if he can be located.

(5) Mr. Serpell referred to the report on Franz Bergler and to S.S.U. comments of the 14th February (1947). He did not think Bergler's ignorance of Natasha's surname was significant, nor did he feel that Bergler was worth interrogating further. It was decided that paragraph three of S.S.U.''s letter should be referred to Mr. Bossard (who is paying short visit to London at the beginning of next week) since we were not of ??? reports to the allegedly given by him to ???

(6) The Wagner report (AOB: alias Dr. Delius; the Leiter of K.O. Bulgaria. There existed a great deal of animosity between Kauder alias Klatt and Obstlt. Otto Wagner. The main reasons were, certainly two-fold: jealousy an Obstlt. of the Wehrmacht versus a civilian and thereupon being a Jew too. What also counted was: that Kauder/Klatt was highly regarded up to the Highest Echelons of the Wehrmacht even Hitler knew of him. The question quasi exploded, after Obstlt. Wagner discovered that Kauder/Klatt had even got, for his Luftmeldekopf office, an telephone connection directly linked onto the Europe-wide Wehrmacht telephone exchange system!) (Commander Scott's letter of 5th March 1947 (4 days before Richard Kauder was released from captivity) was discussed and Mr. Serpell said he found it convincing and of considerable interest. He thought that the relationship between Klatt and Otto Hatz (Hungarian Colonel) ?? bed therein should be investigated, and the commented on the passage //ting to Schellenberg, which provided a reasonable explanation of Schellenberg's own statement at Camp 020 (KV 2/94 .. KV 2/99; PF 600561)that the OKW applied the Klatt ??enstelle with "Spielmaterial".

Mr. Hanson said he though it certain that Mr. Johnson was in possession ? Wagner's information (KV 2/284, PF 601320; quite some is French language because Otto Wagner was made P.o.W. when he was stationed in Stuttgart and thus felt in French captivity) at the time of his interrogation of Klatt.

(7) Commander Scott stated that Turkul and Ira were still in custody; that Ira would in all probability be treated in the same way as Klatt, but that in view of Turkul's importance in White Russian circles, his disposal would present an embarrassing problem for USFET (United States Forces European Theater).

(8) Mr. Serpell stated that it had been decided that deception experts should be asked to examine the Max material for the possibility that large-scale deception had been practised by the Soviet through Klatt's organisation. (completely unaware of that the Russian NKWD was actually the source of information and not reverse)

(1) Commander Scott referred to the following incident described in Flicke's book. The Germans successfully intercepted W/T traffic from the U.S. Military Attaché (Mr. Feller) in Cairo in Autumn and Winter of 1942. (AOB: should be Winter/Springtime, thus early in 1942. The Germans possessed a copy of the American Diplomatic 'Black Code' book. They obtained it from the Italian Secret Service SIM. The British Services could notice in their decrypts of German Communication that they possessed knowledge which they only could have been obtained from inside. Rommel called this secret source my "golden Egg". The interception took place in the Überwachungsstelle in Lauf a/d Pegnitz (vicinity of Nürnberg); where Fricke (Flicke) was engaged in some respect) This traffic contained operational intelligence on the African campaign including details of the British O.B ? Flicke claims that Guenther Weisenborn wrote a play which was broadcast in December 1942 on the Deutschlandsender and whom revealed to the American the fact that their traffic was being broken, whereupon transmission ceased. (AOB: Feller had been removed from the Middle East. Delicate on the British side was to inform the Americans without having to admit that they possessed all the knowledge). Commander Scott suggested that this story might be checked. (AOB: In the 1990s with the support of Louis Brown - a censored version saw daylight in the US: War Secrets in the Ether Story of German Code Breaking)

(2) Mr. Serpell then mentioned certain features of the book which were of exceptional interest:-

(i) Information regarding the R.I.S. in Bulgaria which might throw light on the connection which we suspected to have existed during the war between the Klatt/Ira Longin organisation and the Rote Drei https://www.cdvandt.org/rote_drei_espionage.htm) and which we know to have existed between the R.I.S. (Russian Intelligence Service??) in Bulgaria and the Rote Kapelle, Rote Drei and Robinson networks respectively. It was agreed that this line of investigation should be exploited as far as possible.

(ii) The Polish network operating in Western Europe. and Flicke's speculations on the use by the Russians of the "Enigma" machine in this connection & also in the Rote Drei operations in Switzerland. Mr. Serpell referred to Flicke's believe that the R.D. (Rote Drei) material was obtained largely through interception of OKW traffic, and his opinion that the Rote Drei was the most important R.I.S. organisation in the war. (AOB: for those going really into for it - please consider also: https://www.cdvandt.org/german_intelligence_switzerland.htm and Hans Pescatore KV 2/1329 PF 602116.) This thesis could only be assessed by experts.

3) It was agreed that the bilk of Flicke's book ought to be reproduced and Mr. Serpell thought it might be possible for this to be done in M.I.5 (where Mr. Serpell himself was engaged) It was agreed that both S.I.S. and LSIC should receive a copy.

4) Commander Scott authorised as complete an exploitation of Flicke's material as were able and willing to undertake and he was anxious that an expert evaluation should be made, agreeing that specialist organisations such as LSIC should be consulted. Mr. Serpell himself undertook to attempt a preliminary evaluation of the material from a non-technical point of view within the next fortnight. This evaluation would be welcomed by USFET.

5) Finally, it was agreed that the meeting had served a very useful purpose and that similar meetings should be arranged in the future to eliminate lengthy correspondence and to cover the ground more fully than was possible on paper.

"Subject were interrogated by an agent of CIC Salzburg, who had been carefully briefed to obtain all information possible from Bergler and his fiancée needed to clarify the identity and location of Tanya Balkanowa (KV 2/2125) and her relationship to Ira . Bergler was first taken to CIC headquarters for questioning, at which time he identified the two female companions who accompanied from Pressburg (Preßburg) to Leogang in May 1945. One was Irima (undoubtedly Irina Christenko. Ira's niece who was reported to be employed as a dentist by UNRRA (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Relief_and_Rehabilitation_Administration) in Munich in 1946) (U.S. Zone), and the second, "an attractive blond woman" with the first name Natascha.

It is the opinion of our local representatives that the "attractive blond woman" described by Bergler is identical with the woman described by Kauder (Klatt) whom Ibyola Kalmann remembered as Tanya. It is possible that the name 'Natasha" known to subjects may have been an alias of Tanya Balkanowa, and it is equally possible that subjects were briefed by not to disclose the true name or identify of Tanya Balkanova. Therefore, a notional character Natascha (Bergler alleges to have forgotten her family name) may have been created for us by Bergler and his fiancée, should they ever be questioned on this subject. Attention is also called to the discrepancy between Kalman's statement that Tanya said she had known for years, and Augusti's statement that Natascha had met Ira only in Pressburg (Preßburg).

This interpretation of Bergler's statements would also explain the additional information volunteered by him concerning 's system of obtaining intelligence information from the Soviet Union, which is identical with the original false version given by concerning his sources and methods.

CIC has been requested to gather further information from Bergler and Augusti concerning the full name and present whereabouts of Natascha. Bergler will be available in the future for any further questioning concerning this case."

London comment: The best reason for assuming that Tanya and Natascha are identical would seem to come from the curious similarity in the false information commented upon in para 3. If it can be proved that Bergler was to such an extent in Ira's confidence that he had deliberately sheltering Tanya under the name Natascha, this investigation of Bergler may develop several interesting facets, particularly if it will lead to the location of Natascha. Therefore, at the risk of being led off on yet another side track, we are encouraging the action in papa 4.

Interrogation in German (language) (a great exception in the British Secret Services, as they, generally, were incapable to speak nor understand sufficiently the German language)

J. We have read all the information and reports on you, studied your own statements and made ourselves a (necessarily translated) picture of the ideas you wanted to convey. However, since your last interrogation, we have found hundreds of documents ←→(AOB: Almost certain a lie, as did Mr. Johnson also in the Fidrmuc-Ostro interrogation! See N2116 N2116return) (AOB: It is almost certain that the German Secret Service branches have destroyed almost all of their secret documents; as it was clearly foreseeable, for months, that the Russians were approaching; and the latter did not share documents with their Western Allies) and carried out interrogation of people who know you and whom you know - do you understand?

J. You know that many people who know all about Klatt are now in our hands, from Schellenberg down, ~~all~~ (many) the Abwehr officers, an your particular friends, Turkul, Ira and Romanov (Romanoff) they have all had the opportunity to talk about your case; and now we are going to start on a complete new basis - is that clear?

J. Right. And we will now question you, and it is your last chance to answer. As an Abwehr man you do not interest us; as a man who worked against Russia in the Abwehr you are of no interest, as such are of interest only to the Russians. Do you understand that? ← ↑ (O2118 O2118return)

J. We will start from the beginning. I do not want you, in your own interest, to repeat things that you have already said once when they are not true.

J. Your friend Ira Longin has also stated that he can not take W/T either. Do you believe that?

J. Your first statement was based on the assumption that you and Ira together received W/T information.

J. We'll come back on that. You have no further interest in lying Say at once that your whole story of the wireless system was all swindle. The Bulgarian Police -

J. On the 17th July 1946 you were interrogated by an officer, and you told him that you had a receiving station with the Bulgarian Police in Burgos, who received from Tiflis.

K. One moment. I had an apparatus with the Bulgarian Police who listened in for me.

J. I will tell you. Ira (Longin) confirmed it. It depends on the statement that you had agents in Russia.

K. Oh no, do not confuse that. I was in Sofia, independent of Ira, who was in Budapest. And in Sofia I received from the Bulgarian Police. (AOB: maybe significant is to know, is, that the Bulgarian language has quite familiarities with the Russian language and therefore Bulgarians were likely capable of copying Russian language W/T messages) I said "Is there any possibility of communicating with Russia?" and this arrangement was fixed with Tiflis. At that time Ira Longin was in Budapest and said that he had people who crossed the frontier from Carpatho-Russia.

J. Ira Longin has told us that he never once had a single agent, and that you know very well. (AOB: seemingly a poor British language translator)

J. You are a clever man, and for years your whole Klatt service was founded on the existence, or supposed existence, of up to 6 agents providing Ira Longin with reports, and during the whole time from '41 till '44 you can tell me that you believed in these agents?

K. Excuse me. Ira (Longin) had information from Russia before the war. These messages were sent from Vienna (Wien) to Berlin, and there checked and found good. Quite separate from all this I went to Sofia and tried to arrange communications. These efforts led to the Tiflis link.

K. It is not so, my communications lasted about six weeks. This can be confirmed. A report was received about a ship, and I did not know the name of this ship, which I reported.

J. You have invented this swindle about Tiflis from the beginning to the end. An I now tell you you have one chance left to say it is nonsense, and if you do not admit it, you do your self more harm than good. (AOB: Oh, ?? how then?) The whole edifice you have built up on the bases that Ira (Longin) received the information from Russia is rotten.

K. No, it was later that I was asked by Graf Marogna-Redwitz to pass Ira's messages, and whether he swindled or not I do not know.

J. Oh come, you were years with Ira, and when Delius (AOB: alias of Obstlt. Otto Wagner, Leiter KO Bulgaria) asked you about his information, you said his sources did not interest you. (AOB: touching the essence: between Richard Kauder/Klatt and Obstlt. Otto Wagner there existed a strong animosity: An Obstlt. in the German Wehrmacht versus a civilian and a Jew as well, whom was highly regarded in the highest circles in the OKW and Government, that was un-sustainable for a man like Obstlt. Otto Wagner)

K. I twice sent people after Ira (Longin) in order to find out where he got his messages, and at that moment, when Ira Longin discovered he was being watched, he said "I see you are having me watched, which means that from tomorrow no more messages; and if Ira (Longin) today states that all those years he swindled -

K. I have asked to be told concretely, with facts, where I have lied. If I can be told facts, I might be able to help. I don't know what he was doing. I only know that I passed on his reports as they were received by me. All that Ira (Longin) told me I reported back to Graf Marogna, and he said that up to 80% of the information was true.

J. We know all that. But we do not think Klatt was so stupid for four years to take this information without, in his won interests. Trying to find out where it came from.

K. Do you think I would have risked knowingly to forward false information? That I would make myself a party to that?

K. Ira (Longin) asked it. I said to Graf Marogna that I could not investigate. It you want it, investigated I said to him, please do it yourself.

J. I will give you one more chance. You told the story to the gentleman in July (1946) the story that that you and Ira Longin decrypted the messages. I have your own handwriting for that. You said you know not not one word of Russian. I know Ira's German, as you do too, and it is very bad. And that two people, one halt and the other blind, should translate Max and Moritz messages from the text - that I cannot believe.

K. There were three men, Dr. Deutsch, Colonel (Obst) - and - all three read the messages with Ira Longin, and none of them speak Russian - so I don't see why I need to know Russian either.

J. Let us return to Sofia. I spoke to ~~Romanov~~ Romanoff (relative of the Turkul family), who lived with Ira Longin for three weeks.

J. And he told me - he has no interest in disguising the truth because he is free and content - he told me a lot. He was 3 weeks with Ira (Longin) in the street of 3 September No. 6, and Ira (Longin) 's activities there - Ira (Longin) had no receiving apparatus, but he did have a radio.

K. I asked Ira (Longin) as I thought he got the information from the radio and so asked him if he had a radio; and he said he had none.

J. Well, Ira (Longin) had one and Romanoff said he never listened to it. Romanoff did not leave the house for 3 weeks, because he did not wish to be seen, and he told me exactly how Ira got his Max and Moritz messages. He told me every day - and you know that too, and Ira Longin told us - that Ira Longin went to Tania. (likely in Sofia).

J. Every morning Ira (Longin) and returned with a packet of messages and said "Now I'm going to Klatt." You must have known of such a simple manual system.

(AOB: Mr. Johnson's reconstructions shows a very poor understanding of the historical contexts. We have already dealt with, albeit briefly, that it is almost certain the Russian NKWD had been involved, and they supplied the core of the Max-, maybe also the Moritz messages. But the NKWD (NKVD) could only operate regularly on daily bases, in locations where a Russian representation existed. This did not exist in late 1944, for example in Preßbrug; but it did exist in Bulgaria and what Romanoff was explaining took place there and not elsewhere. In a later stadium, due to lack of direct Russian means, it is to be expected that the NKWD contact took, in some-way-or-another, via means of the Japanese, as they possessed a representation in Hungary, thus Budapest, and Preßburg was the capital (?) of the Republic Slovakia (Tiso?); just where the final stages of the war happened. Japan and Russian became at war to one-another later in 1945.)

K. Because that is not true. He told me that he received the information between 12 and 1, sat down and transcribed it, put the messages in his book and gave this book to me.

J. In any case, he brought the messages. You never had any proof how he received them.

K. Ira (Longin) told me he had received these messages from Turkey - and there they were.

J. How did he receive them? How was he able to get them so quickly because some of them were very "hot" - they could have been sent by no other way than wireless.

K. I was of the opinion that Ira (Longin) had people in a neutral Consulate. I believed that it was in the Japanese Consulate in or something.

J. As you know very well, the Max messages were very highly regarded as headquarters. You must have realised that the Russian tactical messages were mainly true. (AOB: they only knew this due to the constant stream of decrypted R.S.S. messages. But these M.S.S. secrets they could not ventilate; thus a cover-show had to be played) And you want to make me think that the Japanese Consulate in Turkey got those true messages? (AOB: true or not-true, these messages most likely still had been in Russian language, thus Ira 's intermediate was necessary)

K. No, I knew that the messages did not come by W/T, that is why I did not believe it. I believed - and told Ira Longin myself - that he got it from some Consulate.

K. From '41 to '42 I did not examine the question. From '42 to '43 I had so much to do with my affairs (AOB: think of the 5th July event and Kauder's forced moving to Hungary and Budapest) that I really could not go into it. You probably do not realise quite how busy I was. I could not go into the question as far as I wanted myself.

J. But your entire existence was entirely dependent on Ira (Longin). If you had not been "trusty" for the Max-Moritz messages, you would long ago have been in a concentration camp.

J. Therefore when you say you had no time to pay Ira's messages because of other work, it is nonsense. Ira (Longin) was the rock on which your house was built.

K. That I explained a thousand times to Graf Marogna. You must not forget that I did not go to the Abwehr willingly, in the first place, but was forced into it.

K. I swear by my parents that I am telling you the truth. Please put your questions to me and I will answer them. I was nearly a year in prison.

J. I am not angry, but please do not hinder us with noise. I know that you originally said that you got the messages from a man in Tiflis, but I tell you that story was swindle; and if you tell me again that it was so, then I will not believe one single word of what you say from now on. Was that Tiflis business swindle? You can say yes with assurance, because we know it already.

K. Matis and the Bulgarian Police sent me messages for six to seven weeks. There were Matis, Sarafov and the third was Topalov. They told me that they arranged all fixed to receive reports from a Macedonian "freedom" leader. (AOB: Please bear in mind that the Bulgarians were considering Russia as their closest ethnic relatives, see. for example Dimitrov once directing a Russian Secret Service bureau in Moscow during the war, being actually a Bulgarian citizen. Therefore I would not wonder the the Russian NKWD (NKVD) channelled delicate matters via Bulgaria).

K. How could I, during the war? The first message came with the name of an airfield and the number of a formation to which a man belonged, and that was checked in Berlin (AOB, this might have been even before the Germans invaded Russia on 22 June 1941) and was found to be correct. For six or eight weeks they came and were sent on by me to Berlin. (AOB: Maybe indirectly, as Klatt's direct superior was the Abwehrstelle Wien)

J. I don't want to hear that again. All through this you are always hiding someone else. In the Max-Moritz reports you hide behind Ira (Longin), and now you say that freedom workers were getting the reports for you. But you never checked whether these Burgos reports did come from where they said. (AOB: how could he have accomplished this?)

J. Apart from you, no-one knows about it, and you never had any proof that there was a Bulgarian Police officer in Burgos who took the messages downm had you.

K. No, but the messages that we got from the these Bulgarian Policemen and Matis had nothing to do with ~~Lang~~ (Ira ).

J. But what interests me is that you gave the messages on to the Abwehr as reports from Macedonia.

J. Now we are coming to a point which you have talked about before. Your whole existence hung together with the continuation of Ira's ('s) information. In other words, his reports were your first care, had to be your first care.

J. Therefore you had the greatest interest in not disturbing these reports. You knew that in that case Ira would get rebellious.

J. And you never tried to discover the source of the messages, you were never anxious that they might come from a source that could bring you to the gallows?

K. Precisely the reverse. Perhaps I did not go into the question, or did not wish to disturb Ira (Longin) about it, because Berlin knew that the reports came from Ira (Longin) and not me, so that if they discovered it to be swindle, then the German Abwehr, who would investigate, would not have made me suffer. I did not share in hiding of the swindle.

J. You knew very well that Ira's ('s) story of the agents he had smuggled over the border before the war was untrue.

K. In '42 or '43 when Ira (Longin) asked for more money for the support of the families of these agents, I began to doubt it.

J. In other words, for 3 years, although you did not believe him, you continued with the transaction.

K. What has that to do with it? (AOB: please bear in mind - that the Germans regularly checked the significance of these messages and apparently they still considered them being valuable and true)

K. No. Ira (Longin) told me in Budapest that, was a result of his connections as leader of Sokol in Munkatsch ...

J. We know all about that from Ira (Longin). He has now made a complete statement.

J. I want to hear from you that this complete network of agents in Russia did not exist. You knew it.

J. Do you know that they were invented? (AOB: nonsense, as the message passed onto Berlin (via Ast Wien) were checked on relevance) Now, I have already said that since you were last seen, many documents have been found (AOB: a apparent Lie!!), so that now the whole past is built up again, and in the files the name Klatt or Kauder, or whatever you called yourself, occurs not seldom. Do you know the name of Jakovlev? This is a very important question.

J. Yes, tell it. We are not playing chess, that you should take so long to consider your next move.

K. There is a possibility that I wrote this name some time in a report on a person whose name I did not know, and so invented it.

J. That is too complicated. I put it to you straight, do you know the name Jakovlev

J. Can you consider again, because it is of the greatest importance for you. (Bluffing) We will give you five minutes to think that over, Tell me when you are ready.

K. (after long silence) May I tell you something? I know that when I wrote reports on people whose names I did not know, in the Tiflis connection, I put in invented names, and corrected them later when I found the right ones.

J. I asked you if this was the first time you invented anything. You said you put in names that were not correct. Is this the first time you have admitted it?

J. Up until now your have never admitted that you invented a name; suddenly, the first time you invent a name, it is a name with which you do not want to be connected.

K. I state now that the name Jakovlev means nothing to me. I do not remember it nor know it, but I may have used some similar name in a report.

J. You know well that in his absence from Sofia the messages were never taken by anyone else and brought to you. In other words, in his absence the messages never came through. Did yoy never think about that?

J. If the transmissions had been by W/T, in his absence Ira (Longin) would have had to have somebody there to pick them up, or otherwise all the messages would have been wasted.

K. No, Ira (Longin) did not say he wanted to be in Bulgaria, and he said he had no-one.

K. Yes, and he had no-one else. He asked me that when Romanov (relative of Turkul) came I should tell him nothing of it.

K. No, but I thought he had someone in the (Russian) Consulate who forwarded it.

J. Look here, as an Abwehr man, as a German, you are of no interest to us, only to the Russian. For us you are on interest only in one direction - what is that?

K. In 1940 before the Soviets came into it, Delius (= Obstlt. Otto Wager Leiter K.O. Bulgaria) suggested it.

J. You never believed it was Soviet chicken food (AOB: this is too simple as the true relevance coming out of the Russian material was by far to much true).

K. I asked the gentlemen in Vienna (von Wahl and Marogna-Redwitz) in Vienna (Wien) to investigate that might be so. That was '42, '43 and '44.

K. The reproach that I have worked with the Soviets can not affect me, because - I have no words for it. It is so incongruous that I cannot put into words.

J. But you do not come into that - you know that if it were true you would be much more interesting than as a member of the Abwehr.

K. I have no proof for it, that is my misfortune, to make that clear, that it is so absurd that Ira Longin or I worked on behalf of the Soviets that it is impossible to consider.

J. You say that goes for both Ira and you. You are well aware of the fact that you and Ira Longin worked so closely, like twins. Ira (Longin) did not want to have anything to do with the Abwehr, it had to go through you; And you said all your side had to go through Ira (Longin) -

J. One thing we have settled with you, that you can not yourself state definitely that a radio-man existed at all in Tiflis.

J. You said to the gentlemen (von Wahl and the Leiter of the Ast Wien Marogna-Redwitz) who came in July that you helped the Bulgarian Police to decypher. You told him that you used letters, not figures.

K. No, you misunderstand. The gentlemen (von Wahl and Marogna-Redwitz) asked "In what language do the messages come?". I said I didn't know, it was either Turkish or Russian; This question of ???hers - Ira (Longin) told me that he decyphered his own that way. (AOB: by the way - the Russians on Western European Continent used in their OMS (Komintern) communications German language generally)

J. You said (reading from report) "Klatt believed these reports came to the Bulgarian Police in Russian. He did not ask the Bulgarian police.

K. Yes, but do not get the connection confused. Matis telephone the messages to me in cypher. The Bulgarian police decyphered it. Over the question of the ship I telephoned to the Bulgarian Police in cypher. That is the origin of the error. It was used only with the telephone traffic between Sofia and Burgos.

J. I have heard what Matis?? you said. According to you Ira (Longin) brought you all the Max-Moritz reports in Russian.

J. Let us have a few more words of Russian. What is the Russian for "war" or for "regiment"?

J. What did you do in Vienna (Wien) in your youth: What was your profession? What did you do?

J. Did you never have any connection with Workers' Parties; amongst the Vienna (Wiener) food workers I had some connection.

J. You know that the Ira (Longin) today knows exactly and holds back nothing, and does not deny to us that he never sent an agent into Russia. Is there anything surprising about that?

J. With what result to yourself? In other words, I mean that you would have saved yourself from the situation which had been suspected before by people like Dr. Delius (AOB: the alias of Obstlt. Otto Wagner the Leiter KO Bulgaria. There plaid much more things, Klatt's success and favour versus an Obstlt. versus a civilian and of Jewish origin also!)

K. I would, as a trusted man, have repprted to Graf Margogna and asked him to investigate it. When Ira Longin said he was a Life Guards officer and I heard that his father was a Czech emigrant, I told them in Vienna (Wien) that I had heard this.

J. Tell me; you had a big station for the Abwehr, why did it never occur to you to save a great deal of money and save a lot of questions y taking the messages from Russia yourself?

K. Oh yes, we often talked about that, even with Ira Longin, and Ira Longin strictly forbade it.

K. I talked it over with Stumm and Stimmermeyer (?) and we said if we had the frequency, we could try it out.

K. No, there was an Obstlt. (Hötzel Ii - Fulei of the Ast Wien W/T station Wera) in wireless who was often with , who talked it over with me.

K. No, because whenever the officers discussed it, they said so long as the messages are true, we are not interested in where the come from.

J. You said it would surprise you to day to hear that Ira (Longin) was a Soviet agent. (AOB: indirectly maybe, but Mr. Johnson cannot proof without any doubt that the NKWD did not play their own agenda)

K. Yes. That I can not believe. We have talked that over before, and I have said I can not believe it.

J. Why? During the whole war you were a German agent, and in your particular situation. -

J. I know you were one, and if you were no Russian agent, you must have been pro-German. (AOB: here Mr. Johnson is clearly showing that his mind and intelligence is being hampered by the circumstances but leaving out the dramatic fate of Richard Kauder's mother; the Jewish elderly woman mostly slaughtered in Concentration Camps)

K. I could say anything which I was forced to say, but I could not be forced to be a Soviet agent. I was forced to work for the German Abwehr. I had to do it, because they could have arrested me and deported my mother;

J. If Ira Longin is a Soviet agent, then you are the same. (Still Mr Johnson is possessing a distorted mind and lacking clearly intelligence)

J. Because you supported each other - I say this in order that you shall see the situation as we see it. (Möge Gott ihm behüten) It is definite that Ira Longin played his game - it was a game and a wonderful game - could not have been played without your active support. And Turkul lent his name to it. The way you took such care of Turkul and shouted loud that he was the whitest of the White Russians shows it:

J. I will tell you what Romanov said. (AOB: Please bear in mind that this Mr. Johnson was representing and taking this interview on behalf of the British M.I.5.; and not being sent on behalf of a group of instable minds) I asked him how it was Turkul was fetched from Rome, and Romaniov answered Klatt. Klatt Klatt. And he is the only one who pronounces your name correctly, incidentally, the others pronounce it as if it were a Russian name.

K. It was quite simple. Lang (= Ira ) came to me perhaps four of six weeks before the question was precipitated and asked that Turkul could be taken to Switzerland. I said I did not think it would be allowed. I can not say otherwise.

K. Kleyenstüber (KV 2/1494; PF 601503) said that he that he had so long promised to fetch (in Rome) Turkul to Budapest ... (However, it went first to Wien instead)

J. But you had the greatest interest not to anger Lang (Lang was Ira 's name on Lang's German passport).

K. I say I am not interested in hiding Ira , but I had the greatest interest in keeping Ira quiet.

J. To the extent of protecting a Soviet agent. (Klatt did not know the game the Russian NKWD played with them. But the game of the Russian NKWD, was often not in favour of the Russian military operations)

K. That I would have reported. If you do not believe my sworn word, then you can hang me. It is all the same to me what you do with my life.

J. You say that if Ira Longin were a Soviet agent you, so to say, throughout the whole war, hid a Soviet agent?

J. And you, as yourself have stated, from '41 onwards, had doubts of his messages.

K. Not on the source but on the channel. (AOB: Mr Johnson is pushing, but never put in the discussion the option that the NKWD source - did cover himself as a White Russian or as someone opposing the Soviets. I will not say that this actually was true, but scientifically such a circumstance should at least have been taken notice of. But Mr. Johnson wasn't approaching the case scientifically)

J. There is true chicken-food and half-true chicken-food - (AOB: bluff! As in Britain they knew damn well the potential and relevance of the messages conveyed through the Klatt channel)

K. If you tell me he received chicken-food, that I can understand; but if you tell me that for 4 years he received half-true chicken-food that is impossible. (AOB: Please, bear constantly in mind: that the NKWD - Max information concerned mostly matters which were due to happen soon!)

K. I did not believe it was chicken-food. I think Ira Longin had some connection with Russia. There might have been agents or through a neutral.

J. But if Ira Longin says it was all swindle? (AOB: Ira did not possess the means for himself to check whether the information passed on by him was relevant!)

K. How can I convince you? I want to give you in some form proof that I did not know more than I have told you. I admit that sometimes I made more of the business vis-a-vis the Germans, because I wanted to maintain my position until the end of the war. But more than I tell you I did not do. And I had the opportunity - I could have made arrangements with Ira Longin.

J. Ira Longin is not the type of man to make arrangements with you. Your suggestion only shows how little you know him, and how well he judges you. You said yourself that if you came to the conclusion that Ira Longin was working for the Soviet, you would have told your headquarters, Therefore Ira Longin was right, because he knew that if necessary you would safe yourself.

J. There would. If for three years you had hidden a man, and then suddenly came to the Abwehr to say "I have found that Ira Longin is a Soviet agent", they would not have said "Thank you, Herr Klatt, here is $10,000", they would have investigated how it came about that you had protected a Soviet agent for 3 years; and so you would still have to come to the gallows.

J. And you knew well that the only thing you are not telling us - and we are coming to itm you are not so independent as you believe is that you helped him (Ira ?), and you know why you helped him.

K. I never suspected Ira Longin of being a Soviet agent. If you had told me that the messages were not truem or something - yes. But that he was a Soviet agent - the thought never occurred to me up to the time when I arrived here.

J. You never heard that from Delius? (AOB: Dr. Leiter KO-Bulgaria, whom was an opponent, being mixed-up with quite some jealousy; as Kauder/Klatt was regarded more significant within the Abwehr than was an Obstlt. versus a Jewish civilian!)

J. You know very well that in '42 Romanov wrote that Ira Longin was a Soviet agent.

K. That is not true. He wrote a letter in Russian that Ira Longin was a liar. I got that letter from Gavrilov and he translated it. It said that he, Romanov, had cut off from Turkul, because he did not want to take part in an organisation which existed of the efforts of a liar.

J. He wrote a letter to Turkul in which he wrote - that we have from Ira Longin and Turkul and we asked if Klatt knew it and they said yes - it said that Ira Longin was a liar and that he must be a Soviet agent.

K. No, I do not know that letter. It was not to Turkul, the letter I know. I only know that it stated him to be a liar. I asked for Romanov to come to me and Romanov said in the letter that he did not want to have any connection with Ira Longin.

K. He asked me to intervene with Turkul to have the question dropped, and that was done. I believe Romanov was the most decent of the whole lot.

J. But to return to yourself; you say that you protect Ira Longin the whole time? You never did anything to hurt his set-up and always did all you could to ensure his future work.

K. I must tell you that it devoted from the beginning. Lang was the one who said to Marogna that he did not want to get to know anyone else in the Abwehr, but would work only with me for transmission of the messages to Vienna (Wien). Graf Marogna told me that I had the duty of protecting the man, hiding him and doing all he asked to achieve the aim which was that the messages got to Vienna. That was the beginning.

J. Yes, Marogna is dead, isn't it? (AOB: Marogna was murdered in the aftermath of the failed assassination on Hitler on 20^th July 1944)

K. Unfortunately, for he would confirm me. Then I sent the messages in both parts to Vienna. And when he came to me and said "I want money" and this and that, then I told Vienna (Ast Wien) Then I made the mistake of putting the Macedonia business off to Lang (= the name on his German passport; real name Ira )

K. I saw him once or twice in a restaurant with a fair-haired girl. I asked who she was, and he said it was the daughter of the priest.

K. From December 1939 until February 1940 (in Budapest), and Ira Longin was already there when I arrived. He had been there for months.

K. Yes. (AOB: please notice - that Kauder's delicate situation in a jail in Budapest was known to the Abwehr in Wien. And they might even have managed to get Richard Kauder in such a position; as to smooth him and gain him for an Abwehr engagement)

K. No. Ira Longin said "Klatt, things are going badly with me." I said perhaps I can help you, and he said Please, I might be able to do something with my Sokol people in Munkatsch. I told this in Vienna (Ast Wien) and Leutnant Seitel talked with Ira Longin, and told him to come to Vienna (Ast Wien).

J. When you were in prison together, did you never - Ira Longin is a man who had long ago sent agents into Russia - did you never talk about Abwehr?

K. Yes. The only time we spoke of intelligence matters in the Budapest prison was when he asked me whether I might be in Hungary for other reasons than I gave. Another man who was in the prison said perhaps I was engaged in espionage against Hungary.

J. We have found various things. (derived from former interrogations) We have settled that you can not do Morse.

J. So that if you do not know what Army is or Regiment is, it does not help to know numbers.

K. In the last two years Ira Longin spoke quite good German, but in the early days we did it with a dictionary.

J. A strange company. Have you ever thought about it? You did not know where the messages came from and translated with a dictionary.

K. The messages were well regarded by the OKW and on all sides. It was their business whether it was chicken-food or genuine.

J. I have read your life, that you have written yourself - do you remember what I mean? You made here, yourself, in typewriting.

J. Have you ever heard of the Free Russian Movement? (AOB: during the war in Germany known as the Vlassov Armee?)

J. He had something to do with the Abwehr in Belgrade. It is the first time you have heard of him?

J. Why, on the 15th July 1942 did you want to be sent two Russian typewriters? (AOB: this information, most likely had been intercepted by British RSS; we might later come across this actual message)

J. Do not forget that your whole correspondence is in the files in Berlin (AOB: Mr. Johnson is bluffing and lying!!!!!; there was no material left in Berlin, as almost all had been destroyed) Now I ask you - on the 26th 1943 Turkul wanted to go to Spain.

J. You yourself got a telegram which is now in the files in Berlin (AOB: bluffing and a pure lie), in which you were told that the Minister in Ankara regretted that he could do nothing for Turkul to sent him to Spain.

K. I don't know about that. I only know- on that date is shows that Turkul had thought of leaving Rome. (AOB: it was Kauder/Klatt whom managed to get Turkul and Romanov out of Rome by means of an aircraft in the possession of I-L Kleyenstüber, and the group was first heading for Wien)

J. No, that was a reply reply to a question of yours. You interested yourself in his leaving Rome.

K. I do not know now, what I had to do with Kalix. Perhaps some connection with Hungarian visas.

J. A telegram in the ~~Berlin~~ (British) files of the 13th January 1944, Stroh telegraphs you "Nothing functions here except Selmer. Will go ahead here so long as there is a generator. Ira Longin is flying tomorrow. Three of his people dead. Contact partly established. Kalix alleged to be dead" That is the telegram.

K. Yes, that was after the bombardment perhaps. For two or three days connection was broken because of the bombardment. Then first there came a letter from him, and then over the phone. I remember that I asked him which of his men were dead, because I did not know about them, and he said they all were alive.

J. Why did he give Kalix as dead if you didn't know him before, why should he tell you the name?

K. Perhaps it was Kalix sat in the W/T room and he wanted to let me know that the Hungarian Legation in Sofia had been hit.

K. Then please ask Dr. Deutsch (we do not possess any file reference upon him), he will tell you why.

K. I don't know. Last I heard of him he was in Budapest with the Hungarian Abwehr. I had no other connection with him than friendship. (AOB: It becomes clear that Klatt was anticipating upon the type of queries. Hatz .. I don't know .. than friendship. In other words: he knew him likely from Otto Hatz's stating at the Hungarian Embassy in Sofia. But he had no "dienstliche" connection with Hatz in Budapest)

J. We will now return to the earlier questions. Shenshin - does that mean anything to you? (KV 2/369 - 2/370; PF 66726) (AOB: this low PF serial number 66726 (5 digits versus 6 digits files) is pointing at the very fact that already in an earlier stage the British Secret Services took some interest in Mr. Shenshin)

K. The reports that came from Shenshin were given to Dr. Goetz (alias Wigo; operating mainly in Turkey) (Willi Goetz; KV 2/387; PF 600802) in Istambul (Istanbul) and then to Sofia. They were forwarded to Vienna (Wien). Apart from these reports, Shenshin sent letters to Turkul - I think there were 4 - 6 letters that went through me.

J. Would you be surprised if I told you that there was a close connection between the information that Shenshin forwarded and the Max-Moritz messages?

K. No. Romanov told me he did not want me to contact Shenshin, and I asked him why, and he said Lang (Ira Longin) would be angry.

J. Now return to Tiflis. What would you say was the organisation which operated through Tiflis?

K. Sarapov and Mattis were in Burgos (Bulgaria). Topalov was with them. They were Police officers.

K. I came to know the policemen - that is, I got to know them through the Police Headquarters in Sofia.

J. And when you arrived, they said that they had an organisation running with Macedonians.

K. No, we arranged it. That was in '41. (AOB: please bear in mind that the Bulgarian language and feeling was quite well connect with the Russians)

K. No, that was after (the German invasion on Russia broke out on 22 June 1941) I told him that we had succeeded in establishing a line from Macedonia. I showed him the messages.

K. It happened that they both happened to go together for a time, and one stopped and the other continued.

J. You know very well that if anyone had tried to send from Russia he would not have lasted long. Every operator had a couple of men from the Russian III-F (AOB: used here was the German designation for "counter-intelligence") looking over his shoulder.

(Here Mr. Johnson and Klatt continued to talk (in German language) unrecorded, and Mr. Johnson then dictated:

Klatt thinks it is absolutely out of the question that Ira should have invented these messages. If Ira Longin should have invented these messages. If Ira (Longin) said today "I never had an agent in Soviet Russia "Klatt would find it hard to believe.) (AOB: again - the most likely route went - from the Russian NKWD through someone of a diplomatic representation. Please bear again in mind: that most of the achieved information was of the sort of "predicting tactical and strategic military moves; thus information that due was to happen in the near future" thus quite contrary from where spies were obtaining information based upon matters currently already running) (The NKWD might have gathered their own unique sources of information)

J. How is Ira (Longin) can take the responsibility of saying it, but you take the responsibility of disbelieving it?

J. You worked against the Allies? You worked honestly for the Germans? I have talked with many people who were on the German side, and are now in our hands. But I have seen people who for years have lied, and people who have told the truth. I today it was 1943 and I as a member of the Abwehr and Marogna said "Come and look at Klatt", do you know what I would have said? I would have said at once "I do not believe a word that the man says. I can see it in his eyes!"

K. I am not looking normal because I am like a beaten dog. (AOB: Well tried, but neglecting: - that the Germans could take no other conclusion than that the passed-on information contained mostly true relevance; and in Britain the knew that a great deal of the intercepted German W/T traffic on behalf of Klatt was appropriate!)

J. It has nothing to do with the impression you give, and you have enough energy to lie.

J. You will be reminded of that statement. (AOB: meaningless words, after all; as Klatt will be set free some weeks hereafter)

K. You must believe that I wrote numbers of letters to Vienna (Ast Wien), asking that the question of Ira's ('s) source be investigated. I asked that I should be released from the responsibility of a thing that looked like a swindle. (AOB: in my opinion it wasn't mainly fake information, but no-one, also not the British in 1943, believed that a legal Russian entity (NKWD) would have provided it to their enemy)

J. If you were so anxious that you wanted to be released from this responsibility, you can not say that you do not believe in Ira's ('s) own statement that he had no agents in Russia (AOB: but Ira was actually an agent of the Russian NKWD, open remains, whether Ira knew what the real game the NKWD played in this context) You must have mistrusted him. You say that three times you told the Abwehr (AST Wien) you did not like the business - lots of times.

K. Ira (Longin) often lied in other matters, and therefore I simply mistrusted him.

J. You say that in spite of the known worth of his messages, you remained mistrustful of him? And yet now you say that you can not believe that he had no agent in Russia?

K. I cannot see how he can have got these messages all those years if he had none.

K. No, because I had nothing to do with Dr. Delius. There was no love lost between us. (= an Obstlt. Otto Wagner Head of K.O. Bulgaria; and the latter was furious against Klatt, though mainly because Klatt was more regarded at the O.K.W in Berlin, than was Obstlt Otto Wagner; and Klatt being a civilian and of Jewish descent) He had an obsession about Ira (Longin) working for the Soviets.

J. And you would not admit, because you dare not. You and Ira (Longin) stand or fall together. Have you ever offered Delius your services?

J. Does the mean that Delius tried to win you for himself and take you away from von Wahl?

J. And you never tried to approach Delius, in order to get away from Vienna (AST Wien)?

K. No, because my interest was to stay with Vienna (Wien). (the Wiener sphere differs quite much from the Prussian attitudes)

J. You are lying again. You have a particular expression when you are not telling the truth. There will come a day when you will have to tell the truth. (AOB, again purely intimidation, as some weeks later the Americans released Richard Kauder; maybe against British expectations, but they - the US - ruled the world, and no longer Britain)

K. But Graf Marogna was the person who protected my (Jewish) mother. Delius would not have been able to do that.

K. No, not that he was working for the Soviets, only that he was giving his channel of information falsely. (AOB: maybe protecting his NKWD source inside the Russian Embassy/Consulate, in Sofia or elsewhere) That I declared from the first day, and in writing.

K. The first time I asked in December '41, and Major von Wahl came, and I said I wanted to hand over to von Wahl, and had them to a meal together. Graf Marogna sent for Ira (Longin) in Vienna (Wien) and talked to him alone, without me, so that I could not influence it. Wahl talked with Lang (= Ira Longin) many times alone. I always was said Please see whether the reports are correct. That was what I requested. So long as the messages were true, Berlin was not interested any further.

J. You have time to think over what you are saying. We will see you again tomorrow morning.

(AOB: as I already noticed, held just five and a half week before Richard Kauder (alias Klatt) was to be released by the Americans)

J. Today we will talk very slowly, in order that every word may be recorded. Have you though over what we talked about yesterday.

K. Yes. I have made some notes. You said yesterday that Romanov stated that Ira went away to fetch messages and brought them in a package, and then he came to me. That means that he got the messages from somewhere in Sofia. I am not clear where the point is reached at which Ira (Longin) at which Ira (Longin) must have been a Soviet agent. Because he could not have fetched the papers from the Soviets. I am convinced that Delius watched him most carefully, even as he did me.

K. Then Vienna (Ast Wien) often asked questions on various reports, which were mostly answered.

K. Some kind of return line, or at least that there was some proof in the fact for me and for Vienna (Ast Wien) that the connection was not suspicious.

K. No, of this outstation, my station (Luftmeldekopf Süd-Ost). If there was a false game being played, that is the counter-proof.

K. In Vienna (Ast Wien) they asked for photographs of Lang (= Ira Longin), Turkul and me.

K. If Lang (= Ira Longin) had been a Soviet agent, the would not have asked for his picture. (AOB: I would like to add: that we may rightly consider that Ira Longin, unknowingly, was a kind of agent on behalf of the Russian NKWD, but this was of a different (entity) organisation within the Russian Communist State) And in Salzburg, the first thing they did when they came into my flat was to ask for a big photograph of me.

K. Lang (the surname name on his German passport) never brought messages from the Consulate. Then yesterday you asked whether I received messages from Hatz in May '44. So far as I remember, Hatz was recalled at the end of of April and came to Budapest (where Klatt already lived since, say, and or August/early September 1943). Fourteen days later he was arrested by the Gestapo and remained so for six weeks. Could I possibly have → received messages from him?

received messages from him? I have thought that he might have talked about me, but it was physically impossible for me to have received anything from Hhatz then. He could not have functioned as a provider of information from 15th October.

J. Is that all on your list? I will begin when you have finished. On your first point I will say the following. You know, as all of us know, that the best III-F (= counter intelligence) people can not watch a good agent all the time. If Ira (Longin) had any contact with the Soviets he would not have put himself in a position to be photographed in front of the Legation. If Ira (Longin) had intended to evade Delius's control, he would never had visited any official place. He would have gone to middlemen, who, is the case of the Soviets are often women, and on some quite different pretext. As you know, we are not concerned to discover from whom Ira (Longin) fetched messages, but what the channel was. Yesterday I asked you if the name of Jakovlev meant anything to you. I thought you would remember something, but that apparently is not the case?

J. One thing I must tell you. You, Klatt, who worked against Russia ostensibly during the war, will never make me believe there are things that are impossible - you will never make me believe that for years you were in Sofia and worked against Russia without knowing the names of the members of the Soviet Legation. (AOB: Mr. Johnson cannot imagine / understand that there do exist people not bothering what is not their direct aim. Mr. Johnson comes as a representative of M.I.5 and Klatt remaining in Sofia because he was sent there and also as to safe the fate of his Jewish mother; that he actually being a civilian employed by a German Military entity (he was even not entitled to wear a uniform) - that he might not be interested whom being employed in a Russian Legation. This shows that not Klatt is to be blamed, but Mr. Johnson whom is considering Klatt being a member of an Ast or K.O organisation, as a kind of being their middleman)

J. Not at all, you know every name. (an example of being a narrow-minded brains versus someone simply not of his necessary interest /duty)

J. You have said that before. You will never make me believe that, and I think it the most foolish way to inspire trust.

K. Do try, please to trust me. I am not lying. What you now say, That I knew the people in the Soviet Legation (in Sofia), is certainly not true. The personnel of the Legation did not go about freely, they were always under immediate surveillance by the Bulgarian Police.

J. There is this one man who was in the Soviet Legation in Sofia throughout the war, Military Attaché, and that is Jakovlev; and further, we have found information with a Russian if Sofia whe received messages from Jakovlev, and on these documents is written "Für Ira Lang (Ira Longin) - Klatt".

K. This is the first time I have heard of it, and I tell you I know nothing of this connection. (AOB: in case Mr. Jakovlev represented the NKWD channel - it is quite logical that Ira Longin did not share this information with Richard Klatt; why should he?)

J. It was therefore known the Ira Lang (= Longin) passed the messages on to you. You will not convince me that this was not known on the Soviet side.

J. So it is not surprising that these things for Ira (Longin) were intended to be passed on to you. (AOB: when now Ira Longin refused to expose his Russian channel; in my perception, for quite evident reasons) And it is now clear the Ira (Longin) collected his messages regularly through a woman. Furthermore, it → implies that military reports were regularly transmitted to to Ira (Longin) by the Soviet authorities with des-information : Klatt.

implies that military reports were regularly transmitted to to Ira (Longin) by the Soviet authorities with des-information : Klatt. It implies also that the people who gave the chicken-food were clever enough to insert sufficient correct information to maintain the interest of the OKW. (AOB: this was not directly a mixing up, thought at selected very crucial /essential moments to put in false information, as to allow to gain crucial tactical and strategic advantages; although; rather often a costly endeavour)

J. Well, you ask me to trust you, I ask you to trust me, when I say that it is better for you, in the circumstances, to tell us that it was clear to you that Ira got his messages from the Soviet side; in other words, that you completely understood where these messages came from, and, as you say, where the answers came from. I know it is difficult, after one has stuck to one story for a long time, to abandon it.

K. The possibility that Ira (Longin) is a Soviet agent and played this chicken-food into my hand never occurred to me. In view of the attitude of the German Abwehr it never suggested itself to me.

J. You know that Delius suggested it. (AOB: Mr. Johnson is simply jumping over the real source of discrepancy: Dr. Delius real name Obstlt. Otto Wagner Head of K.O.-Bulgaria, was vehemently opposing the Jewish born civilian - gaining far more appreciation of the O.K.W. in Berlin - than attracted Dr. Delius. This was the main source of the ongoing disagreement between Klatt and Dr. Delius)

K. If I had ever thought of the possibility that he was a Soviet agent I would certainly tell you - because what importance has it for me.

J. It has the following importance for you. I have already told you that as an Abwehr agent you are of no interest to me, and the question is seriously to be faced, if you were only and Abwehr agent, what is to be done with you? But we will not settle that now.

(AOB: Mr. Johnson is succeeding his competence, as the British Services were only granted some kind of "interrogation slots" think of when they are entitled to arrive and when they have to return to England on their own cost and behalf. They have further no jurisdiction at all. It was already known when the US would set Richard Kauder free. Only because of the latter facts, their former British Ally were granted a chance to at least have a chance of interrogating Klatt briefly)

K. You asked yesterday - you threatened me yesterday with handing me over to the Russians. Please notice: (O2118 O2118return)

J. I did not not go so far. I only said that you interested the Russians as an Abwehr agent pure and simple. (Mr. Johnson was without possessing a legal mandate)

K. The situation as regards myself is like this - I did not go freely to the German Abwehr).

J. I will tell you how I see that. (AOB: I will explain afterwards what factually appeared with quite many German Abwehr personnel. They were in a show process (tribunals) simply confected to death and thereafter being executed) The Russian method is to interest themselves only in their agents who begin to go soft. They leave in peace people who, in their eyes, are secure and in whom they has complete trust, (Mr. Johnson here explained that the Russian had requested a small agent of theirs who had begun to spill the beans to be handed over to them from Switzerland. (AOB: apparently is Mr. Johnson fit with a childish brain; producing simply - untrue - "baby-talk")

K. Looked at it logically, your view appears justified. As for the fact that I must realise that Turkul and Lang (Ira Longin) were Soviet agents - that I do not know. I can not convince you of it, but it is so. If you said now that you were going to hand me over to the Russians, still I could say no differently.

J. It is the least we can think - if we assumed less we would be taking you for a fool. Since '43 Turkul has been → convinced that Ira (Longin) was a Soviet agent.

→ convinced that Ira (Longin) was a Soviet agent. He shut his eyes and allowed Ira (Longin) to go ahead. Now if Turkul, who is no genius (neither was Mr Johnson, by the way), saw it, how is it that much cleverer and more experienced Mr. Klatt never came to the same conclusion? If today (spring 1947) had a revolver, now that he knows everything, at the first opportunity he would shoot Ira ((Longin), so convinced is he after all he knows that Ira (Longin) is a Soviet agent. It is perhaps in order to put himself in a good light that he says it, but that does not not change his conviction. And the only person who can see nothing is Klatt. (AOB: my personal perception: Mr. Johnson's summary has something in common with that of a "psychopath speaking about is recent sweet dreams")

K. I can only repeat the same words. The original messages that Lang (Ira Longin) brought from Budapest were examined and found to be good.

K. I sent the name of Ira (Longin) to Graf Marogna and said he was regarded by the Bulgarian as a Pan-Slavist. Later it was understood that he was trustworthy, and that I could go ahead with him. Then we came to Sofia. There Lang (Longin) handed over the messages to me. These again were checked. Once in 1941 I sat with Ira (Longin) ...

J. That has nothing to do with the question. If the messages were checked and found correct, the only conclusion to which Klatt, who was possibly the cleverest of the lot, could come, was that they were so correct that they could only have come from the Soviet side. That is the inevitable conclusion.

AOB: Dear dreaming Mr Johnson: - maybe too simple: The British suffered in the fifties and early sixties the scandal of "the Cambridge Five". Also in this respect the British Services and their controlling bodies proved to be clearly incapable of recognising the many counter indications: - that matters were quite wrong for a long time!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_Five

AOB: would like to skip these endless discussions between someone sitting at a regular desk in England, whereas other were being confronted with the danger of their existences.

KV 2/1496-1, page 53ab + page 54ac, both partially Klatt now being a bit more exited expressing himself in his native German language:

AOB: For what ever reason - the next interrogation statement is being worded in its genuine (German) language; what actually always should have been done, as translations never do reach the genuine emphasises of the maintained language and their expressions.

K. Ich habe die Ira (Longin) Meldungen nach dem eingegangenen Werturteil beurteilt, habe, wenn mir etwas auffallend gewesen ist, mich darüber mit der vorgesetzten Dienststelle unterhalten, und gebeten um Überprüfung. Ich habe dort, wo ich über Ira (Longin) persönlich gehört habe, dass seine Angaben bezüglich seiner Person nicht stimmen, nach Wien berichtet, und auch da um Überprüfung gebeten. Ich habe öfters gebeten die Meldungen daraufhin zu untersuchen, ob sie ein Ira (Longin) in die Hand gespieltes Spielmaterial sind - daran dass Ira (Longin) Soviet Agent ist, habe ich nie gedacht, und es wurde mir gegenüber auch nie von irgend einer Seite ein derartige Verdacht ausgesprochen, mit Ausnahme in Oktober 1940, wo, durch Delius nach Wien eine Anzeige kam dass Ira (Longin) mit Dr. Deutsch zusammen in den Garten des Soviet Botschaft gesehen wurde. Diese Anzeige wurde bei Graf Marogna überprüft, und mir mitgeteilt dass sie auf Unrichtigen Angaben basieren -

Essentially, it does not make sense to reproduce the few irruptions of Mr. Johnson.

AOB: In my personal perception: - I feel sometimes quite irritated, when British Secret Services personnel, like was Mr. Johnson, establishes opinions about someone's doings - whereas most of them never have been in the true-, often, rather dangerous situations of the real war. These Crown servants lived - at their homes with their relatives quite peacefully. Commuted during daytime between their homes to their offices by means of public transportations and returned vice versa towards the end of their working days to their homes again.

These men sat in their offices and at desks; and enjoyed their regular luncheons and that like. And, liked their unvarying family lives.

But, sometimes, shamelessly are judging the lives and doings of their opponents; whom did not have had the chance to choose their own way of living.

AOB: The cover-words Rote Kapelle and Rote Drei actually both were coined words on behalf of the German Gestapo (rather feared German Secret Police); both groups were driven purely on Communist basis.

AOB: The Rote Drei was a Communist orientated spying group operating from Switzerland.

It touches the Rado case - the latter was a Russian spy being in communications with Moscow on very regular bases.

Rado's channel passed also most mysterious fresh "Top Secret" information - directly coming from the German Military High Command gatherings.

It was never discovered whom this was, inparticular, behind it; albeit that the Germans decrypted almost all communications between Rado's group and Moscow.

One of Rado's W/T operators was the British - Alexander Foote (KV 2/1611; PF 66965)

1. The recent interrogation of Hauptman (Captain) Piepe in the Rote Kapelle enquiry has produced evidence:

a) that the initial playback of the Rote Kapelle wireless communications by the Germans was compromised by a warning "telegram" sent from Bulgaria to Moscow;

b) that, on the testimony of Trepper (= KV 2/2074; PF 68258), Sofia was rallying-point for agents escaping from German penetration of the Rote Kapelle, and that Sofia such agents were given money and instructions.

2. It has been known for some time that through Koropkin, a leading member of the White Russian colony in Switzerland, there existed a war-time link between Ira (Longin), Klatt's right-hand man in the Max service, and Tscherniak, a member, if not leader of the Rote Drei.

3. Wilhelm Flicke, who claims to have served in the OKW - Wehrmachtsnachrichtenverbindungen (WNV), has now produced a quantity of new information on the Rote Drei. Flicke's claims and his material are being investigated, but it is fair to say that his material at least bears up the initial examination. Apart from a general account of German discoveries on the Rote Drei, Flicke has produced several specimen of Rote Drei wireless traffic intercepted and broken by the WNV/FU III (OKW/Chi). These specimens tend to bear out his general account of the Rote Drei achievement which is a good deal more detailed, and sensational than the story we had from Pescatore (Hans von; KV 2/1329; PF 602116). Briefly, Flicke reports that from 1941 to 1944 (the end of 1943), throughout the Eastern offensive, the Rote Drei transmitters were providing Moscow with up-to-date and accurate information on German operations against the Red Army. (According to Flicke the intercepted traffic was not broken in any quantity until the summer of 1944 (in contrary to Hans von Pescatore's KV 2/1329 file), but according the documentary evidence in our possession some of it was being read as already as Spring, 1943 (this is in line with Hans von Pescatore's statements in his KV 2/1329 file).

Information on German dispositions, strength and intentions was so detailed that the German intelligence Service deduced the existence of Rote Drei sources in the highest quarters of the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres), Foreign Office, Air Ministry and German Intelligence Headquarters. (von Pescatore has already told us that there appeared to be highly-placed sources for the Rote Drei but not to this extent.) Flicke reports that "hundreds" of people were suspected and shadowed in the departments concerned. Rather oddly for an alleged member of the Funkabwehr, he seems so far to have said nothing on the search of communications between the Rote Drei and their agents in Germany. von Pescatore produced speculations on a courier line through the embassy of a neutral power, but this seems an inadequate channel for the volume and currency of the traffic described by Flicke. Flicke states for example that in October 1943 the Rote Drei produced eight eight hundred transmissions.

4. The intercepts of Rote Drei (in Switzerland) traffic so far produced by Flicke do not contradict his story. So far as new-traffic is concerned, however, he has only produced messages from Moscow to Switzerland; his specimens of two-way traffic are all concerned with Rote Drei administration. They very few examples of outward Switzerland-Moscow traffic which we possess in captured documents suggest detailed information on German dispositions but we have no means of judging their accuracy or currency.

5. Flicke's account of the Rote Drei in operation against Germany offers remarkable parallel to Klatt's account of his Max organisation in operation against the USSR. In the Klatt story we have the same date-context, the same widely-spread and highly-placed network....

AOB: We have to skip the rest as this is not really related to our Klatt Survey.

Obstlt Otto Wagner @ Dr. Delius has been encountered rather often; now we will deal a bit more with his backgrounds before the start of the 'Second World War'

In May 1937 Wagner left Saarbrücken for Berlin where he was posted to Abwehr Abteilung III F (counter espionage). The head of this section (then) was Hptm. Protzes and and his immediate superior was Major Hammler. Wagner was given the job of creating an intelligence net covering the whole of central, south east and north eastern Europe wit Russia as its objective. Having organised his net he was to collect the information and prepare a synthesis for Admiral Canaris (= the head of the entire German Military Amt Ausland/Abwehr) who would then forward it to the O.K.W. (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) He made numerous journeys to Lithuania, Latvia, Rumania, Hungary and also undertook investigations into the causes of the frequent sabotage of German vessels.

In 1940 he went to Sofia where he had to organise an intelligence net and then did the same in Greece and Rumania. He overstepped the limits of his mission when, through intermediary of Dr. Walther Dieter, director of an armament factory and friend of Bordosakis, he exerted pressure on the entourage of Metaxas and obtained an assurance that Greece would stay our of conflict. Later he was severely reprimanded by his chiefs for this action.

Whenever he went he left flourishing Aussenstellen in his trail. The white Russians were his best agents in central Europe. He attempted to do the same in Turkey where he established special groups in Istambul (Istanbul) wit Dr. (Paul) Leverkühn in charge. He was a kind of technical adviser on the intelligence services in eastern Europe.

(During his stay in Rumania he came into contact with Critescu, who wished to have his opinion on the situation with regard to the communists who were forming new cells.)

1943: Bulgaria (Where he, at least since late 1940 headed K.O.-Bulgaria) and Hungary.

From May-October 1944 he was stationed at Budapest as head of Kommando Meldegebiet (K.d.M. effected after the merging of the Abwehr into the Amt Mil) in Hungary, under the command of General → von Greifenberg Military head.

von Greifenberg Military head. Kdo Meldegebiet Hungary with Meldekopf Bulgaria came under Mil Amt, as the Abwehr had just been reorganised (ca. Aug. 1944) He made Sofia his H.Q. (AOB: in 1940!)

In October 1944 he went to Vienna where he was appointed Chief of Sonderstab Sued-Ost (AOB: there wasn't much left by Oct. 1944). He had to organise and control any intelligence services possible in his district. His work was made more difficult by the increase of disagreements with the SS who, day by day, were gradually assuming control of the military organisations. He was ordered to Berlin to present himself to von Taysen, Major im Generalstab Head of Section I West (AOB: officially in the Amt VI / Amt Mil period there existed a total new organisation system) working under Dr. Steimle https://www.cdvandt.org/steimle-eugen-kv2-966.htm who was at the same time head of the political section of the SS (Amt VI).

Von Taysen instructed him to be ready for work in the West. It should be remembered that Taysen's adjutant was von Bohlen (KV 2/1975; PF 602800 towards late 1944 he got the Mil Amt alias, Mate) whose sphere covered France, Spain, and South America. Bohlen worked in Chile about 1936-1937)

Wagner was sent to Stuttgart (in fact: Sigmaringen) where he took over from Colonel (Obst.) Ohlendorf, Head of Kdo. Meldegebiet (K.d.M.), on 16.2.45. Ohlendorf returned to Berlin. ...

AOB: In a quite comprehensive reflection in respect to the Klatt Survey, it might be necessary to take notice of a quite significant person: Obstlt. Ernst Kleyenstüber and (Fregatten-Kapitän Ernst) Wilhelm Leissner (the latter was, for some years passed, Leiter of K.O. Spain and he was succeeded about July/August 1944, by Obstlt. Kleyenstüber)

1. The two prisoners (Kleyenstüber and apparently Leissner) personify the two different phases of the Abwehr in general. Leissner is a typical member of the "Canaris Familie GmbH" (AOB: Admiral Canaris was Head of the Military Amt Ausland/Abwehr, between 1935 and February 1944), a regular Kriegsmarine officer, conscientious but completely unthinking, with no conception of the work he was supposed to do; even at this stage, he is without any clear idea of why he was unsuccessful in Spain (AOB: did he spoke the Spanish language sufficiently?). He is methodical and unimaginative, whilst Kleyenstüber, who was sent to replace him in (July/August) 1944, is fully aware of the causes of Leissner's and of the failure of the whole Canaris policy.

(AOB: in my own perception, this wasn't a single minded failure, but was caused by various reasons: Canaris' resignation versus the growing Nazi dominance; Canaris had a penchant for Spain going back to his fliying from Valparaiso (Chile) in late 1914 as an interned member of the crew of the MS Dresden. He flew via de Andes mountain chain and Buenos Aires on a Spanish or Dutch cargo ship to Europe. Where he passed through, unnoticed by the British, via Spain to a harbour in the Netherlands. There he left the ship and went to Germany. He became a famous U-boat commander in the Mediterranean and frequently visited Spain. In some way or another he was also involved in the Kondor operations (German Forces Supporting Franco's side in the Civil war in Spain 1936-1939), where Nazi Germany supported Franco-Spain. Consequently, he got very good friendship with leading military commanders. When during the war, due to British political pressure upon the Spanish Government, did cause severe problem, time and again Canaris intervened successfully) https://www.cdvandt.org/canaris-intercepts.htm He (Kleyenstüber) (= KV 2/1494) is young, keen, mentally alert, of proved intelligence and initiative. Just as in the wider sphere, the reformation in the Abwehr came too late to be of any value, so in Spain Kleyenstüber came too late to achieve anything worthwhile. He realised from the start that KO Spain, from an int point of view, would need to be thoroughly reorganised that it was penetrated through and through, that its security was nil, and, being faced with such a colossal task at so late date as autumn 44, and at the same time having a clear knowledge of the outcome of the war, his efforts at reorganisation were half-hearted and vitiated by his conviction of their futility.

2. It is IO's (interrogation officer's) belief that Kleyenstüber replaced Leissner at an earlier date, the history of KO Spain might have been very different. (AOB: in my perception quite curiously, is that Freg-Kpt. Wilhelm Leissner remained at KO Spain office up to the bitter end in May 1945, albeit, down graded in his competence)

Kleyenstüber can give little information on prominent personalities, for two reasons: first, his comparatively brief residence in Spain before the collapse, and secondly, his deliberate policy of endeavouring to reconstitute the K.O. as a secure org involved his holding himself as 'aloof as possible from outside contacts. A further reason is also the colder attitude of the Spanish government to the German orgs after the fall of Canaris (AOB: whom they appreciated very much), and after the probable defeat of Germany became more certain.

Gen. Vigon's attitude to Germany was conditioned by his friendship with Canaris and with von Richthofen, and originated from the help given by Germany to Franco during the Civil War. Both Prisoners give Vigon a character of complete honesty, of farsightedness and ultra-patriotism. His political views are monarchist; he holds them both by conviction and by tradition. Leissner states that throughout the war Vigon was critical of Germany's prospects, and told him on one occasion that as long as the British Fleet was in being, Germany could not win. He states that Canaris spoke quite openly to Vigon, and the latter's personal convictions, reinforced by Canaris' revelations, enabled Vigon to assert his personal influence with Franco against closer ties with Germany.

Leissner goes so far as to state that it was the personal influence of Vigon more than anything else which was the reason for Spain's neutrality.

Vigon is anti-Fascist, very contemptuous of the Falange, hopes for a return of the monarchy, and is suspicious - if not incredulous (sceptical) - as to the possibility of a democracy in Spain. He was sharply critical of the NSDAP (German Nazi Party) and of Italian Fascism; he took no trouble to hide his feelings from Canaris, but towards other than his personal friends, he adopted an attitude of deceptive optimism as to the outcome of the war, especially towards these whom he knew to be fervent supporters of the Axis, such as General? Krahmer(?). Leissner and Kleyenstüber both say that his attitude did not represent his true feelings, but was merely indicative of his courtesy. Leissner believes that Vigon would oppose a democracy in Spain not only on personal, but also on traditional and ideological grounds. Vigon has told him that his greatest fear is of another Civil War; he could be expected to go to any lengths to avoid this.

AOB: I would like to skip the rest of this section, as it provides us nothing of interest in respect to Richard Kauder/ Richard Klatt.

I. Kleyenstüber's information regarding the Turkul Flight (from Rome in 1943 towards Wien, in Kleyenstüber's aircraft to his disposal, I suppose)

1. Prisoner states that at the time Badoglio (Italian General whom was in charge to let change-over to the Allied side of the Italian preliminary Government) affair, he was on official duty in Sofia, having flown there for a conference with Klatt. (AOB: by then Kleyenstüber was Leiter I-L in Berlin) When the news of the Badoglio affair came through, Klatt told Prisoner (Kleyenstüber) that he was concerned with getting Turkul out of Rome immediately.

2. Prisoner then suggested that they should use the aircraft in which he had come to Sofia, fly to Rome to contact Turkul, and if possible, fetch him out. Klatt agreed to the suggestion and Prisoner, Klatt and Lt. (Dr.) Thiemann of I-L Ost, flew down the following day. (AOB: The latter was the man whom arrested Richard/Kauder on 12 February 1945; maybe the latter was in some way responsible for the loss of Kauder's private stamp collection and other valuables) The aircraft was a He 111 with full crew. On arrival in Rome, Klatt and Thiemann went to locate Turkul, whilst Prisoner got in touch by teleprinter (AOB: likely located at the German Legation in Rome) with (then still) Obstlt. Hansen (Head of Abwehr I in Berlin) in Berlin, to whom he gave details of the reasons for his being there. He also asked for confirmation that no difficulties would be placed in Turkul's way by the SD on the re-entering German-occupied territory. This was necessary, because Turkul (KV 2/1591 - KV 2/1592; PFR 4394 ; PFR = Russia / Russian?) was believed to have been expelled from Germany at the instance of the Sipo / S.D. Prisoner is not sure of the reason for his expulsion other than it had some connection with Vlassov (AOB: I do not think so, because Vlassov (Vlassow) was made P.o.W. on 12 July 1942; but Turkul had been expelled from Germany in pre-war days). Prisoner did not get an absolutely satisfactory reply, and therefore flew back with Klatt and Thiemann. (who had contacted Turkul and ascertained that he was willing to return to Budapest.

3. In Budapest (AOB: according Klatt and [1] Dr. Winfried Meyer's book on Klatt, Ast Wien insisted that first they should approach Wien. Causing quite a raw and after tense discussions Turkul accepted to land first at Wien and accepted the assurance that he should soon be brought to Budapest), Prisoner discussed the matter with Referatsleiter Obstlt. von Wahl, and had telephone conversations with Obst. Marogna (Leiter Ast Wien), which resulted in permission being given for Turkul to return to Budapest. At this point, Prisoner had an attack of tonsillitis (Angina); Lt Dr. Thiemann was then sent down to Rome (again) in Prisoner's (Kleyenstüber's) aircraft, and returned with Turkul, Turkul's wife and possibly his daughter. Prisoner himself never met Turkul personally; he did not see him on the return from Rome as Turkul was taken directly to Graf Marogna, who at first accommodated him in Vienna (Wien) and later in Budapest.

4. Prisoner states that he has heard of an individual named Romanov (KV 2/1453; PF 603457), who was somehow connected (related) with Turkul, but states that he was not in the aircraft when flew the first time, and he is not aware that he was in it when Turkul was brought back.

Prisoner states that "General Turkul" was a Russian émigré (White Russian) and held an important position in the Max organisation. Prisoner was told by Major Bechtle of OKW I Luft ( that Turkul controlled a political org. in the Soviet Union) that Turkul controlled a political org in the Soviet Union. Prisoner believed that members of this org were high-ranking officers on the Ukrainian GS (General Staff?). Klatt exploited Turkul's org for his purposes, in return for which Turkul is believed to have received funds for the support of émigré circles. Turkul is believed not to have known details of Klatt's other orgs. He had lived in Rome since (early?) 1943

(9!) (since 2 January 2024)

Isos 57790

Crown Copyright

Turkul-Rome 26-7'43 brought to Wien (Vienna)

AOB: Somewhere Kleyenstüber noticed exact dates upon when he and Klatt and Dr. Thiemann picked-up Turkul and family from Rome and had been brought firstly to Wien (Vienna) Kleyenstüber notice June which in fact was incorrect, as the above showed decrypted RSS intercept that it was 26/7/1943.

Isos 57790 Group II/5157 (AOB: Group II concerned Berlin, and it points into the direction of Leiter I Obstlt. i.G. Georg Hansen.)

Rome to Vienna

RSS 233/26/7/43, 40/27/7/43

Call-sign 'NMS' on 8230 kHz 1824 GMT - Might be one or two hours later in Rome 26/7/43

No. 12. For (to be transferred to: Schwert Klatt's W/T station Luftmeldekopf in Sofia; though, Klatt himself was among the crew in Rome) Schwert. I (= Klatt) shall remain in Rome till morning of the 27th and then fly to Budapest (destination changed in Wien (Vienna) Inform Talos that I shall arrive at about 0900 hrs.

Sgd. Klatt

Prisoner states that Klatt's real name is Richard Kauder. He was a full Jew, born in or about ~~1910~~ (1900), the son of a military doctor in the Austrian-Hungarian army. At the time of Prisoner's appointment of Gruppenleiter I Luft (I-L) i Berlin in Jan. 43, Klatt was already installed as chief agent of Ast Vienna (Wien) Referat I Luft. His controlling officer was Obstlt. von Wahl; The Astleiter at this time was Obst. Graf Marogna-Redwitz. Klatt had an office → in Sofia well-equipped with card-indices and registration cards, and had been allotted several W/T operators by Vienna (Ast Wien).

in Sofia well-equipped with card-indices and registration cards, and had been allotted several W/T operators by Vienna (Ast Wien). He maintained relationships with the Hungarian IS, with the knowledge of Vienna (Ast Wien). (AOB: Obstlt. Kleyenstüber might not possess an integral knowledge of Klatt's story. On 5 July 1943, due to the Edgar Klaus affair, Hitler furiously decided: that from this day onwards, it was totally forbidden to engage any Jews in the German Military Abwehr. Consequently, Klatt was forced to give up Sofia and to get out of the direct picture of the OKW diehards. After tough deliberations a way out was created by a trick in cooperation of the Hungarian Secret Service. Klatt was fit with an Hungarian passport on the name of Karmany. But his intelligence was shared with the Hungarians but mainly consumed by the regular I-L channels in the Wehrmacht) Prisoner (Kleyenstüber) is not clear as to why Klatt, being Jewish, should have performed such excellent work for the Germans, but states that he known to SD Vienna (Wien) that Klatt was smuggling gold and securities across the border (?), and the question had been actually raised whether disciplinary action should be taken against him; the attitude of I-L was that his work was too valuable to be interfered with, and it was decided not to pay any attention to this smuggling. (AOB: the reality is always differently. - When Klatt had been arrested on 12 February 1945, such kind of charges were raised against him by the Gestapo. But, after some time (in February 1945!) dropped as not true or could not been proved. But, during Klatt's time in Sofia, sometimes Ast Wien applied for the delivery of goods, which were difficult to obtain in German territories; such as particular exclusive food-stuffs and cigarettes and that like. Certainly applying fore was more or less illegal. Though, on the other hand, Klatt shared legally business with Mittermayer (KV 2/1466; PF 74098 Kittel-Mittermayer). Due to the profits of this flourishing business, was Klatt capable to expand employment to quite many people, ending at about > 30 people employed at his Luftmeldekopf in Sofia!)

7. Klatt's to chief sub-agents were Ira Lang (this was the name used at Ira Longin's German passport), who is believed to have been in the Czechoslovak Legion and who hold a key position in Klatt's Ost reports (Max) organisation, and "General" Turkul, a (White) Russian émigré, resident in Rome. Klatt's reports were dividend into three groups as follows:-

These dealt with the Russian Army and Air Force. They varied in quality, but were on the whole considered to be excellent, in particular in so far as they dealt with the (Russian) Army. Prisoner states that the Army reports dealing with deployment and operations were almost invariable confirmed at a later date. (AOB: thus these later sort of reports were possessing a forecasting dimension) Occasionally they were wrong, e.g. various landings in the Black Sea were reported which did not actually materialise, but in view of the the great number of reports which were confirmed, this was unimportant. The evaluation of Army reports was carried out by Fremde Heere Ost (FHO), the head of which was Obst. Gehlen (AOB: Gehlen shortly after Germany's unconditional surrender became engaged by the US Secret Service and this became known as the "Org". In the 1950s this entity became the German Bundesnachrichtendienst situated in Pullach near to Munic (München)). ... the head of which was (before 1943) Major Kienitz, and (after 1943) Major Boie. Neither of these officers had very high opinion of the Max Air Force reports. (AOB: whether this was NKWD (NKVD) strategy or that the chain by which information was channelled did function differently - I don't know)

These were reports dealing with the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East. .......

The KO Leiter at Sofia, Obstlt. Dr. Delius (= Obstlt. Otto Wagner, KV 2/284; PF 601320), and the staff of the SD Stelle in Vienna (Wien) were highly suspicious of Klatt. (AOB: Dr. Delius the Leiter KO-Bulgaria, was jealous as he - being an Obstlt. of the German Wehrmacht, Klatt the Jewish descent civilian highly regarded at the O.K.W. HQ in Berlin up to Keitel, might have been too much to accept and dealing with. The SD always were sensitive for political matters and were apparently anti-Semitic, though had been forced to "back-off"). Prisoner believes that professional jealousy played a large part in the suspicion, as Klatt's success in their own field reflected on their efficiency. Ast Wien, naturally, supported Klatt, in particular Klatt's controlling officer, Obst. von Wahl, and this led to considerable friction between Ast Vienna (Wien) and KO Bulgaria. Prisoner himself never came to a decision as to the genuineness or otherwise of Klatt. He admits that a few hints which Klatt dropped as to the nature of his organisation, i.e. W/T transmitters on ships in the Black Sea and at Trebizond, sounded improbable, and that he himself never believed a word of them, but considers it natural that Klatt should keep his organisation as secret as possible, and quite likely that after the German refused to Aryanise Klatt, the latter would cover all his connections with as thick avail as possible in order to maintain his indispensable position. There was much discussion at I-Luft on frequent occasions over the Klatt reports, but no factual proof that Klatt was an Allied agent was ever produced, and the policy of I-Luft was to treat the Max reports on Russia as reliable, and the Ibis and Moritz reports dealing with Anglo-American matters as extremely doubtful. (AOB: it is nevertheless necessary to notice - and will be dealt with in detail, in due course, that in 1943 the British secret Services put an enormous amount of work in this latter aspect. Klatt then mentioned in his Moritz reports so accurately facts on North Africa, that the Britain was highly alarmed - how was this possible? Did the Germans crack the British W/T codes? Though, after some months, they came up with the query: might it be that information had been gathered by Russian Liaison in North Africa might these have reached Klatt?) Prisoner adds that whatever the motives and irrespective of other considerations, he himself believes that the Max reports were genuine. (AOB: genuine these messages truly were, though, delivered genuinely by means of the Russian NKWD (NKVD). It might have been a curious way of passing-on "chicken-food"; but its veracity was extremely valid, though occasionally untrue; whether essentially or not is, afterwards, hard to reconstruct) They were too factual, too frequent and too valuable to be considered chicken-feed. Again: its contents were mainly in the fields of tactical and operational forecasting.)

AOB: Let us take notice of a draft supposing some of their (British) strategies about Klatt's second interrogation

Including now-and-then threatening him with matters the British possessed no legal power as to accomplish and, of course, lying about actual facts.

Manually written with a pencil: Tischerniak? ; Georgy (KV 2/130 - KV 2/131; PF 600052); Hitzigrath

Points for the Second Interrogation of Klatt. (AOB: planning and commencing incorporates a great difference, the first option is dreaming about matters thereafter comes often a disappointment)

1. Before Klatt is interrogated for the second time, we need to know whether he has knowledge of his probable release (which actually matured on 11 March 1947). We have to decide what offer we can make to Klatt in return for the information we hope to get from him. The following notes are made on the basis that Klatt doesn't know he is to be released and that the interrogator is at libertyy to give him this news if it serves the purpose of the interrogation.

2. I suggest a direct accusation to Klatt that he has acted on behalf of the Soviets. In my view there are only two possibilities about Klatt: 1) that he was wholly conscious Soviet agent; 2) that he was a "black-marketeer" of intelligence who consciously took money from any intelligence service with which he could establish successful contact. (AOB: in what kind of lunatic world were these men living?) If we attack him on the second possibility. I believe that we shall forfeit (loss) any chance of establishing the first, and I think therefore that we should put first to Klatt as our believe, leaving it to him to bring out the second himself should that be the truth. I suggest therefore that we tell Klatt we know him to be a Soviet agent for reasons set out blow, and that according to the American policy (not true as being painted here) towards Soviet agents he will be handed over to the Russians. We can offer him the following alternatives however in his handing over. If he will tell us the whole truth about his Soviet agency, together with any information about Soviet espionage his work in the Abwehr, we can arrange for his 'escape' from custody and will make no official or unofficial approach to the Russians about his disappearance from the American Zone. (AOB: a lunatic draft and plan; as Klatt was likely not informed about the way Ira Longin obtained his information. The Germans call this: Wunschdenken) If, on the other hand he refuses to tell us the truth (what they consider is their truth), we shall hand him over to the Russians officially as a detected Soviet agent, and he may like to consider what sort of a welcome the Russians are likely to give to him as an "agent brûlé". (AOB: I suppose all being bluff - and that the Americans didn't know about this quasi psychological British terror)

3. The case of Klatt has gained some fresh importance from new information obtained on the "Red Orchestra" ("Rote Kapelle") case. The interrogation of Piepe in the latter case has produced evidence that the German play-back of Rote Kapelle wireless communications was a failure because of a warning "telegram" sent from Bulgaria", (b) that Sofia was rallying point for agents escaping from German penetration of the Rote → Kapelle and a place where they received payment and instructions. (AOB: are they really so mad, - and are they linking Klatt's Luftmeldekopf with the Rote Kapelle? A purely Communist orientated resistance Organisation?) (AOB: are we currently viewing at the pre-stadia of a declining British Service, of the 1950s?)

Kapelle and a place where they received payment and instructions. It appears from the Canadian case that a Soviet espionage network cut off from its supports during the war might make an appeal to a place (in the Canadian case - Ottawa) where a network was known to be in successful operation and in touch with Moscow headquarters. It is conceivable that the same sort of remedy may have been used in the application of the Rote Kapelle refugees to Sofia. (AOB: The Russians possessed a fully operational Legation in Sofia)

4. I suggest that we should accuse Klatt of being a Soviet agent on the following basis:

(a) We should say that since we last interrogated him we have been able to see a great many captured documents and we have been able to interrogate a number of important characters concerned in the work of the Klatt Dienststelle. (AOB: all lies!! Though, what should people worry - is the total absence of intelligence of this draft editor) In particular we refer to conversations we have had with Turkul (KV 2/1591 - KV 2/1592 - KV 2/1593; PFR 4394), Ira (Longin) (KV 2/1630 - KV 2/1631; PF 602370), Romanov (KV 2/1453; PF 603457) and Shenshin (KV 2/369 - KV 2/370; PF 66726). It is abundantly clear to us that Klatt was lying at his first interrogation;

(b) We know that Turkul's name was used as an umbrella for certain of Klatt's intelligence operations. Turkul himself was kept in the dark about Ira's activities;

(c) We know that there was no substance in the story of information passed to General Turkul and his organisation by White Russian contacts in the U.S.S.R., either by wireless or by couriers. On the contrary we know that the information passed on this pretence was Soviet deception ~~and propaganda material~~: (AOB: the veracity for the Army Max message were rather high and the British knew this, so from evident chickenfeed was not the question as the bulk was actually most relevant. Let us skip the side aspects what Turkul knew or not, or that the latter's name was used as a cover or camouflage doesn't matter; what counted was that the majority of the tactical and strategic information was relevant (thus valid))

(d) We know that Klatt ran two lines of intelligence based on the Turkul legend; the business end of one was Shenshin and of the other was Ira (Longin). From specimens (British RSS intercepts) of information obtained on both these lines, it is clear that Ira's (Longin's) information was high-grade deception material (thus, material mostly valid, and on special occasion deliberately false), while Shenshin dealt with low-grade deception, (AOB: such as Moritz messages. But in 1943 for quite an episode these type of messages were very true, upsetting the British Secret Services for quite a while! This aspect will be dealt with in due course) It is obvious that any loyal servant of the Abwehr who duplicated his source in the way that Klatt did on the Turkul legend must be seen from a comparison of the material that ~~the~~ he claims of Turkul or his representatives were false.

and we have no doubts about the Power to whom this information went. (Russia? AOB: ridiculous)

5. Confronted with this detailed accusation and with the offer described above, it is possible that Klatt, if he is a Soviet agent, will decide to tell us all. (AOB: this did not happen at all) If, on the other possibility, he is "the black-marketeer of intelligence" he will at least have a good deal of explaining to do. (To safeguard our source (André Gross KV 2/131; PF 600052) I suggest that Schellenberg might be quoted as an authority for Max material and for the material from Shenshin. AOB: was he really? We should doubt these infantile thoughts, as the Leader (Leiter/Head) of R.S.H.A. Amt VI incorporating Amt Mil constitutes a person on such high level he is never an expert in great details) I feel it is important to cover Klatt's lines of retreat as far as possible. He has already been exploited for his Abwehr information and we should make it plain that we are now concerned with an entirely different side of his activities. If he likes to tell us of the other Soviet penetration in the Abwehr so much the better, but it is no good his expatiating on the technicalities of his Dienststelle operations. I do not think it would be useful to set down here any lines of interrogation for Klatt should he confess to being a Soviet agent. If he makes such a confession, then further counsel would have to be taken on the basis of what he admits. If he merely confess to the black-market (AOB: he was concerned on Black-market - but this was related to food-stuff and alcoholic products and that like) and satisfies the interrogator on his plea then it seems likely that he should be able to provide us with a clearer information on the functions of Ira (Longin) and of own means of communications with the Russians. (AOB: simply a lunatic mind is putting this on paper) One card we may keep up our sleeves is the approach made by ~~Andre Gyorgy~~ Mirko Rot (KV 2/1712 ... KV 2/1714; PF 65653) (also a Jewish person), apparently on Klatt's behalf to the British Intelligence in Istanbul (Istambul), suggesting that Klatt tried to take out an insurance with the British, as well as the Russians and the Americans, against the possibilities of German defeat. (Nonsense, as Mirko Rot escaped already in 1943 from German occupied territories; he wasn't a quite reliable chap either)

Special Interrogation Report No. 2 on Richard Kauder @ Klatt @ Karmany (← when in Hungary since ca. September 1943)

1. This report concerns the relationship between Kauder and his principle agent, Ira Longin @ Ilja Lang (← The name Lang was used on his German passport), and contains an account of the latter's activities as a member of the German Intelligence Service. (AOB: whether Ira Longin considered himself being a member of the German Abwehr, I highly doubt)

2. Kauder's acquaintanceship with Longin dates from December 1939, when Kauder was arrested by the Hungarian police for travelling without the necessary papers. (Interrogator's note: It is doubtful that this was the real reason for his arrest; more likely he had been engaged in illegal financial dealings) He found that his cell-mate was a Dr. Longin, who had been arrested for having spread pan-Slavic propaganda after the occupation of the Carpatho-Ukraina by the Hungarians. Longin related that he had been a 1st lieutenant in the Czarist Army, had fought against the Red Army during the Russian Revolution, had been imprisoned by the GPU, and had finally moved to Czechoslovakia, where he studied law.

3. After a few weeks Kauder was released, and his next meeting with Longin was an accidental on in Budapest in June 1940. Longin stated at that time that he had just been released from prison and had been forbidden to resume his law practice; he was living with a Russian friend named Kischkin. Kauder revealed that he was then in the employ of Ast Wien under Graf Marogna-Redwitz →

(AOB: In my perception the following might have occurred: For what ever reason, the Ast was informed about the existence of Klatt in a prison in Budapest. Whether he was arrested on information supplied from that very Ast Wien stays open. But at least we may consider that in someway or another, there had been a mutual Hungarian - German-Austrian agreement that Richard Kauder should be expelled from Hungary and (anschließend) especially being handed over to the German authorities. They collected Kauder and offered Kauder a deal of which the entire Kauder/Klatt complex is resulting)

→ and promised to do what he could to obtain similar employment his ex-cellmate (and preventing Kauder's Jewish mother from anti-Semitic repercussions on behalf of the German Reich). In July 1940, Kauder was sent by Obstlt. von Wahl-Welskirch. Chief I-Luft in Ast Wien, with Obstlt. Seidl to Budapest to discuss the matter with Longin. The latter declared that he had recognised the Germans as the one European barrier against Bolshevism and was willing to engage in Espionage against the Reds but would first have to obtain the permission of his chief in Rome (General Turkul) Shortly after this initial meeting, a conference took place in Wien between Graf Marogna-Redwitz, Obstlt. Seidl, Longin, and Kauder. Although Longin refused to reveal the name of his chief, he was granted a pass (on the name of Lang) to Rome and returned in two weeks with his chief's permission. However, two conditions had been attached by the mysterious chief (later discovered to be Turkul): Longin was not to reveal the source of any information gathered by him, and he was to work under Kauder only. (Interrogator's not: It is more probably that Kauder himself arranged this latter condition with Longin in order to secure his own position in the Abwehr.) Marogna-Redwitz was at first extremely enthusiastic, about Longin, but his enthusiasm declined as the latter's demands especially for money increased.

(AOB: an important question should be considered: Couldn't it have been that the entire context had been, in someway or another, arranged by the Russian NKWD (NKVD)? Or, was it all simply engendered by coincidental circumstances?)

4. At this time, through investigations conducted by Ast Wien, Kauder learned the truth about Longin's background: His Christian name is Longin, his family name Ira; Turkul called him Longin Fedorowitsch. His father had been a Czech whose opposition to the Austrian monarchy had prompted him to emigrate to Russia. Longin was born in 1899 or 1900 (AOB: we may consider both Longin and Kauder being of about similar age, as Kauder was born in 1900), and on the basis of age could not have been a 1st Lieutenant in 1917. It was established that he had been called out of a cavalry school to fight in Wrangki? Army in 1917. He had never been granted a law degree, but acted as a solicitor.

5. Kauder was commissioned by Ast Wien to obtain permission from the Hungarian Abwehr for Longin to remain in Budapest (AOB: Hungary was not yet at war with Russia and therefore it is likely that a Russian Legation existed in Budapest, which as we know, was the key contact as to obtain NKWD (NKVD) intelligence materials) under the alias of Ilja Lang. In granting the papers, Obstlt. Hajnocskay? of the Hungarian gendarmerie stated that he could not understand why the German Abwehr was using Longin, since the latter was not free of suspicion of being closer to the Reds than his statements led people to believe. (AOB: I suppose that the essential key was the fact that at least up to 22 June 1941, there existed a Russian Legation in Budapest; there might well have existed Russian Legation within the German Reich, but these premises might have been under strict German observations)

6. For a few weeks Longin remained in Budapest and submitted some reports concerning Russian weapons and technical matters. In October 1940 he (Ira Longin) went to Sofia, at his own request, to establish new contacts; he was accompanied by Kauder and Dr. Deutsch (also possessing a Jewish background), one of Kauder's right-hand men. Upon Kauder's return to Wien, he was informed by von Wahl-Welskirch that Dr. Wagner @ Dr. Delius had sent a note stating that Longin and Deutsch had been seen leaving the Soviet Embassy in Sofia. Delius (AOB: later Kauder's great opponent, greatly based upon jealousy) Delius asserted that Longin was in active contact with the Embassy. Inasmuch as the Russian Orthodox Church in Sofia is near the Soviet Embassy, the entire matter was regarded as a result of confusion and was dropped.

7. The trip to Sofia brought no immediate results, and for the time Longin's reports continued to reach Ast Wien from Budapest, whither they had been brought by border-crossers. Marogna-Redwitz expressed the suspicion that these reports were deriving from the same source as other reports from agents acting under his personal supervision. Yet, this remained nothing moved? than a suspicion. One report submitted by Longin is worthy to note: It stated that the Russian Air Force had 55,000 planes, of which 40,000 could be used in combat. Berlin rejected the report and labelled it as nonsense, but in September 1941 Ast Wien was requested to re-submit the same report, since further information had confirmed the figures approximately.

8. In December 1940, Longin began to increase his demands, for re???eration to such an extent that Kauder was forced, according to his own story, to use his own financial resources to retain the services of his principal agent. (Interrogator's note: Kauder is not considered to be the type of person who would thus use his money without receiving some greater return. (AOB: because he is of Jewish descent?)

9. On 15 June 1941, shortly before the outbreak of war between Germany and the USSR, Kauder was called from Sofia by Longin, then in Budapest, who stated that he had been arrested by the Hungarian Abwehr and that all his intelligence paraphernalia and personal documents had been seized. Kauder contacted Marogna-Redwitz in Wien, and Maj. Pfannenstiel was sent to Budapest to investigate the matter. Allegedly the Hungarians had been in error in arresting Longin, and his materials and reports were returned to him. Investigation revealed the following facts, which were related to Kauder by von Wahl-Weiskrich: About two weeks before the incident, Longin had received a letter from the Anti-Komintern Union in Switzerland informing him that he would soon be visited by a representative of this Union for the purpose of discussing some intelligence matters. In the letter was one half of a postage stamp; the other half was to be used by the visitor to identify himself. The unidentified visitor approached Longin in a coffee shop in Budapest at the time specific in the letter. The buying and selling of information was discussed, but Kauder is uninformed as to the details of whatever arrangements resulted from the conversation. A second meeting was arranged resulted from the conversation. A second meeting was arranged by the two to take place within a few days. As Longin and his new partner were about to leave the shop after his second meeting, they were approached by three men who carried papers identifying them as Hungarian police officials. One placed the Anti-Komintern representative under arrest; the other two accompanied Longin to his home, where all the papers were confiscated. It was the opinion of von Wahl-Welskirch (Welskirch?) that the three alleged Hungarian officials were not Hungarians but were members of the Abwehr Abteilung III-F (counter-espionage) in Budapest under the leadership of Korda (AOB: the latter likely an Hungarian). Longin explained that it had been his intention to obtain political intelligence from the Anti-Komintern representative, whereupon he was instructed to confine himself in the future to intelligence of interest to the military. Some time later, Kauder learned that the representative from Switzerland was Dr. Willi Goetz (@ Wigo) (KV 2/387; PF 600802) who was still later to become Kauder's main agent in Turkey.

10 During all this time, Longin was careful not to mention the name of of his chief in Rome, although Marogna-Redwitz frequently ventured to identify him as General Turkul, an identification denied by Longin. He admitted, however, that he had known his chief since 1920 (Longin was then 20 or 21 years of age), when White Russians had gathered by the thousands in Gallipoli. In 1944, Romanov, who in that year left Turkul's organisation because of differences of opinion, stated to Kauder that Longin had met Turkul for the first time in the summer of 1940, when he had been granted permission to visit Rome to consult with his chief. Romanov explained that during that visit Longin had subordinated himself to Turkul in order to gain the contacts necessary for successful intelligence activities.

11. From the summer of 1940 until the beginning of the war between Germany and the USSR, Longin submitted approximately twenty rather long reports, which he asserted had been brought to him → from the Carpatho-Ukraine by border-crossers.

from the Carpatho-Ukraine by border-crossers. It is noteworthy that during the entire period he (Ira Longing) was fearful of persecution by the Hungarian gendarmerie, although the reasons therefore were not entirely clear to Kauder.

12. In 1942 Longin, then in Sofia (AOB: likely because there existed still a Russian Legation as Bulgaria was not at war with Russia; hence, a direct channel with someone of the NKWD (NKVD)), increased his demands for financial returns and thereby caused Marogna-Redwitz to consider ousting him from the Abwehr. Longin explained that the additional money was needed for the upkeep of the families of the agents; a letter signed by Turkul supported his demands. To settle the matter and to retain Longin's services, Kauder paid further sums out of his own pocket to amount of 2,000 pengoes (likely Bulgarian currency) but later received indications that the money had been used by Longin to support his sister and her husband, a certain Chris?temko.

13. Login had led Kauder to believe that the reports brought by boder-crossers were originating with Red Army personnel who were actually members of the Turkul White Russian organisation and had been planted in the Soviet Army. In February 1941, Margona-Redwitz requested that personnel be found who, trained in W/T operation could establish direct W/T contact with Longin's agents in the USSR. Kauder proposed to use travelling entertainers for this purpose and, additionally, to find a way for them to visit Longin's agents. According to Longin, the center for that part of the organisation which was xxxxxxx was Kiev. Kauder selected a certain Hans Sturm-Schneider, Jr., who had worked in Wera (= the W/T station designation of Ast Wien)??, as codist and W/T operator, to train as an acrobat with Maria Hammeryik?, another codist in Ast Wien. Sturm was brought to Budapest, and at the same time an agent for entertainers made the arrangements with the Soviet commercial attaché in that city, for the pair to tour several cities in Russia (= all before 22 June 1941). However, Sturm's training as an acrobat lasted until June 1941, and with the outbreak of the war between Germany and Russia (the project fall through (AOB: on 22 June 1941). Sturm was to have brought W/T equipment to Kiev and to have sent reports directly from there to Sofia. (AOB: in my perception: as long as Germany, and thus Hungary, were not yet at war (< 22 June 1941) with Russia, there existed a Russian Legation in Budapest. Thereafter the Russians, logically, did not possess representations in Budapest any longer; but Bulgaria was not at war with Russia, the latter possessed a Legation in Sofia, and therefore Longin moved to Sofia. The story about the agents in respect to Kiev, might well have been a cover-up story) Longin had given strict instructions that his agents were not to be told that they were working for the Germans. In accordance with the plan to commence W/T communication between Kiev and Sofia, Kauder visited the latter city amd made the acquaintance of Paw?ei Pawlow, Chief of the State Police in Sofia. (Interrogator's note: Pawlow was known to be in Milan at the end of the war; it is uncertain whether he is still there to use Bulgarian Police W/T station in Sofia, and an operator named (Wilhelm) Stimmelmayer came to Sofia with W/T equipment early in June 1941. All these arrangements were made personally by Kauder and kept him so occupied that. if one is to be believe him, he had little contact with Longin between February and June 1941 and is not well informed as to the latter's activity during that period, except that the usual number of reports were submitted each week.

14. While in Sofia, Kauder had become acquainted with a certain Sarapow, an officer in the Bulgarian Border Police and through him had received reports concerning the Russian Black Sea fleet. When it became impossible to send Sturm and Maria Hammernyik to the USSR they were used to transmit Sarafow's reports to Wien. This connection lasted until the summer of 1942. Sarafow was later used by Kauder in other projects concerning Soviet affairs in the Black Sea region. (Interrogator's note: Sturm and Hammernyik were forced to end their activity in Sofia because of the hostility of ~~Dr.~~ Wagner (@ Dr. Delius) Dr. Delius to any persons associated with the Meldekopf ? Klatt.)

15. Longin moved to Sofia in June 1941, allegedly more out of fear of the Hungarian Police than for any other reason. (AOB: I don't think so, as the main reason was: that since 22 June 1941 there did not exist a Russian representation in Budapest but only in Sofia)

16. During his stay in Sofia, Kauder had established contact with a member of the Macedonian Movement with a view to gathering intelligence from Southern Russia. On 24 June 1941, this contact proved its worth, and the first reports arrived concerning airports in the vicinity of Tiflis and troop movements in the Crimean area. The person from whom this information came was a Soviet W/T operator in the Tiflis airports. (The name of the person is unknown) The network was originally established by the Macedonian (name unknown) by border-crossers residing in Turkey. When Longin arrived in Sofia, Kauder showed him these reports and asked about the state of affairs with regard to his Longin's network. A few days later Longin brought Kauder three or four reports which in style were remarkable similar to the reports Kauder had obtained from Tiflis. Kauder proceeded to enquire into the source of Longin's information but was told that, as had previously been agreed, the sources of information would not be made known to the Abwehr or even to Kauder himself.

17. In the first four weeks of Longin's stay in Sofia, he produced approximately 40 short reports, all of which were worked over by him and Kauder before being submitted to Ast Wien. During the next few months, the number of reports submitted monthly rose to an average of 100, and still later approximately six reports a day were delivered concerning the red Army and Air Force.

18. In the beginning of August 1941 Hptm. Dr. Zimmer came to Sofia to act as chief of the Luft Meldekopf (Luftmeldekopf), although Longin refused to be introduced to him and refused to serve under any anybody but Kauder. (Interrogator's note: It is more than a little likely that Longin's refusal was a result of conversations between himself and Kauder; Kauder was ever fearful that an Abwehr officer would assume control of Longin, and such action would have resulted in the Abwehr's dispersing with Kauder's services.)

19. In October 1941, Dr. Wagner (= Dr. Delius), Chief of KO Bulgaria, suggested that Kauder works under his direction, but subject rejected the proposal on the grounds that he had initially been employed by → Ast Wien and would be guilty of infidelity if he should join KO Bulgaria.

Ast Wien and would be guilty of infidelity if he should join KO Bulgaria. From that time on, Dr. Delius' attacks on Kauder increased in intensity and culminated in the accusation, made in the fall of 1944, that Kauder was actually a Soviet agent. Nevertheless, the accusation were disregarded by the Abwehr, and the Kauder-Longin team was allowed until (Kauder's arrest) on 12 February 1945.

20. In November or December 1941, Longin revealed to Kauder that Dr. Delius' III F (counter-espionage) Division, principally through Sonderführer (Sdf.) Kleinhampel, had completed a dossier concerning the activities and espionage connections of both Longin and Kauder. Longin explained that he knew of those dossier from some White Russians who were working for Dr. Delius. Kauder asserts that he promptly demanded Longin's word of honour that he was not actually submitting deception material to the Abwehr and gathering intelligence for some other intelligence service from his acquaintances in KO Bulgaria. Longin replied that his anti-Bolshevist attitude was well known and that he was to be either completely trusted or promptly dismissed by the Abwehr. Kauder related the incident to von Wahl-Welskirch, whose attitude was that as long as the reports were worthwhile he would lend no credence to the suspicion that Longin was a double agent.

21. In October 1941, Longin journeyed to Belgrade to find some White Russian who might add to the effectiveness of his network. He returned with Georg Romanov (KV 2/1453; PF 603457) who requested a passport to Turkey, there he establish some White Russian contacts. Within a few days Kauder received a sever reprimand from Ast Wien for attempting to use agents who were in the employ of Ast Belgrade; Romanov was named. Confronted with this, Romanov admitted that he was an agent of Dr. Mati of Ast Belgrade and that he had been hoping for a long time to visit Turkey. Longin, too, admitted that these facts were known to him but explained that his purpose would have been better accomplished if Kauder did not become acquainted with the facts.

22. Early of 1942, Longin visited his chief (General Turkul) in Rome again; by this time Ast Wien was convinced that the chief was Turkul. He returned with the problem that his chief had an American travellers' check for $1500, which had become valueless with the entry of the United States into the war (since 11/12 December 1941). Since Obst. Piekenbrock Leiter I Berlin of the Abwehr in Berlin had forbidden his subordinates to have anything to do with Turkey (s. Special Interrogation Report No. 1 on Kauder concerning this). Von Wahl-Welskirch arranged for Ast Rome to honour the check unofficially; the amount paid was 17,000 Lire. Earlier, Kauder had told Longin of the suspicion entertained by III F, Ast Wien, that he was buying his reports from the Japanese Intelligence Service, whereupon Kauder enquired about the source of the check. Longin's answer was evasive but indicated that some property which belonged to Turkul ? organisation had been sold to the Japanese.

(AOB: Japan was most time of the Second World War not at war with Russia, only towards the final end of the war Russia declared war on Japan as to catch Japanese territories. There existed due to this a communication channel between Japanese in Western Europe and Russia towards Japan. In as much this really had been used I don't know)

23. Shortly after the check indicent ?, Longin revealed that his reports had been coming from seven individuals residing in Turkey and that he was in need of money to maintain these contacts, since the Turkul organisation lacked the wherewithal to continue doing so. Longin made a point of demanding the money in American dollars - 150 a man per month, - Kauder's attempts to persuade Longin to accept to $1500 a month. (Interrogator's note: Was this money actually being paid to agents in Turkey or was it being sent to Turkul, whose source of money from American had been cut off in December 1941?)

24. Approximately at the same time, Longin Longin demanded that Turkul - he named his chief from this time on - receive political support from the Reich and placed in charge of all White Russian affairs in Germany. On this point Georg Romanov (s. Special Interrogation Report No 1 on Kauder) entered the picture again to conduct the negotiations. With the intervention of Maj. Brede (Gruppenleiter 1-L in Berlin), Piekenbrock (Leiter I in Berlin op to the end of 1942), ban on entanglements with Turkul was lifted, and his organisation was promised political support; in return, it was to spread anti-Bolshevist propaganda. With the intervention of (Major) i.G. (im Generalstab) Brede was not enthusiastic about supporting Turkul, and his relief was evident when he (Major Brede in Berlin) was succeeded in this position by Kleyenstüber (in August 1943).

25. In May 1943, Romanov, as Turkul's representative, visited Kauder and stated Turkul's demands that eight named persons from Germany and its satellites be given passports to visit him in Rome and that he himself receive $700 a month. In return Longin would continue to work for the Abwehr. Further, Turkul desired that the Belgrade branch of his organisation be given official recognition. When Marogna-Redwitz refused to continue meeting Longin's and Turkul's increasing demands for money, Longin delivered to Kauder the ultimatum that either the Abwehr would provide the money as requested or he would cease to submit reports. Nevertheless. it is noteworthy that Longin continued his intelligence activity, although Ast Wien persistently refused at the time to grant the $700 a months.

26. In September 1943, Kauder felt it necessary because of the war situation to move the (Luft) Meldekopf from Sofia to Budapest.

(AOB: please remember that on 5th July 1943 Hitler decided that from now on the Abwehr was no longer allowed to engage, in whatever circumstance, people of Jewish descent) (Thus Kauder felt should be read as: he was forced to leave his official Luft Meldekopf in Sofia. The Abwehr managed to get an understanding with the Hungarian Secret Service. Kauder got an Hungarian passport on the name of: Karmany. In practice this meant that he had to prepare some intelligence copies more; thus the bulk was met for Ast Wien and some pages were meant for the Hungarian Military intelligence. He got of sufficient W/T gear and communicated from private addresses in Budapest under the station name Bully 1, 2, 3 . .)

Longin objected (AOB: Budapest did not possess any Russian presentation, whereas Sofia possessed a regular Russian Legation) to this, although his reasons for insisting on remaining in Sofia were not made clear. At any rate. it was finally agreed that the intelligence reports would be sent by W/T to Sofia and Budapest alternatively for ten-day periods. (Interrogator's note: It would be interesting to learn the reason for Longing's insistence on remaining in Sofia until forced by the advancing Soviet to withdraw to Budapest (remember the availability of the necessary Russian Legation in Sofia and not existing in Hungary) Certainly if his network was genuine, there would have been no difficulty for him in receiving W/T reports in Budapest.) At this time, Longin instead that Turkul. who had been brought from Rome (in Kleyenstüber's He 111 airplane) to Wien, although he had desired to be transported directly from Rome to Budapest, be brought to the → to the Hungarian capital.

to the Hungarian capital. (s. Special Interrogation report No.1 on Kauder for a fuller account of this.) Kauder states that at this point he again inquired into the sources of the information submitted by Longin and was again denied an answer. However, Longin provided an indication of the things to come by relating that during a previous visit to Wien, he had been invited to a conference with Marogna-Redwitz and von Wahl-Welskirch and had left the impression that they were seeking a way to continue using him and at the same time to rid themselves of Kauder. (Interrogator's note: It is known that at this time Wagner's (Dr. Delius) attacks on the accusations against Kauder were becoming a source of embarrassment to Ast Wien. Furthermore, the Gestapo's persecution of Kauder's mother, a Jewess, and the Gestapo's obvious desire to put Kauder himself out of circulation were causing Marogna-Redwitz, Kauder's benefactor, more than a few troubled moments.) Yet, both Marogna-Redwitz and von Wahl-Welskirch later denied to Kauder that they had ever had such a conversation with Longin.

27. One source was mentioned by Longin after the battle of Kiev: a Stabskapitän Skoilow of the Red Army Signal Corps, who allegedly had submitted excellent information until he was wounded during the German attack on that city. After half a year Skoilow was heard again and reported that he was the commanding officer and chief instructor in a W/T school in Kujbischev?. Kauder suggested that Skoilow send his reports be coding them and giving them to his students as exercises in W/T/ The suggestion was adopted, and for six months thereafter the information was thus submitted.

28. As soon as Turkul had moved to Budapest late 1943, both he and Longin put pressure on Kauder for increased financial rewards until Marogna-Redwitz capitulated to the demands.

29. Dr. Hans Deutsch, Kauder's right-hand assistant in the Luft Meldekopf , was sent to Sofia to work with Longin in coding the reports to be sent to Wien, and although an initial, mutual antagonism developed between the two, Kauder was able, with Turkul's help, to compel the two to cooperate for the good of the service - and Kauder's continued employment in the Abwehr. Later, Longin demanded a pass which would allow him to roam Bulgaria at will. When Deutsch's initial efforts to obt in the pass from the police failed, Longin refused to work with Deutsch in any capacity and insisted that Kauder come to Sofia to settle the matter. Upon Kauder's arrival, he was told by Deutsch that Wagner (Dr. Delius) was circulating the story that Kauder had been separated from the Abwehr and that his - Wagner's - suspicions of Kauder had been correct. Longin then explained that his real reason for calling Kauder to Sofia had been to find out whether there was any truth to the rumour.

30. It is noteworthy that Longin was over desirous of preventing a close relationship between Kauder and Turkul. Accordingly, he → persuaded Turkul to leave negotiations about intelligence matters to Kauder and himself (Longin) ...

persuaded Turkul to leave negotiations about intelligence matters to Kauder and himself (Longin) and negotiations about political support for the Turkul organisation to Kauder and Romanov. Thus, it would be unnecessary for Kauder to have direct contact with Turkul.

31. When Romanov and Turkul came to the parting of the ways (see Special Interrogation report No 1 on Kauder), Romanov's bitterness against Turkul led him to write to White Russians in Belgrade and Sofia declaring that they should suspend all work with Longin because of the latter's untrustworthiness and because suspicious attached to him. (AOB: the reason might have been, that in someway or another, Romanov got notice that Ira Longin was in direct touch with the Russian Legation - as the diplomatic representation facilitated the exchange of information on behalf of the Russian NKWD (NKVD). The real channel of NKWD information will, most likely, will never come complete unravelled) In this way, Romanov hoped to put an end to Longin's intelligence activities, since he knew that Turkul and his (White Russian) drew their money as a result of this activity. However, Romanov's efforts in this direction came to naught.

32. After Bulgaria's war activity had been neutralized by the Russians, Longin moved to Budapest. (AOB: an open query: how did Longin obtain his NKWD (NKVD) information, since?) Here he increased his demands for moneym and Kauder sent Dr. Deutsch to discuss the matter with Turkul. Deutsch returned with the information that he had failed to see Turkul, because the latter had been in conference an SS officer. The next day Turkul explained that the SS officer was actually a member of his Union who was serving in the SS. Subsequently, Longin asserted that if Turkul did not receive immediately political support from Ast Wien (AOB: likely by then K.d.M. Wien as since July/August 1944 the Abwehr did merge with Amt IV/Amt Mil), he would find it elsewhere. Kauder believes that Turkul was negotiating with the SS to this and, although the incident described above is the only basis for this assumption.

33. In September 1944 Turkul requested Kauder to arrange for the transportation of 30 members of his Union from Belgrade to Budapest. Although Kauder was becoming weary of such requests, he realised the importance to his own future of keeping the good-will of Longin and Turkul. Consequently, he submitted again, although it developed that only eight of the thirty showed any desire to join Turkul in Budapest. In October (1944), Turkul expressed the wish that he and all his cohorts to be moved to Wien, since the Red Army was too close to Budapest for comfort. At this time, Kauder noticed that the relations between Longin and Turkul were somewhat strained (gespannen) and that Longin was so eager to follow his chief. However, after the Wlassow-Turkul meeting had been taken place in Berlin, Longin exhibited his old faithfulness once again. (For an account of the relationship between Turkul and Wlassow, see Special Interrogation Report No 1 on on Kauder).

34. At the end of October, the advantage of the Soviet made it necessary to choose retreat positions for the Meldekopf. Kauder wanted to move the entire headquarter to Csorna, but Longin insisted on moving his officers to Preßburg (Bratislava). On the night of 2-3 November (1944), Longin moved to Csorna, remained there two days, and then → continued on to Preßburg.

continued on to Preßburg. There he demanded that the money for himself and for Turkul be paid in old pieces rather than in dollars.

35. Subsequently, Longin inquired whether it would be possible, in case Preßburg had to be evacuated, for him to flee to Switzerland. When Kauder submitted this inquiry to Wien, the suspicions was raised that he himself had hopes of emigrating to Switzerland. (Interrogator's not: The suspicion probably had some basis in fact, although Kauder denies that he entertained the idea at that time.)

36. In the beginning of February 1945, Longin declared that the war situation was hopeless for the Germans and that he wanted to cease operations. Kauder believes that this was the culmination of all rejections which had met Longin's demands from the Abwehr. Longin remarked also that he was beginning to consider himself a traitor to Russia in having caused the death of many Russian troops through his intelligence activity. (Interrogator's note: In the light of Longin's present whereabouts, this is worth keeping in mind.) Nevertheless, Longin recognised the difficulties that would arise for him by his leaving the Abwehr and continued to submit reports.

37. In (12th) February 1945, Kauder was arrested on charges of having engaged in unlawful financial dealings and was interrogated by Hptm. Kiausnitzer?. During the interrogation he was informed that Longin was still in function under supervision of Lt. Thiemann and that Turkul and Longin were receiving more money than they had previously. (For an account, chronologically written, of Kauder's arrest and subsequent career, see the SCI/A Report ISK 41, dated 7 September 1945.) In May 1945 Kauder, Longin, Turkul and their cohorts were arrested by American authorities, and Kauder saw Longin for the last time in a jail in Salzburg. Longin requested him not to mention the regularity with which he had submitted intelligence reports nor to state the sums which he had been paid to him.

38. Kauder has the following to say about Longin's activities from 1940 to 1945: During the Abwehr career, Longin submitted approximately 5,500 W/T reports, of which about 10% concerned tactical matters. Of these tactical reports, about 55% were determined to certain correct information. It was noted by Abwehr officers that the number of Soviet Air Forces units were never given - at least, never correctly; in the few instances in which they were given, they determined to be false. The reports from the USSR were labelled the Max Reports; those from the Near East, concerning Anglo-American affairs, were known as the Moritz Reports. The Moritz reports numbered about 1,000; the source of most of these was once named by Longin as a White Russian emigrant. The evaluation office in Berlin considered these reports of little worth, although it is → noteworthy that the numbers of the air force units, when given in the Moritz reports were found to be correct.

(AOB: These latter facts, particularly in 1943; did cause an enormous raw in England, and great efforts had been put into it. However, factually, after having eliminated the possibilities that the Germans did read British coded messages, that maybe the Germans had been informed by the Russians deliberately. Which we may now consider being quite true. This aspect will be later dealt, with in due course)

noteworthy that the numbers of the air force units, when given in the Moritz reports were found to be correct. (Interrogator's note: Kauder is careful to assert that Longin along was responsible for gathering intelligence concerning "Western Powers" in the Near East, but it is known that he himself was directly involved in such actively.) (AOB: in my perception, this is true: one course was Willi Goetz (Wigo) and another channel came via the Spanish Ambassador, and Kauder's friend Pratt Y Soutzo Pedro (KV 2/1465; PF 67230) AND Velicotny (Velikotny?) KV 2/1656; PF 67232). This aspect will, Deo volente, be dealt with in due course.)

39. Kauder presents the following view of the Longin-Turkul relationship: He is convinced that Longin first joint the Turkul organisation in 1940 and had not had any previous relationship with the White Russian general. In return for the intelligence connections which obtained from Turkul, Longin pressed the Abwehr for political and financial support for the Turkul White Russian organisation, although it is questionable that any great part of the money that went to Turkul was ever passed on to his subordinates. There is little doubt that Longin was to some extent inspired by Turkul - until he learned more of the latter's character in Budapest. However, when it seemed that Turkul was to receive a position of importance on the Wlassow (Vlassov)-Turkul arrangement.

AOB: comparing the foregoing US G-2 Interrogation pages and comparing them with what had been left of the British Services, I tend to consider - that the latter Interrogation copies a far more stable, with less childish imaginations. Thus being a good example as to how it should regularly be accomplished, instead.

Original filed in PF 602341 KV 2/1331; Dr. Wolfgang Dietze, Istambul (Istanbul) at Minute 33 (AOB: until now quite many Minute Sheets are missing)

Following our discussion on the points raised by the information given on Klatt and his organisation by Horaczek, I discussed this with U.35 → (AOB: Klop Ustinov. A German/Russian born, whom lived in London after the end of Word War One. He represented first a German News agency; maybe once being engaged in the German Embassy in that quality. He was in some way or another engaged in the early 1920 by the British Secret Service. Maybe because he spoke German language, something that was hardly the case in the British Services, and where almost every document had to be translated firstly. What I myself don't like is - that he cheated quite many of his former countrymen; often journalists residing in England . He did so systematically long before the Nazi era. Making friendship and informing time and again briefing everything of them. What also was apparent: he wasn't a very smart guy, either. There are some indications, but not being proven, that U.35 thus Mr. Ustinov, also carried the cover name Sharmer. Jonah Ustinov was born in Jaffa in Palestine, from a Russian father and a German mother on 2?/12/1898)

→ His view is that Horaczek has given very full and interesting information but nothing that takes the (Kauder) case further: it is his (U.35) view that very little more would be obtained by further interrogation. In my view (Mss. Joan Chenhalls?), any clue which would mead us to identify the source of Ira's (Longin) information is vital, and any information disclosing the methods of Ira's two-way service of intelligence would be of value, which we know to have been a vast and efficient service wit traffic in and out. (AOB: actually the Russian NKWD (NKVD)) You may consider it, however, well worth while questioning Horczek on what he knows of Ira. (AOB: in my perception hardly anything) You will see at (Minute) 34a (not provided) the only information that Klatt gives on Horaczek.

I just have received word from our representative in Germany that under the new G-2 directive, MISC will release individuals being held for security reasons. Richard Kauder alias Klatt and his mistress, Ibolya (Iby) Kalman, fall in this category since their interrogation has apparently been terminated. Their release, therefore is imminent. (AOB: actually, this occurred on 11 March 1947)

It is believed that MISC plans to take both of them to Salzburg where they will be set free.

USFET will not consider holding these two at our request after the interrogation has been finished. Our organisation has no facilities for holding them.

cc: Mr. H.A.R. Philby (M.I.6) (AOB: 'Kim' Philby was a member of the Cambridge five, and actually being a Russian Spy!)

KV 2/1496-2, page 31a (minute 82?) Translation from a genuinely French document based upon information given in Stuttgart to the French, source being (Otto) Wagner

In 1940 a client of the Hotel Slavianska Besseda in Sofia, in possession of a German passport attracted attention by his interest in German clients of this hotel, most of whom came from Vienna. The doorkeeper (Portier) was frequently questioned by him. This German was called Klatt (an alias) Richard (real name Richard Kauder) and came from Vienna (Wien).

According to the Abwehr Amt and Ast Wien, this Klatt was absolutely unknown but the information he was trying to get concerned almost exclusively the agents and collaborators of the Ast Wien in Bulgaria.

At the beginning of 1941 an agent of III-F (counter-espionage) Wien going under the alias of Heller was in close contact with the Bulgarian Police to whom he communicated information on the SR Foreigners in Bulgaria. The K.O. got wind of the affair, by asking the 2nd Bulgarian Bureau for information, wand warned Ast Wien to obtain confirmation of the identity of this agent who was amongst other things engaged in the smuggling of tobacco. Wien did not reply. (AOB: sometimes Ast Wien had been supplied with rare goods via Klatt's way of trading by means of the profitable firm: Mittermayer)

Later on this Heller introduced to the Bulgarian Police his Chief ~~Major~~ Klatt (AOB: being a Jew, forbade to become engaged in the German Wehrmacht; therefore the rank of a Major, is ridicule), which proved to the KO that Klatt was an agent of Ast Wien, confirmed by a note from I Luft. Wien signed signed by Von Wahl-Welskrich (AOB: The latter name I have already suggested before, and will now change all the forgoing incorrect spelling). This later went to Sofia to introduce Klatt to the KO and to find out the real mission of Klatt.

This latter was to install a "PC" in Sofia to receive air information on Russia. He was to be equipped with radio to obtain the maximal results. But this Luft Meldekopf Süd-Ost would work with the Bulgarian Police Radios who would know the peculiarities of the Russian Radios. Consultation of the Abwehr ~~Amt~~ Referat I-Luft confirmed the discussions of the Ast Wien. The "Büro Klatt" installed itself in a small villa of the Patriach Effimi Avenue (Allée).

It was a very buy place where Klatt entertained the most ill famed elements of Wien and Budapest, with the help of the bar maids of Sofia. This everlasting orgy attracted the attention of the 2nd Bulgarian Bureau. Wien and Berlin ignored the representations of the KO Bulgaria and gave protection to the "Büro Klatt" to which the OKW attached a particular importance. (AOB: we are now viewing the enfolding of an ongoing raw, between Obstlt. Otto Wagner (official alias Dr. Delius). He an officer of the Wehrmacht versus the Jewish Richard Kauder (alias Klatt). This will become a villain raw; which Obstlt. Wagner will not win) The information transmitted by it was so varied and so important that it was necessary to shut ones eyes to the "ugliness" of the service.

Cautiously the Bulgarian KO set out to establish that Heller and Klatt without proper authority had had doubtful contacts with the Russians Delegation in Sofia, which led one to believe that Klatt was working for several people among them the Abwehr and therefore the 5 or 6 wireless sets installed in Bulgaria to work with the Russians did not exist. (AOB: we have already noticed that the real channel of information was in, someway or another, related to an NKWD (NKVD) contact. Why the Russian NKWD (NKVD) did play it this way, has never been clearly come to light. What counted for the OKW was: - that the military, tactical and strategic, information proved to be relevant that the veracity was great to a high degree! (But sometimes, unexpectedly, matters were faulty All these aspects were, of course, unknown to Obstlt. Otto Wagner)

Cornered, Klatt declared that he was working with a station installed at Samsun on the Black Sea. Once again this station did not exist. Klatt then retreated behind professional secrecy, he was Jewish and would not part this secret while he did not have to answer and while he was in safety.

The protection which Klatt enjoyed was not countermanded. The information obtained was very important and the means of obtaining it very obscure. The attitude of the Klatt collaborators was very doubtful not to say anti-German. (AOB: some of them were also of Jewish descent; and logically not well treated by the Germans)

Wagner (Dr. Delius) came to the following conclusion: If the "Büro Klatt" furnished such important and exact information with so little discretion and security, then it must be worked by the enemy, and in fact is a double-cross (exact translation; a tentative neutralisation of German Services). The Russian superiority in manpower, augmented by American material resources permitted authentic information to be passed of the Russian military intentions because the Germans could not retaliate.

Wagner (Dr. Delius) could not say precisely who was employing Klatt, English, Americans or Russians. (AOB: it were the Russians) He estimated that the Russians could make the necessary "sacrifices" to get their "agent" built up.

Klatt has contacts in Turkey with the Spanish Embassy (AOB: Pratt Y Soutzo Pedro KV 2/1465; PF 67230). Sofia could not, even on orders of Canaris himself, exercise an efficacious watch, since OBDL (Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe) was vouching for Klatt and his organisation.

Schellenberg (KV 2/94 .. KV 2/99; PF 600561) confided to Wagner in April 1945 that the "Büro Klatt" had done some dirty work, and that the Germans were intoxicated, particularly the Luftwaffe which is not surprising as the Russians had high up agents placed there. (AOB: I am not so certain whether Schellenberg expressed it this way, during his Camp 020 interrogations (June/July 1945))

Q. Did Klatt ever try to contact you during your prison term in Salzburg, or afterwards?

Ira. Only indirectly. He sent several people, whom I did not know to prison to ask me if I needed anything - especially food. (Note: The term referred to is June, July and August 1945, in the Landesgericht jail, Salzburg.) I once saw Hirsch (KV 2/717 ... KV 2/726; PF 63185) on the street in Salzburg, but avoided him.

Ira. Very little. I didn't meet him until Klatt moved to Budapest from Sofia (AOB: after 5 July 1943, but he settled somewhere in September in Budapest. He was simply a driver for Klatt and thus avoided induction into the Wehrmacht.) I never talked to Bergler (Franz I-L Wien); Klatt asked me never to talk to any of his people. Consequently I'm unaware of their activities; as a matter of Fact, I know very little about Klatt's own activities and have no idea what he did 90% of the time.

Q. How could you contribute all your intelligence information to a man about whom you knew next to nothing? You must have realised that Germany might lose the war, and that some day you would be responsible for the intelligence operations you conducted against the Allies, and especially for the reports you handed to Klatt.

Ira Well, I have already suggested that you bring me before a military court which must judge whether or not I am a war criminal. It must decide whether or not I am at fault, and sentence me to ten years or whatever it is, or else release me as a gentleman. I alone know what I have done, I know more than your entire organisation may ever know of my work. All I can say is that I always been anti-Communist and a guter schöner Arbeiter. Why am I locked up here? If you're going o arrest me, then you must also arrest all other active White Russian emigrants here. You Americans are making a big mistake in locking me up. I offered to work for you as the |Representative of General Turkul, who is the last remaining vestige of strength of the White Russians throughout the world. You must work through us. You may try to work with individuals, or with groups of emigrants such as the Ukrainians, Georgians, or even now with the Polish, Hungarians and other emigrants, but they are all beginning to look to Turkul for leadership, and sooner or later you will be forced to work against Communism through us. I can't understand this - locked up here without proper food, eating utensils, clothing etc! Tomorrow you may look up all our collaborators. Why? Perhaps you think I am a Soviet agent like General Skoblin.

I cannot afford to give information about people who have worked for our organisation (Turkul union) for many years. I am a representative, can you tell me the names of any → persons, in Austria, for example, who know you, outside of Turkul's immediate staff.

persons, in Austria, for example, who know you, outside of Turkul's immediate staff.

Ira. I am a representative through Turkul, - directly. I have always maintained strict secrecy in my intelligence activities. Not even Klatt's people know me. The Russians don't even know my name.

Q. How can you say that they don't know your name when several members of Klatt's organisation, for example, Ibi (Ibolya) Kalman (Klatt's wife or mistress), Illi Tallosch, and two Sturms, who, you have already stated, were personally known to you are now or have at some time been held by the Soviets and ma even be working for them?

Ira. Well, ah, er, ah - So what would they discover? That I was perhaps an informant of Klatt. So what? Many White Russians fall into that category; besides, they only knew me a Dr. Lang.

Q. You have often stated that Klatt made much money through your information. Didn't you also receive your share of the benefits, including financial gains?

Ira. No, I received few benefits. I made no money. Klatt had his own deals on the side, and I can't vouch? for what he has told you.

Q. Which agents? Specifically who received American dollars out of all the dollars you received from Klatt?

Ira. Various agents. Sometimes their families also. The American dollar was the only valuable currency at the time. I can't remember the amount I received. (Note: Subject admitted later receiving to $1600 monthly, but would not account for the same.)

Ira. Yes. That was a big swindle deal pulled of by Klatt. He and I flew to Rome to talk with Turkul in May ~~1944~~ 1943. (AOB: might have been towards the end of August, but more likely September 1943. Why this? The Germans capitulated on 13th May 1943 in Tunis. And, it was foreseeable that Italy might change sides, and the German interest no longer could be executed. In the whole story, for whatever reason, Klatt decided that it does make sense to move-out Turkul and some relatives, from Italy before Italy changes sides. Another motive might have existed. It was foreseeable that the Allies who enter Italy's mainland. And Turkul might have been suspected fore what ever reason, Klatt's endeavour might have been in great danger). Klatt flew me to Sofia and proceeded to Budapest alone. There he got together with his good friend Romanov. The two of them about two weeks later - this was some time during the first week in June - flew to Rome with Kleyenstüber, to evacuate Turkul, Mme. Turkul and their daughter, Tamara, and the secretary Muchanov. All this was done without consulting me. Klatt didn't want me to know that Romanov was in on the deal, and he didn't want me to talk to Turkul about the future plans.

Ira. No. Here Klatt pulled another fast one. He told Turkul that a cable had been received from headquarters (AST Wien) (AOB: quite understandable that Marogna-Redwitz and von Wahl-Welskirch would like to meet the ones for whom they are paying quite a lot) saying that Turkul was to remain in Wien for several days before (as was promised) proceeding to Budapest. I think Klatt did this so that Romanov could talk to Turkul in Wien. Klatt feared that I would be waiting for them in Budapest and wanted first to obtain a promise from Turkul that Ira (Longin) would continue to provide inteligence.

Q. Why did Turkul want to go to Budapest in the first place, instead of remaining in Wien he would certainly have enjoyed more physical security?

Ira. No, but Romanov was an opportunist, only willing to work for money. He often told me I was crazy to give Klatt so much information without demanding more financial and physical assistance in return. (AOB: according to Klatt:- Ira Longin demanded several times for increasing his payment, but at Ast Wien they rejected these demands. It turned out that Ira Longin remained operating for less than he demanded for.)

Ira. Money meant nothing to me. I had been waiting for twenty-five years for an opportunity to fight Soviet Russia, and here was an opportunity to work with a nation which was to destroy Communism.

Ira. Not exactly. Whenever I needed money, I wrote a letter to Klatt in Budapest, and shortly thereafter the money arrived in an envelope - through Deutsch (also acting as Klatt's chauffeur), of course. I believe Deutsch had something on Klatt which the latter didn't want known at any cost, and thus Deutsch, Baumruck, and Dominik (Johannes Weiss) - who seemed to be the inner brain of his organisation. This whole organisation was nothing but a comedy, and I was its only worthwhile source. (AOB: quite many engaged within Klatt Luftmeldekopf were only employed because it allowed them to be set free from unwanted military- or related services. At a certain point, the Germans forced Klatt's organisation to reduce quite rigidly his 'blown-up' organisation of the Luftmeldekopf)

Ira. Yes. I met him once in 1941 after my arrest by the Hungarian Secret Police in Budapest, which he instigated because he thought I was a Soviet spy. Klatt soon arranged for my release from prison, but most of my important papers were retained, including a first rate complete on the Battle Order of the Red Army. Goetz and Klatt then distributed this report to their superiors as if it were their own. After this incident I always refused to speak to Goetz, or even to meet him. He was strictly a "Hochstapler".

Ira. Yes, in my apartment in Sofia, Septembrisstr. 3. I burned all my files etc., in my fireplace in Bratislava (Preßburg), Groesslengova 10, in March 1945 before fleeing to Leongang Austria with Bergler.

Q. Did you realise that you were giving the Germans intelligence information concerning British and American operations in the Middle East and in Italy when you passed on the Marchenko reports to Klatt?

Q. How can you prove that these reports did not come from the same source as the Russian operational reports?

Ira. Well, why don't you bring me before a combined Anglo-American military court and try me for whatever espionage activities they accuse me of? How I obtained the information on Soviet Russia which I supplied to the Germans is my secret, and I shall tell no one. (AOB: Ira Longin most likely obtained them via a Russian NKWD (NKVD) intermediate) The last time we discussed my operations as gentlemen - as representative of two independent → intelligence services.

intelligence services. But now, in violation of your agreement, you have locked me up like a criminal. The Major said I was to be free. I told you when we first began to talk together that we (Turkul and myself) wanted to talk to some very high official who deals with the Communist problem. Your unit seems to be more interested in making records of all our past activities than in working with us in our fight against Communism.

Ira. Well good! Then tell your higher authorities that I am a Hochstapler and want to be tried. I have waited a year now for a work program. but never a directive. And now I/m arrested again! All you know about me is what you have heard from Klatt, and was mostly lies. I have always told you the truth and kept my honour. You have your intelligence system, and I have mine. We differ greatly in our methods of operation. I alone can be responsible for the "stories" that I produce, and you must accept them on face value, of "auf wiedersehen".

Q. This seems to be as far as our discussion can go now, but before we say auf Wiedersehen, you will have the opportunity to explain your story to "higher authorities".

(AOB: the Anglo-American attitude - mainly is to speak about "body or bodies" reducing someone dignity to about nothing. This constitutes a poor kind of attitude, but it also signalises the intellectual limited horizon of these kind of humans and their ultimate disposal)

3. Subject states that by far the most important agent of I Luft in Wien and indeed of the whole Abwehrstelle there was a Jewish man, the name of Klatt (alias of Richard Kauder). This man was first recruited as a 'V'-Mann by Major von Wahl-Welskirch, ca ~~summer '41~~ late Spring 1940. He had then declared that very possibly he would be able to obtain information from Russia, but tha to do so it would be necessary to send him to Sofia. (Because of the Russian Legation) Thereupon he was allowed to go to Sofia, with plenty of money in order to recruit agents etc. He sent in his first reports towards the end of '41 (early in the year 1941) and straight-away they attracted a lot of attention. This was because the concerned the movements of large bodies of Russian troops, including Division, brigades and regiments of the army and also the Red Air-Force and Navy. These reports were considered so important in Wien that the sanction was given that a special wireless-station (called Schwert) was to be built in Sofia, merely to deal with the incoming and outgoing reports of Klatt. Subject remembers that at least eight wireless-operators were despatched to work there.

Difficulties raised by K.O. Sofia and confirmation of Klatt's reports by Berlin:

4. The one trouble, which Horaczek declares, was constantly reoccurring, was that the Abwehr K.O. in Sofia was always demanding that Klatt should be taken over by them. Wien however, was determined to avoid this and informed Berlin that Klatt himself wished to continue to work for them and not to be taken over by Sofia. (AOB: among the agreement, was that Ast Wien represented by its head Obst. Baron Marogna-Redwitz). This still further incited the Leiter of the Sofia K.O., Obstlt. Otto Wagner @ Dr. Delius, who subsequently began to maintain that Klatt's reports were worthless. Thereupon a request was sent from Abwehrstelle in Wien both to the Luftwaffeführungsstab and to the Wehrmachtführungsstab that an estimation be given as to whether Klatt's information is authentic. The reply came back, that the reports were considered of extreme importance and were termed as being quite essential and that they had repeatedly been confirmed as valid by subsequent events on the Russian Front. From then onwards, KLatt was given the special protection of Berlin and was granted all assistance that he requested.

As already mentioned Hptm. von Kahlen was sent to Sofia from Wien ca. April '42 in order to look after Klatt's wireless station there. He was also instructed to find out as much as he possibly as to exactly how Klatt obtained his information. Ca. september - October '42 he returned home to Königsberg (East Prussia now known as Kaliningrad) following his being sick with stomach trouble. Later, towards the end of '42 he was sent to join the staff of I-Luft at Walli I (= Warschaw, Warschau) Nikolaiken (AOB: with station "Atlas" was the Headquarters near to Hitler's Wolfschanze in East Prussia. Canaris and also Hansen visited Nikolaiken rather often - as it was also close to Russia). In actual fact, Subject declares, Kahlen was able to find-out very litttle indeed about Klatt's methods. as the latter was very intent his activities as secret as possible.

6. Transference of Klatt to Budapest and Subjects first personal contact with him:

Summer'44 it was aranged by Abwehrstelle in Wien, that Klatt should be evacuated with his H.Q. from Sofia to Budapest. (AOB: remember Hitler's decision of 5th July 1943 declaring the from now on it was strictly prohibited to engage someone from Jewish descent in German Abwehr service) (Subject himself (i.e. Horaczek) was in that town, where he was Leiter of F.A.K 178 (Front Aufklärungskommando) there). Klatt had taken over a house he installed his wireless stations (Bully I, Bulli 2, Bulli 3 ...). These latter were at opposite ends of the town, once of them being used as a receiving station and the other as a transmitting station. Subject states that he was often visited by Klatt and that he himself returned these visits on numerous occasions. Klatt himself was very apprehensive that he might be arrested by the Stapo (Staatspolizei) or the the S.D. (Sicherheitsdienst) (AOB: more likely the Sipo = Sicherheitspolizei) there (owing to the fact that he was a Jew), as his arch-enemy Obstlt. (alias) Dr. Delius had also taken up residence in Budapest. With the idea of gaining additional protection, Klatt gave Subject a copy of all his reports, which Horaczek handed over to his Chief Obst. Jessel. The last declared that he would → inform his superior, Gen. von Greifenberg ...

inform his superior, General von Greifenberg about the importance of Klatt's report and request his intervention also in protecting him from the Stapo (Gestapo). At the same time, of course, Klatt continued to relay all his reports back to Wien.

Following an invitation fro Klatt, Subject visited both his H.Q. and the two wireless stations. He declares, that he was forced to marvel at the efficiency with which the whole organisation had been buil up, more so as it had been done by a civilian. Thereupon he asked Klatt how it was possible for him to achieve such startling results and Klatt agreed to outline his methods to him. Klatt explained that, he was in communication with a group of Red Officers, who were followers of the old Russian Czar. The Chief of these officers, he declared, was an instructor at the Red Army wireless School (AOB: I do not trust this story). It was this officer who received numerous reports from other Red Army colleagues of his, also with Czarist tendencies. This officer, at the Wireless College, then used to relay the information he had obtained both to a special wireless receiving station set-up by Klatt in Turkey and also to the Bulgarian Police HQ. in Sofia. Whilst Klatt had been in Sofia, the information had been relayed on to him from Turkey. He had also collected it direct from the Bulgarian police. Later when he was in Budapest he received the reports direct at his own wireless station and also continued to have the reports relayed to him from the Bulgarian Police HQ, in Sofia. Klatt declared that that he had already found an establishment to which he could move his HQ. in the event of Budapest having to be evacuated. (AOB: the impression is being ventilated as if he could move to Turkey. Turkey, und heavy diplomatic pressure on behave of the Western Allies did broke-off the diplomatic relation with Germany. All were interned and they left Istambul (Istanbul) on a Swedish ship heading for Portugal, about February/March 1945) His new HQ. was on the Hungarian - Austrian frontier ca. 10 km from Hegyshalom. He stated that he was still very apprehensive of actually entering the Reich, as he feared some action being taken against him by the Gestapo (which actually occurred on 12 February 1945 in Wien).

In ~~January~~ February '45 when Subject (Horaczek) had moved his HQ. to Breslau he heard that Klatt had been arrested by the Gestapo in Wien. He attempted to learn some more of the details by phoning to Wien, but was not able to do so. (AOB: in my perception mainly due to the circumstances that Breslau was besieged already by the Russians; or was Horaczek only in the vicinity of Breslau, thus outside the "Festung Breslau"?)

Subject describes Klatt, whom he met very often whilst he was in Wien and and Budapest as:

170-172 cm; tall; corpulent; light and thick hair; clean shaven; round and full face; nose very slightly upturned; ca 40 - 42 years old (he was born on 6 September 1900); Born in Austria and also spoke a little Bulgarian and Hungarian. He possessed a tremendous personality and was the only civilian, as far as Subject (Horaczek) knows, who was in charge of Wehrmacht personnel (i.e. the wireless operators and the chauffeurs in Sofia and Budapest.)

1). It is recommended that an investigation be made in order to determine the fate of the Agent Klatt. (Klatt was set free in Austria by US G-2 on 11 March 1947) It can be assumed that any former members of either the Abwehr or the Gestapo in Wien will will be able to supply some relevant information in this respect. Subject (Horaczek) himself believes that if Klatt is still alive he will be living in Austria (correct).

2). If it does prove possible to locate this man (??), it is recommended that he be very thooroughly interrogated as to the exact nature of his methods he employed for smuggling, what does appear to have been highly important information out of Russia.

Reference your request of 26 September for information concerning the above-named person.

Ira (Longin) told Klatt that Samoiloff was with a signal unit attached to an Army HQ in Kiev. After the battle of Kiev in 1941, Samoiloff disappeared for approximately six months after which time Ira (Longin) told Klatt that he had re-established contact with Samoiloff and Samoiloff was now running a signal school at Kubishev (?).

For about nine months after Samoilloff's reappearance the information presumably sent from the above school was of unusual excellence.

Original filed in PF R (= Russia) 4394/B.2.b/JC (= Joan Chenhalls) (M.I.5.) 17th October, 1946.

Daily over a period of three and a half years, from 1941 to 1943, Klatt, a Hungarian Jew (AOB: this might indicate that this summary originates from after 5th July 1943; as then Klatt was forced to leave Sofia, as Hitler had decided that from now on no Jews may be engaged in actual Abwehr Service. However, Klatt genuinely was an Austrian, but as to remain in contact with Richard Kauder whose alias was Klatt - he got an Hungarian passport on the name of Karmany), obtained information of considerable operational value for the German Intelligence Service from Russian sources. Klatt's recent interrogation by a representative of this office in the American Zone of Germany had thrown a sinister light on his main sources - General Turkul and Ira (Longin). The theory is now held that these two White Russians are members of the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) (now M.V.D.) who have penetrated and controlled the White Russian Organisatios in Western Europe under cover of their association with the G.I.S. (= German Intelligence Service), and that the information they receive from Russian sources was for the purpose of establishing and maintaining their position in the eyes of the Germans.

All these three characters were, following the collapse, in the American Zone of Europe, and until a few weeks ago we (Britain Services) had not been allowed to question them. Following the Klatt report, however, permission was given by C.I.C. Washington, for Turkul and Ira (Longin) to be made available to the Britsih and they have for the past month been under interrogation in the U.K. The purpose of our investigation has been threefold.

c.) to discover the method whereby Ira (Longin) received his information from Russian and from the Middle East. He claims that it came by W/T, but no trace of any such messages has ever been found.

We are satisfied on point a.) We are now more convinced that b.) is true, tough we have not yet an admission from them, and point c.) has still to be cleared up.

- The disposal of the characters has now to be decided. (AOB: They only could have meant the way Turkul and Ira Longin should be retuned to US G-2 custody; as the British Services lacked further jurisdiction) (AOB: It think some text had been made invisible). I think it will be impossible to persuade the Home Office to hold White Russians here as presumably the same difficulties may arise if we ask them to be taken to the United States of America, The only alternative would be to return them to Russia, where, if they were N.K.V.D (N.K.W.D). agents, they would never again be trusted, having been in American and British hands too long. (AOB: do these rather mad thinking British servant minds - do they realise what they were supposing? They only guessed what in someone's limited brains pops-up, without possessing a clearly sound understanding!) If, on the other hand, we have misjudged them, we send White Russians to an unpleasant future under the regime of the Republic. May we know from you whether whether you would willing to have them transferred to CSDIC/WEA to be held there by Colonel Stevens.

He might have an illegal crack at them if we prove unsuccessful and they may well link up with other work on which he is engaged at that centre. Their ultimate disposal would, of course, be determined by the policy covering other people interned at this establishment. Their status at the movement is that if self-confessed agents of G.I.S. (German Intelligence Service) , though we firmly believe them to be agents of M.V.D. the only hypothesis which fits all the facts. (AOB: of course, within the latter's minds)

(AOB: Generally speaking: those interned by US G-2 in their P.o.W. Camps - must be regarded quite lucky people, because they did not underwent ill minded British revenge thinking)

As requested by Sam, I forward herewith a copy of Professor Ryle's original report on Klatt for Salzburg office.

With reference to your not about the intended release of Shengalaya, although this is not within our jurisdiction we are of the opinion that it would be wise to hold him until the Ira (Longin) case is finished here (at Camp 020). Would it be possible to postpone his release for a while?

Lieut. Commander Winston Scott, (U.S. Liaison Officer at the U.S. Embassy in London)

1. Philip Rouskov has indicated that during his period of Service for the Belgian Second Bureau under Kostoff he had considerable knowledge of the activities of the German Intelligence offices Bulgaria - especially those run by Klatt (= Richard Kauder) and Obstlt. Otto Wagner (@ Dr. Delius). Rouskov indicated the following interesting report about the reasons for suspicions by the Bulgarian Second Bureau of Klatt's use by the Soviets as a DA.

2. Klatt was found to have had a cut out at 6 September Strasse #3, a Frau Alexandrowa, who was receiving reports regularly from the Russian Legation in Sofia. Rouskov states that this woman was arrested by the Bulgarian Second Bureau, date unknown, and a search of her flat and personal effects disclosed numerous operational intelligence reports on Soviet Russia, all of them bearing the name "Dr. Long" (= Ira Longin) at the head of the reports. Rouskov was of the opinion (and this was probably also the opinion of the Bulgarian Intelligence) that Lang was the cover name of Klatt's organisation providing these reports to Klatt via Mrs. Alexandrowa. Rouskov further stated that among such documents by the Bulgarian Intelligence concerning Klatt's possible penetration or control by the Soviets is not disclosed to Kobu (KO Bulgaria??) or any other German Intelligence representatives because, according to Rouskov, the Bulgarian authorities did not wish to jeopardize their relations with the Soviet Legation. by releasing a report which they did not possess complete information about.

3. Ira has mentioned the fact that he maintained an apartment at this address and careful interrogation on this point should reveal the exact role played by Mrs. Alexandrova. It is possible that this was his actual link to the Soviet Legation in Sofia which Klatt was accused of having by Obstlt. Otto Wagner.

A meeting was held in Colonel Robertson's (TAR) room on 29.8.46 between Colonel Robertson, Commander Winston Scott (US Liaison Officer at the US Embassy in London), Sam Bossard and Miss Chenhalls.

Colonel Robertson reported that Prof. Ryle intended to interrogate the men one after the other in a friendly manner manner seeking information about their connections with the Abwehr. He would than play back one against the other and if nothing resulted from this approach, then the "heat" would be turned on, He stated that Mr. Philby (AOB: he himself actually being a Russian Spy pure san; thought not yet been caught; he was one among the so-called Cambridge Five spies) was agreeable to this procedure. Commander Winston then reported that Turkul by now should have been arrested and would be coming very soon, and that Ira (Longin) (this apparently is the true name) had under surveillance by the Americans in Austria for the last 3 months as he is suspected of being a Soviet penetration agent. It is believed that he has been greatly assisted in this work by Alexander Shengalaya. He handed over a Top Secret Document on the National Workers' Union of the New Generation which he thought should be read by the interrogators as it might possibly as it might possibly provide a motive for Turkul's actions, and should be read in conjunction with Schellenberg's reports (KV 2/94 ... KV 2/99 PF 600561). We felt that the Dr. Delius @ Otto Wagner report should also be studied by the interrogators. He handed over 3 Top secret reports which have been received from Austria on Ira. Commander Scott suggested, and it was agreed, that he should be asked to invite Ira's (Longin's) (US) interrogators to company him to this country and to collaborate with Professor Ryle on the examination of these men. (AOB: I personally highly doubt that his will be allowed by US G-2). It was agreed that the interrogation should be under the control of Professor Ryle and he would be assisted by his American colleague and by Captain Derbyshire and a Mr. Johnson (AOB: we have encountered Mr. Johnson before in interrogating Richard Kauder alias Klatt; in my perception not a too brilliant mind) (see Q2122 Q2122return). Sam Bossard would also be available. It was thought wise for all these interrogators to work temporarily under assumed (cover-) names. As the meeting was finishing Mr Philby (our Russian spy) rang up to say that a French report had come in, via their represenative in Istambul (Istanbul), saying that Jocovie, a Russian in the Middle East had volunteered that he had been running a Klatt as a Russian penetration agent. This French aspect of the case is new and it is thought probable that it links up with the fact that Dr. Delius @ Otto Wagner is at present in French custody.

Miss Chenhalls has asked to see Captain Derbyshire and Mr. Johnson and obtain their help over the interrogation.

Header being typically on behalf of M.I.6. Exceptionally showing, the rarely provided CX/ data

I attach a list of suggested emendations to Professor Ryle's paper on the Dienststelle Klatt. I found it unnecessary to make many alterations, and I do not think that the ones which I have suggested in any way prejudice the value of the text. If you think that I have missed anything, would you please give me a ring.

AOB: Hand written: Mr. Philby told that he may keep the copies he has. Really for himself or did he have a plan to inform the Russians about it?

You do not say in your letter whether you wanted either of the copies of Professor Ryle's report back, so I have retained them. If you want either or both, will you let ,me know?

KV 2/1496-2, page 86 AOB: not provided, but I consider this being Philby's changes of Ryle's document. Ryle being a Professor and Philby being a Russian spy and a British Crown servant

I suggest that the passage starting "We were" and ending "Of 1941m but" should be deleted, and that the paragraph should start with the word "Though".

I suggest that "The attempts of R.S.S." (Radio Security Service) (= British W/T intercept Service focussed particularly upon Abwehr communications)

4. "Check with M.E." and "Check" should be deleted. Your paragraphs 5 and 6 respectively.

After "But Klatt showed" insert "Every symptom of lying. The only reason I can think of (AOB: the Russian spy is thinking of) for Klatt's". "In "after "embarrassment" should read "Is".

6. "What of Moritz reports (dealing with information on the Eastern Mediterranean)." Not 2 on page 11.

The first passage from "The question whether" to "For which Lang worked" should I think be omitted.

Commander Scott reported that a signal had been received from C.I.C. Washington to the effect that a) Turkul and Lang (Ira Longin) should be brought to the U.K. for interrogation by British and U.S. authorities. b) Requesting all information obtained should be pooled and c) that any further line of action should be cleared with Washington.

It was agreed that Turkul and Lang should be interrogated under friendly conditions whilst held at Rugby Mansions, and in view of their past history, present status, and probable future, it was considered that four carefully instructed guards would be necessary to look after them. Miss Chenhalls was asked to a) Obtain from the Home Office permission to bring these characters to the U.K. b) To ascertain if S.I.S. (= M.I.6) had any additional accommodation that could be used if Lang was held separately for a while. c) Endeavour to get hold of four guards through the A.D.A. and Military Section. c d?) Keep Mr. Hollis advised on the case.

Commander Scott was asked to go ahead with plans with Germany to a) decoy Turkul and b) arrest Lang and bring them either separately or together by American airplane to an airport in this country. It was considered essential that Turkul should arrive and handled first. It was suggested by Mr. Bossard that it might be wise and worth while to bring Turkul's White Russian Lieutenant, with him. S.S.U. also agreed to explore the possibility of using two Americans as guards for these men.

It is quite apparent that quite some attentions was dedicated in the 1970s, which might have been accomplished by Mss McCallum (R2125 R2125return)

The Kraemer case as well as the Kauder/Klatt case possessed quite some in common.

The attached draft is the beginning of a full report of the Klatt case. It sets out the reason for the report, chronological histories of the three main characters, set-up of Dienststelle Klatt, the channels of communication used by the organisation and the factual report of what happened until their arrest by the American forces in 1945.

The portion of the report still to be written is various hypotheses concerning the Klatt organisation, the differing judgements as to whether the characters were, in fact, used by the Russians or not, and the setting out of all the various theories on this unsolved case. In addition, a full glossary of all the characters mentioned in connection with this case is to be prepared alphabetically.

Until such time as the report is concluded by the responsible officer, this unfinished portion is placed on the file as it is thought that to newcomers the fact already set out are the quickest way of knowing something about the intricacies of this Intelligence net-work.

B.3.a. 28.9.49 (AOB: about the top was written: Copy in KG or K6 Library 27.6.77.)

AOB: it is rather annoying - that M.I.5, after about 4½ years after the end of the hostilities on the European continent, that British Officers had not yet been enough informed in the true past historical context.

This man, did not possess much knowledge on the wartime situation on what occurred at the European continent! Might this be an indication of a former "Great Nation" truly being in a state of decline since?

The German High Command considered that one of their most valuable sources of intelligence between 1941-1945 was the daily supply of operational reports from Luftmeldekopf Süd-Ost, Sofia, known as Dienststelle Klatt. We were aware of the existence, and nature, and distribution of these five thousand odd messages (AOB: nonsense, Klatt's main concern were not the so-called Moritz messages on matters about the Eastern Mediterranean, but the so-called Max messages of high mostly valid intelligence most often "forecasting Russian military operations".), was were passed by the Klatt Bureau to the Abwehr in Vienna for onward transmission to Berlin. They dealt with British dispositions in the Mediterranean theatre of war and the British Middle East (known as Moritz Reports., and with Russian Naval, Military and Air operations (known was the Max Reports).

On May 24th, 1945m Richard Kauder @ Klatt was arrested by the American Forces. Subsequent investigation by U.S. and British interrogators disclosed details of his organisation and led to the interrogation of what he claimed to be his two main sources of information, Ira Longin @ Lang (by the way his name on a German passport), and his chief General Turkul.

The purpose of the examination of these three persons was not so much to gather details of Klatt's personal espionage history, but to determine the sources of the Max/Moritz Reports, and the channels whereby the information reached Klatt.

The results were protracted, inconclusive, and wholly disappointing. It is intended that this report should clearly indicate what facts are known about this case, and to assemble the hypothesis put forward by the interested services, so that it can be seen upon what evidence the interferences are based. It must be said, however, that all connected with the case came to the conclusion that Ira (Longin) was and possibly is a Soviet agent though proof has proved impossible to obtain.

@ Karmany, Richard, (given by Hungarian Abwehr) (since about September 1943, after Hitler's decision that no Jews were allowed to engage in the German Abwehr!)

Born 6.9.1900 in Wien, nationality Austrian Jew; son of a military Doctor in the Austro-Hungarian Army.

Klatt was educated in Hungary and Austria, graduating as an mechanical engineer, and afterwards became a salesman in Wien and then Berlin. In March 1932, he left Berlin because of the growth of Nazism, and settled in Linz. From 1932 to 1938 he was an Austrian agent (better salesman or trades man; as he was not engaged in intelligence or spying) but in July 1938 (AOB: bear in mind: that Austria had been occupied or unified with the German Reich since March 1938) he fled to Budapest to escape increasing Nazi persecution. In September, 1939, he was first approached (by Obstlt.) von Wahl-Welskirch of Ast Wien (of the German Intelligence Service) and then by ~~Wagner @ Delius~~ in Wien. (AOB: nonsense! Wagner was the K.O. Leiter in Sofia, whom did not know about Klatt at all, yet (see S2126 S2126return), but turned down their proposal. In consequence, no assistance was forthcoming when he was arrested in December, 1939 by the Hungarian Police for a residency irregularity, and handed to the Gestapo for imprisonment near the Austrian border. On February 4th 1940, Marogna-Redwitz summoned him from prison and recruited him for the German Intelligence Service, promising that his mother would be protected from radical persecution. He was issued with a Reichsdeutsche Reisepass in name of Richard Klatt (AOB: I am not yet certain that it did not was on his real name Richard Kauder), valid for travel everywhere but he was prohibited from going to Turkey or Roumania?? and Switzerland! He was assigned to the I-Luft section of ~~K.d.M.~~ Ast Wien (AOB: K.d.M. was a designation introduced about mid 1944 after the OKW Abwehr had merged with the SS controlled R.S.H.A. By the way, this occurred after Marogna-Redwitz was caught after the failed assassination attempt on Hitler of 20 July 1944), and directly responsible to Marogna-Redwitz, though his papers were to be routed through Ritter von Wahl-Welskirch.

In June. 1940, Klatt ran into Ira Longin @ Lang (Ira Longin possessed a German passport on the name of Lang) in Budapest (AOB: Klatt met Ira Longin already in 1939, in a Budapest prison, where they both shared a prison cell), who had been a fellow-recidivist, and with the sanction of Seidl, (I Luft, Wien) and Marogna-Redwitz, offered employment with Ast, Wien. Ira (Longin) stated that he he would have to obtain the approval of his chief in Rome (later found to be a White Russian General Turkul). He was supplied with the travel permit (on the name of Lang), and on his return with the necessary permission to aid the Abwehr against Communism. He was issued with a German travel pass in the name of Ilya Lang: although he was to work direct to Klatt, he still claimed his real boss to be Turkul. October, 1949, to May 1941 was spent in organising the Klatt network, Vienna (Wien) and Budapest. (AOB: in my perception, omit Budapest) According to Klatt, his bureau started functioning in May 1941, under the nominal chief von Wahl-Welskirch, but our sources (AOB: R.S.S. intercepts on the line 7/23 ↓) → (V2128 ↓↓↓ V2128return W/T line 7/23 between Sofia and Wien)

This map is a reconstruction of a small part in about the centre - once published in a British HW 19-332 file. It started about 2015, when I brought in this map in a conversation with late Rudolf Staritz. He then suggested: whether it would be possible to extend it towards the east, thus also covering Russia.

The limiting factor being - that British R.S.S. focussed their attention upon Western Europe; almost mainly.

Consequently, we decided to add peu à peu what was given in the various KV 2/xxxx serials. Luckily for us, the R.S.S. serial provided also the various W/T links concerned, as well as the according line numbers (AOB: in my perception these were British designations not German ones). However, it demanded quite some discrimination as to distinguish between the various places concerned.

Though, as I was becoming rather used to what it all is about, it proved possible to extend the map even up to Argentine.

There existed German communication links with Tokyo and Shanghai (Seehaus? of the German Foreign Office = A.A.?); but I have not yet come across the according references.

Please notice the line 7/23 Sofia - Wien (Wera was the cover-name of the Ast Wien W/T station); where later (think of later than November 1941) the station Schwert constituted Klatt's Luftmeldekopf Süd-Ost.

AOB: we later will deal extensively with a wide range of British R.S.S. decrypted intercepts also implying the Klatt complex. A huge achievement! We will later learn much of the 'damn normal lives' of Klatt and his comrades between say: 1941 and mid-1943.

→ do not reflect traffic from before November (1941) of that year. (AOB: what hardly had been noticed in the British files, is, that in Autumn 1941 the Klatt W/T traffic was decrypted mechanically by means of Enigma like gear, likely of the G-type) (please notice (T2127 T2127return). Head were at Boulevard Ferdinand, 93a, Sofia. In the next three years, Klat controlled a vast net-work of official informants (AOB: the latter I highly doubt) W/T operators, etc., and handled personally the daily messages sent to him by Ira (Longin). It was because of the importance of this material that his bureau escaped the persistent attempts of Obstlt. Otto Wagner @ Dr. Delius to close down this free-lance out-station. (AOB: as the main reason we may consider the rivalry between Obstlt. Otto Wagner versus the Jewish civilian engaged by Ast Wien; whom was utmost highly appreciated by OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr, in Berlin. We may think of a kind of 'read-carpet animosity' against Richard Klatt, the Jewish civilian) In August 1944, Schellenberg relieved von Wahl of his duties, (AOB: the reason was quite pragmatic. After 12th February 1944 Hitler furiously decided that: - from now on the OKW Abwehr should merged with the Himmler controlled R.S.H.A. Amt VI of which Walter Schellenberg was the commanding officer. The merging took about 6 months, thus think of about August the two - OKW Amt Abwehr and R.S.H.A.. Amt VI merged in what became known as Amt Mil (Milamt). This is why Walter Schellenberg enters the scene. Since the SS controlled Amt VI as well as the Amt Mil.) and prohibited all members of the Luft , Marine and Kriegs Marine to travel into the Reich, and placed the bureau under Ohletz in Amt Mil-C (Milamt-C) (KV 2/106; PF 602765).

Due to the fortunes of war, by January 1945 Klatt had moved his offices to Czovna, West Hungary. Suddenly, in on 12 February Klatt was arrested by the Germans, ostensibly for currency smuggling, and for proposed marriage (read sexual relation with Iboly Kalmana his mistress). He was told that, with the exception of his chief operator, Bergler, and Ira (Longin), all his organisation were under arrest. Before the advancing allies he was moved from prison to prison, and eventually freed in Salzburg. It was there that he ran into many of his organisation, also released, but on the 24th May (1945), both Klatt and Ira (Longin) were arrested by the 42nd Division, C.I.C. of the U.S. Army.

Claims to have fought against the Red Army in the revolution and to have been imprisoned by the G.P.U. Left Russia in 1920 for Constantinople and thence to Czechoslovakia in 1921-22; from 1923-27 studied for a degree in Prague, and was a teacher in a Primary School.

Then became a clerical assistant to a lawyer, Dr. Walinzki, in Munkacs from 1928 to 1937 at two thousand kroner a month. He speaks Hungarian and Russian fluently, and has a good knowledge of German. Travelled until the war on a Nansen passport (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nansen-Pass) EN (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nansen_passport) as a Russian émigré. Claimed that he first met Turkul in Berlin through the introduction of an engineer Padalka, and became a representative of Turkul's publication, "Signal", in Ruthenia. After Munich he was recruited by Turkul in Berlin through Ksenoffontof, and became head of a Hungarian Branch of Turkul's Russian Imperial Liberation Movement. In December 1939, he was arrested by the Hungarian Police for having spread pan-Slavic propaganda after the occupation of Carpathia and Moravia by the Hungarians and met Klatt in prison (sharing mutually a prison cell).

In June 1940 he met Klatt again by accident in Budapest, and received a proposal from Marogna-Redwitz to enter employment of Ast Wien. Having obtained the permission of Turkul to do so, he was commissioned to obtain Russian operational intelligence on behalf of the German Abwehr. He was paid by the Germans through Klatt, and was issued with (German) papers in the name of Ilya Lang. In October 1940, he went to Sofia to establish his network. On 15.6.41 he was arrested by the Hungarian Police in Budapest and all his papers seized. He was released again only after Abwehr intervention.

During the next four years Ira contrived to send some six messages a day to Klatt from Sofia (both Klatt and Ira Longing lived almost mainly in Sofia) of operational intelligence on the Russian and Middle East theatres of war. (AOB: differentiation is necessary: The bulk of military intelligence were of the "forecasting" intelligence - known as Max Meldungen; the rest were mostly known as Moritz Meldungen, which mainly covered naval matters concerning British Mediterranean matters; and which were of far less quality) In October 1941 he (Ira Longin) travelled to Belgrade, returning with George Leonidovitch Romanoff (Romanov?), born in Tiflis, Caucasus 1901 (another member of Turkul's organisation). In 1942 and again in June 1943 he was in Rome to see Klatt.

(AOB: far to simple story: Klatt's main concern was the foreseeable Italians changing sides, and to bring back Turkul and his relatives from Rome, where Turkul currently lived, to Budapest. Klatt managed, rather un-bureaucratically to charter Obstlt. Kleyenstüber, by then Referatsleiter I-L in Berlin, who had an airplane (type He 111) to his continuous disposal. They had to approach Rome twice but ultimately brought Turkul and relatives safely to Wien, and a few weeks later Turkul could settle in Budapest.)

After Bulgaria's activity had been neutralized by the Russians (think of September/October 1944), Ira (Longin) was forced to move (also) to move to Budapest, and in November, 1944 he retreated from there to Csorna and thence to Bratislava (Preßburg/Pressburg).

By February, 1945, Ira realised that the German defeat was unavoidable, and though he carried on for a short time after the arrest of Klatt under Dr. Fritz Thiemann, he was arrested by the American forces in Salzburg in May 1945.

Nationality: White Russian, son of an Engineer William Turkul, born 11.12.1892 at Odessa;

Wife: Alexandra Turkul born 23.4.1899 at Kharkhov (Charkov); daughter Tamara born 26.3.'20 married to Sigismund Wecsey.

From high school Turkul went to compulsory military training camp for one year. Then in 1914 he enlisted as a Private in the Russian Imperial Army. By the end of the war he was Captain of a special attacking regiment. With coming of the Revolution, he joined voluntary White Army under General Drozdawski, which was organised in Poland in 1917 and after a distinguished history on the battlefield became General of an Infantry Division. When the resistance realised that the defeat was inevitable, Turkul left Russia with the remains of Deniken's Army and went to Gallipoli and thence in August 1921 to Sofia and on to Serbia where he worked as a clerk in a sugar factory returning to Bulgaria in 1924.

He worked at various jobs until 1931 when he took his family to Paris where he lived in poverty running a petrol station, a restaurant and tacking lodgers. He served on the Council of the White Russian Military Association headed by Kutiebov. After Kutiebov's kidnapping and death, Turkul left this organisation, but in 1932 he claims to have started one of his own for the National Unit of War Participants whose members were mostly drawn fom the purely military ROVS under General Miller. Their aims were:-

In 1936 to 1937 he began to enjoy a reasonable prosperity (confirmed by Wehr). This may have been due to the wise management of his business or the profits from his book "The Drozdawski Soldier under Fire" written in conjunction with Ivan Lukasch, but according to Turkul's story certain Japanese officers began to pay him handsomely for selecting, training and despatching to Russian volunteer apostles of anti-Bolshevism. The operation of smuggling these missionaries required some collaboration with the Abwehr. Turkul first claimed → that he despatched several hundred such persons in small groups,

that he despatched several hundred such persons in small groups, but later he said he only got five or six such lay creatures into Russia and nothing had been heard of their fate. The Jap officers paid him first of all $100 per month. This was later raised to $200 and on one occasion he received a special bonus of $2000. These payments continued from 1936/37 until at least 1939. Out of these monies Turkul was able to launch "Signal" the periodical of the organisation which he created in 1937.

In 1938 the French police required Turkul to leave France (The Communists had some quite influence in France). He alleges that the reason for his expulsion is unknown to him, but he was returned to have been involved in the abduction of General Miller (though in self-defence he professes that he has always been the intended victim of kidnapping by General Skoblin). He is reputed to have organised terrorists training sections for White Russians in France; if true this might have proved to be the excuse for the French getting rid of him. According to Turkul, he could only obtain a passport to Germany, so travelled to Berlin.

Whilst in the German capital Turkul received a telephone call from Ira who had just arrived from Czechoslovakia. He brought with him some form of introduction from one Ksenoffontow, a Prague member of Turkul's new organisation, Thus Turkul and Ira (Longin) met for the first time, and apparently with no further check on Ira's credentials, Turkul appointed him as representative for the Ruthenia/Hungaria Zone.

Turkul also made contact in Berlin with Major-General Hans Piekenbrock (AOB: At that instant Piekenbrock must have been Obstlt. or an Obst. As Piekenbrock left the Abwehr as - Leiter I in Berlin, as to get his General-Patent towards the end of 1942; and was proceeded by Obstlt. i.G. Generalstab Georg Hansen) (AOB: June 1939, Chef I OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr) and was in close touch with him until November 1939 when there was a serious quarrel and the Abwehr were issued with strict instructions not to contact Turkul. Immediately after the Russo-German pact, (AOB: the true reason must have been: the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pakt of 23 August 1939, a kind of mutual friendship agreement between Russia and Berlin); DE (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deutsch-sowjetischer_Nichtangriffspakt) and EN (https://en.wilipedia.org/wiki/Molotov-Ribbentrop_Pact), Turkul moved to Rome. In 1940 Ira visited him there (Rome) and obtained his permission to work for the Abwehr claiming that by so doing he would obtain facilities for the members of Turkul's organisation to travel about the Continent.

Turkul alleges that he led a lazy life in Rome as the nominal head of his White Russian Organisation and took little or no part in the war. His aim was to create an armed force against Bolshevism, but his chief function seems to have been to act as an umbrella to the branch of the Klatt Organisation who obtained all their information from Ira (Longin). When Mussolini capitulated in June 1943, Klatt persuaded Kleyenstüber Obstlt. Ernst Arno Paul (~~I Lift Ast Hamburg~~. KV 2/1494; PF601503) (AOB: Leiter I-L in Berlin; by then headed by Obstlt. Hansen) (AOB: no question, all was sanctioned by Obst. Marogna-Redwitz and HQ. in Berlin) to fly him, Ira and Thieman →

→(AOB: Thiemann has been noticed here for the first time in this context; so considering the inaccuracies of the M.I.5 summary issuer, I doubt therefore that Dr. Thiemann, out of the blue, was among them. Another aspect, which cannot be ignored, is, that they flew in a He 111, which is a not too big airplane. It might even not have been secured how many family-members would be among onboard the He 111 aircraft)

→ to Rome to remove Turkul from Italian hands. (AOB, to remove the Turkul family could only be successfully accomplished with the full acceptance of Turkul himself! There did not existed a real legal power to force what was intended. The only direct threat, could have been expressed that payments could be stopped; but legally they did possess jurisdiction on Italian soil.) Upon arrival in Rome, Kleyenstüber went to Kesselring's headquarters (= named: Togo, situated at Frascati) to obtain approval for Turkul's departure. Just as they were leaving, Kesselring reversed his decision, so on the following day (27.6.1943) Kleyenstüber, Tiemann, Klatt and Ira flew to Sofia where Ira returned to his office and the other three proceeded to Budapest. There Kleyenstüber called at Admiral Canaris's office and obtained approval for Turkul to leave Italy; according this time Romanov, instead of Kleyenstüber (AOB: by the way: the He 111 aircraft was at the disposal of Kleyenstüber) with Ira (Longin), Klatt and ?Thiemann flew to Rome and on 28.6.43 removed Turkul, his wife and daughter and his secretary, Mouhanov, to Vienna (Wien). (AOB: the latter fact was against Turkul's own will, but it was agreed upon (but after Marogna-Redwitz's promise) that Turkul would be permitted later to move to Budapest.)

Turkul wanted to set up a political headquarters in Budapest and whilst his organisation had adherents in many countries, it was only in 1943 that he altered the required entry to include any Russian willing to fight Bolshevism. (Before that date members had to have been participants in the 1917-18 Campaign). During August and September 1943 Turkul got some of his followers to Budapest with the aid of Klatt who supplied German Fremdenpässe with Hungarian visas. Following the occupation of Roumania and Bulgaria by Russian troops, Turkul was → supposed to have set up a White Russian screening organisation in Hungary to prevent spies and saboteurs,

supposed to have set up a White Russian screening organisation in Hungary to prevent spies and saboteurs, but the Russian advance was so rapid that this plan did not materialise and Turkul was forced to withdraw to Vienna (Wien).

Turkul then joined K.d.M. (Kommandomeldegebiet) (since about August 1944 the Abwehr was mainly amalgamated in the Amt Mil (Milamt) of the SS controlled R.S.H.A. (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) Ausweichstelle which had moved to St. Ulrich and went from there to Salzburg. At the end of April 1945 Turkul told his small group that he had been in contact with American Forces since the 21st April and with their permission was going to contact Mihailovich (the opponent of Tito) in Jugoslavia. Throughout the war Turkul's men in Belgrade (Belgrado), namely Gan and his brother, Serdakowski and Romanov were in constant and close contact with General Lyotic (one of Mihailocich's semi-subordinate generals). Through Romanov Turkul also had contact with Mihailovich, through Hptm. Matl (KV 2/1493; PF 600769) of the Abwehr Belgrade (Belgrad). Turkul, it would seem, believed that the collapse of Germany, he could persuade the Allies to support him financially in stemming the tide of Communism in the Balkans. His private legion (which had throughout the war successfully evaded battle against the Russians?) might yet be of service in quelling E.A.M. in Greece or curbing Tito in Jugoslavia.

AOB: quite some lines have apparently been deleted; when you look carefully you might notice some traces of it.

Before leaving Turkul's biography it would be as well to add the following pertinent facts from his interrogation. To controvert the charge that Turkul's organisation was either actively or passively pro-German, Ira (Longin) incautiously divulged that Turkul had sedulously concealed, that in fact the organisation had been throughout the war actively penetrating and sabotaging pro-German White Russian organisations all over the Axis-Controlled Europe. Turkul admitted this point when taxed with it, and reluctantly gave corroborative information. It also became clear, without being explicitly stated, that these operations of penetration and sabotage were applied to anti-Communist organisations in general. whether or not they were actively pro-German.

(a) Many thousand of White Russians were recruited into the Russian Free Corps in Yugoslavia which, under German direction, functioned first in a police and later in a belligerent capacity. Other units of White Russiansm Cossacks, etc., were organised into analogous units in that theatre of hostilities. Through the Belgrade section of Turkul's organisation a close watch was kept on these units and recruitment for them was hampered by suasions issued under Turkul's name: enormous casualties were suffered by these units.

(b) As the Axis armies (German, Italian, Hungarian and Roumanian) came to use more and more Russians, they needed more and more interpreters. In either a random or a systematic way Ira (Longin) and → Turkul came utilise many of these interpreters as regular informants.

(c) A notorious pro-German White Russian, Gerebkow, was set up by the Germans as controller of White Russians in France. His activities in getting Russians drafted into Labour Corps for work in Germany were reported to Turkul who was able to despatch his subordinate Romanov (KV 2/1453; PF 603457) from Belgrade to Paris to do something unspecified in operation to Gerebkow.

(d) In mid November 1944 Ohletz (Mil/Amt-C) suggested to Schellenberg (Leiter R.S.H.A. Amt VI and Amt Mil) that General Vlassow (Vlassov) and General Kreuter meet Turkul in Berlin. Schellenberg's object was to bring Turkul's army into Vlassow's (Vlassov's) Army forming one political and competent military weapon and thus exploit Turkul's as fully as possible as a source of Russian Intelligence. Turkul did not get on with Vlassow (Vlassov) and said that Vlassov had not changed his propaganda to suit the development of Soviet politics towards nationalism, but had remained in the 1941 rut. However, in 1945 he informed Ohletz that he had accepted from Vlassov the task of setting up & commanding a corps. (AOB: even when all was arranged, how to supply weaponry is sufficient numbers?) Turkul thereupon set about persuading Klatt to press Schellenberg to grant permission to infiltrate his men into Vlassov's Army as "Politiccar Commissars" so that he could gain virtual control of his Prisoner-of-War Army, but this did not succeed and by the end of of Jjanuary Turkul returned to Berlin and informed Ohletz that his plans with Vlassov had fallen through.

According to Klatt, the Luftmeldekopf Süd-Ost (Klatt Bureau) was founded in October 1940, though it did not function before July 51?, 1941. (WE can confirm its existence from the end of 1941).

1. 1941-1943: Sofia (AOB: ca. August when Klatt had been forced to move to Budapest; but the office still was still operating)

W/T communications was maintained, through (ca. 1940 to Autumn 1941) the facilities of the Sofia Polizeidirektion,, with the following out-stations:-

(b) Istambul (Istanbul) (Spanish Embassy) (Station) "Islam" (AOB: remember: the Germans maintained in such cases the first letter of the place forming the first letter of a cover-name)

(b) Ankara (Willi Goetz station "Islam" (Islam is pointing at Istambul, instead of Ankara and was linked onto the Spanish Embassy or Legation in Istambul) (Velikotny KV 2/1656; PF67232)

4. Personal reports - Ira. (AOB: the latter obtained via Russian Legation channels, likely supplied by NKWD (NKVD) channels)

1. Appointed Liaison with Ast Wien (Vienna) for onward transmission to Berlin (Klatt alleges he prepared four copies of all his intelligence reports - two for the Hungarian Abwehr (AOB: likely since September 1943), one for LMK (Luftmeldekopf remaining in Sofia) files and one for Ast Wien.

(c) Press Attaché Spanish Embassy, Turkey (mainly handled in Istambul by Vladimir Velikotny and Arnoldo Dalisme [1, page 385] (= Dr. Mayer's book on Richard Kauder/Klatt)

(d) White Russian Sources in Switzerland on Croat-Hungary border, P.o.W. Camps etc.

This well organised intelligence network, staffed with technicians and office personnel and supplied with a flow of information through miscellaneous agent ostensibly provided Klatt with:-

Firstly an excuse for a large expense account, secondly personal protection as the head of a flourishing spy ring, and most important of all cover for the fact that his reputation really rested (almost) on one source only - Ira (Longin).

On 22 August 1946, Ira (Longin) was placed in solitary confinement to await transfer to the U.K. and immediately went on a hunger strike which lasted for about a week. His arrest was the result of a Washington decision project was a potential source of information should be liquidated to clear up the outstanding problem of the Max reports, their authenticity, source and channels. (AOB: I would not wonder, that the reason for Washington's proposal had originated from a request from the US Liaison Officer Winston Scott stationed at the US Embassy in London)

After inconclusive interrogation in London, Ira (Longin) and Turkul were returned to the American Zone of Germany on 22nd and 21st ?November (1946) respectively and Turkul was almost immediately released.

In NB ... Ira was seen again by a British interrogator and Klatt and Ira were confronted. Even this plan failed and under the general amnesty following the Nürenberg Trials it was found impossible to hold these "servants of the Abwehr" and Ira was accordingly released in Frankfurt on 10th April 1948.

AOB: this is indicating that something still must be kept-off the public; albeit that sometimes it concerned a US Embassy document with some, non official private name being noticed.

AOB: Whether this letter has links to the foregoing minutes 121a and/or 122a I don't know

We have been informed by a delicate source whose reliability has not yet been fully established that the R.I.S. (British Radio Intelligence Service in Vienna (Wien) are anxious to obtain the following:-

a) information of the "Greater German Intelligence Service" organised by the former German officers. (AOB: the might point at the US headed German Org in Pullach bei München, headed by General Gehlen, after the establishment of the new Bundeswehr; and becoming a Nato partner it was known as Bundesnachrichtendienst.)

b) Further information on the "Büro Klatt", established in Budapest and already known to the R.I.S. for the past 10 years. (AOB: nonsense, as Klatt started up servicing in late 1940 but operationally early 1941 and that is considering the date of the letter not yet 10 years ago. Or - they speak, without expressing it precisely, that they had a British spy around, likely covered by a neutral diplomatic legation) which is believed for the Americans (indeed the "Org" was engendered by the US intelligence). Present whereabouts and the names of its agents were particularly required.

We feel that on both these subjects you will be interested in learning the extent of Soviet knowledge (not yet by the British Services realist: H.A.P. Philby engaged at M.I.6. was an notorious Russian Spy!) and we, therefore, propose to pass you any further information which may later be revealed.

It may alos interest you to learn that the R.I.S. official asked for full details on the recently discovered smuggling of arms in Vienna (Wien). He intimated that the Soviets were afraid that the Americans might try to pin this affair on them.

KV 2/1497, page 17n (minute 120b) AOB: please notice: that this list is inconsistently put together by the Archive Servants in post war days; thus maintained not in an alphabetic order.

List of Alphabetical Names and Cover names of LMK (Luftmeldekopf in Sofia) Organisation.

Alm Cover name of W/T station set up in Bratislava (Preßburg) in January 1945. Station forwarded on Ira Longin's incoming reports.

Anker Cover name of W/T station in the Spanish Embassy in Ankara: operated by Arnoldo Dalisme and his wife Gerti (nee Piancentini). In July 1943, station was transferred to Istambul (Istanbul) under cover name "Islam" with Sturm-Schneider in charge.

Bachmann Josef Chauffeur with LMK in Budapest from August 1944 until the 12th February (Klatt's arrest by the Gestapo), 1945. Volksdeutscherm but Hungarian citizen ca. 1890.

Bacskay Fedor Hungarian citizen. Official in the Ölwerke in in Zalagebiet. From end December 1944 to 12 February 1945, was an agent of "Ali" (Alsolendva). Entrusted with penetration of Partisans in Southern Hungary as well as with building up communications behind the Russian lines. c. 1910.

Baumruck Franz Wiener (Viennese) half Jew. Went to the LMK in Sofia in January 1942. Was employed in the radio key (Schlüssel) section, and took charge of all Pass matters in liaison with the Bulgarian Police.

Bergler Franz Wiener (Viennese). Agent of I. Luft Ast Wien. In March 1944 was chauffeur assistant to Kowalewsky in Bucharest. Following von Wahl's dismissal (AOB: likely after the SS controlled RSHA took over the OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr), transferred to LMK (still in Sofia in October 1944?) where he took over Longin reports in Bratislava (Preßburg). Remained with LMK until the end (but not in Sofia)

Bertha Alice Hungarian citizen. Divirced. Was sent to LMK as telephone operator by Hungarian Abwehr in November 1943. Later employed in radio key (Schlüssel) section c. 1905/

Bruttyo-Walster Helene; Alsation by birth and Hungarian following her marriage to an Hungarian Jew. Employed in the code section of LMK Spring 1944. 28 years.

Bully I Cover name for W/T station in Budapest, Szeheructa No. 24. Station maintained traffic with Sofia and Istambul (Istanbul).

Bully II Cover name for W/T station in Budapest - Rakoskerestur, Batori utca 15. After dissolution of "Bock" station, Bully II took over the direct traffic with Wera (Wien) and "Burg" (Belzig?) (Berlin).

Dalisme Arnoldo Spanish citizen. Was sent to Sofia in Spring of 1941 by Spain's Ambassador Pratt (Pratt Y Souzo Pedro; KV 2/2125; PF603499) in Turkey for training as agent - W/T operator. Following the course, Dalisme took over station Anker. c. 30 years.

Deutsch Valja Born Estonian, becoming Austrian through marriage. First wife of Dr. Deutsch. Trained in W/T work. In December 1943 came to LMK in Budapest and employed as clerk and codist. End of October 1944 proceeded to Csorna and in January (1945) to Bratislava (Preßburg) Station "Alm" c. 40 years.

Dostal Grete Austrian. Recruited by LMK in Sofia, Spring 1942. In October 1943 went to Budapest. From November 1944 was in Csorna. Was employed as office clerk and W/T/ codist. c. 30 years.

Frey Rudolf @ Duzzy Viennese (Wiener). Recruited by LMK as agent in August 1944 where he trained as W/T operator. After 8 December took over Budapest Station "Bully ?" as 'Rest'station ca, 30 years.

Fuehrer Albert Posted from "Wera" to LMK Budapest in August 1944 as W/T operator. January 1945 was sent to Bratislava (Preßburg) station "Alm".

Goetz Wilhelm @ Wigo Bavarian. Head agent of LMK in Turkey; possessed German and Hungarian passports. In October 1944, went over to the Allies with Hungarian M.A. c. 37 years.

Groeneweghe Moritz @ Groenes Robert Belgian. Agent of I-L since May 1941, Handled currencies for LMK. c. 54 years.

Hanf Official cover name for the whole LMK W/T network. Assigned by Berlin and was in use from November 1944 to beginning of January 1945.

HAP 2 Cover name and calling signal of the former Hungarian Gendarmerie Station at Sarvar.

Hammernyk Maria @ Eva Hungarian citizen. Artist and graduated in philosophy. Spring 1941, went to Sofia and was employed in the code room. September 1943 proceeded to Budapest. c. 35 years.

Haslinger Gregor Austrian. Was with Austrian Legion in the Reic at time of the Nazi Party was outlawed. Appointed as driver to LMK in July 1941.

Hirsch Josef Partner of Klatt in firm Mittermayer and Co., which served as cover firm for LMK. In August 1944 he began to handle wholesale purchases of foodstuffs and live cattle for the Wehrmacht in Hungary. Was with Klatt from 1942 but was only as manager in the firm.

Jack Cover name of an agent of Gruppe I Luft Berlin who was turned over to LMK for watching. Went to Turkey in december 1941 as a lumber merchant. In 1942 to Sofia and then in August 1942 was recalled.

Kahlen Eberhard Major attached to Anti-Aircraft unit. December 1941, went to Sofia as head of LMK under jurisdiction of I-Luft Wien (Vienna). Baltic ?? returned to Sofia as deputy head of KO-Bulgaria. in 1942.

Samraheddin @ Sami Iraq chemist; formerly lived in Budapest; went to Turkey where he offered his services to the LMK. Worked with Prof. ~~Schenschin~~ (Shenshin KV 2/369 - KV 2/370; PF 66726 this quite low KV 2/... and low PF serials are proving that this person was already for long a watched-upon person). (AOB: the latter was supposed to possess some NKWD (NKVD) contacts)

Samsonow White Russian and member of the League of Assistance For White Russians. Head of the Russian Red Cross in Budapest.

Schweidnitzer-Zombor Hungarian. Chief of the Political Police. Anti-Nazi, ant-Slav and Anti-Communist - friend of the Jews.

Schubert von White Russian from the Baltic. At the Spanish Legation in Istambul (Istanbul) handling military intelligence reports. Volunteered to procure intelligence information for (Willi) Goetz (Wigo) providing Turkul approve it in writing. Subject discussed the matter with Turkul in Budapest early 1944 and obtained his O.K. However, Subject (Richard Kauder /Klatt) states that Schubert never actually began work for Goetz due to communication disruptions with Turkey following Bulgaria's capitulation (ca. September 1944)

Serdakowsky White Russian. Secretary to General Kreuter in Belgrade (Belgrado). Was in liaison with the Finish Marshal Mannerheim, also wit German political circles. Later became member of the Turkul organisation. Upon the approach of the Russians to Belgrade, left with General Kreuter for Wien (Vienna). Contact between Kreuter and Vlassow was established by means of Serdakowsky. Joined his family at Fuschl (Austria) early in 1945.

Soldi Industrialist in Breaza (Roumania). Declared himself ready to work against the "Bolshevics" and volunteered to set up a clandestine W/T set in his home.

Thoran Dr. Luftwaffe Major. Assistant to Air Attaché in Turkey until 1942, handling the procurement of information. His best source was Velikotny (KV 2/1656; PF 67232) (whom was engaged at the Spanish Consulate in Istambul). Transferred to a combat unit in 1942).

(Dr.) Fritz Tiemann (Thiemann?) Luftwaffe Lt. Reichsdeutscher; lawyer from Bielefeld, Westfalia. Came to Gruppe I Luft in Berlin in 1943 as an intimate friend of (Obstlt.) Kleyenstüber. Remained, however, in the same position under Ohletz (Leiter Amt Mil-C (KV 2/106; PF 602765). Sent to K.d.M. Wien in Dec. 1944. Following the events of 13 February 1945 (Klatt's arrest by the Gestapo though with Tiemann/Thiemann in charge.), took over the LMK from Subject (Richard Kauder/Klatt). Changed the name of the LMK to "Organisation Leo". c. 41 years;-

Velikotny White Russian. Former resident of Paris where he owned a stationary store. Following the Spanish Civil War came to the Spanish Legation as Press Attaché. During 1942 sent Subject (Klatt) reports via Pratt Y Soutzo Pedro (KV 2/2125; PF 603499) Abwehr Berlin stated he sold his information to 11 different offices! Worked closely with the Japanese. Forced to leave Turkey during the summer of 1943 on account of two of his agents being arrested by the Turkish authorities. c. 38 years.

Vroni Cover name of K.d.M. Wien W/T Station "Wera" after January 1945. (AOB: likely at a different "Ausweich" location)

Kittel Dr. Hugo Wiener quarter-Jew; former Polizeirat of the Austrian Bundespolizei in Wien. Recruited (likely by Ast Wien) and sent to LMK (Luftmeldekopf) Sofia in February 1943 (AOB: It must have been much earlier and we should thinking of 1941; as the largely expanded LMK crew in Sofia were paid by the profits gained by the Mittermayer company) (KV 2/1466; PF 74098)

Kowalewsky Olly Bulgarian citizen but Volksdeutscher. Recruited in September 1942 as officer clerk, codist and Bulgarian interpreter; remained with LMK in Sofia until the beginning of February 1944.

Kowalewsky Dr. From the Ukraine. Resided in Bucharest and fled to Budapest following Roumania's capitulation. Was V-Mann for I-Luft Wien. Was cared for by LMK up to his transfer to the SD. (AOB: likely meant K.d.M. Wien the section of the SS controlled RSHA Amt Mil)

Kuehnle Eduard Bavarian (Bamberg); NCO (= Uffz.), W/T operator (he was a member of the DASD). Posted at LMK in Sofia 1 May 1941.

Labens, @ Josef Laederer Belgian. Recruited into LMK in May 1941. Employed as book-keeper in Csorna. c. 45 years.

Laszlo W/T operator discharged from Hungarian army; recruited December 1944 as W/T operator at station "Ali", Alsolendva.

Leitenberger Ilse Austrian journalist with Europa Presse?. Employed by LMK in Budapest following Bulgaria's capitulation; worked in the code office, but was dismissed by orders of Berlin. c. 27 years.

Marzowas Anna (Muschi) Bulgarian half-Jewess. Employed in Budapest as codist. Went to Sofia in March 1944 with LMK stay-behind (R-) network. c. 22 years.

Michalenko @ Michel Ukranian. Delivered intelligence reports from Omeida (Japanese??) c. 40 years.

Mintscheff Iwan Chauffeur for LMK in Sfia and former clerk in Bulgarian Political Police. With LMK until Bulgaria's declaration of neutrality.

Mittermayer & Co Export Company used as cover? firm (Its revenues on Klatt's part were used to finance the blown-up staff engaged at LMK in Sofia) for LMK's activities. Headquarters in Bratislava (Preßburg), branches in Budapest and Sofia.

Moritz Cover name for (Ira) Longin's reports deriving from all regions with exception of those from Russia.

Natter Cover name of W/T station of LMK Ausweichstelle at Alt Aussee, Austria. This station operated for about three weeks.

Nemeth Mathilde Hungarian citizen; wife of Dr. Goetz. Was taken to Csorna following the retreat from Budapest and employed there as codist.

Orlow-Brilkin Nina Daughter of Russian official. Placed with LMK by the Hungarian Abwehr in November 1943 as W/T codist. Sent to Csorna on 3rd November 1944 and to Bratislava (Preßburg) in January 1945.

Piacentini Gerti (Dalisme married name) Austrian. October 1941 was employed as office worker with LMK. Summer of 1942 married Dalisme operator of the Spanish Embassy in Turkey with whom she ran station "Anker". Following the closing down of "Anker", she returned to the Sofia office. September 1943 moved (among Klatt) to Budapest.

Prodanoff Dragmir @ Drago Bulgarian. Established contacts for LMK in Sofia with various Bulgarian offices and headquarters; occasional interpreter in the office and obtained his visas through Klatt.

Quinz Josef Hungarian. Driver for LMK June 1943 to 12th February 1945. c. 50 years.

Reiss Julian Austrian officer. Remained as wireless operator till the end in Lehrgang, Austria. c. 23 years.

Romanov Georg (Sergei) White Russian (KV 2/1453; PF 603457) and member of Turkul organisation. Former agent of Ast Belgrade (Dr. Matl) (KV 2/1493; PF 600769) then transferred to LMK. Established contact with Pratt and ~~Schenschin~~ Shenshin for LMK. Moved from Belgrade to Budapest and joined Turkul in July 1943. In August and September was Turkul in Vienna (Wien). In July 1944, Turkul accused Romanov of insubordination whereupon he went to the Propaganda section of the German Embassy in Budapest. Now Priest in Switzerland.

Rosza Tamas Hungarian 1st Lt. Liaison Officer between LMK and the German authorities (October 1943).

Samraheddin @ Sami or Sammy Iraq citizen. Lived in Budapest until Autumn of 1943. Recruited by Klatt to obtain intelligence information from Iraq and Iran upon going to Turkey.

~~Schenschin~~ Shenshin Alexander @Alessy @ Shin White Russian professor, Resided in Istambul and was in contact with Turkul. Provided "Islam" with information on Russia, chiefly on the Caucasus.

Schwert Cover name of the W/T station of LMK in Sofia. (AOB: please consider V2128 V2128return particularly: Sofia)

Sturm-Schneider Hans Sr. Wiener half-Jew. Started employment with LMK in Sofia Spring 0f 1942 as W/T codist. Stayed till end of 1943.

Sturm-Schneider Hanns Jr. Wiener quarter-Jew. Recruited in Autumn 1940 following his return from France; trained in W/T to be sent to Russia for organise intelligence station. Following outbreak of the Russian war, he went to Sofia as W/T operator. As a result of difficulties arising in station "Anker" proceeded to Ankara and transferred the station to the Hungarian Military Attaché in Istambul. Following his return to Sofia, was considered being sent by Klatt to Switzerland to obtain information "Interavia" (avionic) newspapers. Plan fell through. On 6th September 1943 was arrested on suspicion of desertion by Dr. Delius and sent to Ast Wien. Marogna-Redwitz had him inducted and attached to "Wera" (Ast Wien W/T station) as W/T operator.

Tal Cover name of Obstlt. Kroha's W/T station at Bratislava (Preßburg). Station dispatched information to LMK Csorna until the establishment of the LMK wireless station in Bratislava (Preßburg).

Tschertkow White Russian. Recruited in summer 1943; trained in W/T and codes in Sofia for purpose of going to Finland or North Russia. This plan fell through when Tschertkow, Muchonow and Romanov had a quarrel with Turkul, July 1944 in Budapest, on which occasion, Turkul accused his co-worker Romanov of insubordination. Soon after this incident, Tschertkow and Romanov transferred to the German propaganda section of the German Legation in Budapest and were thus completely separated from Turkul. Klatt was told by Romanov that Tschertkow had been killed during the entry of the Russians in January 1945.

Tarnoczy Veronica @ Vroni I Hungarian. Recruited in July 1944 for local Russian Army intelligence. Husband is Budapest lawyer and intellectual Communist who is unaware of his wife's anti-Communist feelings. Worked until December 1944. c. 33 years.

Wahl Erika Employed as telephone operator with LMK in April 1944 and after the withdrawal to Csorna employed as codist. 28 years. Former dancer.

Roland Ritter von Wahl-Welskirch Obstlt. of Luftwaffe. Wiener. Was Marineflieger in Austrian Army during World War I. From 1920 to 1938 was an actor. In 1938, drafted into the Army as Lt. and attached to Ast Wien. In charge of I-Luft, first in Czechoslovakia (= Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren) and later in Poland. During Greek-Italian war, established W/T contact with German Embassy in Athens for his agents. This contact was served the following outbreak of German-Greek war (Balkan Feldzug). In Yugoslavia, he had Beluf (Major Benesch) and Lt. (K-H?) Kraemer; in Roumania Kowalewsky; in Bulgaria "Dido" and in Hungary and Slovakia various other agents. he began his employ with LMK as Referatsleiter of I-Luft and and from June 1942, was given complete charge (AOB: in charge of what?) Upon his return, liquidated his office and transferred over to the Heeresersatzwesen where he was made Deputy Leiter for Wehrkreis 17 Wien (AOB: I suppose that history being mixed-up due to not possessing enough understanding on what went on the German side) (AOB: I suppose a bit more in line with the events: The Abwehr was forced to merge with the SS controlled R.S.H.A. Amt Mil since the office designation became K.d.M. instead of the foregoing Ast. Ritter Roland von Wahl-Welskirch born in a very high-class family (nobility) , and maybe he chose the opportunity to change over from the Abwehr to the Heeresersatzwesen) where he was was made was made Deputy (Stellvertretender) Leiter in Wien.

Wallenstein @ Wally Former agent of I Berlin. Employed in Greece as Telefonautomatengesellschaft, Frankfurt a Main representative. Following outbreak of Greek-Italian war, proceeded to Sofia and employed by LMK as Cashier Director from June to October 1941. Transferred then to KO-Bulgaria as agne?? until summer of 1942, and later sent to Roumania where he remained until the capitulation (about August 1944) Comes from Frankfurt a. Main.

Weinberger, Anni Austrian, married to Hungarian Jew. Employed in Budapest Bureau October 1943. c. 37 years.

Weiss Johannes @ Dominik Austrian. Employed by LMK in December 1942 to take charge of registry and card files. Speaks German. English.

Weniger, Fritz Volksdeutscher of Roumania. Feldwebel W/T operator of Station "Wera". First contact with LMK was in 1943 when he was W/T operator for new station "Dido" in Dedogatsch. In mid-April 1944, Weniger was sent to Roumania by I-Luft Wien to establish a W/T station for Kowalesky. After 12th February 1945, was employed by Tiemann (Thiemann) as W/T operator in place of the arrested operators where he remained until the end.

Zintler Dr. Hptm later Major. Austrian, Brother-in-law of von Wahl-Welskirch's. Adjutant for I-Luft Wien. In August 1941 attached to LMK in Sofia as Leiter. c. 55 years.

Adam Hungarian Colonel with IInd Büro. leiter of entire Hungarian W/T network. Last residence was Oedenburg (= Sopron). Reported to have gone to Corinthia.

Aghy Hungarian Police Major. During 1940 and 1941, was Leiter of the Police in Karpatho-Russland.

Ahrenstein, Prince ? Major. Worked at prisoner's camp Breitenfurt near Vienna (Wien), where Russian prisoners were selected for employment as W/T operators, parachutists (Fallschirm-Jäger), saboteurs, etc. against Russia. Austrian.

Anreanszky Hungarian Colonel. Deputy Leiter of Positive Intelligence section. Appointed Secretary of State in Hungarian Foreign Ministry on 15 Oct. 1944.

AOKI Two employees with the same name at Japanese Legation in Turkey; one Press Attaché, the other employed by the Military Attaché who also cooperated with the SD Amt VI or Amt Mil. They intended setting up a W/T station with the SD? in Ankara. Subject (Klatt) does not know if plan materialised. (KV 2/1504; PF716232 : AOB: a quite hilarious story of about 1953; where current British business prevailed over Aoki's once wartime engagements)

Apanassenko White Russian of Turkul organisation. Lived in Berlin; Editor of White Russian newspaper, presumably "Slowo". Came to Budapest Aug. 1944 on Turkul's request. Permission for travel to Berlin was again requested in February 1945.

Armster Obstlt. Former Leiter at (Ast) Wiesbaden (Station name Wilja). Succeeded Marogna-Redwitz, April (July??) 1944 in Wien.

Ba?gration-Mouchransky, Thiemouras, Prince. Georgian Throne Pretender; mother nee Princess Romanoff (Romanov?); White Russian, naturalised Yugoslavian; cousin of Prince Paul of Yugoslavia; 1st Lt. of Cavalry of the Guards; Turkul member. Sent to Switzerland by Subject (Klatt), to Geneva-Vesenac in January 1942 on request of (Ira) Longin in order for protection from the Stapo. Was to have contacted Anglo-American there through Turkul, Nov. 1944. Subject believes nothing ever came of this and states his only means of communication was ordinary postal service.

Bagyony With counter-intelligence of Hungarian Abwehr. Prior to 1941, was Assistant to Military Attaché in Bucharest, during which time, he organised several Hungarian Abwehr W/T stations in Roumania. Later with Col. Merkly, then with Col. Hatz in Turkey, with whom Bagyony was arrested. Then assigned by Budapest Stapo to Hungarian Military Attaché in Sweden.

Barlay Hungarian General Staff Major and Leiter of the Hungarian Positive Intelligence Section, 1943-1945.

Bartalics Koloman Hungarian Colonel of the General Staff. Military Attaché in Turkey until 1943. Recalled and made Leiter of Levente (Pre-military Youth Preparation). June 1944, was reinstated as M.A. in Turkey.

Bartha-Tarnoflava Hungarian Naval Obstlt. Came from K.u.K. Kriegsmarine; was liaison officer with German Naval Command in Sofia. Handled Danube (Donau) shipping problems between the Hungarian and Roumanian borders. Cousin of former Hungarian Minister of War Bartha and opponent of National Socialists. Transferred from Sofia to Budapest in Aug. 1943.

Bauer Col. Leiter I of Ast Roumania until Spring 1944; after the withdrawal of Obst. Rodler became Leiter of Ast Roumania capitulation. Later was made Ic of Ic AO with Group Tschoermer (Schoerner?) in West Hungary.

Baumgartner @ Bauer Hptm. Owner of a Munich (Münchener) brewery in civilian life. Formerly with I Wi of Ast München, then made I Leiter with KO-Bulgaria in Sofia.

Benesch @ Beluf Luftwaffe Major. Member of I-Luft Wien. Worked Croatia. Presumably former Czech officer. Benesch is known to Maj. Spigl of K.d.M. (= thus the situation since about August 1944) Wien. Was active as late as Jan. 1945.

Berchtold @ Berger Capt. (Hptm.) With Ast I Wien Ost, but chiefly active in Turkey. Received his information via "Ilona", radio contact of Hungarian Military Attaché with "Wera (W/T station of Ast/K.d.M. Wien) South American citizen. In 1944 left both the Army and Ast Vienna.

Brede, Walter Major i.G. Staff of the Luftwaffe. Gruppenleiter of Abw. 1 Luft Berlin from Spring 1941 to Jan. 1943. In Aug. 1944, transferred as Ic to Luftwaffekommando Süd.

Brei Luftwaffe Major. Assistant to Air Attaché in Sofia. Also employed with Sonderstab of the Luftwaffe in Sofia.

Christenko Longin's brother-in-law; White Russian; maintains his permanent residence in Karpatho-Russia. Went from Budapest to Vienna (Wien) with his wife and the Turkul familiy. Later to region South of Munich (München) via Fuschl.

Czernin, Count I Luft Wien agent. Channelled his intelligence reports via the German Consul in Smyrna. Once resided in Slovakia.

Enomoto Japanese journalist. Travelled extensively in the Balkans. (AOB: in late 1944 Monotaro Enomoto travelled with his family in his own car from the Balkan via Wien Denmark up to Sweden! He must have been supplied with the according food coupons as well as travel permits for all routes as well as, most important, being supplied with patrol coupons! As patrol was in late 1944 quite rare product!)

Ertl, Josef @ Elias LW Major; former Roumanian Flight (Volksdeutscher?) officer from Lugos. While still a Roumanian officer, passed on information to L-Luft Wien. Originated from K.u.K. Army (Kaiser und König). When Roumania became a satellite to Germany, was taken into the Luftwaffe as Oblt. Short time thereafter was with I-L in Wien and later made Leiter of I Wien Meldekopf on the Turkish border (town) Svilengrad and Dedeagatsch. As a result of a love affair with a Bulgarian, Ertl was removed, Meldekopf liquidated and replaced by Meldekopf "Dido" in Dedeagatsch which also belonged to I L but transferred to KO-Bulgaria control in July 1943.

Garzuly, Josef Dr. Hungarian Lt.Col. Worked in Hungarian counter-intelligence section, chiefly on Yugoslav matters until 1942. Then transferred to Hungarian Security Office in Ministry of the Interior under General Ujszaszy. Nov. 1943 made Deputy Leiter of counter-intelligence section dealing with Yugoslav questions. Outspoken Anglophile. Cousin was Hungarian Press Attaché to Hungarian Embassy in Zagreb (Agram).

Galitzin Prince White Russian; Member of Turkul organisation; resident of Paris.

Gavrilow White Russian and Turkul member. Former resident of Brussels. Brought to Budapest in Aug. 1944 to become Turkul's interpreter.

Gross, Sandor @ Gyoergy ?, Andor @ Grainer (KV 2/130; PF600052) (AOB: the latter person is a most curious one, I would like to take up his file in due course.) (German name Alexander, "Bandy"). Agent of Ast Stuttgart I, Meldekopf III-F Budapest, Hungarian counter intelligence section and of Col. Hatz. Made numerous journeys to Turkey during 1941 and in 1942 (and rather many later in 1943/1944) also to Switzerland.

Hajnocskay Hungarian Gendarmerie Colonel. Country Police Officer with Hungarian counter intelligence dept. during 1940 and 1941. Since 1943 with the Ministry of Interior, later became in charge of VII Dept. (Public Safety).

Hatz, Otto Hungarian Colonel of General Staff. Military Attaché to Sofia from 1942 to 1943 them Military Attaché in Istambul until May 1944. Later appointed Chef of General Staff of Hungarian VII Corps. Fled to the Russians (who put him for quite a while in captivity) through the front lines on 6 or 7 Nov. 1944.

AOB: this header is curious, but at least we should consider that M.I.6. being concerned as well.

Reference is made to a questionnaire dated 13 February 1947, your reference PF 602358/B1c and previous correspondence I have had with Col. (TAR) Robertson and Miss Joan Chenhalls on the subject of Klatt and Ira (Longin).

some had been deliberately made invisible. has prepared the following replies to the questions asked. These, He states are from answers by Klatt, Ira and Rolf Wodrag (Leiter Ic OKL).

"Klatt has repeatedly stated that he often asked Ast Wien for an evaluation of the contents of the Max (obtained by Longin Ira mainly via NKWD sources at Russian Legations) reports. The evaluation were given to him orally by Von Wahl, Referatsleiter of I Luft at Ast Wien. It rarely occurred that a Max report was given a low evaluation rating, according to Klatt. The answers to the specific questions follow:

Q. At what date did Klatt begin to receive questions from the OKW (presumably through Wien (AOB: The Abwehr officially was designated: OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr; therefore Klatt operated thus on behalf of the OKW) for transmission back along the Max line?

A. Questions from the OKW were transmitted to Klatt through Wien (Vienna) from the end of 1941 on.

Q. Will he give us an account of the flow and quantity of these reactions, mentioning any peak periods during the operation of the Max service?

A. No statement can be made concerning the regularity of the flow and quantity of the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) reactions. These reactions depended entirely on the content of the → "individual" reports.

"individual" report. A study of the results of past interrogations of Klatt reveals no peak periods of reactions during the operation of the Max service.

Q. Did he experience any difficulty in obtaining answers to OKW reactions and did he exercise any discrimination in what reactions he passed to Ira for transmission back to the USSR?

A. Interrogations of both Klatt and Ira (Longin) reveal that most of the questions submitted by the OKW were answered in a period of five days. As far as is known Klatt exercised no discrimination in what reactions he passed to Ira (Longin). It is noteworthy however, that, according to Klatt, whenever the OKW submitted questions concerning numbering of Soviet Air Forces units, the answers were unobtainable. One of the outstanding shortcomings of the Max reports which were concerned with the Soviet Air Forces was that their air forces units were almost never identified by number. Wodrag is of the opinion that this shortcoming prevailed because the sources of the reports were not familiar with air forces matters and were not properly briefed as to what was and what was not of importance.

Q. Can he give us a description of some of the OKW reactions received? Were they all in the form of questions asking for further information on points reported by Max or were they at any time couched in the form of comments on the veracity and importance of special Max messages? Did Klatt receive from Wien (Vienna) general evaluations of the material on tactical lines and did he show these to Ira (Longin)?

A. The OKW reactions were either in the form of simple comments describing the reports as excellent, fair, or poor or in the form of questions concerned with particular points which were not clear in the Max reports. General evaluations were given to Klatt by Von Wahl (Klatt's handling officer), and he often passed these evaluations on to Ira (Longin).

Ira states that he was never interested in a detailed evaluation of the Max reports. He states, and this is confirmed by Klatt, that he often told the Abwehr through Klatt to inform him immediately if the reports were not considered worthwhile, whereupon he would leave the service of the Abwehr. Ira constantly demanded carte →"blance" or dismissal.

"blance" or dismissal. Occasionally he (Ira Longin) received general evaluations from Klatt. More often he was given particular questions based on reports which he had previously submitted. Hhe states that his agents in the USSR (NKWD) were able to supply the answers to most of these short order.

"Wodrag, recently interrogated at this (US) Centre, has stated that the Max reports were considered strikingly correct. Between the summer of 1943 and the summer of 1944 a study was initiated by Ic of the OKL (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe) of 34 Max reports. 30 of these were proved to be absolutely correct. Of the other four, one was partially correct and the other three evidently contained incorrect estimates of the situation. The Luftwaffe Führungsstab considered the Max reports of the greatest importance. Many Soviet Air Forces operations were predicted as much as a month in advance. Questions based on Max Reports were submitted to by the OKL to Wien (Vienna) and were answered in most cases in to to three days.

"The interrogation of Ira (Longin) is still in Progress (AOB: wasn't Ira Longin been released in late April 1947 or was it 1948?), though it must be stated that he is considered no nearer the breaking point than he was at the time when Mr. Johnson visited this Center." (February 1947)

Source: Wagner, Otto @ Dr. Delius Position: Chief of KO Bulgaria, 1941-Spring 1944; Chief of K.d.M. Hungary in Budapest.

The interrogation of Wagner was directed towards finding the answers to two questions of primary importance in the investigation of the wartime Klatt-0Ira-Turkul relationships and of the Klatt-Ira (Longin) intelligence networks:

a. What were the specific grounds for Wagner's oft-repeated charges that Klatt and, secondarily, Ira (Longin) were Soviet-controlled?

b. By what means did Ira receive the Max/Moritz with emphasis on the Max - reports?

Interrogation of other Abwehr officers had revealed (Obstlt. Otto) as the foremost accuser of Klatt, although the same officers left little doubt that Wagner had, to an undetermined degree, been impelled to these accusations by feeling of jealousy over the reportedly large quantities of valuable information regularly submitted to the Abwehr by the Klatt-Ira (Longin) combination. It had further been made explicit that Klatt's status as a non-Aryan and enjoying unparalleled freedom in the Abwehr had aroused Wagner's antagonism. Consequently, it was the anticipation of the interrogator that the mention of the name "Klatt" would provoke a tidal wave of emotional denunciation on Wagner's part. This proved not to be the case. (AOB: the hostilities ended about two years ago, and the prospect for Wagner by then, was quite bleak)

The approach used by the (US-G2?) interrogator was that of a historian attempting to complete the picture of Abwehr activity during the war: One of the largest blank spaces in this picture was labelled Luftmeldekopf Süd-Ost Klatt. Could Wagner supply the necessary colour pattern to complete this portion of the picture? Wagner obliged by launching into what was, at least at the surface, a cool description of Klatt and his Luftmeldekopf. He admitted shortcomings in his knowledge and made no attempt to steer the interrogator into accepting one or another version of Klatt's activities. There were, however, two instances in which he revealed that, try as he might, he could not speak with the objective attitude which is desired in the investigation of a case which has too often caused wild flights of the imagination and unwarranted conclusions. First, after having mentioned that Klatt had often been referred to as Major Klatt, WQagner protested bitterly that Klatt had never been an Abwehr officer but merely a civilian employee of the Abwehr. Secondly, in speaking of Klatt's favoured position in the Abwehr, Wagner made it quite clear that he had not relished the idea of a non-Aryan's enjoying almost complete freedom of movement and possessing an impenetrable immunity from official investigation.

It must be stressed that it was not Wagner himself but one his subordinates, Sonderführer (Sdf.) Kleinhampel who conducted the unofficial investigation of the Luftmeldekopf Klatt. What information Wagner has to offer derives from reports submitted by Kleinhampl, and consequently many details which appeared in those reports cannot be recalled by Wagner. Further, after his transfer to Budapest in May 1944 Wagner lost contact with the case and from that time on is unavailing in answering the multitude of questions surrounding the activities of Klatt and Ira (Longin).

It can not be stated that Wagner made no attempt during the interrogation to discredit Klatt as an Abwehr man and to cast aspersions on Klatt's moral character, but it is believed that the information which appears below is, in general, reliable. Where the interrogator has some doubts as to the reliability or where Wagner admitted that he was not certain of the facts, a notation to this effect will be made.

Klatt first came to the attention of Wagner when he, Klatt, appeared in Sofia in the fall of 1940 seeking a certain Dr. Andreas and at the same time making inquiries about Abwehr officers. (Wagner is unable to identify Andreas, nor is Klatt able to recall that he was in search of a person with this name.) Klatt disappeared in October (1940) (it is unknown that he returned to - Wien to report to I Luft (von Wahl) and again came to Wagner's notice in Sofia early in 1941. This time he was accompanied by Heller an agent of III-F Wien, and engaded in what seemed to be intelligence activity. Wagner initiated inquiries in Wien about a possible relationship between Klatt and the Abwehr and was informed by Von Wahl-Welskirch, Chief of I-Luft, in the Spring of 1941 that Klatt had, with the aid of of a White Russian organisation, established a W/T line between the USSR and Sofia. Although this satisfied a W/T line between USSR and Sofia. Although this satisfied Wagner that Klatt was under the control of Abwehr officers, he was more than a little perturbed by the fact that Klatt's Luftmeldekopf in Sofia was developing into a social crossroads for what Wagner terms "masses of people, especially travelling entertainers". Disturbing as this was to Wagner from a security standpoint, he was further irritated by the types of persons with whom Klatt surrounded himself - "black-marketeers and gangsters".

Wagner was aware before the outbreak of the Russo-German War on 22 June 1941 that a few, if any, W/T messages were being received immediately after the conflict had begun, a veritable flow of reports was passed to Wien by Klatt. Wagner questioned Von Wahl-Welskirch about this apparently sudden success and received an explanation which may be labelled discredit on the Abwehr. Canaris reply was to cite an order from the Version No. 1 of the sources and channels of the Max reports: The White Russian organisation serving the Abwehr through the medium of KLatt had established W/T stations in the USSR before the war, and in the late spring of 1941 Klatt had succeeded in placing a W/T receiving station with the Bulgarian State Police in Sofia. The explanation as to why a Bulgarian station had been chosen hinged on the close affinity of the Bulgarian and Russian languages and on the traditional understanding between the Bulgarian and the Russians, an explaining which left Wagner somewhat in a state of confusion. Yet, since he had no official connection with Luftmeldekopf Klatt, Wagner did not press the matter with Von Wahl-Welskirch. His only course of action was to a register a complaint with Admiral Canaris (between 1935 and his relive on 12 February 1944 was heading the entire OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr) to the effect that Klatt's methods of dealing with international intelligence swindlers and of trafficking with black-marketers was casting discredit on the Abwehr. Canaris' reply was to cite an order from the Luftwaffe Führungsstab forbidding any investigation of the Luftmeldekopf or any interference with its work.

Approximately in August 1941, Klatt approached Wagner and offered to transfer his services from Ast Wien to KO Bulgaria. Asked for the cause of this offer, Klatt asserted that Ast Wien did not understand the needs which attended continued Luftmeldekopf operations. Wager states that he showed Klatt the door (die Tür verwiesen). (Interrogator's note : Long previous to the interrogation of Wagner (the latter actually was a French P.o.W.), Klatt had explicitly stated that Wagner made the attempt in 1942 to assume control of the Luftmeldekopf (AOB: a KO also incorporated/handled I: Heer, Luft and Marine Referate) Of the two versions, the interrogator is inclined to believe that given by Klatt. It was, after all, Marogna-Redwitz of Ast Wien who had enjoyed success in keeping Klatt would have made any attempt to rid himself of an employer who had affording him political protection.)

In the beginning of 1942, Wagner commissioned Sonderführer (Sdf.) Kleinhampl with the task of conducting an unofficial investigation of the Luftmeldekopf Klatt. Within a short time, Kleinhampl reported that he was unable to locate a W/T receiving station in Bulgaria which was servicing the Luftmeldekopf. Thereupon, the question arose Wagner's mind as to the means by which the allegedly invaluable reports were reaching Sofia. Questioning Klatt directly on this matter, Wagner received Version No. 2 : From a number of W/T stations within the borders of the USSR, messages were transmitted to a receiving station in Samsun, Turkey. Thence the messages were telephoned to Istambul (Istanbul) , where they were handed to couriers riding the international railway to the Bulgarian (railway border town Svilengrad) The messages were there delivered to hand carriers who brought them to Ira (Longin) in Sofia.

Kleinhampel's investigation of version No. 2 revealed two flaws: To establish telephone communication was so unreliable that a constant flow of reports such as was reaching Sofia would have been impossible. Secondly, inasmuch as a railroad bridge in Greece had been washed out, it was impossible for the international railway to reach the Bulgarian border. Having thus become cognisant of the fact that two false versions of the Luftmeldekopf's connections with the USSR had been offered, Wagner was convinced that the entire network was controlled by the enemy. →

(AOB: this may be to some extent valid, but whom was the enemy? The British concluded that it most likely was the NKWD (NKVD). This latter service had an longer ranging target in mind; supplying information to the Germans which were mainly true and being supplied in advance, thus in the predicting/forecasting, character, but sometimes being essentially false. However, in contrast to British 'Chicken-food' the Russians supplied highly valuable information. That the NKWD (NKVD) supplied delicate (strategic forecasting) information had a deliberate advantage, that say one false out of 10 valid information could gain optimal results as the Germans trusted, with very valid reason, the Klatt information channel. When a message was deliberately false, there hardly was a German military preparation to be expected)

→ He entertained two possible interpretations: The first and more obvious was that the sources of the Klatt-supplied information and Klatt himself were consciously in the employ of the Soviets. The second, less obvious, was that Klatt and his Luftmeldekopf were British-run and that the British Intelligence Service, supplying information which alternately caused severe losses to the German and Russian forces, were playing one side against the other in the hope that mutual destruction would result. He has since discarded the second theory in favour of the first.

Again Canaris was approached by Wagner (Canaris was the commanding Officer in charge, of the entire Abwehr) on the subject of an official investigation of the Luftmeldekopf Klatt. Canaris rejected the proposal with the statement that both the Luftwaffe Führungsstab and the Wehrmacht Führungsstab had vetoed such an investigation. At this point in the interrogation, the question arose as to why Klatt was so immune to investigation. Wagner expressed his opinion to the interrogator that in both the Luftwaffe Führungsstab and the Wehrmacht Führungsstab there were a number of officers who were "Russian orientated. In this connection, he mentioned the cases of Schulze-Boysen (Rote Kapelle) DE https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rote_Kapelle and EN https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Orchestra_(espionage) (please copy the latter hyperlink and implement it into your browser; because Microsoft is sabotaging this operation.)

You may be interested in the following, our latest information regarding the two persons named above.

Kauder and Kalman were transferred in custody of a C.I.C. guard by military train from Frankfurt to Salzburg on 10 March 1947.

They were turned over to C.I.C. Salzburg and are presentlt living at the Old Fox Hotel, Salzburg.

In view of the new general order, C.I.C. Austria can no longer intern Kkauder on security grounds, we are told. Further, we have learned that Camp Marcus Orr will be turned over to the Austrian authorities within about another month.

Our people in Austria, because of the above, and because they believe internment or imprisonment under conditions existing now would result in the spread of the knowledge of Kauder; his activities and connections, have decided not to attempt to hold him. Too, it is felt by them that punitive action might further embitter Kauder.

A. Neither Kauder nor Kalman be allowed to reside (for the time being) in Salzburg. C.I.C. will find a residence in the country, probably in Mittersill.

B. C.I.C. has severely warned Kauder not to undertake any intelligence activities and not to reactivate intelligence contacts.

C. A telephone and mail censorship will be maintained as completely as possible.

Ernst Kleyenstüber and Wilhelm Leissner (before Kleyenstüber became K.d.M. Spain leader this function was in the hands of Wilhelm Leissner)

I. Kleyenstüber's Information Regarding the Turkul Flight (June 1943, about bringing the Turkul family from Rome to Wien)

2. Prisoner then suggested that they should use the aircraft (He 111) in which he had come to Sofia, fly to Rome to contact Turkul, and if possible, fetch him out. Klatt agreed to the suggestion and Prisoner, Klatt and Lt. Dr. Thiemann of I Luft Ost, flew down the following day. The aircraft was a Heinkel 111 with full crew. On arrival in Rome, Klatt and Thiemann went to locate Turkul, whilst Prisoner got in touch by teleprint (Fernschreiber) (= FS) with Obstlt. i.G. Georg Hansen in Berlin, to whom he gave details of the reasons for his being there. He also asked for confirmation that no difficulties would be placed in Turkul's way by the S.D. on re-entering German-occupied territory. This was necessary, because Turkul was believed to have been exppelled from Germany at the instance of the SD. Prisoner is not sure of the reason for his expulsion other than it had some connection with Vlassov (Wlassow). (AOB: the latter fact is purely nonsense, as General Wlassow (Vlassov) had been made P.o.W. in Spring 1942; whereas Turkul was forced to leave Germany about 1939. We should therefore consider that Turkul had been forced to leave German territory due to the then just settled Molotov - Ribbentrop agreement of 24 August 1939!) Prisoner did not get an absolutely satisfactory reply, and therefore flew back with Klatt and Thiemann (who had contacted Turkul and ascertained that he was willing to return to Budapest. (AOB: Which not directly matured, as Ast Wien Leiter Obst. Marogna-Redwitz wanted first to meet Turkul; though after some weeks, as was promised, Turkul travelled to Budapest)

3. In Budapest? (more likely firstly in Wien), Prisoner discussed the matter with Obstlt. von Wahl-Welskirch, and had a telephone conversations? with Obst. Graf Marogna-Redwitz, which resulted in permission being given to Turkul to return (later) to Budapest. At this point, Prisoner (Obstlt. Kleyenstüber) had an attack of tonsillitis; Lt. Thiemann was then sent down to Rome in Prisoner's aircraft (to Kleyenstüber's disposal), and returned with Turkul, Turkul's wife and possibly his daughter. Prisoner himself never met Turkul personally; he did not see him on the return from Rome as Turkul was taken directly to Graf Marogna-Redwitz (Ast Wien), who at first accommodated him in Vienna (Wien) and later in Budapest.

4. Prisoner states that he has heard of an individual named Romanov, who was somehow connected with Turkul, but states that he was not in the aircraft when Prisoner flew there the first time, and he is not aware that he was in it when Turkul was brought back (to German held territory).

Prisoner states that "General Turkul" was a Russian émigré and held an important position in the Max organisation (actually not Turkul but it was Ira Longin). Prisoner was told by Major Bechtle of OKW I-Luft that Turkul controlled a political organisation in the Soviet Union. Prisoner believed that members of this organisation were high-ranking officers on the Ukrainian General Staff. Klatt exploited Turkul's organisation for his int purposes, in return for which Turkul is believed to have received funds for the support of émigré circles. Turkul is believed not to have known details of Klatt's other organisations. He had lived in Rome since 1943? (AOB: most unlikely, think of 1940 or 1941)